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Abstract 
In this thesis I critique the modern tendency to construct the legal subject upon a sharp 
distinction between Reason and body and to ground the normative force of law on an 
ideal conception of Reason.  The legal subject is thereby presented as a disembodied 
cogitans to the neglect of his corporeality.  This disregards both the necessarily 
material aspect of the legal subject and the necessarily embodied aspect of legal 
action, and results in an inadequate account of how legal normativity is manifested in 
material reality.  This thesis aims to construct a theory of material legal normativity by 
re-incorporating the body of the subject into legal action and presenting that as the 
proper locus of law’s normative force.  Although I focus on the material body in favour 
of Reason or rationality as the locus of action, I do not dismiss the possibility of 
meaningful normative action which is free from determination by material forces.  I aim 
to construct a theory of action which is both material and normative by navigating the 
opposition between ideal Reason and material determinism.  I do this by proposing an 
alternative conception of normative action which draws together the mechanism of 
habit and the manner of interaction with the material world.  This theory of normative 
action will then form the basis for an account of normative legal action which gives due 
weight to the embodied nature of the legal subject as the proper locus for the material 
manifestation of the normative force of law.  
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Introduction
Law is a ubiquitous presence in modern liberal societies; it towers in the grand 
buildings of government and courts of justice, omnipotent institutions of power whose 
agents of authority roam the civilian space as a constant visible reminder of law’s 
might.  But law’s other, less visible face is more insidiously inserted into every crevice 
of society; in the humdrum motions of buying living necessities, going through reams 
of bills and registration forms, designating drivers for social nights-out.  Law is an 
ineluctable aspect of modern living, so influences the very foundations of action for its 
legal subjects, however its own foundations of power and validity are arguably less 
accessible than its surface phenomena.  The normativity of law  has been a source of 1
philosophical inquiry for likely as long as the phenomena has existed; copious theories 
of law have been produced, ranging from law as divine inspiration,  to law as 2
oppressive ideology,  and all the while law continued to be uneventfully and 3
relentlessly legislated, enforced, and obeyed. 
My project as I wade into this debate is centred around my dissatisfaction with one 
dominant theme in jurisprudence; the tendency to ground law's normativity in some 
immaterial notion of Reason or cogito, and to dismiss the corporeal shell they are 
encased within.  The subject of legal normativity is posited as a being whose faculty for 
Reason and rationality enables the norms of law to find purchase, and through the 
mind to dictate the movements of the body.  This categorical attachment of legal 
normativity to the cogito aspect of the mind/body dualism is reiterated in varying forms 
throughout modern jurisprudence: law is a rational or moral reason for action; a 
coordination of joint social planning; a standard of impartial justice.  The normative 
justifications for law are equally so: law is a necessary moral or natural state for human 
flourishing; a form of ideal public discourse; a narrative towards achieving nomos; a 
product of autonomous consensus.  These prominent theories all appear to premise a 
 I use the term normativity to refer to that aspect of ‘ought’ which distinguishes prescriptive norms from 1
descriptions of fact.  Although I do not subscribe to the Is/Ought dualism, I do believe there is a judgement 
or attitude attached to norms which is often expressed in value terms, such as ‘should’, or ‘right’.  
 Theological law, i.e. Thomas Aquinas; R.J. Henle, Saint Thomas Aquinas, the Treatise on Law : [being 2
Summa Theologiae, I-II; QQ. 90 through 97]. Notre Dame Studies in Law and Contemporary Issues ; v. 4. 
Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993.
 Various strains of Marxism, i.e. Antonio Gramsci; Joseph Femia, Gramsci's Political Thought : 3
Hegemony, Consciousness, and the Revolutionary Process. Oxford ; New York: Clarendon Press ; OUP, 
1981.
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legal society consisting of rational and autonomous agents whose actions are dictated 
by the combined forces of legal norms and rational will.  The law is fundamentally a 
rational system of rules, their validity is assured by the subject’s receptiveness to 
rational reasons and arguments, and their efficacy is enforced by the subject’s 
capacity for free  autonomous action.  Throughout this discourse the body is sidelined 
as a vessel for the mind, a contumely object for regulation whose sensible impulses 
necessitate that law is reinforced through coercion.  Legal normativity is imposed upon 
the body; it is not derived from or conditioned by the body.
I feel an intuitive rebellion against an approach which effaces the irrevocable and, I 
would argue, primary mode of human existence, that of embodied action and being in 
the world.  The body that enables sensory experience, motility, consciousness, is the 
conduit through which the material world is made accessible.  Surely such a 
mechanism must condition to some extent the phenomena produced through its own 
motions.  For me it is highly doubtful that law as foremost a social construct can 
establish its normative foundations independent of material reality, or that legal action 
can be determined beyond the influence of its embodiment in the corporeal legal 
subject.  Hence my primary aim in this thesis is to redress this perceived lack of 
materiality and embodiment in normative legal theory, by constructing legal normativity 
from the body of the legal subject as an active being in the world.  This also implicates 
the necessity of advancing an account of action which departs from traditional models 
of physical movement determined by rational deliberation.
Although large parts of my thesis will be concerned with the philosophical structure of 
normative action, it is not my intention to analyse the concept of action, its internal 
mechanisms or its conditions of possibility.  Instead I take a largely descriptive 
approach to notions such as voluntary, cognitive action, and activity, without positing 
any particular theoretical basis for their possibility.  The materiality I am concerned with 
is not limited to the body of the legal subject, but includes the wider material conditions 
of his existence, such as social and economic institutions.  Neither is it my intention to 
analyse law as a concept with essential components or features that mutually interlock 
into a neat system which contains the conditions of its normativity.  I take law as an 
open-textured social construct without conceptually necessary features; a haphazard 
construction which exhibits contingent commonality across empirical examples as a 
result of commonalities in action as opposed to common principles.  My project 
consists in combining action and law into material legal action, which necessarily 
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implicates a certain theoretical approach to action.  For this I draw upon a combination 
of phenomenology  and pragmatist  philosophical traditions, the former for its 4 5
dialectical synthesis of body and mind, the latter for its emphasis on external reality as 
the vector for practical action.  The aim is to present legal normativity as material 
action which is conditioned by law presented as structures of material reality; hence it 
is neither entirely a theory of legal action, nor a theory of law as concept, but an inquiry 
into the constitutions and conditions of how legal normativity is borne into materiality 
through action.
Pursuing my critique of grounding legal normativity in Reason, I examine the theories 
of Thomas Hobbes and Immanuel Kant as prominent representatives of a 
philosophical tradition which exerts significant influence on modern jurisprudence.  I 
outline their arguments for law as a necessary part of a political common-wealth, built 
upon an absolute sovereign authority, all justified through ideal Reason, and offer my 
contentions for what I perceive to be problematic or insupportable.  I then examine the 
theory of Karl Marx and his materialist approach as a philosophical foil, again 
focussing on his arguments of the politico-economic conditions of law, informed by his 
conceptions of human nature and consciousness.   Although a materialist approach is 6
preferable to idealism, Marxian theory exhibits a tendency towards economic 
determinism which I do not find compatible with normativity.  In conjunction to Marx’s 
antipathy towards law as ideology, I conclude his is not a potential model for legal 
normativity.  (Chapter 1).  Pursuant to adopting a materialist approach, I examine the 
theory of Michel Foucault, and his conceptions of discipline and subjectivity.  At first 
glance his theory offers a promising account of material reproduction of norms which 
takes the subject’s body as the primary site of training, however I find his theory of 
discipline to be excessively deterministic, and his notion of power too mercurial.  Also 
given his dismissal of law as obsolete, his theory cannot be incorporated wholesale 
into my thesis.  (Chapter 2).
 Primarily Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Colin Smith, Phenomenology of Perception. Routledge Classics. 4
London: Routledge, 2002.
 Primarily John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct : An Introduction to Social Psychology. New York: 5
Holt, 1922.
 Hobbes, Kant, and Marx advance their theories of law as part of their broader theories of society.  For 6
Hobbes and Kant this is political common-wealth, for Marx the political economy of production.  I focus on 
these political philosophies because my inquiry relates to the social conditions for legal normativity, which 
I posit to be outside of law as concept or discipline.  In other words legal normativity is not grounded in 
legal norms or practices, which are themselves products of other non-legal functions.
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Having established the theoretical landscape and finding an impasse between 
idealism and determinism, I change perspective to inquire what I find counterintuitive 
in law and legal discourse.  I explicate this counterintuitiveness of law through a few 
illustrative examples, and argue that it is a symptom of attempts to subsume the 
embodied experience of law under discourse, and could be remedied by a material 
discourse of legal action.  (Chapter 3).
Constructing my theory, I begin from the intuition that what characterises human action 
is connection and interaction with the material objects that immediately surround us, 
undertaken through our corporeal being.  From there I offer an analysis of how 
material reality may be understood as a constitution of such objects and actions, and 
detail how collective action and social entities such as law may be constituted in 
similar fashion without resorting to immaterial notions of collectivity.  (Chapter 4).  I 
then build upon this material skeleton framework by introducing habit as an embodied 
mechanism of action.  Habit is examined primarily in its effects of conducing repetitions 
of action and structuring knowledge, which contributes to maintaining inertia in the 
status quo.  (Chapter 5).  I combine this account of embodied action with norms in a 
manner which overcomes the often antithetical relationship between norms and habit. 
I advance my conception of embodied normative action as the culmination of my 
thesis.  (Chapter 6).  Finally I apply this model to legal norms and legal action, and 
argue that legal normativity is constituted by habitual actions which contingently 
embody the norms of law and manifest them into materiality.  I revisit the 
counterintuitive features and illustrate how they may be better understood through my 
account of embodied legal normativity.  (Chapter 7).
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1 
Role of Reason
In this opening chapter I will set out what I perceive to be a central problem in common 
amongst many contemporary legal theories, namely an over-reliance on ideal Reason 
and the concomitant construction of the legal subject as rational, autonomous, and 
disembodied.  I will argue that Reason-based accounts of normativity are unduly 
dependent upon a transcendental and immutable conception of Reason and its 
abstract principles as the foundations for normativity, so cannot adequately account for 
the embodied nature of the legal subject.  By placing the embodied legal subject at the 
source of normativity a fuller and richer account of legal normativity may be achieved.
Normative theories of law , although widely diverse in each particular account of legal 1
normativity, share an important similarity in their conceptions of the legal individual. 
Specifically they emphasise the individual's capacity for Reason, in the sense of 
enabling reflection on reasons as determinants of action, as the source of normativity. 
Reason is elevated to a plane of existence which is ostensibly free from determination 
by empirical experience, by any particularity of the subject or his historical or social 
context.  Reason becomes in effect an eternal and immutable aspect of the subject 
which contains the very possibility of normative and rational action.  Neglected in this 
conception of Reason is the embodied nature of the subject as physical being in the 
world, susceptible to sensation and bodily needs.  The body and mind are bifurcated 
and entrusted with completely separate, often opposing realms of responsibility.  The 
interactions between body and mind, expressed through action, are chaperoned by the 
omnipotent image of Reason.  Emphasising the individual as locus of Reason results 
in a dichotomised and contrasting depiction of the rational and the real, separating 
legal normativity from its material existence. 
 Normative theories are here distinguished roughly from Positive theories of law by their emphasis on 1
different aspects and questions regarding the subject Law.  Normative theories are engaged primarily with 
the conditions of law's existence and the source of its legitimacy, implicating questions of how authority is 
justified and why obedience is necessary.  Positive theories in contrast are taken to engage more in 
articulating the criteria for ascertaining legal validity, given the presupposed posited existence of law.  This 
is a rough distinction used only for the purpose of theoretical convenience.
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In examining the fuller implications of such Reason-based theories of normativity the 
works of two eminent philosophers, Hobbes and Kant, will be taken as representative 
examples.  Both theorists are preeminent in Enlightenment thinking which continues to 
exercise significant influence on modern secular philosophies.  Kant’s theory of law 
and civil society is based upon his conception of practical reason as the medium 
through which ideal Reason may determine action by ordering the Will according to its 
imperatives.   This formation of law as imperatives to action is a strong motif in 2
contemporary legal theories which propound variants of the law as practical reason 
tenet, proponents of which I would argue include Raz , McCormick , and to some 3 4
extent Hart .  This lineage shares the notion that normative legal action must be 5
determined to some extent by legal norms, the force of which is grounded in practical 
reason, so predicates a bifurcation between the nature of reason and the body, and 
rejects a material account of agency.   Kantian philosophy also lends itself to natural 6
law theories which seek to establish morality as a condition for law and obligation; 
Simmonds , Rawls , and Finnis  are examples of such theorists.  I argue that these 7 8 9
theories all exhibit that tendency to ground normativity in a disembodied Reason which 
enables the immaterial world of norms and morals to dictate the actions of the material 
body.
Hobbes’ theory of the Leviathan state predicates a relatively more empirical basis for 
law’s conditions of existence, based on an account of social covenant induced by 
material interests.  Nevertheless the principles upon which the Leviathan state is 
 Kantian accounts of moral normativity generally share an emphasis on an autonomous will which is 2
determined fully by moral imperatives without extraneous instrumental objectives.  Although Kant himself 
seemingly denies this requirement in his account of legal normativity, or the Doctrine of Right, 
nevertheless Kantian influenced legal theories generally argue law exerts some force upon action other 
than coercion.  See George Pavlakos,  ‘The relation between moral and legal obligation: An alternative 
Kantian reading.’ in G. Pavlakos & V. Rodriguez-Blanco (Eds.),  Reasons and Intentions in Law and 
Practical Agency. Cambridge: CUP 2015.  
 Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law : Essays on Law and Morality. Oxford: Clarendon, 1979; law a pre-3
emptive reasons for action.
 Neil MacCormick, Practical Reason in Law and Morality. Law, State, and Practical Reason. Oxford ; New 4
York: OUP, 2008.
 H.L.A. Hart The Concept of Law. 2nd Ed., 1st Pbk. ed. Oxford : New York: Clarendon Press ; OUP, 1997; 5
the internal point of view of rules.
 The extent to which law acts as a determining reason varies according to particular theory, but law must 6
be present in some manner, so excludes actions which are pursued for purely instrumental purposes. 
Similarly the account of reason may be more or less ideal in character, but must retain some 
independence from determination by empirical factors in order preserve autonomous agency.
 N. E. Simmonds, Law as a Moral Idea. Oxford ; New York: OUP, 2007.7
 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Oxford, OUP, 1976; specifically the idea that justice is universalised 8
rights. 
 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights. 2nd ed. Clarendon Law Series. Oxford ; New York: OUP, 9
2011; law as a coordinating system of external freedoms based on the moral legitimacy of authority.
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established and its authority maintained are explicated through a conception of reason 
which shares many similarities with Kant’s.  Hobbes’ formulation of law as command 
and coercion finds resonance in the Positivist tradition of Bentham and Austin, which 
accepts law as primarily a system of force rather than norms.   More nuanced 10
theories centre around the social covenant as a product of rational agreement, and 
seek to characterise law as a form of social action whose legitimacy arises from 
voluntary agreement.   I would cite Shapiro , Habermas , and Marmor  as a few 11 12 13 14
theorists who adopt a law as social action approach.  Despite their empirical 
beginnings, the normative grounds of law become detached from material action and 
attached to some account of rational agency, thereby resulting in another form of the 
mind/body dualism. 
By critiquing the normative theories of Hobbes and Kant, those Hobbesian and 
Kantian elements which contemporary legal theories draw upon for their accounts of 
legal normativity will also be put into question.  It will be argued that the arguments 
presented by Hobbes and Kant for a concept of transcendental and eternal Reason 
capable of validating a set of eternal and immutable norms are incomplete.  Moreover 
the dependence of these theories upon abstract principles neglects the real locus of 
legal normativity which is the acting legal subject, and in doing so presents an 
impoverished account of normativity.
The critique against Hobbes and Kant will be pursued through the theory of Marx as a 
preeminent representative in modern thinking.   Marx's theory is pertinent to this 
critique in its direct rejection of the transcendental tradition of Hobbes and Kant in 
favour of a materially dialectical approach.  Marx thinks of the nature of the subject 
and the concept of reason in ways diametrically opposed to Hobbes’ and Kant’s 
thought.  The materiality of the subject is of central importance here, and the locus of 
 Jeremy Bentham, Burns, and Hart, A Comment on the Commentaries: And A Fragment on Government. 10
Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham. Principles of Legislation. London: Athlone Press, 1977.  John 
Austin,  The Province of Jurisprudence Determined. Great Minds Series. Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus 
Books, 2000.  This was later problematised by Hart who questioned force as a legitimate source of 
obligation, after which legal theory in general moved away from coercion based accounts of law.
 A fundamental difference to Kantian theory which posits legal obligation as a universal moral duty. 11
Social covenants only apply ostensibly to those who have given their voluntary agreement in some 
fashion, and cease to be valid if their conditions of agreement are breached, much like contract.
 Scott Shapiro, Legality. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 2011; law as social planning.12
 J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms : Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. 13
1st MIT Press Pbk. ed. Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
1998.; ideal public discourse as a means of establishing democratic institutions and legal norms.
 Andrei Marmor, 'Legal Conventionalism.' in Hart’s Postscript, OUP, 2001, chapter 6; social convention 14
substantiating Hart’s rule of recognition used to identify legal norms.
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study is situated in the subject’s embodied activity.  Marx's theory of alienation poses a 
serious challenge to that transcendental and immutable concept of Reason 
propounded by Hobbes and Kant, by emphasising the necessarily material conditions 
which determine human existence and reduce human reason to situated embodied 
consciousness.  However Marx's emphasis upon social and material conditioning of 
consciousness poses potential problems for the possibility of normative action, as the 
rejection of self-determination through reflection and the potential denial of 
autonomous action renders legal normativity meaningless.   
1.1 Hobbes: Practical rationality
Hobbes' infamous conception of man is that of a creature obsessed with selfish 
desires for dominance and glory, whose inclinations drive him to always seek 
advantage, that his natural state is war and his life 'nasty, brutish and short'.   Yet the 15
Hobbesian man is saved from eternal perfidy by a single faculty of his mind which is 
Reason, the source of knowledge of the Laws of Nature, and the possibility of peace.
Hobbes begins from a naturalistic concept of man; drawing upon empirical evidence 
he asserts that humans are born with the faculties of Sense and Imagination, the 
former to access the physical world and the latter to remember and reconstruct it.   It 16
is the natural disposition of curiosity, to seek the cause and effect of events, which 
differentiates humans from animals. Specifically, the ability to envision future 
consequences based on past experience begets Prudence.  According to Hobbes, 
Prudence is what guides men in their actions, and develops into man's 'natural wit' 
which is characterised by quickness of judgement, discernment, and discretion, so that 
based on differing experience man may achieve differing levels of wit.   In contrast 17
Hobbes' conception of Reason extends from the exactitude of beginning from true 
definitions and reasoning to true conclusions and knowledge; Reason is more akin to 
philosophic method, and serves the important purpose of discovering the Laws of 
Nature.  18
 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan : Or, The Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiasticall and 15
Civill: London: Printed for Andrew Crooke, 1651: Reprinted Cambridge, 1904.
 Ibid. Part I chapters I &II16
 Ibid. chapter VIII17
 Ibid. chapter V18
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In conjunction with these faculties of the mind are the bodily appetites and aversions, 
which the subject comes to associate with love and hate, good and evil; these are 
separated into in-born appetites for food, drink, and such, and those appetites 
acquired by experience.    It is these appetites which incentivise man to voluntary 19
action, for in deliberation  amongst competing appetites the subject finds a Will in the 20
last enduring appetite, a will which stimulates him to voluntary action in the means to 
satiate his desire.   Thus Hobbes' conception of man is of a being capable of 21
accumulating experience and acting upon simulated consequences to his own benefit. 
It would appear that in a state of isolation the man has no need for Reason  for his 22
appetites and the will to achieve them serve him adequately well.  In normal life the 
common man has little use of Reason, instead it is sufficient for him to rely upon 
Prudence to serve his own purposes; so Prudence is adequate for the individual man 
whereas Reason is necessary to achieve the benefit of mankind which is the proper 
end of Reason.  23
The faculty of Reason is the medium through which Hobbes derives his Laws of 
Nature, essentially a set of laws which are necessary to fulfil the fundamental aim of 
self-preservation within a community.  Because humans are endowed with practically 
equal strengths of body and mind, and are by nature driven by 'competition, diffidence, 
and glory' , the resulting natural state, wherein each man has the objective of self-24
advancement and the natural right to appropriate anything, is a state of war.  However, 
to fully realise the fundamental objective of self-preservation each man must be secure 
against the violence of others, a feat which no man can achieve independently owing 
to his vulnerability.   Therefore to realise peace with another the subject must 25
covenant away his right to interfere with the other's enjoyment, thereby creating duty 
 Ibid. chapter VI19
 ‘…the whole sum of desires, aversions, hopes and fears, continued till the thing be either done, or 20
thought impossible, is that we call deliberation.’, ibid.
 Ibid. 21
 Reason here defined as acquired wit which is attained only by industry, proper method, and instruction, 22
as opposed to natural wit which is begotten by experience.  
 Leviathan pg.25-27.  For a fuller discussion on the difference between the definition of Reason 23
formulated in Leviathan chapter 5 and those in later chapters see John Deigh, 'Reason and Ethics in 
Hobbes's 'Leviathan', Journal of the History of Philosophy, 34(1) : 47-60.
 Leviathan pg.8324
 Hobbes' state of nature has often been characterised as a Prisoner's Dilemma situation, and the 25
choices of the agents postulated in accordance with economic rationality.  Such readings of Hobbes 
include Rawls n.8 pg.269; Brian Barry, Political Argument, London, RKP, 1965, pg.253.  Cf. Andrew 
Alexander, 'Should Hobbes's State of Nature Be Represented as a Prisoner's Dilemma?', Southern 
Journal of Philosophy, 30(2):1-16 who asserts that Hobbes' state of nature is more representative of an 
Assurance Game.
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and obligation; to achieve peace in accordance with the Laws of Nature all men must 
covenant for the same.  Hobbes has effectively combined the nature of man as a 
selfish yet rational being with the primary drive to self-preservation to derive the Rule 
of Reason, to 'do not that to another, which thou thinkest unreasonable to be done by 
another to thy selfe' , and presented this as a necessary outcome when accounting 26
for the ability of each man to do violence to others, or alternatively to seek peace 
under equal terms.  Following from this Rule of Reason are expounded the several 
Laws of Nature, which are necessarily applicable to all man living in peaceful civil 
society.  Hobbes deemed these laws 'eternal and immutable', but nevertheless easily 
observed for they would appear reasonable to any man who wished his own wellbeing.
Thus for Hobbes Reason serves an important function in dictating proper action, not 
only for the immediate satisfaction of appetite, but also for the attainment of the 
overriding interest of self-preservation through establishing a stable civil society.   The 27
Laws of Nature derived under the auspices of Reason dictate that certain natural 
human dispositions towards unconditional self-advancement must be curbed in order 
for a civil society to function.  This conflict between the short-sighted motivations of 
each man and his greater interests is reconciled through the common faculty of 
Reason, which enables each man to perceive the benefits of peace when compared to 
the unpalatable alternative of war.  The Hobbesian man is rational to the degree 
necessary to maximise his chances of prolonged survival, and as such may be 
persuaded into advocating a minimal set of social norms under the auspices of his 
Reason.   28
 Leviathan pg.19426
 This dual use of Reason is a result of Hobbes' different definitions of Reason as instrumental rationality 27
and scientific method.  Hobbes does not make this differentiation explicitly, although it may be discerned 
in the different roles Reason plays in various parts of Leviathan, see n.23.
 The nineteen posited Laws of Nature include the keeping of promises, gratitude, compleasance, facility 28
to pardon, amongst other dictates.  In Leviathan chapter 14 Hobbes will come to call these the rules of 
morality which need no positive enactment but nevertheless must be observed for the proper functioning 
of civil society.  In accordance with Hobbes' conception of Reason as method, the ostensible necessity of 
these laws are very much derived from imagining counterfactual situations and consequences which 
serve to destabilise society and lapse mankind into warfare.  It will be seen that despite his more 
metaphysical approach, Kant advocates a similar pattern of reasoning in expounding his rule of universal 
law.
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1.2 Kant: Transcendental Reason
In contrast to the monistic underpinnings of Hobbes' theory, Kant presents a dualistic 
conception of man; of the Will which is forever assailed by the irrational demands of 
Desire.   Kant explicitly severs the subject's physical being from the metaphysical 29
realms of Reason and morality, and ascribes to the Kantian man a dualistic mode of 
living in which Desire determines unfree action, and must be overcome through his 
higher capacity of Reason for man to achieve his true end of freedom.  These separate 
faculties of sensible Desire and metaphysical Reason  are combined within the act of 30
choice, which for humans is affected, but not fully determined by sensible impulses.  31
The Kantian man has freedom insofar as his choice is not determined in the final 
instance by his sensible desires, so is potentially capable of achieving an autonomous 
Will by subjecting his choice fully to the dictates of Reason.32
Kant separates the essence of man, the Will, which is subject only to Reason, from the 
embodied presence of man in the world of Sense; hence man occupies two planes of 
being, that of Sense and Understanding, but the true essence of man lies in his Will 
which makes itself known through the effects it produces in its causal force upon 
action.   It is this faculty of Will which differentiates man from irrational things, and 33
acts as the source of all normative and moral action. The Will alone is capable of 
responding to Reason, which necessitates the Will by imperatives.   These 34
 That the relationship between Reason and Desire is one of conflict is a widely accepted interpretation. 29
See Roger Sullivant, 'The Influence of Kant's Anthropology on His Moral Theory', Review of Metaphysics, 
49(1): 77-94, pg.86; Daniel O'Connor, 'Kant's Conception of Happiness', Journal of Value Inquiry, 16(3) : 
189-205, pg.196.
 The metaphysical nature of Reason and the related concepts of Freedom and Autonomy have been 30
criticised as presuppositions which were posited but not proven by Kant in his circular argument; 
Immanuel Kant, Gregor, and Timmermann,  Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Rev. Ed. / 
Translation Revised by Timmermann. ed. Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy. Cambridge: CUP, 
2012 (hereafter Groundwork) Section III.  Cf. Warszawa P. Lukow, 'The Fact of Reason. Kant's Passage 
to Ordinary Moral Knowledge’, Kant-Studien, 84(2) : 204-221 for a defence that Kant does not rely on 
asserting these transcendental ideas.  Lukow asserts that the Fact of Reason is defensible through 
reflection and reflexive examination of its precepts and causality.
 Immanuel Kant, and Gregor, The Metaphysics of Morals. Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy. 31
New York: CUP, 1996. Introduction Section III 6.214-6221.  Free choice is that only determined by 
Reason, and its opposite of animal choice is that only determined by impulse.
 Groundwork section III 4.446-4.448. Kant calls the former 'negative freedom' meaning freedom from 32
sensible determination.  'Positive freedom' consists in the causality of pure practical reason in determining 
choice independently of any empirical conditions, and indicates both a 'pure will within us' and the 
transcendental existence of Freedom which is the basis for laws of morality. 
 Ibid. 33
 Imperatives of skill which denote the possible courses of action; hypothetical imperatives which indicate 34
the necessary means to achieve an end; categorical imperatives which command absolutely.  Ibid. 
4.414-418
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imperatives are expressed as 'oughts' and act upon all rational minds as objective 
reasons for action; as such they enable man to formulate means of action based upon 
his several ends.  However Reason alone does not command the actions of man, who 
unfortunately is prey to sensibility; the faculty of Desire which is determined by 
experience acts upon the subject by furnishing it with ends.   Although such desires 35
are purely subjective, like Hobbes' motivation for self-preservation, Kant also advances 
a common object of Happiness.   All humans will desire to be happy, their sensible 36
faculties will furnish them with subjective desires learned from experience and thus 
create ends for action, whilst their faculty of Reason necessitates the Will in attaining 
the means to achieve happiness.  The combination of these faculties of choice may be 
subject to capture by Desire or Reason in differing measure.
Unlike Hobbes' concept of will which is merely the last appetite in deliberation, it is 
significant that Kant's Will emanates from a separate metaphysical origin which is a 
priori to any empirical characteristics of the subject.  As the causal factor for voluntary 
action the Kantian Will can only be more or less free from the pressures of desire and 
inclination, and be correspondingly more or less autonomous; for Kant the counsels of 
skill and prudence are irrelevant to Reason.  This distinction from Hobbes arises from 
Kant's fundamental separation of the body and mind in achieving differing objectives; 
whereas for Hobbes the subject exists only as a body endowed with a rationality to 
preserve itself, for Kant the Will takes on a life of its own in pursuing autonomy from 
the demands of the body.  There is a direct opposition between Reason and Desire, 
complicated by their mutual necessity in motivating action.  The result is Kant's 
ultimate object of humanity, the absolutely good Will which can only be realised in 
internal freedom.
Despite this fundamental difference in the function of Reason, there is an important 
similarity between Hobbes' and Kant's concepts of Reason, which is its transcendence 
over the particularities of material existence.  For both theorists Reason is universally a 
priori to the subject in its embodied form; for Hobbes as a method of reasoning which 
is acquired, for Kant a necessary imperative over Will which answers only to its own 
maxims.  This similarity may be evidenced by Kant's own formulation of the universal 
maxim, which is to will that which may become a Universal Law; comparing this to 
 Ibid. 4.414-42135
 Ibid. 4.415-416; Metaphysics of Morals Introduction 6.21636
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Hobbes' Rule of Reason there is a striking parallel.   Both theorists utilise these rules 37
in similar fashion, in the construction and reasoning from counterfactuals to establish 
the necessity of other rules.  For example Kant uses the principle of non-contradiction 
to demonstrate how a maxim of promising without the intention to honour it can never 
become a Universal Law, for it will lead to a general disregard for promises and render 
them meaningless.   Due to the objective and universal character of Reason any 38
normative force or claims derived from it must also be immutably true for all rational 
beings. 
If for Kant the ultimate objective of Reason is to realise itself in the perfectly good Will, 
whence comes the impetus to enter into civil society?  Kant's answer is to be secure 
from the violence of others and place oneself under a rightful condition of living.  Kant 
asserts that although in a social state man may be naturally well disposed, there 
cannot be a conclusive right to anything for by nature every man has his own right to 
do as he sees fit, and commit violence upon others, which renders meaningless the 
very concept of Right.   The concept of Reason is normatively necessary in 39
formulating a complete system of rights under which the external freedoms of 
individuals may be preserved through the authoritative coordination of their external 
choices.  Thus despite the absence of the threat of mutual destruction which motivated 
the Hobbesian man, the Kantian man will nevertheless also enter into civil society 
under a Duty of Virtue derived from the dictates of Reason.  For Kant there is only one 
law of Right, which is to act in a manner not inconsistent with another's freedom.  This 
is supplemented by a set of natural rights derived from the innate right of freedom, and 
commanded by pure practical reason.40
For Kant it is imperative that both the doctrines of Right and the doctrines of Virtue 
have their source in the a priori concept of Reason.  It is this metaphysical origin that 
supports the absolute validity and purity of the laws of morality derived from Reason, 
 For Hobbes the rule is a necessary caveat owing to the selfish nature of man, for Kant the significance 37
lies in non-contradiction which is necessary to the a priori nature of Reason.
 Groundwork Introduction 4.11.  Hobbes makes a similar line of argument for his Laws of Nature; 38
Leviathan chapter XIV.
 Metaphysics of Morals Introduction 6.31139
 Kant's reasoning in deriving his private rights from a priori practical reasons parallels that of Hobbes' 40
reasoning in his Laws of Nature; both begin from the concept of human nature, in Kant's case the freedom 
of choice over external objects, the accumulation of means to better realise ends, and the motive to 
procreation.  Kant elsewhere states explicitly that the accumulation of practical comforts is conducive to 
the development of a moral disposition, for unfulfilled needs and desires apply greater pressure upon the 
Will to satisfy bodily desires, thus rendering the Will heteronomous.  Metaphysics of Morals, Introduction 
to the Doctrine of Virtue 6.380-390.
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making them objectively applicable to all rational beings.   Kant distinguishes between 41
the duties of Right as being constraints upon external actions themselves, and the 
duties of Virtue as constraints upon the maxims of actions.  External lawgiving is 
possible only for the former, and is the subject for his political philosophy.   In deriving 42
a complete system of rights from Reason, Kant attempts to establish the conditions 
under which the external freedom of all humans may be reconciled and coexist without 
conflict.   In contrast, in deriving a complete system of virtues Kant attempts to 43
establish the proper ends for humanity to pursue.  The Doctrine of Right dictates the 
norms for external action and leaves the choice of ends to the subject, whereas the 
Doctrine of Virtue goes beyond the mere form of action to prescribing certain ends 
which are duties for the subject, so dictates the norms for internal motivation.   The 44
concept of Reason is the common factor between Kant's moral and political 
philosophies, for Reason generates obligation, both towards oneself and towards 
others.  In light of the innate freedom of rational beings and their absolute moral worth, 
pure practical Reason is the only a priori concept which may validly dictate universal 
principles that afford equal respect to all subjects.45
 Groundwork 4.411-412.  The relationship between Reason and its laws is presented here as a 41
derivation or deduction.  Cf. Lukow n.30 who asserts that the relationship is one of reflection and reflexive 
examination.
 Metaphysics of Morals Section IV 6.218-6.221.  Duties for which only internal lawgiving is possible are 42
the subject for Kant's moral philosophy.
 The sum of such conditions is expressed in the Universal Principle of Right which is an obligation but in 43
itself furnishes no incentive to obey.  Metaphysics of Morals 6.280-231
 Ibid. 6.389-398.  For Kant only a Doctrine of Virtue, consisting of the rules of morality may present ends 44
as duties, and laws which themselves have normative force.  Consistent with his conception of the Will 
ruled by Reason, the objective end of humans as Will is to achieve absolute moral worth, resulting in a 
Kingdom of Ends wherein public law becomes redundant, for every individual Will shall conform perfectly 
with the dictates of practical reason and Virtue.  The faculty of moral endowments are what enables the 
subject to be put under obligation; coupled with the freedom to control action the human subject may 
increase his moral strength such that the law becomes the incentive to action rather than an external 
constraint.   Thus only in a perfect utopian society can the disjunction between internal and external 
freedom be reconciled, and civil law become true obligations as reasons for action, rather than imposed 
constraints upon external choice motivated by extraneous interests.
 The relationship between Kant's moral and political philosophies is subject to wide debate.  Theorists 45
who claim that each philosophy is independent of the other, such that moral autonomy bears no 
connection to conformity with external rights tend to emphasise the different conceptions of external and 
internal freedoms; George Fletcher, 'Law and Morality: A Kantian Perspective', Columbia Law Review 
87(3) :533-558.  Contrast theorists who see conformity with Right as a necessary aspect of achieving 
moral autonomy; Robert Pippin,"On the moral foundations of Kant’s Rechtslehre."  The Philosophy of 
Immanuel Kant (1985): 107-42.  The pertinent issue for the thesis at hand is not the specific relationship 
between Kant's moral and political philosophies as such, but rather the common factor of Reason in both. 
The two philosophies are taken to be differentiated by their ascribing different internal incentives to actions 
as opposed to external and internal freedom, thus preserving the image of Reason in both instances.  For 
a similar argument in relation to Autonomy see David S. Stern, 'Autonomy and Political Obligation in Kant', 
Southern Journal of Philosophy, 29(1) :127-147. 
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Thus for Kant the concept of Reason serves as a metaphysical medium which both 
dictates the objective and moral forms of action, and through the Will legislates the 
body to act in accordance with universally objective principles as opposed to 
subjective desires.  In common with Hobbes, Reason is charged with the exalted task 
of enabling the human being to discern and achieve his ultimate end, which is also his 
ultimate happiness and state of being.  Kant more explicitly eschews the role of 
empirical experience, and by extension the embodied aspect of the subject, as having 
no influence upon autonomous acts of morality.  Indeed Kant views all empirical 
examples as poor approximations to norms determined a priori.  The Kantian man is 
rational in necessitating his Will to better achieve his desires, but is also possessed of 
an higher potential for morality which stems from that same faculty of Reason.
1.3 Common-wealth by necessity
Having established their several conceptions of human nature, it remains for Hobbes 
and Kant to organise the subject into civil society  which is the necessary outcome 46
according to Reason.  Civil society is antagonistic to the natural dispositions of human 
beings, yet is necessary for the advancement of human beings out of the state of 
nature.  The condition of civil society is dictated by Reason, and by extension the 
normative force of law is also sustained by that faculty of Reason each man 
possesses which collectively prevents mankind from regressing to a state of war. 
Thus both theorists advocate the necessity of a common-wealth, specifically a 
sovereign which comes to represent the collective will of society, and derives its 
legitimacy from the dictates of each individual's Reason to himself.
Hobbes acknowledges that the Laws of Nature alone cannot compel the subject to 
obey, but must draw authority from a common power.  Hence according to necessity 
each man must covenant to surrender his natural rights to a common representative, 
the sovereign, in order to receive the same protection from the violence of other men 
and the enjoyment of his liberties under the auspices of justice and right.   A common-47
wealth is achieved by the collective surrender by each man of his natural rights under 
conditions of equality.  For Hobbes’ Rule of Reason is such that the selfish nature of 
 Civil society is Kant’s terminology.   Hobbes uses the term common-wealth; both are effectively the 46
same.
 Leviathan chapter XVII47
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every man dictates he must not be disadvantaged in comparison to his neighbour, that 
he will only submit to be ruled if all others will submit on the same terms.  By extension 
the sovereign must also be absolute in order to issue the necessary laws which 
obligate subjects generally.  The normative force of civil laws is endowed by virtue of 
the sovereign being the issuing authority, whose position of authority is validated and 
reinforced by the Rule of Reason as the necessary locus of peace.  Civil laws 
determine the particular definitions of Justice, Equity, and Virtue which exist in natural 
law without promulgation; vice versa the normative force of civil law depends upon 
natural law to legitimate the entire legal order and prescribe the conditions necessary 
to maintain peace.  Since natural law in itself cannot compel man to action they must 
be positively enacted and enforced through civil laws which are particular 
interpretations of natural law.  Thereby civil and natural law contain one another and 48
reflect different aspects of the same law.49
This relationship means that civil law must not be contrary to the demands of Reason, 
and in particular subjects cannot give up those innate liberties of self-preservation, 
namely the right to self-defence, not to incriminate oneself, and to refrain from 
murder.   Hobbes has reasoned from the nature of man and the conditions necessary 50
for him to realise his ultimate goal of self-preservation as dictated by Reason, to 
establish the foundations of the normative force of law and its permissible limits.   The 51
nature of man necessitates an absolute sovereign, whose will is expressed in civil laws 
which must be obeyed unless they infringe upon the inalienable right to preserve 
oneself.  Thus analogous to how Hobbes utilised Reason to arrive at the Laws of 
Nature, he has utilised Reason to establish the normative force of civil law and 
conclude that any civil society which does not oppose Reason must be preferable to 
the state of war.  It is thus open to Hobbes to conclude that obligations which are 
observed through fear are equally legitimate as those observed through duty, for they 
nevertheless secure the subject in his safety from the evils of others. 
Although Hobbes’ confirmation of the stark necessity of autocratic authority may be 
expected given his prior conception of the nature of man, Kant's own arguments for 
 Cf. Martin Harvey, 'Hobbes's Conception of Natural Law', Southern Journal of Philosophy, 37(3):48
441-460.
 Leviathan pg.188-19349
 Ibid. chapter XXI50
 For a fuller account of how Hobbes' Laws of Nature constrain civil laws both formally and substantively 51
see Harvey n.48. 
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civil society present many similarities.  For Kant the necessary conditions for the 
perfection of the human being are divided into the external and internal conditions of 
freedom, consisting in a Doctrine of Right and a Doctrine of Virtue respectively.  For 
Kant civil society is necessary to coordinate the physical choices of humans who 
cannot avoid living and sharing space and resources, so under a Duty of Virtue ought 
to enter into a rightful condition.  It is only under such a rightful condition, wherein the 
distribution of rights is authoritatively guaranteed and unilateral exercises of Will 
prohibited, that the very concept of Right is maintainable and without it all falls into 
violence.52
Like Hobbes, Kant presents an essentially contractarian vision of civil society, which is 
reinforced by the metaphysical idea of 'State'.   Kant begins from the natural rights of 53
individuals inferred a priori from practical reason, namely the right of property, right of 
contract, and familial rights, which in a state of civil society are perfected into a system 
of rights and duties safeguarded by a common will.   This, argues Kant, is a rational 54
development, for humanity is destined to live under a system of rights as opposed to a 
system of violence, thus it is incorporated in the very idea of ‘State’ the duty of the 
subject to absolute obedience.   It must be noted that the ‘State’ as the perfect civil 55
constitution cannot be directly cognised, but sets the normative standard for all 
empirical examples such that all sovereigns in reality ought to be obeyed as a 
command of practical Reason.   This metaphysical idea of 'State' is supplemented by 56
 Metaphysics of Morals 6.306-308.  The rightful condition is an aspect of the final end of the Doctrines of 52
Right; 6.354-355.
 'Contractarian' is used here as a loose term of reference to the social covenant which is the source of 53
civil society as propounded by Hobbes and Kant.  It does not denote the various characteristics 
associated with traditional social contract theories.  For fuller discussion on whether Hobbes and Kant are 
better interpreted in the tradition of Natural Law or Social Contract theory see Harvey n.48; also Daniel M. 
Weinstock, ‘Natural Law and Public Reason in Kant's Political Philosophy', Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy, 26(3):389-411.  The distinction is not directly pertinent to the thesis at hand.
 Metaphysics of Morals Introduction to the Doctrine of Right 6.231-23954
 Metaphysics of Morals Public Right 6.319-320; 6.371-37355
 The metaphysical origin of Kant's theory means it is not feasible to claim any empirical basis for his 56
political philosophy; Manfred Riedel, 'Transcendental Politics? Political Legitimacy and the Concept of 
Civil Society in Kant', Social Research, 48(3) : 588-618.  Cf. Weinstock n.53 who argues that Kant does 
not construct his political philosophy wholly upon such metaphysical bases, and that actual practices of 
public reason are also necessary to establish the legitimacy of law.
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its substantive end which is the perpetuation of itself, from which stem further 
demands such as taxation and military powers.57
Examined at their foundations both Hobbes and Kant appear to be asserting a 
common theory of legal normativity; the subject ought to obey the law because a 
system of civil law is necessary given the ultimate end of human beings.  The 
normative force of law depends entirely upon a higher plane of ideals and principles 
cognised through the universal faculty of Reason accessible to humans as rational 
beings, which must be objective because of its ubiquity, and eternal in its premises and 
conclusions.  The state of civil society, consisting of a centralised authority and system 
of norms must be an enduring solution to the problem of humanity, for any conceivable 
alternative is comparatively worse for the interests of industry, development, morality, 
and realisation of human perfection.  In essence Reason-based accounts of 
normativity assert that law exists because we must have juridical justice, out of 
necessity, out of rationality, for only under law is the end of mankind able to be 
achieved.
1.3.1 Authority, not normativity
The emphasis placed by Hobbes and Kant upon the element of autonomy, reflected in 
the consent to authority and reinforced by the natural obligation to obey creates a 
contingent relationship between the normative force of law and human rationality. 
Both theorists begin from the nature of the human subject as possessing not only 
sensible desires and instincts which furnish him with the fundamental goals of self-
preservation and happiness, but also a faculty of Reason which enables the subject to 
subordinate immediate desire for the pursuit of more far-sighted goals.   This faculty 58
of Reason enables the subject to perceive the unfeasibility of prolonged peaceful 
interaction in the state of nature, but also demands that peace be sought under equal 
terms.  From this dilemma both theorists deduce the necessity of a common will, 
 Metaphysics of Morals Public Right 6.326.  Comparing Kant's conception of state to Hobbes' conception 57
of common-wealth it would appear both share similar end objectives of the perseverance of itself against 
internal discord and external attack.  Both theorists utilise the ideal concept of a common-wealth to justify 
use of measures such as taxation, punishment and waging war.  Significantly in both theories the State 
appears to have escaped direct translation from the original amalgamation of social contract to become a 
semi-autonomous state of being.  It is this shared yet differentiated experience of the social form, 
reproduced in embodied actions and normativity which eludes both Hobbes' and Kant's theoretical efforts.  
 For both Hobbes and Kant this includes maintaining a condition of peace and the capacity for moral 58
action; where the Kantian man strives beyond self-preservation for the higher goal of a moral existence in 
itself, the Hobbesian man views morality in a more instrumental manner. 
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represented as the sovereign which is capable of placing all subjects under equal 
obligation and guaranteeing each from the violence of others.  From this authority 
emanates the representation of its will in the form of law, which prescribes the 
permissible boundaries of freedom.  Human rationality is satisfied only by subjection 
under equal terms to a common authority, and by extension to its laws, so that the 
normative force of law can only be construed in relation to the legitimacy of authority. 
The connection of necessity extends between the propounded nature of man and his 
ideal end, made possible by the common-wealth which in turn implicates the presence 
of authority and civil law.  Insofar as legal normativity is concerned, it is fully contingent 
upon the necessity of authority.  Hobbes and Kant cannot establish a normative order 
of law independent from the legitimacy of its issuing authority.
This reliance upon authority and the threat of force is perhaps the most telling 
indication that Hobbes and Kant cannot completely purge the subject’s material aspect 
from their account of law’s normative force.  If compliance to norms depends upon the 
threat of coercion, obligation elides quickly into force, and the normative aspect 
becomes rhetorical as opposed to practical.   Hobbes explicitly states that obligation 59
through fear is equally as valid as obligation by acceptance.   Similarly Kant 60
acknowledges that his Doctrine of Right only prescribes the forms of action, not the 
ends of action, therefore laws themselves cannot form the motivation for the Will; the 
Will in acting legally is motivated by external interests, and is thus not acting 
autonomously.   61
1.4 Materiality of existence
In light of the foregoing discussion of Hobbes’ and Kant’s respective theories on the 
human subject, it may appear theoretically feasible to sustain the sharp distinction 
between body as the source of base desires and appetites, and the mind as the seat 
of uncompromising Reason.  However this dichotomy is complicated by the subject's 
inhabiting both the world of sense and the world of understanding, wherein pure 
 Stern advances a defence for Kant's account of political obligation which he asserts do have direct 59
bindingness without the need to elide political into moral obligation.  Stern characterises all juridical duties 
as moral duties which are legislated for externally, such that the incentive to obey is not coercion, but the 
law's moral status; Stern n.45.
 Leviathan chapter XXVIII60
 Metaphysics of Morals Introduction 6.211-22161
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practical Reason is not the sole determinant in action, but must coordinate with 
empirical experience to mediate desire, organise enduring interests, and pursue long-
term goals.  Prior to attaining the perfect Kingdom of Ends, the faculty of Reason is not 
only utilised in its ideal form of morality, but also in its instrumental role as practical 
rationality to direct the subject’s mundane actions.62
This intermediate state of being, of a subject partially free from material determination 
by virtue of a degree of consciousness and self-awareness, yet nevertheless not fully 
self-determining, is the current reality for the human subject.  Both Hobbes and Kant 
struggle to incorporate this partially rational image of man, with Kant erring on the side 
of idealism and Hobbes on the side of empiricism.  For Kant this state of existence lies 
between being determined by sensible desires and being determined by autonomous 
Will; the state of nonmoral freedom realised in the exercise of choice, a freedom which 
is not truly free from sensible demands.   Kant acknowledges that the human subject 63
must exist in the world of sense and be assailed by the demands of desire, but to the 
extent that the subject may think of his Will as belonging solely in the world of 
understanding he is also not fully determined by the demands of desire.  Therefore he 
demonstrates his freedom by mediating his desire in the form of cultivating passions. 
These passions signify what the subject perceives will best serve his object of 
Happiness, given his perceptions of the current state of society, so are rationally 
developed through the dialectical interaction between Desire and Reason over time;  64
such is the development of the heteronomous will in the pursuit of Happiness, aided by 
Reason in the form of hypothetical imperatives.  Kant acknowledges that owing to the 
indefinite and empirical nature of Happiness, objective principles for action cannot be 
deduced from that concept, however this does not preclude a minimal level of 
 For Kant a fully moral Will solely determined by Reason is theoretically possible.  For Hobbes the issue 62
of whether the subject can ever be free of empirical demands on his actions is less clear, given his 
definition of will being the last appetite in deliberation.
 This is Kant's negative conception of freedom, discussed above.  This nonmoral freedom is 63
characterised by O'Connor as the pragmatic use of Reason to organise a hierarchy of goals and desires 
in order to pursue Happiness, O'Connor n.28 pg.193.
 Iain Morrisson, Kant and the Role of Pleasure in Moral Action; OUP, 2008, pg.42-44. Morrisson calls 64
these natural and social inclinations, and asserts that Kant does not radically divide pre-existing 
inclinations of desire from reason.  Instead the human's predisposition towards freedom develops into 
those passions which are socially conditioned to achieve Happiness.  Cf. O'Connor who asserts that 
passions are strong inclinations which act as obstacles to Happiness, and requires greater strength of 
Reason to overcome.  Passions represent the 'victory of inclination over reason', so represents a 
conflicting rather than dialectical relationship between desire and Reason, O'Connor n.28 pg.196.
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rationality required for the subject to mediate desire through farsighted goals and life 
plans.  65
Similarly the Hobbesian man in the state of nature remains ignorant of all but his 
immediate desires and concern for self-preservation, such that Hobbes is often 
regarded as propounding a theory of mechanical action and economic behaviour. 
However such a simplistic notion is only meant to serve as a conceptual contrast to 
the more maximally rational man who is capable of sacrificing immediate satisfaction 
for longer term happiness.  Reason serves a greater role than merely guiding the 
subject to attain his immediate desire, by ordering and suppressing desire in the 
pursuit of a more coherent life plan which necessitates the observance of the Laws of 
Nature.66
Therefore, the stark contrast between the Kantian man who is a potentially 
autonomous Will, hindered only by the demands of sensible Desire and the lack of 
moral strength to repress them, and the Hobbesian man who categorically seeks only 
self-advancement through the aid of instrumental rationality, becomes increasingly 
inadequate.  The Kantian man is capable of minimal instrumental rationality when he 
mistakenly pursues socially determined passions and refuses to cultivate his higher 
moral faculties, in the delusion that it serves Happiness.   The Hobbesian man is 67
capable of maximal rationality if by use of Reason he perceives the virtues of the Laws 
of Nature, of cultivating a good character and acquiring wit.  It is apparent that both 
theorists make great concessions to the material existence of the subject, particularly 
its influence in determining the objects of happiness and the necessary means to 
attain them.
 This relationship between Kant's moral and practical theories, in particular the possibility of nonmoral 65
freedom is widely disputed.  Reath asserts that the categorical imperative is simply the logical conclusion 
of a practical reason which evaluates normative reasons and justifications for action; thus moral action is 
an extension of nonmoral action.  Andrews Reath, Agency and Autonomy in Kant's Moral Theory Oxford, 
UK: Clarendon Press, 2006, pg.70-82.  Contrast theories which views moral and nonmoral reason to be 
entirely disparate aspects of Kant's theory, such as Fletcher n.45.
 For a fuller account of how Hobbes' concept of man can be expounded as a complete moral theory see 66
David Van Mill, Liberty, Rationality, and Agency in Hobbes's Leviathan Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 2001.
 Kant posits fundamental Passions for dominance over others and being free from such domination, 67
which renders his conception of human nature very similar to Hobbes'.  O'Connor n.28 pg.196; Morrisson 
n.64.  
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1.4.1 The material conditions of Reason
In light of these apparently ineluctable concessions to man’s material existence, it is 
questionable whether the eternal and immutable laws of Reason deduced from 
metaphysical principles remain tenable.  If, as Hobbes and Kant concede, man's 
rationality dictates the ends and means to his happiness, which is in turn determined 
by his material existence, and if there is no guarantee that the laws of Reason will not 
change to reflect developments in the material world, then they are not immutable.  It 
is significant that in formulating these immutable dictates of Reason both theorists 
employ counterfactual examples drawn from the state of society as they understood 
it.   It appears from the similarity of their fundamental moral rules  that the emphasis 68 69
upon equality and respect for others results from a rudimentary theory of mind, that is 
the ability to perceive others as possessing minds similar to one's own, and projecting 
particular behaviour to be generally applicable.   Again the very notion of justification, 70
of practical reasons which are objective for all rational beings, of Laws of Nature 
appearing to be inevitable if only one employed Reason, depends essentially upon the 
predicate that rational beings think alike.   Indeed it is this minimal level of likeness 71
that enables both Hobbes and Kant to claim the dictates of Reason are objectively true 
and universally applicable, by positing laws of Reason which are imaginably 
acceptable to all in a particular historical and social context, and assuming a particular 
state of human condition.
It is by this act of reification that human reasoning is transformed into omnipresent 
Reason.  Reification is the distortion of perception and behaviour in society, such that 
 In arguing against the right to borrow money dishonestly, Kant asserts it is impossible to universally will 68
such a maxim because in consequence humans will no longer trust any promise, resulting in no promises 
being made and no money being lent, amongst other examples; Groundwork 4.422-424. 
 For Kant the categorical imperative; for Hobbes the biblical rule of impartiality.69
 By theory of mind I refer to its social psychology usage which denotes notions such as meta-70
representations, false beliefs, ‘I think that you think…’, which aim to explain social interaction.  For an 
interesting account of preschool theory of mind and its role in predicting actions of deception, persuasion, 
and other social behaviours, see Henry Wellman, Making Minds: How Theory of Mind Develops. OUP, 
2014 chapter 3. 
 If this theory of like mindedness is not presumed, Hobbes’ and Kant’s counterfactual arguments for the 71
necessity of their moral rules cannot be sustained.
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concepts and things are attributed with characteristics they do not possess.   It is 72
relating to the social and natural world in an inappropriate way as a result of a 
particular form of praxis or worldview.   In this specific context the perception of 73
human reason as a priori to cognition attributes Reason with the characteristics of 
transcendence and omnipresence.   Notwithstanding the earlier concessions to the 74
materiality of existence, Hobbes and Kant appear to have divorced the instrumental 
rationality of embodied action from the pure Reason of disembodied thought through a 
series of generalisations.  What is claimed to have been deduced from metaphysical 
truths is in fact constructed from presuppositions about the material world.  Indeed 
Kant himself acknowledges that material hardship impedes the Will's ability to be 
moral, so satisfaction of material wants creates conditions more conducive to morality. 
This is an indication of the significant influence of material conditions upon the terms of 
morality.   If there is validity in this suspicion it greatly problematises the immutable 75
nature of Reason and its substantive laws, for it allows potential changes in the 
material conditions of existence to change the content of Reason; what appears 
necessary or natural in one setting may not be so in another.
 A definition of reification is offered as ‘the transformation of intangible human qualities, such as 72
thoughts, ideas, and values, into physical objects.’ in Ian Buchanan, ’Reification.' A Dictionary of Critical 
Theory, 2010.  Reification is part of the more general process of alienation, which for Marx takes on the 
material expressions of commodity fetishism and objectified labour.  Marx’s conception of alienation has 
its theoretical origins in Hegel’s dialectic of the spirit which is first alienated from itself through its 
subjective and objective aspects, and the spirit’s inability to be fully subject or object.  Georg Wilhelm 
Friedrich Hegel,  Phenomenology of Spirit. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977, chapter IV; Hegel’s 
terminology is ‘being in itself’ and ‘being for itself’.  See Gavin Rae, 'Hegel, Alienation, and the 
Phenomenological Development of Consciousness.'  International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20(1): 
23-42 for a discussion on alienation as estrangement and externalisation.  Cf. Sean Sayers, 'Creative 
Activity and Alienation in Hegel and Marx.' Historical Materialism 11(1): 107-28; discussion on the theme 
of labour as objectification of spirit.  Timothy Brownlee, 'Alienation and Recognition in Hegel's 
Phenomenology of Spirit.'  Philosophical Forum  46(4): 377-96; recognition of particularity is achieved 
through dialectical resolution of difference.  
 In Marx's theory this reification stems from the social form of commodity exchange which imbues 73
commodities with a semblance of value, and human relationships with an element of commodification; 
Karl Marx, Capital. Everyman's Library ; No.849. London: Dent, 1951 v.I chapter I section 4.  See also 
Lukacs, 'Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat' in György Lukács,  History and Class 
Consciousness : Studies in Marxist Dialectics. London: Merlin Press, 1971.  Cf. Honneth who criticises 
Lukacs' interpretation as insufficiently theorised, instead advancing a theory of reification which is based 
on recognition of other humans which extends towards the natural external world.  Axel Honneth, Judith 
Butler, Raymond Geuss, Reification : A New Look at an Old Idea. The Berkeley Tanner Lectures. Oxford ; 
New York: OUP, 2008. 
 I would argue that this process of casting off and forgetting the material foundations of reason in order 74
to posit it as something metaphysical involves a form of reification.  The theme of forgetting inherent in 
reification is advanced in Theodor W. Adorno & Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment. London: 
Verso Editions, 1997. 
 Groundwork 4.399 Kant emphasises the indirect duty of achieving happiness, the absence of which will 75
exacerbate the temptation to moral dissolution.
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The source of this incongruence lies in the atomistic approach taken by Hobbes and 
Kant in divorcing the subject from his material conditions of existence whilst retaining 
the same conception of Reason developed within those conditions.  Both theorists 
began from the notion of an isolated individual 'man' and expounded from his essential 
nature his various faculties and his proper end.   They then proceed to postulate a 76
state of nature wherein this theoretical construction of man is multiplied, and his 
interactions with other men then deduced as an inevitable consequence of his 
theoretical characteristics.  From this the unfortunate condition of war and violence is 
deduced and presented as the natural and unavoidable state of community which is 
antagonistic to the proper end of humanity and must be overcome through a collective 
endeavour by all subjects through their common faculty of Reason.  As Reason is 
seemingly accessible to all human subjects, this leads to the conclusion that Reason is 
objective and universal.  Consequently the dictates of Reason must also apply 
objectively and universally.  Thus Reason is qualified to serve as the origin from which 
to derive eternal and immutable laws which are objectively valid because all who 
possess Reason will arrive at the same conclusion.  Reason itself is beyond reproach, 
so its precepts must also be equally valid. 
This argument whereby Hobbes and Kant begin from seemingly irrefutable postulates 
of human nature and end in universally valid laws, with each step in reasoning posited 
as theoretically necessary, is deceptively plausible.  However the atomistic approach 
of isolating the subject as individual whilst also projecting a common faculty of Reason 
misconstrues a constituted subject as a priori.  Hobbes and Kant take the subject out 
of the community but retain those characteristics which were constituted by that 
community, and present them as somehow endowed by nature.  It will be argued that 
the claims to metaphysical status are made possible by obscuring the material origins 
of the subject, and sustained by constructing an artificial image of human society.77
The opposition between the claims of universally true laws of Reason and the 
materially affected rationality of the subject is a source of tension in Hobbes' and 
 These faculties refer to those pertaining to sense and intelligence, namely the faculties of Desire and 76
Reason combined with the motivations they engender, and their relation to the causal factor of human 
action which is the will.  The proper end of humans, for Kant the moral Will, and for Hobbes the benefit of 
mankind, are posited as unique and necessary to the subject by virtue of his humanity.
 A similar argument is advanced by Sullivan n.29 who criticises the validity of Kant's supposed 77
metaphysics which he asserts is a result of Kant's particular theory of anthropology.  This reliance upon a 
specific view of human nature as the foundation for a supposedly metaphysical moral and political 
philosophy calls the validity of their justification into question.
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Kant's theories.  Once the illusion of immutable Reason is abandoned, the concept is 
reduced to the observation that all human subjects have a degree of self-determining 
consciousness, a concept so impoverished that it is unable to sustain any ambitious 
claims of morality.   There are no longer moral principles which humans must observe 78
by virtue of their humanity, or by their absolute worth in the pursuit of human 
development.  What remains justifiable in both theories is that of limited rationality, of 
the subject who is capable of responding to reasons and norms, who possesses a 
degree of foresight and the desire for happiness, and orders his desires and actions 
for purposive living.
1.4.2 Law without Reason
Having problematised Hobbes' and Kant's conceptions of reason, their Reason-based 
accounts of legal normativity are also called into question.  If Hobbes and Kant can no 
longer plausibly claim the status of natural or moral law for the legitimacy of the 
sovereign, it is no longer tenable to claim unconditional obedience from the subject 
towards an empirical figure of authority.  Once the unquestionable validity of natural 
and moral law is undermined, so is the normative force of positive law which emanated 
from the once supposed unquestionable figure of sovereign.   79
This critique may be elaborated by exploring the concept of the state of nature, which 
both Hobbes and Kant rely heavily upon as the conceptual foil to civil society.  The 
state of nature is a collection of discrete individuals who interact principally through 
competition and threatened violence.  Great emphasis is placed upon the distinction 
between self and other, expressed through property relations, or division of control 
over external objects, and the act of contract, or the alienation of rights over external 
objects.  Hobbes and Kant claim these rights are 'natural' insofar as they are 
necessarily implicated by a self-regarding, purposive being who utilises external 
objects to vindicate his freedom and achieve happiness.  This natural right to contract 
consists of a hypothetical mutual exercise of will between equal parties which creates 
 Claims that the laws of morality are valid eternally and universally, irrespective of context because of 78
their derivation from metaphysical Reason, such that the laws themselves take on a status akin to 
metaphysical maxims.
 Manfred asserts that Kant fails to address the aporia of norm and fact in his account of legitimation of 79
civil society.  Kant's transcendental approach in using an a priori universal will as the foundation for State 
and obligation is criticised as being reliant upon prior material suppositions.  See Manfred n.56.
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obligations, and by extension justice.   It is highly significant that obligation is possible 80
in the state of nature only as an act of exchange expressed through relations of 
property and power, to the extent that all other forms of 'ought' exist only by the 
auspices of morality.   In the state of nature and between nonmoral subjects the 81
predominant form of shared obligation is mutual contract.   I would argue that this 82
contract-created obligation represents an impoverished vision of social interaction, and 
casting it as the predominant social interaction corrupts social normativity in general. 
Contract may simply be one possible form of social interaction which is perfected in 
material life and transposed into the state of nature, thereby elevating it to a status of 
natural right.  
The foregoing does not demonstrate that the ostensible natural rights are not aspects 
of the human subject eternally and necessarily as Hobbes and Kant claim, merely that 
those claims are not fully warranted.  Instead of taking community as an organic 
whole, the state of nature ignores community and replaces it with a constructed 
collection of theoretically rational subjects.  In similar fashion Reason, which was 
cultivated through material interactions in community is artificially abstracted and 
implanted into the theoretical concept of human nature, thereby reified to metaphysical 
status.  
Hobbes' and Kant's artificial constructions of human subject and human society lead to 
an artificial and impoverished account of legal normativity.  Although both theorists 
emphasise the necessity for civil society as a coordinating system between physically 
embodied beings who cannot avoid sharing space and resources, that material aspect 
becomes obscured and displaced by a metaphysical and reified Reason.  Hobbes and 
Kant concede that perfect Reason is not attained for most subjects, for whom the 
primary motivation is sensible desires and selfish ends, so external constraints upon 
action enforced by coercion is required.  The necessity of law is thus premised upon 
an image of the embodied and self-regarding subject who reacts primarily to self-
 Kant's definition of the rightful condition is where such distributions of property rights are authoritatively 80
enforced, and encroaching upon another's rights of property deemed unjust, Metaphysics of Morals The 
Doctrine of Right, Part I section II; similarly Hobbes defines justice purely in terms of proprietary rights, 
that to encroach upon property belonging rightfully to another is deemed unjust, Leviathan pg.89-100.
 Such examples may include Kant's duty of virtue to observe the perfection of one's own capabilities and 81
the achievement of others’ happiness, and Hobbes' various Laws of Nature which do not depend on 
mutual promising but on the general dictates of civil society.
 Indeed Kant goes as far as to express relations of marriage as contracts for the exclusive use of 82
another's sexual organs, so terms familial rights 'rights to persons akin to rights to things', Metaphysics of 
Morals The Doctrine of Right, Part I section III.
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advancing motives, whilst its normative legitimacy is premised upon the subject as a 
disembodied vessel of perfect Reason.  This disparity between the conditions of 
justification leads to a portrait of society wherein the majority of subjects experience 
legal normativity only in terms of external constraint and threat of punishment.  It is the 
figure of authority which is paramount, not the normative order of law.    
Hobbes and Kant construct their theories of legal normativity upon a false dichotomy 
between the embodied subject and his Reason, and between the state of nature and 
civil society, so limit legal normativity to a choice between opposites.  Legal normativity 
is premised upon the imminent threat of human subjects succumbing to the demands 
of desire, passions, and mutual diffidence.  Law saves the human subject from himself 
by externally imposing the dictates of Reason which guard against those sensible 
impulses so subversive to peace.  Law's normative force becomes aligned with 
Reason against those aberrant elements such as emotions and desires, just as 
Reason purges itself of its material and embodied aspect.  However such an 
impoverished account of legal normativity merely obfuscates those problematic 
elements, which make their presence felt in counterintuitive features of law.   Hobbes' 83
and Kant's account of legal normativity pretends to forget its dependence on human 
subjects who are incessantly assailed by their sensible desires and inclination to 
violence, instead addresses itself to an abstract and metaphysical concept of Reason.  
1.5 Historically conditioned reason
In this section I will explore the Marxian view of man which is based on a rejection of 
transcendental traditions.   By propounding a dialectical relationship between man 84
and reason Marx presents a unified subject who changes and progresses throughout 
history, thereby rejecting Kant's ideal ontological categories.   Marx attempts to 85
 These will be explored in greater detail in chapter 3.83
 Marx's theory is often compared with Hegel's, from whom Marx took his dialectical method but rejected 84
Hegel's idealist approach.  See generally David Harvey, Companion to Marx's Capital  Verso 2010 chapter 
1.
 Marx’s dialectics is often presented as a historical materialism, a theory of history which evolves 85
dialectically through different epochs of economic production, culminating in the state of communism and 
the end of history.  This gives the impression that Marx is advancing a predestined or scientific account of 
human development.  Cf. M. Tabak, Dialectics of Human Nature in Marx’s Philosophy Palgrave Macmillan, 
New York, 2012, chapter 2 for a non-teleological interpretation.
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construct a conception of man which is predicated upon the necessarily material 
conditions of his survival, yet possesses the potential for change and self-realisation.86
Eschewing the metaphysical approach of Kant, Marx begins from empirically 
observable descriptions of the life-process of man, which is his active production within 
the confines of material limits existing independently of his will.  For Marx, what 
distinguishes man from animal is primarily his faculty for consciously producing the 
means of life by purposively fashioning the objective natural world according to his 
needs.   Hence the peculiarly human aspect of the subject is organised labour, not 87
possession of rationality; the species-being of man is the conscious labouring upon 
inert nature, through which man raises himself above nature and becomes more fully 
actualised in the self-fulfilling act of labouring.   In this initial description of Marx's 88
theory there emerges a fundamentally different conception of reason, for unlike 
Hobbes and Kant for whom the concept of Reason is removed from the material 
sphere and is preserved in a higher metaphysical plane accessible through reflection, 
for Marx reason is limited to the consciousness of the material subject.  Moreover due 
to the necessity for human development, reason is not fully realisable merely by the 
employment of logic or reasoning; it is not discoverable as eternal and immutable 
natural laws, but only expressible through the actual development of the subject 
himself.   89
The first historical state for Marx is the existence of man possessed of animal 
consciousness, specifically those fixed needs for subsistence.   The satisfaction of 90
 The proceeding discussion is a controversial topic in Marxian scholarship regarding the status of Marx’s 86
earlier philosophical works in relation to his mature works in Capital, specifically around the issue of 
human nature.  Some critics posit a continuity between the ‘young Marx’ of Economic and Philosophic 
Manuscripts and his seminal volumes of Capital, whilst others downplay the weight of Marx’s earlier works 
as being philosophically immature.  See Marcello Musto, ‘The ‘Young Marx’ Myth in Interpretations of 
the Economic–Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844’  Journal of Socialist Theory 43 (2) 233-260 for a general 
overview of the subject.  In my following arguments I have relied mostly on Marx’s pre-Capital works in 
constructing a Marxian account of human nature, only because that is where the most references to 
human nature is to be found.  I do not subscribe to any particular school of Marxist thought, and the 
prospect of an entirely structuralist reading of Marx poses no direct problem for my thesis.  
 Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. New Ed.]. ed. London: Lawrence & Wishart, 87
1970 (hereafter EPM) pg.328-329.
 Thomas Wartenberg,''Species-Being' and 'Human Nature' in Marx.' Human Studies 5(2): 77-95.88
 The important difference here is the way in which Reason is constituted, for Hobbes and Kant also 89
conceded imperfect manifestations of Reason owing to the very material aspect of the subject which 
Reason is intended to compel.  Marx is stressing the changeable nature of reason and denying it a 
separate ontological status apart from the material subject; hence Marx refers only to consciousness and 
self-awareness without referring to autonomous will or reason.
 Karl Max and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology : Including Theses on Feuerbach and Introduction 90
to The Critique of Political Economy, Great Books in Philosophy. Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1976 
(hereafter GI)  pg.48-49
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these first needs lead to producing the means of survival, the creation of new needs, 
and the need to produce other men.   As this process continues, the division of 91
labour, originally presented in the sexual act, expands to encompass increasing 
productivity in order to satisfy the increasing needs of the growing population.   For 92
Marx this is the most rudimentary form of social intercourse.  The actual cooperation 
necessary between subjects in the satisfaction of their needs creates social relations 
which form a mode of cooperation associated with a certain mode of production and 
independent of any specific social order.   Significantly the Marxian subject requires 93
no prompting in this division of labour apart from the immediate consciousness of 
sensual activity, and the awareness of his and others’ needs.
Therein lies a fundamental difference between Marx's conception of the human subject 
and those of Hobbes and Kant.  Marx eschews the atomistic approach of isolating the 
subject as individual from his social context.  Instead the subject is posited from the 
outset as both creator and creation of a set of social relationships, such that an 
isolated individual endowed with purely natural characteristics is inconceivable.  Marx 
emphasises the human as social being inseparable from society.   For Marx the 94
hypothetical state of nature as constructed by Hobbes and Kant, wherein man is 
isolated but nevertheless imbued with a specific social dynamic of competition and 
violence is a false premise.   The subject is a nexus of social relationships which by 95
definition cannot exist independently of its social context.  
 Ibid. pg.48-51; Marx saw these moments as hypothetical but also replicated in every act of the subject 91
even to the present day; thus it is not a mischaracterisation to see this process as akin to a law of nature 
for Marx. 
 Ibid. pg.4892
 In contrast to Hobbes the first social intercourse is not conflict but cooperation, and society is not an 93
abstracted entity above the individual but an extension of man as social-being.
 Marx n.90 Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy (hereafter Introduction) pg.2; Theses on 94
Feuerbach (hereafter Theses) VI; EPM pg.350-351
 Introduction pg.2 where Marx states 'isolated individuals outside of society - something which might 95
happen as an exception to a civilised man who by accident got into the wilderness and already 
dynamically possessed within himself the forces of society - is as great an absurdity....'
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Marx has avoided corrupting the social character of man, but in emphasising the social 
aspect  he is often interpreted as advocating a theory of determinism.   Humans are 96 97
fully determined by society, a nexus of modes of life and production relations fashioned 
historically and independently of their will.  Man cannot determine his consciousness, 
only his labour, such that the Marxian man seems to lack autonomy and is incapable 
of self-determination.   However such a crudely materialist interpretation neglects 98
man's capacity to transform nature, thereby transforming himself.   Marx's humanism 99
is reflected in his conception of human freedom as production free from the constraints 
of necessity.  Man is truly free when he fully realises his species-life, namely the 
objectification of self through humanising nature, and he may achieve this through the 
fulfilling act of labour in order to objectify his self by consciously transforming the 
natural world around him.  The Marxian man, far from being a socially determined 
object, demonstrates his autonomy by purposively transforming nature, thus exhibiting 
a potential for positive material freedom.  The Marxian man's relationship to external 
objects is not reduced to mere control or ownership, but is a direct reflection of his 
being.100
 GI pg.41-43 where Marx speaks of the social formation of man; EPM pg.350-351 where he speaks of 96
the 'social being'. 
 On structuralist accounts of Marxism the economic relations of production scientifically determine their 97
corresponding class consciousness, so allows no room for human nature or reason; the traditional base-
superstructure model.  Althusser offered an alternative model wherein Ideological and Repressive State 
Apparatuses actively operated to control the public; Louis Althusser, and G. Goshgarian,  On the 
Reproduction of Capitalism : Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses. English-language ed. 2014. 
Nevertheless he outright rejected humanist readings of Marx and the possibility of change in 
consciousness without the collapse of capitalism; Louis Althusser, and François Matheron, The Humanist 
Controversy and Other Writings (1966-67). London ; New York: Verso, 2003.  Cf. H. Sherman, ‘Marx and 
Determinism’, Journal Of Economic Issues (Association For Evolutionary Economics), 15(1): 61-71.
 Indeed this summary approximates the claims of vulgar theories of Marxism.  Further evidence for such 98
interpretations is ostensibly provided by Marx's Theses, but see Geras' denials of that textual 
interpretation and his defence of Marx's concept of man in general.  Norman Geras. Marx and Human 
Nature: Refutation of a Legend. London: Verso, 1983.  Cf. Wartengurg n.88 makes an argument that 
Marx’s theory of human nature is rich enough to ground a normative critique.
 Marx levels this criticism at Feuerbach's theory of materialism, which he asserts commits the mistake of 99
crude materialistic determination by casting man as an impassive object of the senses and ignoring his 
sensuous activity; These VI; GI pg.44-47.
 This dynamic humanism reading of Marx is propounded by various critics.  See Erich Fromm, Marx's 100
Concept of Man. Milestones of Thought. New York: F. Ungar, 1961; Gary Chamberlain, 'The Man Marx 
Made', Science and Society 27(3) : 302-320; Walton et al., 'Image of Man in Marx', Social Theory and 
Practice, 1(2) :69-84.  Wartenburg n.88.  Cf. Tabak who presents Marx’s dialectic as a process which 
culminates in the reunification of man and nature; Tabak n.85 chapter 1.
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1.6 Alienated consciousness
In positing this image of man as both autonomous and conditioned, Marx is concerned 
with relating the human subject in his entirety, encapsulating a universal humanity and 
not merely a disintegrated vision of it.  The latter is characterised by the tendency of 
bourgeois society and philosophy to atomise the individual, to force him into 
dichotomies and particularities of existence.   Such is the unfortunate state of man's 101
self-alienation within bourgeois society.  Marx presents alienation in various forms,  102
however the process remains essentially the same.  Alienation arises from the division 
of labour which obscures the sociality of production from the limited perception of each 
contributor, such that the end product appears independent of each contributor's 
labour.  Man is alienated from his species-being when the products of his labour, his 
inorganic body, are removed from his control and confront him as something foreign. 
Alienation is only overcome when the relations between men may be directly 
perceived and immediately experienced.  This entails submitting the totality of 
productive forces to the conscious control of society, thus freeing man from the 
necessities of living in order to pursue freedom.   103
Parallel to Marx's rejection of the fragmentation of man's being, he also rejects the 
apparent schism between common and private interests.  Instead, for Marx, the 
appearance of conflict is also an unfortunate result of alienation within society.  Man is 
alienated from other men when his cooperation with others within the common interest 
is hidden and involuntary, and the products of his labour used only to satisfy another's 
desire, such that he perceives the common interest to be in conflict with his private 
interests.  When man is atomised into particular roles in the social intercourse he 
becomes limited by those imposed categories, his labour becomes involuntary, and in 
 Marx gives examples of such dichotomisations of abstraction from civil society vs. integration into 101
political society in Critique of Hegel's Doctrine of the State pg.143, and On the Jewish Question pg.
221-222, in Marx, Karl, Livingstone, Rodney, and Benton, Gregor. Early Writings. The Penguin Classics. 
Harmondsworth ; New York: Penguin in Association with New Left Review, 1992.; different occupations in 
GI pg.53.
 Self alienation, alienation from other men, and alienated labour in EPM pg.322-334; political and social 102
alienation in Critique pg.140-147; GI pg.51-54; economic alienation in Capital vol.I chapter 1 section 4. 
For a concise definition of alienation see Buchanan n.53 under ‘alienation’.  For a concise description of 
alienation see Walton n.77 pg.69-84 who presents Marx's 'three modalities' of alienation.  Cf. Meszaro 
who asserts that for Marx alienation is superseded when social practices are no longer fragmented, and a 
truly human science could be achieved; Meszaro, Marx's Theory of Alienation London: Merlin P, 1970, 
chapter 2.
 D. McLellan, ‘Marx's View of the Unalienated Society’ The Review of Politics, 31(4), 459-465103
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consequence he cannot perceive his relationship to society except in terms of conflict 
and isolation.104
Marx acknowledges that man seeks only his particular interest, which may not coincide 
with the common interest.   The common interest here is real in the sense of 105
interdependence among men in order to reproduce the means of satisfying the current 
and potential increases in their needs; in other words the common interest is the 
satisfaction of needs, be they basic or social, which can no longer be achieved through 
individual effort as a result of population expansion.   In addition each generation 106
would have inherited a totality of productive forces from the preceding generation, 
which is an historically created set of relations of individuals to nature and to each 
other, which propitiated self-activity within the community and so is expressed as the 
common interest.  Marx is asserting that given a certain level of productive forces there 
corresponds a social form and division of labour which better utilises those forces, 
thereby advancing the interests of humanity to become more productive.  These social 
forms will eventually be outgrown and consequently discarded as fetters to increased 
productive forces.   To the extent that the social forms are successful in advancing 107
the productive forces of society, Marx may be construed to be advancing a comparable 
argument to Hobbes and Kant.  The common-wealth and rightful condition are in the 
greater interests of humanity, but only perceived to be in conflict with private interest 
due to a lack of Reason in the self-regarding individual.  Similarly the common interest 
is in the greater interests of society, but only perceived to be in conflict due to the 
individual's alienated state of being.  Once these defects are remedied through 
education or de-alienation, man would voluntarily accede to the common interest.    
The vital difference, however, in Marx's conception of common interest is its historically 
specific character which is embodied in the class structure.  The division of material 
from mental labour enables consciousness to express itself independently from reality 
in the form of pure theory, through the endeavours of its guardians.  By extension the 
 EPM pg.322-326.  It is submitted that when Marx speaks of man's consciousness being determined by 104
his social position he is not speaking of generic consciousness, but the way in which man views his 
relationship to other men, specifically to the social power which is distorted by this process of alienation.
 For Marx common interest denotes a class interest which is presented in its ideal form, thus it is not an 105
enduring common interest of humanity in the sense of Hobbes' Commonwealth or Kant's rightful 
condition.  Althusser makes plain that capitalism serves exclusively the class interest of the bourgeois, n.
95.
 Marx mentions this factor explicitly, GI pg.48106
 GI pg.53-92.  On the inevitability or otherwise of these transitions see Tabak n.85 chapter 2 and the 107
need for revolutionary force.
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class-specific interests are also expressible in this idealistic fashion.  The ruling class, 
which is defined as that which controls the greatest material means of production, also 
controls the greatest forces of intellectual dissemination, and presents its class 
interests in their ideal form as being universally rational and eternally valid.   For 108
Marx this motivation towards the ideal form is necessary during revolutionary epochs 
when the prevailing ideals of the failing ruling class no longer promote the productive 
forces, so must be supplanted by an alternative.   During this time the rising class will 109
present its interests as the common interest in order to appeal to other classes in 
society, an endeavour made tenable owing to the coinciding interests against the 
failing ruling class.  Owing to this idealistic form of expression the ideas are reified into 
immutable ideals, or the Idea of the age which in reality is only the interest of a 
politically motivated mode of life.110
Indeed Marx explicitly levels this criticism at Kant, who he asserts is the unwitting 
recipient of the ideas of political liberalism from England and France as a result of their 
social revolutions.   Whereas the economic stage in England and France had 111
matured sufficiently for the bourgeois to rise into ruling position, and thereby asserting 
their class ideas of freedom, independence, and such as instruments towards 
achieving their political goals, Germany which still languished in the economic stage of 
the vulgar burghers  could only conceive of these as abstract metaphysical 112
concepts.   Thus for Marx, Hobbes saw the presence of power within the liberal 113
revolution where Kant saw only metaphysical origins of self-determination and freewill; 
these ideas are divorced from their historical bases and consequently reified and 
alienated from the material conditions of man.   For Hobbes and Kant the liberal 114
ideals of freedom and self-determination engender the universal laws necessary to 
reconcile the essentially self-regarding man with his greater moral and civil interests by 
justifiably compelling him through force and morality.  For Marx such ideals are merely 
private interests expressed in an ideal form, a mode of life conducive only to 
historically specific stages of productivity which are continually destroyed and 
reproduced in the life-process of production.  The image of the egoistic subject 
 GI pg.67-71108
 Tabak n.85109
 GI pg.208-211.  See Kit Christensen, 'Marx, Human Nature, and the Fetishism of Concepts.' Studies in 110
Soviet Thought 34(3): 135-71 on the fetishisation of concepts in general.
 GI ibid.111
 Ibid.  Marx is presumably referring to the pre-capitalist bourgeois class who were intermediate between 112
the peasantry and the lord in the feudal system.
 Ibid.113
 Ibid.114
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compelled to conform to an enduring common interest is false, for the common interest 
is only the ephemeral mode of life, and the egoist only the reflection of the bourgeois 
man.
1.6.1 Material conditions of freedom
The foregoing is not to argue that Marx propounded a naturally cooperative and 
productive image of human society, but merely to convey the emphasis Marx placed 
on the material and historical relations between men, expressed in the mode of social 
intercourse, as the determinants of human nature and human consciousness.  115
Indeed the Marxian man shares certain similarities with the Kantian and Hobbesian 
man.  He seeks to satisfy his needs which are conditioned by his physical nature and 
social existence, thus he may be prone to greed, selfishness, and other 
predispositions of character.  However the advantage of the Marxian man lies in his 
potential to redefine his needs through improving his material conditions of life, to 
overcome constraints of character not by forcibly imposing a metaphysical Reason 
upon himself, but naturally by the efforts of his labour.  What for Hobbes and Kant is 
the inevitable and undesirable burden of humanity, is for Marx only a stage in human 
development, and in denying absolute Reason he makes possible the achievement of 
full human consciousness, which is consciousness unimpeded by alienation or 
ideology.  116
This contrast may be further elaborated by comparing Marx's depiction of the capitalist 
economy as characterised by the commodity form with Hobbes' and Kant's 
constructed state of nature as characterised by private rights.  Under capitalism man is 
alienated from the products of his labour which are transformed into commodities for 
exchange rather than for use.  This commodity fetishism imparts a semblance of 
inherent value onto objects by obscuring the real source of value which is congealed 
labour power.   Capital is perceived to be inherently productive, so becomes the 117
object force which organises social relations.  The commodity form rules over man's 
 Tabak n.85 chapter 4. Contrast Hobbes and Kant who vice versa begin from positing an essential 115
human nature, one which is self-advancing and rational, from which they construct feasible modes of 
cooperation which constitute the relations within society.  For Marx the actual cooperation is prior to the 
formation of the consciousness of that mode of cooperation, which in turn shapes the nature of the 
subjects when engaging in social intercourse.
 McClellan n.103.116
 Capital n.73 chapter 1 s.4. 117
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consciousness and corrupts their production relations into 'fantastic social relations 
between things'.   The common interest here is the marketplace, whose laws appear 118
independent from, and as constraints upon the subject acting in the market.  Man 
becomes merely an appendage to the exchange of commodities rather than their 
creator.  In this guise he can only relate to other men as owners of property, a social 
form which obscures their real relations as producers of those objects.  This is the 
distorting effect of capitalism and the commodity form upon the consciousness of 
man.119
This perverted portrayal of society is instead advanced by Hobbes and Kant as the 
hypothetical natural state of man.  The form of private property is presented as a 
natural right, and extension of man's exercise of freedom.  The act of exchange 
through contract is lauded as the natural source of mutual obligation and cooperation. 
Where Hobbes and Kant insist upon the form of equivalent exchange as the basic 
rationality between equal subjects, Marx reveals the hidden inequality of surplus-value 
which originates in extracting from labour value above its market price.   The dictates 120
of Reason which arise from this capitalist conception of society are taken by Hobbes 
and Kant to be inevitable and natural.  The fundamentally alienated state of the subject 
is hidden by elevating the reified form of private property into the natural form of social 
relations.  As in the state of civil society, the historically specific rules of the 
marketplace are preserved in reified form as the enduring state of nature. 
The same criticisms of how Hobbes and Kant reify the interests of liberalism into an 
enduring common interest of humanity, and the interests of capitalism into a 
hypothetical state of nature, may be applied to their conceptions of metaphysical 
Reason.   Man's consciousness under the social conditions of capitalism and 121
liberalism still exist in a state of alienation.  Since alienated man is unable to relate 
immediately to his sociality, so he perceives himself to be constrained by the demands 
of the market to specialise and earn his subsistence, by the demands of other men 
which are hostile to his own, and by the demands of civil society to conform upon 
 Ibid. pg.99118
 Marx discusses this perversion of social relations by objects of property in the context of lumber laws: 119
Karl Marx, and Friedrich Engels  Preface and Introduction to A Contribution to the Critique of Political 
Economy. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1976.
 Capital n.73 vol.I chapters 9-10.  Marx's theory of surplus-value is based on the differing values of 120
labour power, where the cost of reproducing labour power is lower than the value able to be abstracted 
from that labour.  See David Harvey n.83, Companion to Marx's Capital chapter 4.
 These are essentially elements of the superstructure misidentified as the prima facie reality.  Tabak, n.121
85 chapter 4.
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threat of violence.  For Hobbes and Kant this alienated state of being is portrayed as 
the inevitable lot of mankind.  By extension that alienated consciousness is portrayed 
as the image of immutable Reason which acts to reconcile man's essentially self-
regarding nature to his greater common interests.  Reason is the reified form of 
consciousness, just as civil society is the reified form of bourgeois ideals, and the state 
of nature the reified form of the capitalist market.
1.7 Law as Ideology
Marx's systematic rejection of ideal conceptions of human nature and society poses a 
problem for establishing legal normativity.  For Hobbes and Kant the normative force of 
law lies in its capacity to advance the ends of humanity.  Under their respective 
conceptions of the human condition, a lawful or rightful condition is necessary to 
realise the fate of humanity in the ends of peace and morality.  Insofar as the subject 
conforms to the dictates of Reason he is consciously fulfilling his potential to be fully 
human.  In this sense law-making represents an act of autonomy; it is a conscious and 
autonomous act to better fulfil the human potential.  Legal normativity is the promise of 
human fulfilment through the active striving by the human subject towards the higher 
goals of morality and justice. 
In contrast to the necessity of autonomous action towards a moral humanity, Marx 
conceives of humanity in a dialectical relationship with nature which ends in nature 
becoming fully humanised.   Man is related immediately to the products of his labour 122
and is free to produce without the constraints of necessity.  It is a state of de-alienation 
which is only possible under the social conditions of communism, a condition which 
cannot be actively brought about, but must mature within the womb of its preceding 
social structure.   This is not to assert that Marx is given over to materialist 123
determination, for the Marxian man is always the active force in reproducing his 
conditions of existence.  However Marx's formula of alienation may amount to a denial 
of the possibility of true legal normativity.  Because of the presence of class conflict, 
any dominant theory of social norms is deemed to be ideological, the ideal form of 
 Tabak n.85 chapter 1.122
 GI pg.72-82 where Marx illustrates how the epochs in history are characterised by differing degrees of 123
division of labour, asserting that capitalism matured in the womb of feudalism.  Cf. Tabak n.85 for 
argument that communism is only a historically specific arrangement made necessary by the growth of 
capitalism, and not the teleological end of human society.
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class interest.  Dictating the norms for behaviour is attempting to preserve an 
historically specific mode of production and preventing it from being superseded. 
Expressions of social normativity are the products of alienated consciousness which 
do not further the advancement of humanity.  Only labour is truly transformative, and 
when the subject is no longer alienated there remains no need for such ideologies.124
1.7.1 Ephemerality of law
Marx does not deny categorically the significance of law and State within society, 
merely their pretensions to ideal status.  As recognised in the preceding discussion on 
the common interest, Marx himself saw the instrumental value of ideals, expressed in 
the form of State and by extension its laws, religion, and other social institutions.  125
Such social forms are needed to stabilise and promote the functioning of production 
relations as determined by the existing productive forces.  Social forms are depicted 
as serving a functional role of enabling the productive forces of society to function and 
increase.   Social forms by themselves carry no determining force against the real 126
relations of production, consequently law as a social form can only be determined by 
the prevalent modes of production.   Law as a form of consciousness for Marx 127
possesses no determining potency, for it is merely a reflection of how man perceives 
his world through a consciousness conditioned by his material state, a consciousness 
to be destroyed and reproduced instantly upon a change in his material state.128
In direct contradistinction to Hobbes' and Kant's theories of State and law, it is not 
these concepts and institutions which are the determinants of history.  Authority and 
law are not determinants of man’s proper end, but are products of his life-process, 
alienated from him and reified to rule over society.  Civil society is not the ideal social 
form as dictated by unerring Reason or nature, but only a manifestation of the social-
being of man expressed in varying forms necessitated by the specific relations of 
 EPM pg.348-358 where Marx details what communism entails for human emancipation, and how 124
human history begins.  For the seminal theory of law withering away under communism see Evgeniĭ B. 
Pashukanis, Law and Marxism : A General Theory. London: Ink Links, 1978.
 Althusser on ISA n.97.  Tabak n.85 chapters 5 & 6.125
 GI pg.72-82.  Such a functional theory of social forms is expounded by Cohen who defends historical 126
materialism led by the productive forces, the expansion of which is the function of the corresponding 
production and social forms.  G. A. Cohen, Karl Marx's Theory of History : A Defence. Expanded ed. 
Princeton Paperbacks. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001.
 Marx uses the example of laws changing to admit new forms of appropriation, such as insurance 127
companies, which in reality are new modes of cooperation. GI pg.100.
 Ibid. pg.41-43128
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production.  Analogously law is not the final arbiter of justice and obligation, but simply 
a pale reflection of the prevailing modes of production and the ideas of the dominant 
social form depicted idealistically.  In a state of communism, with the supersession of 
private property these disparate modes of existence will be unified, and the alienation 
of man from the products of his labour overcome, implicating the eradication of State 
and law.   Hobbes and Kant posited the role of State and law as essential aspects of 129
human society.  For Marx, State and law were essential to human society only insofar 
they served to advance the historically specific productive forces.  Because the state 
of consciousness corresponds with the economic stage of development, social forms 
are liable to radical change and the forms of ideology are incapable of an independent 
history.   Attempts to construct an enduring theory of law’s normativity or legitimacy 130
risks reifying ephemeral ideas into ideology.
1.8 A state of impasse
The foregoing discussion seems to culminate in a state of impasse between the 
oppositions of ideal Reason and material dialectics, with neither theoretical approach 
offering an adequate account of embodied normativity.  The accounts offered by 
Hobbes and Kant as representatives of a Reason-based approach to normativity tend 
to increasingly efface the subject’s material aspect as Reason is elevated to a higher 
metaphysical plane, and the body consigned to a mere empirical instrument.  In spite 
of each theorist’s concessions to the significance and necessity of material being, that 
mode of being is strictly denied as a source of meaningful normative content.  The 
result is a dependence on a theoretically precarious concept of Reason to unilaterally 
determine the normative terms of embodied human action.  
In contrast a materialist approach as represented by Marx begins from a sound base 
of the material conditions of living, however encounters difficulties when attempting to 
integrate the non-empirical normative aspect.  Marx opts to maintain materialism at the 
 Pashukanis n.124.129
 GI pg.41-43; Preface pg.424-426130
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expense of denying social norms objective validity.   Social forms such as law claim 131
normative force only as an instrument to a mode of production capable of furthering 
the productive forces in society, and must be discarded in order for human progress to 
continue.   It is the innate productivity of the human subject which drives the creation 132
of social forms which will ultimately be superseded once emancipation is achieved. 
I believe that neither of these approaches provide an adequate theoretical foundation 
for legal normativity which unifies the subject’s material being with the non-material 
norms of law into a moment of embodied normative action.  Hobbes’ and Kant’s 
accounts dismiss the body as a contumely object for Reason to tame, whilst Marx’s 
account portrays enduring norms as ossified class ideologies.  The former seeks 
normativity in the metaphysical, the latter tends towards determinism and denies 
normativity of substance and meaning.  
 The extent to which the material ‘base’ of economic activity determines the ‘superstructure’ of social 131
forms and vice versa differs amongst Marxian scholars.  Structuralists and historicists such as Althusser 
and Cohen would allow only an instrumental significance to social forms, whereas Pashukanis arguably 
offers a more dynamic interpretation.  However in almost no Marxian theory are norms such as law or 
religion treated as valid determinants or goals for human action, as to do so would be anathema to Marx’s 
philosophy.
 At best they serve a functional purpose of enabling production; Pashukanis n.124.  At worst they 132
operate to oppress and retard human development; Althusser n.95.
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2 
Foucault and Subjectivity 
In the first chapter I have identified and analysed what I perceive to be an over-
dependence on a concept of ideal Reason for the normative foundation of law, and a 
corresponding neglect of the corporeality of being.  I explored this theme through the 
theories of Hobbes and Kant, and by extension those modern legal theories influenced 
by their philosophies which also exhibit some variant of this theme.  I also explored 
Marx’s material dialectics as a possible method of reintegrating the body into 
normative action, but found his theory lacking because of its tendency towards 
economic determinism.  As things stand, the chasm between norms and their material 
foundations has yet to be bridged by an account of embodied normativity which I 
believe entails a legal subject unified in mind and body, whose actions materialise law 
in an undetermined fashion.
To construct such a legal subject I will proceed in this chapter to explore Foucault’s 
theory of subjectivity as a potential theoretical foundation for legal normativity. 
Foucault presents a suitable foil for Marx and Marxian theories of the subject, as he 
pursues the common aim of constructing a material conception of subject, but rejects 
that structuralism which characterises much of Marxian theory, and which I have also 
critiqued as the source of economic determinism.  Instead Foucault offers a less rigid 
genealogical method with explicit emphasis on social forms as a constituting factor in 
subject formation, another notion largely denied by Marxian theories.  A subject whose 
formation is not constrained by an economically determined society or a structured 
view of historical evolution offers the possibility of normative self-determination. 
Moreover Foucault’s emphasis on the individual body as the site of discipline is in 
common with my claim that the individual subject is the locus of legal normativity.
Firstly I will analyse Foucault's theory and compare it to those of Hobbes, Kant, and 
Marx.  The points of comparison will be centred on each theorist's conception of the 
human subject, how that subject is able to exist in a social setting, and specifically the 
role of law in providing a normative force enabling social cohesion.  I will not follow 
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Foucault’s genealogical approach, instead I will adopt a conceptual analysis which I 
believe is better suited to addressing the problem of legal normativity.  Eschewing a 
strictly genealogical approach would also avoid collapsing all normative concepts into 
mere historical effects and denying their normative aspect, or sliding into some form of 
radical relativism.  Despite these potential problems, Foucault’s theory nevertheless 
offers valuable insights into the processes of subject formation, notably the body as an 
instrument and object of power.
2.1 Foucault’s genealogical critique
The Foucauldian project of envisioning a modern society dominated by biopower 
represents a fundamentally different approach compared to preceding philosophies. 
Eschewing analysis of abstract principles in favour of instances of minutiae and 
concrete examples, Foucault's theory is able better to approximate the immediate 
experience of a subject in society.  Moreover in constructing a discourse from the 
material subject in his entirety as social being, Foucault is able to give adequate 
attention to the body of the subject as a source of value and knowledge.  This has the 
advantage of weaving a discourse which omits no part of the subject, by placing the 
body and its material experiences at the forefront of study.
Foucault's genealogical approach which emphasises instances of experience as 
unique and irreducible  results in a theory of historical analysis as opposed to a 1
science with discernible principles.  Whilst this has the advantage of placing theoretical 
concepts in their historical context, it also renders the application of theory to different 
contexts less certain.  Coupled with Foucault's tendency to write of historical concepts 
in their ideal form,  as if such events were absolute, complicates efforts to identify his 2
critique as opposed to a narrative description of events.  As such it is difficult to 
abstract the substantive theoretical elements of subjectivity formation from the 
historically specific events they are embedded in, and replicate them in the particular 
case of legal subjectivity.   Alternatively if subject formation is entirely determined by 3
 A methodology Foucault derives from Nietzsche; see John Ransom, Foucault's Discipline : The Politics 1
of Subjectivity, Durham: Duke University Press, 1997 chapter 1.
 Ransom, ibid.2
 Foucault’s treatment of law is a non-starter for legal normativity, as he relegates law to an obsolete form 3
of power; see below.
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social mechanisms, then Foucault’s theory encounters the problem of determinism 
which I have rejected in Marx.  
Nevertheless Foucault's theory offers a rich and fertile account of the human subject in 
society, with the advantage of focusing on how the body of the subject is not only 
incorporated in his development, but also forms the site upon which expressions of 
knowledge and power are inscribed.   By beginning from the concrete experiences of 4
the body in its various relationships, Foucault allows the body a history independent of 
metaphysical concepts which are so privileged in Western philosophy.  For Foucault 
the corporeal mode of existence is suitably placed at the centre of his account of the 
subject, who is a both the source of knowledge and the object of power.5
Foucault offers an historical account of the body in society which, having undergone 
various epochs of development, culminates in a modern society of discipline wherein 
every crevice of life is studied, regulated, and administered.   Through the forces of 6
disciplinary mechanisms and the art of governance, the subject's body becomes a 
valuable site of 'political anatomy' which is fought over and moulded by a multitude of 
disciplines and governmental regulations.   The envisioned end result is a well-oiled 7
machine of society comprised of fully disciplined subjectivities working in concert to 
reproduce the administered society.
2.2 The Foucauldian subject
Explication of the Foucauldian subject necessitates a discussion of Foucault’s 
conceptions of power and knowledge and their inextricable connection to the subject.  8
His departure from traditional conceptions of knowledge is particularly pertinent in 
comparing his theory with those of Hobbes and Kant, who equate objective enduring 
truths with morality.  For Hobbes and Kant the possibility of a knowledge acquired 
 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish : The Birth of the Prison Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979, 4
(hereafter DP), pg.27 
 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality. Vol. 1, The Will to Knowledge, London: Penguin, 1998, 5
(hereafter HoS I), pg.17-21.
 Foucault, DP pg.195-197.6
 Ibid. pg.24-27; pg.135-1407
 Although Foucault discusses power in great detail in his works, his central concern remains the subject, 8
and how he is produced through power relations.  See Michel Foucault, 'The Subject and Power.' Critical 
Inquiry 8,(4) pg.777.
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through Reason which transcends material particularity guarantees the universal 
validity of moral laws, whose contents inform the necessary norms for human society, 
and whose universality validates their normative status.  I see this conception of true 
knowledge as immutable and independent of the subject, but nevertheless accessible 
through inner reflection, as a fundamental cornerstone in both theorists’ conceptions of 
legal normativity.  Power is also heavily implicated in this model as a force possessed 
by the subject which must be submitted to Reason and knowledge in order for human 
society to advance.  Sovereign power in particular must conform to the dictates of 
objective morality in order to claim any normative force.  Whilst Marx’s conceptions of 
power and knowledge are grounded in the material acts of labour and consciousness, 
I would argue that his idea of emancipation as social power and consciousness free 
from alienation implies there is innate within the subject true knowledge and power 
over his life, which is realised once the necessary material conditions are achieved. 
The idea that power and knowledge are already present pure and fully formed within 
the subject, to be realised through inner reflection or objectifying labour is the common 
notion between these theories.  The conception of a subject who exercises power and 
knowledge, but whose essence is beyond their influence, so able to serve as the 
benchmark for ideal critique, is what Foucault challenges in his theory.9
2.2.1 Subject and power
The Foucauldian subject is a product of relationships of power, which also determine 
the possible fields of knowledge; the subject is both a source and an object of 
knowledge, and a conduit for that power.   Herein lies a fundamental difference in 10
Foucault's conception of power compared to Hobbes’ and Kant’s, and to an extent 
Marx’s.  For Hobbes and Kant power is predominantly conceptualised as a possession 
or capacity imbued in the individual by virtue of his natural state; the individual is a 
source of various forms of power which he may exercise over others, typically in 
manners of coercion.  In the state of nature this power is rampant and tenuously 
constrained by the will of the individual through the dictates of his Reason.  This 
arbitrary power which is potentially destructive presents a problem for which Hobbes 
and Kant devised the state of civil society as the only possible solution.  In the civil 
society each subject's naturally endowed powers are constrained under equal terms, 
 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things, Routledge Classics. London: Routledge, 2002, pg. xiv.  See 9
Sacha Golob, ‘Subjectivity, Reflection and Freedom in Later Foucault’ International Journal of 
Philosophical Studies 23(5) 666-688 for her comparison of Foucault's and Kant’s conceptions of reflection.
 Foucault’s conception of subject is foremost an ‘effect and object’ of power; DP pg.192.   10
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by surrendering part of their power to the sovereign who exercises this collective 
power for the preservation of peace.  Sovereign power is a conglomeration of those 
powers denied to each individual, concentrated and amplified into powers necessary 
to ensure the survival of the State.  As a result the individual subject confronts 
sovereign power as an external constraint upon his freedom, thus giving legal power 
its liberal model as a perimeter of prohibited and permissible fields of freedom.   For 11
Hobbes and Kant power is a relatively static factor which presents only a problem of 
proper partitioning and legitimate exercise.
Marx by comparison envisions power as a valuable source of constructive energy, 
specifically his conception of labour power as both the means of realising the 
conditions of freedom, and the most direct expression of the human's species-life.  12
The problem Marx presents is the alienation of that positive social power which is 
captured by class interests, and made to serve the interests of a particular group.  For 
Marx this social power may be directed through various means to serve either the 
ephemeral interests of capitalism, or the enduring interests of human society.  Thus 
social power is inherently constructive, but the source of that power remains with the 
individual in the form of his life force and labour power. 
In contrast Foucault adopts a conception of power which is altogether more mundane 
but also more insidious.  Foucault defines power in terms of relationships, specifically 
the everyday instances of relationships where there exists an unequal status or 
standing.  Foucault gives the example of a father and son kinship as one such power 
relationship which is not directly magnified into an analogy of State power over the 
citizen, but is part of a matrix which elides into other relations of power.   Hence for 13
Foucault the entire social fabric is comprised of such matrices of power which form a 
continuum and are invested in the individual bodies they come into contact with.  This 
new form of power actively forms and constitutes the individual and makes his 
subjectivity possible.  Instead of any individual or group holding and exercising power 
over others in the form of coercion, power is actually invested in the individual by virtue 
 For both theorists law is concerned only with the coordination of external actions, and not with the 11
internal motivations of actors.  Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan : Or, The Matter, Forme and Power of a 
Commonwealth, Ecclesiasticall and Civill: London: Printed for Andrew Crooke, 1651: Reprinted 
Cambridge, 1904 chapter XXVIII.  Immanuel Kant, and Mary J Gregor,  The Metaphysics of Morals. 
Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy. New York: CUP, 1996, Introduction to the Doctrine of Right 
6.230-231.
 Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. New Ed.]. ed. London: Lawrence & Wishart, 12
1970 pg.328-329.
 Foucault, HoS I pg.92-94.  See also Ransom n.2.13
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of his relationship to others.  This implies that there is no individual subject outside the 
network of power relations which constitute him, as power is not a possession to be 
held, but a relationship to be engaged and experienced.   Moreover this implies that 14
one individual is not fixed in the amount of power he exhibits, as his position may shift 
as he moves through the various matrices of the social network.  Foucault's 
conception of power is far removed from that sovereign or class power which he insists 
have been superseded.15
2.2.2 Subject and knowledge 
Analogous to Foucault's conception of power is his conception of knowledge, which is 
intimately implicated in the former.  Within this power-knowledge matrix is the 
privileged position of truth, whose validity is placed in question.  For Hobbes and Kant 
truth and knowledge are self-evident facts which are discernible through a proper 
application of their science, specifically through the reflections of Reason.  Hobbes' 
empiricist approach to knowledge begins from correct identification of objects, which 
through deductive reasoning leads to truths regarding the human subject which are 
eternal and immutable.   Similarly for Kant knowledge is obtained through rigorous 16
application of the principles of Reason, and although one may never know the nature 
of things in themselves, one may nevertheless discern the categorical principles of 
morality through transcendental Reason.   For both theorists the locus of knowledge 17
is the knowing subject, the active cogitans which, by employing his distinctive faculty 
of Reason, may arrive at true conceptions of his self and the world.  
For Foucault this privileged position of the knowing subject and his access to truth is 
an historical result of a form of truth creation which stems from the confessional.  18
This procedure of producing truth and knowledge is based on an assumption that truth 
has an absolute and immutable quality which is spontaneous and independent of the 
subject.  Hence philosophy needs only to look inward to the subject’s consciousness in 
order to retrieve certainties of truth free from the taints of power, whereas, in fact, the 
 Ibid. pg.96-9714
 Ibid. pg.89; DP chapter 115
 Hobbes, n.11 chapter V16
 Immanuel Kant, Gregor, and Timmermann,  Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Rev. Ed. / 17
Translation Revised by Jens Timmermann. ed. Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy. Cambridge: 
CUP, 2012 Section III.
 Foucault, HoS I pg.57-60.  This ‘scientia sexualis’ is contrasted with ‘ars erotica’, or the art of sexual 18
practice, which is focused more on mastery and use than on attaining truth.
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confessional is a relationship which is invested with power given to the confidant who 
is placed in a position of authority by the confessor, who gives his truth value only by 
its intimate relation to himself.   Foucault categorically denies the validity of a truth of 19
oneself, or knowledge of morality which is guaranteed by the apparent certainty and 
immutable quality of the subject's consciousness.  For Foucault there can be no 
power-neutral knowledge.   This critique reveals a significant assumption by Hobbes 20
and Kant of a subject whose constancy of nature and Reason together provide an 
objective source from which to deduce immutable knowledge and morality.  In denying 
the possibility of a pure and objective knowledge, Foucault has precluded dependence 
upon such knowledge as a possible guarantee for normative validity.
Marx's approach to the subject of truth and knowledge is much more nuanced, as he 
shares Foucault's denial of the validity of an eternal and immutable Reason.  Instead 
the Marxian subject comes into his consciousness through the objective life of his 
labour, and is capable of altering his consciousness through the material conditions of 
his being.  However Marx does not deny the possibility of a truth which is the ultimate 
expression of human emancipation.  For Marx the human subject indicates a 
necessary species-life which is capable of fulfilment in the condition of labour free from 
need.   What is obstructing the attainment of this true state of being is the presence of 21
alienation created by the conditions of capitalist production.   The emancipated 22
conditions of production will provide the subject with the full consciousness of his self, 
analogous to Hobbes' and Kant's state of complete determination by the faculty of 
Reason.  The intermediate state of alienation may be likened to a mistake in 
reasoning, or misidentification of truth.
For Foucault the fundamental difference lies in his questioning the very possibility of a 
knowledge that is not invested with power.  On the contrary power determines the 
possible fields of knowledge, which is developed and used in a tactic of discipline. 
Foucault gives the example of sexuality becoming a field of knowledge and a method 
of accessing the truth of the human subject, only as a result of the problematisation of 
sex contemporaneous with a growing population and consolidation of middle class 
social power.   Any field of knowledge which centres upon the subject takes him as 23
 Ibid. pg.58-60; pg.64-6719
 Foucault, DP pg.2720
 Thomas Wartenberg,''Species-Being' and 'Human Nature' in Marx.' Human Studies 5(2): 77-95.21
 D. McLellan, ‘Marx's View of the Unalienated Society’ The Review of Politics, 31(4), 459-465.22
 Foucault, HoS I pg.115-12323
 50
the object of investigation, but only through power relationships which define and fix 
the truth of that knowledge onto his body.  Experience is never 'true' in itself, but is 
given its truth and meaning retrospectively by the discourse which produced it.   Thus 24
for Foucault the subject may never come to know his self or the world in an absolute or 
transcendental fashion, for the possible fields of knowledge are always already defined 
and imbued with power relations.25
The combined effect of Foucault's critique of power and knowledge in relation to the 
individual subject amounts to a denial of the subject as a position of critique.  In fact it 
may be fair to say that the 'Foucauldian subject' is a theoretical fiction, so dispersed is 
he along the relations of power and knowledge which constitute him.   In the theories 26
of Hobbes, Kant, and Marx there is discernible a relatively stable conception of the 
individual subject.  The Hobbesian or Kantian subject who is beset with natural 
passions, but also possesses a faculty of Reason which defines his humanity and 
provides the means to attain his ideal human state.  The Marxian subject whose 
species-life leads inevitably to a state of freedom characterised by full self-realisation 
through productive labour.  Both theoretical approaches describe an ideal state of 
being which finds its ground in the present, albeit in an imperfect fashion.  The human 
subject in his pursuit of his ideal humanity provides the means and position of critique.
In contrast the Foucauldian subject who is the product of power and knowledge 
relations appears to lack a corresponding ideal form.  Any knowledge he may gain of 
his self will have been fed to him through a discipline which has reproduced countless 
other subjectivities.  He is no discrete individual at all, but is only fixed in his 
individuality by the spheres of knowledge traversing his body.  The more he becomes 
a specified and individual subject, the more he approaches a fully disciplined and 
knowable object of power and governance.  Such is the logical result of the trends of 
disciplinary tactics Foucault details.  It remains to be seen whether Foucault does 
indeed propound such an individual as the ultimate end result of society, and the 
problems such a conception of subject poses for the possibility of autonomy and 
normative action.
 Ransom n.2 chapter 224
 Golob n.925
 Although Foucault in his later works did retreat from the more hardline deterministic conceptions of the 26
subject which characterised his earlier work, and attempt to return some form of freedom and self-
determination to the subject.  See Golob n.9.  Cf. Charles Scott, 'Foucault, Ethics, and the Fragmented 
Subject.' Research in Phenomenology 22(1): 104-37 on how fragmentation of subject presents a different 
form of ethics.
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2.3 Disciplining the body
The first step in constituting a disciplined subject lies in establishing complete control 
over the body through exercise and repetition, rendering it docile and productive.  27
Instrumental in this process are the disciplinary institutions which Foucault identifies as 
correlating with the growth of a 'political anatomy' from 19th century onwards.   With 28
the decline of pestilence and death, technologies of life became necessary to support 
the growing population, to turn subjects into economically productive but politically 
docile bodies.  Within that process the aspects of the body under discipline are 
studied, their results amassed into expanding areas of knowledge about the human 
subject, which in turn reinforces more efficient disciplinary methods and fuels the 
colonisation of greater parts of the body.  The end result is an individual whose every 
aspect may be registered, measured, compartmentalised, and fixed according to a 
population norm.  It is a process of enforcing conformity through normalisation.29
Foucault analysed several dominant institutions which first employed disciplinary 
techniques upon the body; the military, the monastery, and the school.   From this 30
comparison he abstracted elements which he argued are characteristic of disciplinary 
mechanisms and come to define the docile body.   Firstly the body must be confined 31
within a space of monotonous discipline, individual inmates must be partitioned and 
ordered according to function, efficiency, and other criteria.  Secondly everyday activity 
must be controlled and structured down to the most minute of gestures to maximise 
efficiency of movement, and to avoid idleness and time-wasting.  Thirdly time is used 
as a measure of development and accumulation of skill within the body.  Lastly the 
organic body is composed around inorganic machines to increase efficiency.   'The 32
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disciplined body is cellular, organic, genetic, combinatory'.   The overall effect of a 33
disciplinary institution is to produce bodies imbued with a certain set of skills through 
rigorous physical training and subjection.  Such is the procedure Foucault describes as 
the successful subjection of the individual through his body.   By taking complete 
control over the physical body and forcing it to submit to repetition and habit, the 
individual becomes ingrained with that automatic reaction.
A contemporaneous process is the normalisation of behaviour which aims to establish 
a proper norm and enforce conformity to that norm.  Firstly the subject must be 
observed in order to gather information, which leads to the construction of architecture 
in disciplinary institutions conducive to observation.  Secondly normalising judgement 
is used as the standard for punishment; arbitrary yet natural criteria are chosen, and 
the subjects ranked according to that criteria to establish a population average or norm 
against which performance is evaluated.  Discipline is achieved not only by 
punishment for non-conformity, but also by rewards for good performance, such that 
within homogeneous groups there are differentiated ranks which determine the status 
of each individual at any time.  Lastly the examination process is undergone as the 
ritualistic reaffirmation of hierarchy, norm, but also the truth of oneself, the 'case' of 
each individual judged according to its particular values.   Every disciplinary 34
mechanism utilises these methods of training to establish an internally coherent 
system of norms and their corresponding punishments.35
For Foucault these centres of discipline are the harbingers of a disciplinary society 
awash with technologies of the body, which have become detached from their 
respective institutions and 'swarm' the social fabric.   As the Foucauldian subject 36
becomes increasingly specified in every aspect of his character, a 'case' is made of 
him which may be passed from one discipline to another, and constitutes his entire life 
history.  The subject is disciplined from the moment of his birth, through the 
surveillance of the family, the school, and other social institutions.  He learns what is 
required of a model student, an obedient child, a responsible citizen.  For every 
transgression of the norm he is punished, and for good behaviour he is rewarded. 
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Hence the subject's level of tolerance for punishment is dramatically lowered, as he is 
persistently punished in every manner of his life.37
In conjunction to this persistent process of normalisation, Foucault identifies a trend of 
fixing the individual in his' individuality'.  Actions and behaviours which were discrete 
events come to be fixed to the actor and made to reveal an ostensibly innate aspect of 
his character.   Foucault gives the example of madness, which in the Classical age 38
simply expressed an absence of Reason or degree of Unreason, with the advent of 
psychiatry became a medicalised and documented phenomenon, identifiable as an 
inherent pathology of the individual.   Similarly the act of sexual perversion such as 39
sodomy, once limited to the act itself, now comes to be attached to and define a 
distinct sexuality.   Thus in this process it may be seen how Foucault's power 40
knowledge dynamic operates to discipline the subject, to make him an objectified 
individual, and teach him the truths about himself and the proper way of behaving 
according to that truth.
2.3.1 Subjection of self
A distinct aspect of discipline which operates to reinforce generalised discipline, but 
also directly produce individual subjectivities, is the pressure to self-regulate, to make 
oneself the object of self-discipline and reflexive behaviour.  This habit of self-discipline 
for Foucault may be achieved through two processes; the device of panopticism, and 
taking the self as the object of ethics.  The Panopticon, a perfect incarceration device 
envisioned by Bentham utilises the power of the omnipresent gaze to monitor and 
correct behaviour.   In the Panopticon each inmate is visible to the surveyor, without 41
the inmate having corresponding visibility of the surveyor or other inmates.  It induces 
a 'state of conscious and permanent visibility' which engenders self-correction and 
automatic submission to power.   The individual is always aware of being observed, 42
 Ibid. pg.302-30337
 I would argue this insight on subjectivisation is why Foucault’s theory is often employed by identity and 38
gender theories.  See Judith Butler, Gender Trouble : Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. 1999 Part I 
section V and Part II section II.  Cf. David Farrugia, 'Exploring Stigma: Medical Knowledge and the 
Stigmatisation of Parents of Children Diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder.' Sociology of Health & 
Illness 31(7): 1011-027, on the specific case of autism as a fixed social identity.  
 Michel Foucault, and Richard Howard. Madness and Civilization : A History of Insanity in the Age of 39
Reason: Routledge Classics. London: Routledge, 2001 (hereafter MaC) pg.186-188
 Foucault, HoS I pg.45-4940
 Jeremy Bentham, The Panopticon Writings, London ; New York: Verso, 1995. 41
 Foucault, DP pg.200-20142
 54
so learns to observe his own behaviour, thereby inscribing the power relation onto 
himself.  It is a power which is exercised from the inside, and precludes the necessity 
for external coercion.
For Foucault the principle of panopticism, namely surveillance, is vital in facilitating the 
deinstitutionalisation of disciplinary mechanisms, turning them into flexible methods of 
control, and enabling them to swarm throughout the social fabric.   By being spread 43
along the networks of surveillance exercised by centres of discipline, whole 
communities may be controlled and disciplined at low economic cost.  Foucault gives 
the example of a school which uses parents to survey and discipline the children, or, 
vice versa, the school comes under surveillance through the children's behaviour 
outside its walls.   Such networks of surveillance repeat to produce increasingly 44
homogeneous communities and subjectivities.
Alternatively the individual may also become self-subjecting by thinking of himself as 
an ethical subject.  Foucault uses the example of sexual practice and charts the 
genealogy of sex as a moral problematic through the prescriptions the ancient Greeks 
propounded regarding the proper use of sex in caring for the self.   An analogy may 45
be drawn with modern self-ethics such as the proper care and conditioning of one's 
productive abilities; the moral imperative to embrace learning, cultivate skills and 
hobbies, the productive use of time and avoidance of idleness.   The mundane 46
cautions and commonplace wisdoms which are proliferated in modern society as self-
evident truths, but are in fact effects of a particular attitude towards the value of work 
and the sin of idleness.47
2.3.2 Social or self determinism?
There is a similarity between Foucault's use of the disciplines and Marx's treatment of 
the factory assembly line.  Both devices operate through subjecting the body to 
repetitive and mundane tasks to deprive the subject of independent thought and make 
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him an extension of the machine.   However there is a significant difference; whereas 48
for Marx the human potential is stifled and stunted as living labour is made subservient 
to dead labour,  for Foucault the disciplining serves to make the subject more 49
productive.  The oppressive setting of a factory or school serves to produce ever more 
efficient bodies by instilling them with skills otherwise not possible.   This difference 
stems from their fundamental conceptions of the subject, which for Marx is a species-
being with innate powers of labour and creativity capable of infinite modes of 
expression.  For Foucault the body appears a much more mundane matter, it must be 
trained and worked upon in order to be skilful; creativity and productivity must be 
taught.  Hence for the Foucauldian subject discipline is that which constitutes and 
makes him possible.
A similarity may also be drawn between Foucault's self-disciplining subject and 
Hobbes' and Kant's moral subject who acts voluntarily in accordance with the rules of 
Reason, without the need for external constraint.  For Hobbes and Kant the ability to 
reflexively censure one's behaviour is indicative of a freedom and autonomy which 
separates man from beast.  Whether Foucault envisions self-discipline to be 
emancipatory or simply a further gain for the disciplinary mechanisms is slightly more 
ambiguous, particularly with regard to thinking oneself an ethical subject, an exercise 
which does appear goal-oriented and teleological.   With panopticism the dilemma is 50
less apparent, as forcibly ingrained self-correction becomes akin to the training of 
animals through reinforcements of pain and pleasure, replicated on humans capable of 
second-order thinking.  The gaze which represents the threat of punishment is 
constantly present in the imagination, so that subject is reduced to a state of perpetual 
subjection through the power of his own mind.  I would argue this is a far cry from the 
autonomous moral agency envisioned by Hobbes and Kant.
These comparisons reveal a potential problematic for Foucault's theory of the subject 
which is the distinct lack of a teleology, an ideal towards which society may strive. 
Foucault refers to ‘resistance’ as the path to freedom, and self ethics as a form of self-
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determination,  however even if such self-determination free from power is achieved, 51
this still leaves the question of what ends should this subject pursue.  Whilst Foucault 
presents a commendable analysis of the disciplinary mechanisms and their modes of 
operation, arguably the mechanisms by themselves cannot hope to approximate a 
value order.  Perhaps realising the possibility and potential for resistance and change 
is the more pressing issue for Foucault than establishing substantive norms to guide 
change.  Nevertheless I consider it difficult to claim that the Foucauldian subject in 
conforming with law is engaging in meaningful normative action as opposed to being 
determined by the disciplinary forces employed by legal institutions.      52
2.4 The Foucauldian Society
Having explored the Foucauldian conception of subject as a productive body 
constituted through power and knowledge, I proceed now to examine how a 
Foucauldian society of such subjects is constructed, with a specific regard to the role 
of law.  Unlike Hobbes, Kant, and Marx whose conceptions of the subject already 
provide an ideal model of society with a robust normative content which empirical 
models may approximate, Foucault’s lack of a distinct teleology means the relationship 
between subject and society is more apparent in functional terms, but less so in 
normative terms.  In other words whilst Foucault emphatically relates how shifting 
power and knowledge dynamics constitute different types of societies in history and 
produce different types of subjects, the latter is increasingly subsumed and determined 
by social relations of power such that its status as a locus of normative action is 
effaced.  As social mechanisms determine subjectivities, it is difficult to imagine the 
subject as the active producer, as opposed to the mere product of social relations, 
except in a limited and deterministic fashion.  In specific regard to law, a legal 
subjectivity that is fully determined by the disciplinary mechanisms used by power is 
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only capable of reproducing the norms of law in a mechanical way which I would 
hesitate to portray as an instance of normative legal action.
2.4.1 Law and power
The Foucauldian society comprises of a network of continuous and referential power 
relations, which work in concert to produce hegemonic forms of power.  These in turn 
find their object and mode of expression in the body of the subject to create a society 
of subjects with certain characteristics.  For Foucault the modern society is typified by 
the techniques of discipline wrought on the subjects' body, but also by the art of 
governance of a population necessary for the flourishing of the State.  The two forms 
of power work in cooperation to create a bio-politics, based on 'political anatomy' and 
'governmentality'.   53
Because of the way in which Foucault conceives of power in his theory, rarely does he 
reference explicitly law understood in its form of State or juridical law.  For Foucault 
law is simply an expression of power, and the liberal model of juridico-political law is 
one form of power which has been superseded by newer modes of power.  Hence it is 
more conducive to analyse the forms of power and the function that law partakes in 
that power.  Foucault's seminal study of power and society is conducted through the 
specific phenomena of punishment.54
In Discipline and Punish Foucault conducts a genealogical study of the history and 
theories of punishment through three historical epochs.  Through this analysis he 
identifies the role juridical power serves in meting out punishment; through juridical 
judgment, condemnation of crime, and its hermeneutic approach to an aspect integral 
to itself.  Significantly, Foucault concludes that the power to punish is increasingly 
disavowed publicly by juridical power, which is fragmented to become an area for 
experts of science.   This dilution of the juridical element is in keeping with a general 55
shift in the form of power in modern society away from its old terms of force and 
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consent, legitimacy and illegitimacy.  This assertion has often led to an interpretation of 
Foucault as rejecting the relevance of law in modern society.56
However I would argue that this represents an impoverished reading of Foucault's 
theory, for the law retains a substantial role within the disciplinary society.  What 
Foucault has pronounced obsolete is not law itself, but that particular expression of 
power which presents itself as prohibitive and punitive, a simplistic model which 
Foucault associates with the juridical.   For the purposes of clarity the following 57
discussion will be structured along the three forms of power, monarchical, juridico-
political, disciplinary, which will be discussed in concert with their corresponding forms 
of punishment; torture, semiotics, imprisonment.  These pairings are not conceptually 
discrete, and for Foucault one form of power may exhibit all three forms of punishment 
simultaneously.  I will argue that Foucault reserves a specialised role for law in modern 
society which presents a challenge to law’s normative element.
2.4.2 Law and punishment
Foucault famously remarked we ‘have not cut off the head of the king',  specifically 58
referring to that form of sovereign power which is associated with the monarchy.  This 
power, asserts Foucault, exhibits itself through arbitrary and violent displays of force. 
It is a power which unabashedly allies itself with military might, and the people are 
simply subjugated to this sovereignty.  The law of the land is represented as the will of 
the sovereign, and any transgression regarded as a personal attack upon the 
sovereign's majesty.   Yet, simultaneously, there is a surfeit of illegalities which are not 59
only persistent, but tolerated.  These pockets of illegalities are dispersed based on 
right, so form the privileges of the aristocracy, and the customary infringements of the 
peasantry.  Thus monarchical power is characterised by arbitrariness, physical force, 
and a relatively immobile public.60
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The corresponding form of punishment is torture and public spectacle.  Because every 
transgression of sovereign will was seen as a personal injury, the sovereign must take 
the physical body of the criminal and mark him with the power of sovereign force.  The 
absolute sovereign power is demonstrated upon the criminal's body as a sign of the 
monarch's reinstatement of domination.   Moreover, the public character of this 61
punishment makes the spectating crowd co-adjudicators in the torture.  In an age 
where the primary instrument of juridical truth is confession extracted through torture, 
the criminal must repeat his confession publicly through speech and the mutilation of 
his body.  For Foucault this expression of monarchical power is exhibited most literally 
through the mutilated body.62
Foucault's second epoch is characterised by a juridico-political power which arguably 
finds most resemblance to the liberal model of juridical law.   Gone is the arbitrary 63
power of the monarch to be replaced by a transparent and coherent set of laws which 
may be organised hierarchically, and anchored in the common will.  Gone also are the 
old illegalities which were centred around rights, to be replaced by a new emphasis 
upon illegalities against property as the bourgeois class became dominant and 
desirous of protecting their interests.   Laws which were once the private will of the 64
sovereign, now must find their validity in the natural and moral order, such that their 
necessity must be immediately perceivable as natural and inevitable.  65
Correspondingly the form of punishment devised by the Reformists  was 66
characterised by a preoccupation with semiotics, specifically the symbolic value of 
punishment which must mirror the nature of the crime.   Hence the public spectacle 67
was transformed from one of instilling fear to public education.  The criminal is 
displayed as an example of the inevitability of punishment, and to teach the public the 
immediate connection between the crime and the punishment.  The purpose is to 
educate the masses to recognise their true interests in society as dictated by Reason 
through the creation of a 'punitive city'.  The old methods of confession were replaced 
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by common standards of truth, modelled upon the standards of Reason.  The 
Reformist punishment sought to influence the mind, and through it control the body.68
This epoch is arguably the golden age for liberal theories of law and power; a juridico-
political power modelled upon enlightened thought.  However for Foucault the shift 
was necessitated by a growing volatility in the people towards the raw expressions of 
sovereign power.  This restlessness was subdued only by a growing legalisation of 
social relations.  The dispersal of the juridical power throughout society was realised in 
the constitution of juridical subjects through the use of semiotic punishment.  69
However, the formal egalitarianism of juridico-political power concealed the actual 
inequalities which lay within society.  Moreover this masking of the actual disciplinary 
mechanisms already operating was necessary to ensure their successful continuation. 
Foucault's critique may be levelled directly against Hobbes' and Kant's theories of law 
which ostensibly draw their validity from the immutable rules of Reason, but which are 
bound up inextricably with a certain form of truth produced through punishment and 
power.70
Foucault's third epoch represents that disciplinary society which he argues has been 
the perpetual dream of rulers: not the state of nature and civil society, but the plague-
ridden city.   The latter is characterised not by a gay lawless festival, but rather by a 71
completely regimented society under constant surveillance and control.   Such is the 72
ideal disciplinary society which Foucault asserts is being constructed through 
disciplinary power.  In this society the form of law as juridical power has been 
superseded, for it is no longer the primary instrument in constituting the individual.  It is 
the head of the king which remains as a visible decoy to mask the real operations of 
discipline within the social institutions.
This shift of power from expressing itself in negative terms of constraint and coercion, 
in delineating areas of prohibited and permissible action, to a positive life affirming-
power was precipitated by a growing population.  The decline of pestilence and death 
from everyday lives means a decline in the significance of power over death.  Instead 
death is viewed as the limit of power's province, which must be kept at bay for the 
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sake of humanity.   Coupled with the growth in productivity comes the emergence of 73
'population' as a political object, thereby leading to the art of governance where every 
aspect of the population must be monitored, regulated, and managed in order to 
extract the maximum efficiency from a productive resource.   Foucault details how the 74
size of population relates directly to its sexual activities, which also in turn became a 
problem for political science and the object of a new power-knowledge.75
2.4.3 Law and governance
In this disciplinary society Foucault has indeed excluded the function of juridical law to 
the outskirts of power, which now expresses itself as life technologies, reproducing 
docile and productive bodies.  This critique of law and ideology is in part reminiscent of 
similar Marxian critiques which also emphasise the ideology of law in contrast to the 
material subsumption of bodies to capital.   However for Foucault the crucial 76
difference lies in the workings of the law in producing real individualities, not merely 
the illusions of an ideology.  This may be demonstrated in Foucault's concept of the 
delinquent and its part in the police-prison-law discourse.
For the disciplinary society the corresponding mode of punishment is the prison, 
encompassing the multifarious techniques of discipline.  The deprivation of liberty 
expresses publicly the vindication of law by depriving juridical subjects of their most 
valuable asset.   However once within the prison walls the juridico-political trappings 77
of discourse dissipate, and one is confronted with a disciplinary space where 
punishment is measured in terms of rehabilitation and conformity rather than penance. 
The prison also serves a significant goal apart from its penitentiary function, which is to 
reproduce and cultivate 'delinquency'.   For Foucault this new category of the 78
delinquent is the disciplinary version of the old illegalities and vagabondage, which 
were no longer tolerable in their unruly nature.  The disciplinary society requires 
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absolute control even over its criminality, so deploys three primary institutions to 
effectively reproduce, monitor, and control its criminal classes.   79
Delinquency occurs in the vast majority of cases within the lowest socio-economic 
strata which is placed under heavy police surveillance.  The police institution operates 
to section the class of illegality by frequently transporting part of its population to the 
prison.  The prison in turn gathers these delinquents in close proximity to promote 
internal networks and connections, which are utilised once the delinquents re-enter 
society.  The role of law lies in creating legal prohibitions which actively generate 
delinquent behaviour and act as the recruitment criteria for this class of specialised 
criminality.   Thus Foucault details a process whereby through pro-actively targeting, 80
recruiting, and training a category of delinquent persons, society is able to section and 
control criminal activity by confining them within the province of several disciplinary 
institutions.  It is the active and intentional reproduction of criminality which explains 
why prisons are the only answer to a problem they have created.81
Foucault's analysis of delinquency and the role of the legal system in its production is 
enlightening.  It explains why the law is able to permeate both legality and illegality ; 82
the delinquent is at the very heart of law, and his discipline is perceived as natural and 
acceptable, for the threshold of punishment is lowered as individuals are punished at 
every turn.  The legal norm is merely a continuum of a wider process of normalisation 
in society; its function is not to judge or prohibit, but to rehabilitate and discipline.
2.5 The Normative Question
Foucault’s theory presents a two-fold challenge to the concept of legal normativity: the 
relevance of law in setting normative standards for behaviour in a modern disciplinary 
society, and the capacity of a decentralised and disciplined subject to engage in 
normative action in a non-deterministic fashion.  The latter challenge is more pertinent 
to my thesis which aims towards a theory of material legal normativity based on the 
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subject as the embodiment of law.  It is also arguably the more difficult challenge to 
answer. 
In regard to the first challenge, if Foucault relegates the role of law explicitly and 
exclusively to the recruitment of illegality, he may indeed be interpreted as offering an 
excessively narrow view of law in society.  Specifically this conception of law as merely 
instrumental deprives legal norms of any normative status, and the notion of justice as 
an expression of a normative ideal.  Such is the critique advanced by Hunt and 
Wickham who argue Foucault neglects the importance of law's regulatory function in 
his emphasis on its punitive function, thereby miscasting law as irrelevant.   Tadros 83
rebuts this critique by raising the possibility of law acting as an interface between 
governance and the disciplinary mechanisms.  Law may be used to control other 
diverse disciplinary tactics, in addition to its involvement in prisons.84
I believe that whilst both critiques have merit, both neglect to address the normative 
element of law which Foucault's analysis appears to challenge directly.  If Foucault is 
interpreted as relegating law to the very limits of society, that is no issue if law is 
represented as delineating some form of acceptable social limit, such as in liberal 
theories where the law represents a moral or value perimeter.  What is more 
problematic is for law to be reduced to a disciplinary mechanism which is now largely 
obsolete, for that would imply the internal norms of law were nothing more than a 
derived average standard of behaviour, a standard which no longer applies owing to 
the emergence of more scientific and objective criteria.  Hence Foucault's premonition 
that the standards of psychiatry and criminology will gradually replace legal norms, 
legitimated by their greater scientific quality, and force law to relinquish its prerogative 
in determining criminality.  Indeed this appears a close approximation to Foucault's 
pronouncement of how 'criminal justice functions and justifies itself...by this unceasing 
reinscription in non-juridical systems.  Its fate is to be redefined by knowledge'.   The 85
normative force of law will be established, not by reference to Reason or morality, but 
by a technical organisation of society according to objective knowledge of how the 
population behaves. 
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My view is that there remains some normative space for law to subsist prior to the 
empirical disciplinary forces.  As long as society continues to utilise law as the medium 
of cohering various disciplinary institutions, such as how family relate to schools, or 
how police relate to prisons, then law exerts an active force in shaping the power 
relations which constitute society.  Even if law or juridical power is no longer the 
predominant mode of controlling the population, it can retain a normative role in 
organising the more direct expressions of discipline according to law’s normative 
standards.  86
In regard to the second challenge, if the Foucauldian subject is truly decentralised 
along the various disciplinary forces which all compete to fix him in this or that 
subjectivity, then any robust conception of will or rationality would be unfeasible. 
Although I reject ideal conceptions of rationality or freewill, I interpret the Foucauldian 
subjectivity as determined in his actions to an extent which undermines meaningful 
normative legal action.  I appreciate that different interpretations of Foucault’s theory 
clearly deny a deterministic reading of the subject, especially Foucault’s later works 
which attempt to advance a substantive theory of how freedom is exercised in 
resistance against disciplinary power and the pursuit of a form of ethics.   87
I agree that portraying the Foucauldian subject as a fully determined being incapable 
of normative agency would be an unfair critique.  However I will maintain that 
Foucault’s emphasis on power as generated by relations between subjects and 
capable of being exercised in hegemonic forms, leads to a tendency to lose adherence 
to the material conditions of being.  Because power and knowledge are ultimately 
intangible relations, material aspects such as the physical body, places, and objects 
are designated as the effects of power relations; the material is constituted rather than 
constituting.   In relation to my aim of constructing a material theory of legal 88
 Examples of this might include legal regulation on the permissible extent of biological experimentation 86
and medical ethics, both of which Foucault identifies as modern disciplines designed to advance biopower 
and governance of the biological body, but I would argue are heavily curtailed in their exercise of power by 
legal regulations in the fields of genetic mutation, cloning, prioritising patient rights over medical expertise.
 Charles, E. Scott, n.26.  Cressida Heyes, n.50.  Brenda Hofmeyr, 'The Power Not to Be (What We Are): 87
The Politics and Ethics of Self-creation in Foucault.' Journal of Moral Philosophy 3(2): 215-30.
 This also is a relatively simplistic account of Foucault’s theory, particularly in relation to his notion of 88
biopower and the trained body as the potential locus for resistance against power.  See Diane Skinner, 
'Foucault, Subjectivity and Ethics: Towards a Self-forming Subject.'  Organization  20(6): 904-23 for an 
interesting ethnography of organic farming as a method of subject formation.  However overall Foucault 
pays less attention to the broader material conditions compared to Marx, and designates materiality to 
instruments or functions of power, as opposed to Marx to saw them as the means for achieving 
emancipation.
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normativity, I would regard Foucault’s approach of focusing on the body predominantly 
as an effect of intangible power and knowledge as not giving sufficient emphasis to the 
body’s immediate material environment.  Although Foucault's conception of subjectivity 
is comparatively more sophisticated than Marxian conceptions, on the issue of 
external materiality Foucault’s theory lacks in comparison to Marx’s. 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3 
Counterintuitive Features
Hitherto I have analysed the theories of Hobbes and Kant as representatives of an 
ideal Reason-based account of norms, premised upon a fundamental division between 
the sources of normativity and material existence.  In contrast to this idealism I have 
explored the theories of Marx and Foucault as representatives of a different 
philosophical approach based on materialism and embodiment.  I have advanced my 
arguments for what I perceive as problematic with these theories in the preceding 
chapters.  I now turn to the perspective of the legal subject as the locus of legal 
normativity in order to explicate how the Reason-based account of norms fail to offer 
an adequate account of the embodied experience of law.  This inadequacy is 
presented in certain features of law which I identify to be counterintuitive and not 
amenable to explanation by modern legal discourses.   
According to many modern legal theories, the normative force of law lies in its capacity 
to stand in judgement of the legal subject's empirical existence from the perspective of 
an ideal nomos.  The validating force of this nomos depends on objective or valid 
principles ascertained through Reason and reflection.   Legal normativity, or the aspect 1
of oughtness with which law makes claims upon the behaviour of individual legal 
subjects and determines public standards of conduct, may be expressed as the bridge 
between the status quo and a hypothetical state of affairs ostensibly achievable 
through faithful submission to the strictures of law.  This chasm to be bridged is 
between the empirical reality and nomos, and is surmountable by taking the law as 
guide to action.
My argument against this and similar accounts of legal normativity is that they neglect 
the fundamental aspect of the legal subject as a material being whose actions are 
situated within and responsive to his empirical reality.  It appears to me that to posit 
Reason as the sole determinant of valid normative action and dismissing other 
 Korsgaard's four sources of normativity, which include 'reflexive endorsement'; Christine Korsgaard, and 1
Onora O’Neill, The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge ; New York: CUP, 1996.  
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features such as emotions or instincts as natural and non-normative, takes a one-
sided approach to human behaviour.  It precludes the possibility of meaningful 
interaction between a legal subject and his environment beyond terms of dominance 
by one over the other, such as Reason determining nature, or social forces 
determining the subject.  In respect to what I term the discourse of Reason on legal 
normativity, this dismissal of the body presents its symptoms as certain counterintuitive 
features in its theoretical representation of law, wherein the embodied experience of 
law runs counter to the legal rhetoric.  
I use the term counterintuitive in its simple sense of being aberrant or conflictual to 
intuition, understood as a deep seated and immediate sense of knowing characterised 
by quick and unreflective decision making.   I am not concerned with a rich 2
philosophical inquiry into intuition or its evidential value for knowledge or truth; intuition 
is not posited as a distinct faculty or cognitive category.  I take intuition as a synthetic 
and descriptive phenomenon which is created through material being; instincts, 
reflexes, gut-feelings, premonitions, are all aspects of intuition.   Counterintuitive is 3
simply that which conflicts with or defies expectations or common-sense truths.   Law's 4
counterintuitive features are symptomatic of a legal discourse which fails to address 
the embodied nature of the legal subject which I would argue is the seat of intuition.   5
3.1 Law and Reason
Theories in this discourse claim legal normativity to be the faithful instrument of the 
faculty of Reason inherent in every legal subject.  It is the dictates of this higher faculty 
which both constrain and justify the validity of the law's demands upon individual 
action, and enable the legal subject to respond to those demands as reasons for 
 See definition Colman, A Dictionary of Psychology, 2008, under ‘Intuition’ OUP 2013.  Erik Dane, and 2
Michael G. Pratt. 'Conceptualizing and measuring intuition: A review of recent trends.' International review 
of industrial and organizational psychology 24: 1-40.
 The closest analogy would be social psychology’s theory of cognitive domains which dispose humans to 3
certain structures of belief and experience, such as religion or superstitions.  See Pascal Boyer, 'Cognitive 
Constraints on Cultural Representations: Natural Ontologies and Religious Ideas.' in Mapping the Mind: 
Domain Specificity in Cognition and Culture, Hirschfeld and Gelman (eds), Cambridge: CUP, 1994. Social 
psychology’s claim that cognitive domains as natural categories of mind are not relevant to my thesis.  
 Scientific thinking is actually a counterintuitive phenomenon, as it does not congeal naturally onto these 4
domains and often presents results not anticipated by intuitive knowledge; see Paul Harris, 'Thinking by 
Children and Scientists: False Analogies and Neglected Similarities.’ in Mapping the Mind ibid.   Law is 
similar to science as it is also a publicly maintained world theory.  
 Elijah Chudnoff, Intuition OUP 2014 chapter 1.5
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action.  Reason is the condition for law’s existence and the guarantee of its validity, 
thus law must structure itself in conformity with Reason in order to maintain its 
normative force.  Consequently legal subjects who deny the normative force of law 
must thereby reject the dictates of their own Reason, and by extension their own 
humanity, and revert to an uncivilised state of nature and animalistic existence.
Such is the relation between law and Reason propounded by the theories of Hobbes 
and Kant, reiterated in differing guises in the theories of many modern jurists.   A 6
dichotomy is posited between the state of nature characterised by uncurbed self-
interest and mutual warfare, and the precarious social stability of civil society 
maintained by the tenuous regard each legal subject holds towards the social 
covenant.  The necessity for law to bridge this dichotomy is established by appealing 
to Reason, which in turn guarantees law its normative validity.  Legal norms give 
practical import to the dictates of Reason by positing the respective rights and duties 
between legal subjects, instituting authoritative procedures to settle and adjudicate 
mutual conflicts and mete out justice, and prohibiting unilateral expressions of interest 
or violence at the expense of others’ interests.  Thus legal norms regulate the external 
interactions of legal subjects according to the dictates of Reason, and maintain their 
normative integrity through ratification by the faculty of Reason possessed by rational 
human subjects. 
3.1.1 Embodiment
Present throughout this discourse of Reason is the embodied legal subject whose 
material situation within his social conditions of being cannot be reduced to pure 
discourse.  The body is both a rich source of motivation and stimuli towards action, 
and the vessel for Reason’s conscious deliberations; the body is both a belligerent 
source of irrational demands, and a necessary conduit for Reason to realise itself in 
the world through practical action.  The embodied subject encounters limitations to the 
potentially infinite aspirations of his Reason in the form of his bounded material 
existence.  Inasmuch as Reason would like to think itself limitless and fully 
autonomous, it seeks to subject the motions and demands of the body to its unilateral 
 See chapter 1.  These theories share the common presumption that legal community represents a 6
rational development from a prior natural state wherein cooperation was either fortuitous or inefficient, and 
society has not yet achieved the degree of coordination necessary for full human flourishing.  Where 
these theories diverge is their conception of the final end of legal community as either fulfilling a discrete 
good in itself, or as simply the means through which other social goods are obtained.
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instruction, to the extent it becomes almost a disavowal of the embodiment of self, 
which is characterised as a base and animalistic existence.  Analogously legal 
normativity which explicitly justifies itself solely through Reason perceives the 
embodied being as the contumely object of regulation, rather than a valid source of 
meaning.  
Such an approach to the embodied being of the subject has been challenged by social 
theorists who emphasise the body as the locus of extensive social conditioning not 
fully cognisable in spite of Reason's endeavours.  The subject's embodiment is 
constructed and conditioned through an array of disciplinary technologies which take 
the human body as their object of knowledge, and seek to normalise it according to 
objective standards.   The body has also been cast as the locus of primordial libidinal 7
enjoyment which must be tamed and de-eroticised in order to exploit its energies for 
labour.   The common challenge posed to the discourse of Reason is to reinstitute the 8
material aspect as the centre of the subject's being, such that what appears to be 
decisions of autonomous agents are in reality the predetermined response of socially 
conditioned beings.  The faculty of Reason cannot escape its embodiment within the 
socially conditioned subject, as such its deliberations are not so autonomous as it 
claims.  Neither is Reason so omnipotent as to fully comprehend the internal 
motivations of the self, for the embodied subject is a product of social forces 
independent of himself, forces which operate to produce subjectivities not thoroughly 
understandable through Reason. 
The embodied subject who is the object of legal regulation is bifurcated into a body 
which is the cause of potential conflict for material beings sharing space and 
resources, and the faculty of Reason which is the only valid source of norms.  The 
discourse of Reason presupposes an image of the body as natural and constant, and 
constructs a theory of legal normativity which treats this body as a passive object of 
regulation.  Such a theory ignores the role of law in actively constructing and mediating 
the meaning and experience of embodiment by reifying what is social and conditioned 
into a natural and enduring phenomenon.  Feminist jurists have criticised the image of 
the legal body as unjustifiably masculine inclined; the legal body is defined by bounded 
masculinity, Cartesian consciousness, and moral autonomy which are overwhelmingly 
 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish : The Birth of the Prison, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979; The 7
History of Sexuality. Vol. 1, The Will to Knowledge, London: Penguin, 1998.
 Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud, London: Ark, 1987.8
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expressed in terms of valorising masculinity and debasing femininity.   More pertinently 9
in viewing the body as a natural phenomenon, the discourse of Reason is unable to 
communicate law’s transformative force upon embodiment, except in an impoverished 
fashion.   
Despite the law's overt role in defining the terms of material human interaction, the 
embodied presence of the legal subject quickly becomes subsumed within the 
totalising discourse of Reason.  This is problematically exhibited in certain 
counterintuitive features of legal normativity as experienced by the legal subject, 
whose sociality with other embodied beings is not confined to the limits of purely 
intersubjective relations.  Embodied beings do not interact on a metaphysical plane 
consisting of a disembodied cogitans; their material presence does not simply conform 
to the instructions issuing from their Reason, but will often make itself intrusively felt. 
The experience of legal normativity cannot be explained through a discourse of 
Reason which is satisfied with an abstracted legal subject as discrete moral agent fully 
disposed to the normative force of law through reflection.
3.1.2 Discursive dissonance
Legal normativity as propounded by the Hobbesian and Kantian tradition and the 
modern jurists influenced by it, is a discourse explicitly aligning itself with Reason and 
the legal subject as a disembodied moral agent.  Underlying this explicit discourse is 
an implicit discourse which cannot be fully articulated without subverting law's 
normative foundations, yet is also necessary to support legal normativity.  The 
counterintuitive features of law may be characterised as indicative moments where the 
irreconcilability of the two discourses are exhibited.  Whether these counterintuitive 
features are necessary products of law’s liberal rhetoric, evidence of law's reification, 
or simply aspects of inherent opposition or conflict within the law remains to be 
investigated.  However it will be argued that in all likelihood the embodied nature of the 
legal subject is implicated in some fashion.
 Ngaire Naffine, 'The Body Bag', and O'Donovan, 'Sense, consent' in Naffine and Owens, Sexing the 9
Subject of Law 1st ed. North Ryde, NSW: LBC Information Services, 1997.  Atherton, 'Cartesian reason 
and gendered reason’, and Lloyd, 'Maleness, metaphor, and the 'crisis' of reason’, in Antony & Witt, A 
Mind of One's Own : Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity. 2nd ed. Feminist Theory and Politics. 
Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2002.
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The counterintuitive nature of law will be illustrated by tracing the fault lines of 
discourse upon two leitmotifs within legal discourse; responsibility, and emotion. 
Responsibility is an idea intimately connected to law and is expressed in various ways 
across specialised legal areas, from contractual obligation, to tortious duty of care, to 
criminal liability.  In contrast the topic of emotion has less visibility in formal law, but in 
its guise as passions, desires, and guilt permeates legal discourse and legal action.  10
These are not an exhaustive account of law's counterintuitive aspects, but are simply 
illustrative examples chosen for their breadth of representation.  Firstly the discourse 
of Reason pertaining to each theme will be elaborated, and its problems illustrated 
using specific examples of conflicting discourse found in the legal literature.  I will 
attempt to articulate the implicit discourse, and argue that legal normativity is 
dependent upon this dual level discourse which may occasionally manifest as 
apparent mistakes or problems in legal reasoning, but ultimately serve to maintain a 
particular account of the normative force of law as sustainable purely through the force 
of its own rhetoric by creating illusions of universality and coherence.
3.2 Reason and responsibility
The explicit discourse of responsibility as articulated by Reason proceeds from an 
atomistic conception of the legal subject and the necessary conditions for his social 
existence.   The self-regarding nature of the legal subject, coupled with his economic 11
rationality leads to the creation of mutually beneficial arrangements of will in contract, 
wherein each subject voluntarily accedes certain duties and obligations towards the 
other.  In the ideal contract model responsibility is that which is stipulated under the 
contract, and each party motivated by their natural self-interest in securing an 
immediate benefit.  Therefore contract creates responsibility directed towards the other 
by force of the subject's autonomous will.  Where immediate interest conflicts with 
longterm benefit, Reason is required to dictate the necessary terms and conditions for 
a functioning social contract.  Under the guidance of each individual's Reason to 
himself, consent to his share of social responsibility is procured.  This responsibility is 
expressed as a limitation upon the natural freedoms of appropriation and pursuit of 
self-interest, by restraining the legitimate avenues of their expression.  Each legal 
 Legal action for Hobbes and Kant are determined by desires and passions which conform externally to 10
the norms of law; see chapter 1.
 See chapter 111
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subject thus becomes responsible for the exercise of self-control in his pursuit of 
advantage and the accordance of due respect for the equal status of others as 
autonomous moral agents, as ends rather than means.  Collectively a state of social 
peace and mutual compromise is achieved through the law mediating the external 
interactions of legal subjects according to objectively determined public 
responsibilities.  
From the subject's perspective responsibility becomes displaced from the other to the 
legal norm and himself, as he must now exercise vigilance against his natural 
compulsions and become a self-subjecting being.  His publicly apportioned 
responsibility to society applies not because of autonomous choice, but by virtue of 
their foundations in Reason, and the requisite motivation provided by threat of 
sanctions.  Subjects have regard to legal norms as determinants of public 
responsibility, so preempting the need to negotiate mutual contracts with all other 
members of society.   Insofar as these responsibilities do not fully accord with their 12
desires, the lack of motivation is remedied by the threat of punishment, which is 
internalised by subjects who learn to check their actions even when punishment is not 
imminent.   According to this explicit discourse, Reason would reign through law to 13
allocate social responsibility amongst equal moral agents, who must consent to these 
necessary limitations upon their natural freedom by force of Reason complemented by 
legal sanctions.  It is the combination of law and Reason which enables the voluntary 
accession of legal subjects to legal norms, without which social responsibility would 
not be possible.
It is significant that Reason’s discourse places such emphasis upon the notion of 
autonomous moral agency as the cornerstone for juridical responsibility.  This is a 
result of positing contractual obligation as the origin of responsibilities between legal 
subjects, whose autonomous choice is necessary to impart legitimacy onto the 
contract.  However this conception of the responsible individual is problematised in the 
context of responsibilities defined through relationships other than mutual agreement, 
and by the presence of persons seen to lack the capacity of Reason essential for 
assuming responsibility.  
 Raz’s theory of legal norms as preemptive reasons.  Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law 12
and Morality. OUP, 1979.
 See Foucault’s account of Panopticism and discipline, Chapter 2. 13
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3.2.1 Familial responsibility
The archetypal challenge to Reason's juridical personality lies in the context of family 
and its constitutive familial relations and ethics of care towards minors. The normative 
framework of a society of free autonomous rational legal subjects fits uncomfortably 
when applied to the family context.  In particular the legal subject as locus of rights and 
responsibilities is problematised by the person of the child who is not capable of the 
same autonomy.  The model of mutually defined rights and duties of individuals is 
complicated by the relationally defined responsibilities within the family structure. 
More fundamentally the presumption of the selfishly rational juridical subject is 
undermined by the expectations of altruism and unconditional benevolence between 
family members which speaks of an entirely different aspired ideal from that proposed 
by purely juridical relations.   In short, the presence of family poses a discursive 14
problem for legal normativity based solely on Reason which seems to offer only an 
impoverished and counterintuitive representation of the family subject.
This problem of discursively constructing the family in law has been addressed 
extensively in the literature on family law, the specifics of which are not directly 
pertinent to the issue at hand.   A general overview of the broad themes of debate will 15
suffice to illustrate the counterintuitiveness exhibited in this area of law.  Proceeding 
from a presumption that law can and should regulate the relationships between family 
members, the question becomes how this is achievable in accordance with Reason’s 
discourse found so suitable to private law.  Traditional theories approach the family as 
a collection of individuals with relative status, and allocate responsibilities based on 
 The model which characterises a private law concerned with Aristotelian corrective justice as immediate 14
justice between two formally equal parties, which cannot be understood in terms of community, see E. 
Weinrib, ‘Liberty, community, and corrective justice.’ In R. Frey & C. Morris (Eds.),  Liability and 
Responsibility: Essays in Law and Morals : CUP 1991.
 There are many ways in which the law’s construction of family poorly reflects the realities of family life. 15
The law may simply be outdated or insensitive to changes in contemporary family relations, such as the 
rise in prevalence of unmarried couples, civil and homosexual partnerships, children having different legal 
and biological parents.  In these relatively superficial cases of disconnect between law and society, it is 
straightforward matter of changing the law to better reflect and regulate contemporary family life.  See 
generally on the developments in US law, Wilson. Reconceiving the Family : Critique on the American 
Law Institute's Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution. 2006.  A more fundamental way law may be 
inadequate to constructing the family is the lack of appropriate conceptual tools with which to analyse and 
represent the various facets of a complex idea.  For a comprehensive analysis of various concepts and 
their legal counterparts, see John Eekelaar, Family Law and Personal Life: OUP 2007.  For a review 
focused on the concept of responsibility and how that is treated in various parts of family law, see Jo 
Bridgeman, et al., Regulating family responsibilities. Farnham, Surrey, England ; Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate 
Pub. 2011.
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the legal status of the subject.   Thus the legal status of 'parent' would comprise of 16
rights and duties towards the legal status ‘child’, and vice versa.  The result is a legally 
constructed model of family wherein the statuses are accorded respective 
responsibilities in the form of corresponding rights and duties, fixed categories into 
which concrete individuals are placed.  The responsibilities of a parent are demanded 
of a legal subject by virtue of their legal status and relationship towards another legal 
subject, defined by and owed to the law and society in general.  
Such a legal theory of familial responsibility is an impoverished mischaracterisation of 
the parent and child relationship.  Arguably Reason’s discourse cannot fully integrate 
the family structure into the public sphere of juridical society without compromising the 
relational integrity of family itself,  and yet to exclude family relations from the 17
province of law altogether would represent a significant injury to the normative force of 
an institution claiming to be the manifestation of Reason.  In response legal theory 
proposed alternative normative frameworks to discursively construct the legal family, 
most notably communitarian theories and theories of ethics of care.   Such theories 18
reject Reason’s discourse by emphasising the communal and relational nature of 
familial responsibilities, and reinstate the concrete other as the proper object of care 
and responsibility.  Instead of allocating rights and duties on the basis of status, 
parental responsibility becomes an open-ended, context bound activity which is 
constrained only by the responsibility of caring for the minor.   Responsibility is shifted 19
away from its representation in legal norms towards the material person of the child as 
the proper recipient of parental activity.   This is more than merely a difference in 
conceptual analysis, but represents a change in the very nature of parental duties 
which find only tenuous expression in the language of legal obligation.  However 
proponents of such theories are not so naive as to place trust in the better nature of 
legal subjects as the only guarantee for the discharge of their proper responsibilities. 
The law remains a significant factor in family relationships, but its role is confined to a 
guarantee of minimal welfare rather than the constituting discourse of family.  20
 Sonia Harris-Short and Joanna Miles, Family Law : Text, Cases, and Materials. 2nd ed. OUP 2011 16
chapter 10; Eekelaar n.15 chapters 5 & 6.
 Eekelaar, n.15; Eekelaar, ’Are Parents Morally Obliged to Care for their Children?', OJLS 11(3) 340-5317
 Amitai Etzioni, The Parenting Deficit. London: Demos, 1993.; Jo Bridgeman, 'Parental Responsibility, 18
Responsible Parenting and Legal Regulation' in Bridgeman, et al., Responsibility, Law and the Family. 
Aldershot, England ; Burlington, VT: Asgate, 2008.; Bridgeman, Jo. "Accountability, Support or 
Relationship-Conceptions of Parental Responsibility." N. Ir. Legal Q. 58: 307.
 Harris-Short and Miles n.14.19
 Eekelaar, n.1520
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Reason is displaced in favour or ethics, morality, and community in the context of 
family.
However this challenge to the omnipotence of Reason’s discourse is robbed of much 
of its subversive potential through an act of discursive disavowal whereby the law's 
inability to regulate is re-characterised as a concession of autonomy to the subject of 
family granted by law.  Moreover it is a concession in accordance with the very ideals 
of Reason itself, and by sleight of hand legal normativity reaffirms and reinforces its 
ubiquitous validity through the very act of non-regulation.  This is achieved by 
characterising the concept of family as a natural concept which exists in the state of 
nature, that is pre-civil society and pre-legal.   By differentiating between naturally 21
altruistic familial relations and naturally competitive relations between autonomous 
legal subjects, the family comes to represent a sacrosanct value of nature which ought 
to be protected from external interference.  Just as the internal motivations of an 
autonomous legal subject are not the proper object for legal regulation due to respect 
for freedom of choice, so analogously the boundaries of family must be respected and 
the internal dynamics of familial relations allowed self-determination.  By confining the 
alternative discourse of community and ethics to the context of family, and justifying its 
exclusion upon the basis of Reason, family becomes another nodal point in the 
structure of civil society rather than a competing ideal of embodied sociality.22
The foregoing discussion on the normative theories behind the family concept 
endeavoured to draw out the counterintuitive quality of law through the concept of 
responsibility.  The law’s rhetoric would have one believe that without the constant 
vigilance of Reason, no rational subject could voluntarily undertake any limitation on 
himself or responsibility towards others.  There is a constant threat of widespread 
abdication of social responsibility and a regression to the state of nature, kept at bay 
only by the force of law and the legal subject's consent to its normative demands.  In 
contrast, familial responsibility is represented as a natural order, maintainable without 
external compulsion and defined by relationships rather than rational interest.  Here 
 Classically the family is represented as the natural conduit through which persons as members of oikos 21
become members of a larger polis, Aristotle, and Saunders, Politics. Books I and II. Clarendon Aristotle 
Series. New York: Clarendon Press, 1995.  Aristotle also emphasised the spousal relationship as defined 
by a specific form of philia forms the rational basis for ethical community, thus an essential component in 
a rational polis.  Eekelaar n.15 has also remarked upon the different attitudes adopted by law towards 
family correlating to differing political ideologies of the time.  
 I argue this in the context of modern Western liberal democratic societies.  I am not claiming that this 22
dichotomy between family and public society pertains to all communities, or that there is stark separation 
of  the two in reality; I am presenting the relationship in an ideal form. 
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the material other is central to responsibility, and the law cannot mediate this 
relationship without altering the very nature of its obligation.  Family as a collection of 
embodied social relations is constituted by concrete and unique individuals interacting 
in close physical and emotional proximity, to establish mutual relations which are 
highly unique to the persons involved.   I would argue that embodied interaction is the 23
foundation of family, and whilst theories on family relationships and models may 
generalise common features, the necessity for physical proximity and interaction in 
order to build those relationships are largely affirmed.   For me this indicates the 24
fundamental importance of embodiment in familial relations; physical and bodily 
proximity and interactions, family traits and resemblances exhibited through 
appearance and behaviour, and the home environment all serve to constitute and 
reinforce family relations.   These relations in turn condition how responsibilities in the 25
family are actually discharged, not as rational agents fulfilling the duties of Reason, but 
as embodied beings sensitive to the messy physical and emotional demands of 
others.   26
The normative relationship of the subject to himself defined by his duties to Reason 
translates poorly to the family context, for without the other as the relational reference 
parental duty is empty and meaningless.  The explicit relational nature of familial roles 
reveals the fact that all human subjectivities are defined relationally.  As argued in 
chapter 1 the conception of an atomistic moral agent is untenable.  By extension 
Reason’s discourse misrepresents responsibility, by structuring it upon individual 
nodes of legal subjects, neglecting the otherness of human interaction, and displacing 
the responsibility onto the legal norm and self-subjection. 
 Attachment theory in developmental psychology states that physical presence is vital in allowing 23
children to become attached to their caregivers, and early separation leads to predicable negative 
outcomes for the child.  For an overview of John Bowlby’s seminal theory see Jeremy Holmes, John 
Bowlby and Attachment Theory, London: Routledge, 1993.  
 Hayley Davies, ‘Affinities, seeing and feeling like family: Exploring why children value face-to-face 24
contact’ Childhood  19(1) : 8 - 23.
 Mason J, ‘Tangible affinities and the real life fascination of kinship’ Sociology 42(1): 29–45.25
 See Stoilova, et al. 'Constructions, Reconstructions and Deconstructions of ‘family’ amongst People 26
Who Live Apart Together.'  British Journal of Sociology  68(1): 78-96, for a study on how normative 
expectations of cohabitation and de facto separation impact subjective evaluations of family status.  Even 
for business and work relationships physical or face to face interaction is important, see J. Urry, ’Social 
networks, travel and talk’ British Journal of Sociology 54(2): 155–175.  
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3.2.2 Underside of responsibility
Thus far the discussion has revolved around how Reason’s discourse on responsibility 
tends to pervert its representation of the family context due to the obtrusively 
necessary presence of embodied relationships in that context.  The discourse is 
premised on an atomistic autonomous legal subject, and the object of responsibility is 
displaced from others towards the subject's self and the legal norm.  Each legal 
subject's self-responsibility leads to a collective state of peace and externally 
coordinated spheres of freedom.  However as responsibility is transformed into a 
subject-self relationship, this renders law complicit to widespread social irresponsibility, 
and the abdication of responsibility for great social atrocities.  
Veitch advances a theory of how law facilitates irresponsibility by creating categories 
which are defined by their function, thereby apportioning responsibility for certain tasks 
amongst the population.   These roles enable their functionaries to enact their 27
responsibilities which collectively facilitate the perpetration of vast atrocities to 
humanity without the accompanying responsibility towards the victims of those 
atrocities.  This is made possible by obfuscating the victim and perpetrator from sight 
behind the immediate role or function, in this case the legal norm which authorises 
individual actions and accumulates their effects without accumulating their 
responsibilities.   To an extent Veitch's theory may be interpreted as one of alienation 28
and reification in society; each functionary is alienated from the social power, mediated 
by the legal norm which is reified to become the ultimate referent of responsibility.
The discussion of social responsibility may be further elaborated by taking the 
perspective of the exception, in this case the holder of substantive responsibilities and 
obligations towards a specific recipient.  Cover's essay upon the difference of Jewish 
obligation from liberal rights rhetoric presents such a perspective.   Instead of the 29
initial social contract which authoritatively apportions social responsibility according to 
 Scott Veitch,  Law and Irresponsibility : On the Legitimation of Human Suffering. 1st ed. Abingdon, 27
Oxon ; NewYork., NY: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007.  I would say that these functional roles share a similar 
effect with authority in that both are requests for action without the burden of responsibility, which is 
displaced onto either the duty or the authority, as was demonstrated by the Milgrim experiments 1963. 
 Each functionary in fulfilling a task defined and limited by the office is only liable for those 28
correspondingly limited responsibilities, such that there is no party capable of bearing liability for the 
accumulated harms.  
 Robert Cover, 'Obligation: a Jewish Jurisprudence' in Cover et al. Narrative, Violence, and the Law : 29
The Essays of Robert Cover:  Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993.
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formal equality, the Jewish counterpart of Sinai operates by allocating public 
responsibility based on social status, with a specific emphasis upon adult males.  Each 
subject, instead of being affirmed in their rights to property, contract, and family, 
becomes the holder of determined obligations towards specified recipients, such as 
the obligation of a father to provide his children with education.  Cover notes that 
within rights rhetoric there is a danger towards empty ideological slogans to the 
prejudice of substantive technical bureaucracy.  In contrast, in mitzvot  there is the 30
danger of obscuring oppression by placing the obligation above the subject, so 
perpetuating social inequalities.  The pertinent observation here is that a legal 
discourse which takes the form of rights and duties, and the legal subject as 
disembodied Reason suffers precisely from that obfuscation of substantive 
responsibility that Cover has noted.  The presence of a legal norm which claims to 
enshrine a public right is sufficient to absolve the legal subject of his responsibility with 
regard to that right.  For example the oft repeated right to equal opportunity prevalent 
in labour law, human rights law, freedom of contract creates the impression that the 
legal subject participates in a society which recognises the equality of all subjects, and 
effaces the material obstacles of social prejudice and economic inequality.  Similarly 
the discourse within family law on the rights of children to receive care and education 
creates the impression that the care of children is limited to its familial context, and 
conveniently ignores the material conditions of society, such as economic hardship 
and availability of childcare services and schooling.  
Reason’s discourse is unable fully to capture the experience of responsibility because 
it limits subjectivity to rationality, which is primarily the subject's relation to his self.  The 
initial object for legal regulation which is the external presence of the embodied other, 
is transformed firstly into a problem of society's ability to coordinate a multiplicity of 
subjects, then into a problem of a subject's ability to coordinate his natural 
compulsions in order to live in peaceful association with others.  The object of law 
which began as the external coordination of embodied subjects became an internal 
struggle within the subject between his nature and his Reason, and what was once the 
means to a civil society became the end of civil society itself.31
 The 613 commandments in the Torah.30
 This process may be presented as an example of fetish whereby the disciplinary mechanisms take on 31
an element of eroticism which makes their operation the fulfilment of a desire in itself; Foucault History of 
Sexuality n.7 Part II.
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3.3 Reason and emotion
This ability of law to interpolate between the legal subject and his self, and the legal 
subject and society, and locate law's normative force within the vacuum of the legal 
subject's alienated experience is repeated in its treatment of emotions.  There is the 
explicit Reason discourse which rests on a disavowal of emotions and the body in the 
valorisation of objective and universal standards against subjective and arbitrary 
demands.  Underlying this rhetoric is a mass of social emotion which law attempts to 
direct towards its own purpose to drive and reinforce its normative force, but which 
always threatens to burst the tenuous boundaries of law’s rhetoric.  The law vindicates 
subjective emotions by displacing them onto the legal norm, hence inflating an 
embodied experience into a societal expression.  The presence of emotion within the 
law becomes counterintuitive when it infects the foundations of a legal normativity 
ostensibly derived from the objective and rational dictates of Reason.
The body is associated with the state of nature wherein action is driven primarily by 
appetites and passions, and it is only fear of reprisal and calculation of benefit which 
restrains the subject from indulging in excessive expression of his impulses.   The 32
faculty of Reason subjects the body’s natural emotions to its rational and moral 
deliberations to provide objective and universal rules for action.  Therefore only 
Reason is capable of imposing objective norms upon society to regulate individuals’ 
conflicting subjective expressions of desires.  Reason constituted by objectively valid 
principles sets itself in opposition to emotion which is arbitrary and subjectively valid 
only for a particular individual.  Law as the instrument of Reason is necessary to 
prevent unilateral and excessive expression of particular interests which threaten to 
destabilise the social peace.  Law must thus rise above competing subjectivities and 
arbitrate according to impartial standards dictated by Reason.  To preserve the force 
and validity of its normative claims, law cannot allow itself to be influenced or captured 
by the arbitrary impulse of emotion.  
This fundamental dichotomy between the body's emotion and Reason means the 
subject is involved in a constant struggle between his natural predisposition to indulge 
his emotional impulses, and obeying the demands of his Reason.  Analogously the 
 I would argue that motivations for nonmoral action necessarily contain an emotional element, in the 32
impetus of desire or constraint of fear.  See chapter 1 for Hobbes’ and Kant’s theories of nonmoral action.
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precarious state of civil society is only maintainable if its subjects obey the demands of 
their Reason. Unruly emotion which challenges Reason directly poses a threat to 
public peace.  Thus the discourse begins from the individual legal subject whose 
perpetual inner struggle between his sensible emotions and his Reason represents the 
competing demands between subjective desire and objective norm as the determinant 
of practical action.  On a societal level the struggle is staged between competing 
demands of individual legal subjects pursuing their private interests, and impartiality of 
the law in coordinating these demands according to objective standards of justice.
The foregoing is not an argument on whether legal action must proceed from 
subjective or objective motivations for obeying the law, but rather an attempt to convey 
the awkward position of emotion in Reason’s discourse.  Emotions are presented as 
an individual concern which the law must involve itself with due to their potentially 
destructive effects if allowed unilateral expression.  The state of civil society cannot 
countenance capricious acts of emotion unconstrained by legal norms, which threaten 
to cause society to regress back to a state of warfare.  For example, the emotion of 
desire must be expressed in a legally condoned fashion such as consensual bodily 
contact or intimacy, and not through rape or assault.  The emotion of hatred must be 
properly pursued through legal proceedings and lawful punishment, not through 
private revenge or retribution.  Emotions are not prohibited by law per se, but 
restrained by objective standards which apply equally to all legal subjects, irrespective 
of the strength or veracity of their particular emotional appeals.  Law which purports to 
reflect the dictates of Reason acts like a form of public Reason to constrain and order 
the emotional impulses of a society.   The disjunction between acting from the 33
dictates of Reason, and the experience of emotional impulse within the legal subject is 
bridged by the obligatory demands of the legal norm.  Legal normativity which 
succumbs to emotional persuasion risks jeopardising the validity it derives from 
universally objective Reason, so law must distance itself from particular emotional 
arguments to preserve the force of its normative position.
3.3.1 Hatred of the body
Problems arise where the capricious element of emotion overwhelms the boundaries 
imposed by Reason’s discourse.  The discursive dichotomy which attempts to contain 
 Cover on law as communal narrative; n.29 ‘Nomos and Narrative’.33
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the unruly emotional element in the content of a legal norm whilst keeping the form of 
legal institutions impartial and objective, becomes suspect when the emotional 
foundations of legal normativity are revealed.  Hate crimes are a pertinent and 
potentially illuminating area from which to analyse the discourse of Reason and 
emotion, for they represent norms of behaviour which arguably have their basis almost 
solely in emotional justification.  Laws of prejudice derived their normative import 
largely from the irrational hatred for the other's sex, race, or sexuality, given systematic 
expression through an institution ostensibly faithful to the dictates of Reason.  Laws 
which ironically now derive their legitimacy from the very denouncement of those same 
emotions and justify this change of allegiance as a progress of human Reason. 
Furthermore such norms of hatred represent a further challenge to Reason’s discourse 
by focusing on the embodied other as the object of the legal norm.  Unlike areas such 
as private law, laws relating to prejudice cannot ignore the bodily intrusion of the other 
in its highlighted foreign element; the raced, sexed, or sodomised body.  In these 
cases the source of threat is not the autonomy of the other in competition with the 
subject for advantage, but the very visible bodily aspect of the other.  Reason cannot 
discursively obfuscate these intrusively present embodied beings without rendering the 
concept of crime in its case nonsensical.  Reason can only seek to rationalise these 
objects to conform with its discourse, an endeavour which is analysed below.
Nussbaum has noted the prevalence of emotions in the law, specifically those of 
shame and disgust and their influence in not only reinforcing pre-existent judgements 
in social attitudes and legal norms, but also justifying the criminalisation of certain 
behaviour.   Much of contemporary theories of social psychology concur that the 34
psychological basis for prejudice such as racism and homophobia lies in an aversion 
towards the bodily presence of the hated object and the fear of contamination.  35
Concurrently there is also a perceived lack within the hating subject which is 
transmuted into the jouissance of the other, leading to a perverted desire for that 
jouissance which is manifested as envious hatred.   Racism, sexism, and 36
homophobia are the results of a fantasy discourse which reacts to the primordial 
compulsions of the human subject towards his most animalistic instincts.
 Martha Nussbaum,  Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law, Princeton: Princeton 34
University Press, 2009.
 Simon Clarke,  Social Theory, Psychoanalysis and Racism. Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: 35
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
 Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology. Phronesis. London: Verso, 1989.36
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The problem posed to Reason is to rationalise and justify legal normativity 
independently of the powerful emotional foundation of these social norms.  Reason 
must explain how those subjects possessing a different race, sex, or sexual 
persuasion may be treated as less than morally autonomous agents, and why these 
distinguishing features are sufficient to deserve legal regulation.  This is achieved by 
constructing supposedly 'natural' categories of persons, and denying them the 
privilege of possessing Reason, or characterising their behaviour as defects of 
Reason, and consequently forfeiting the respect and recognition due to a fully 
autonomous legal subject.   This assertion may be illustrated by a cursory 37
examination of popular depictions of racial minorities, homosexuals, and women in 
legal and social discourse.  The image of the black man as an animalistic, pre-evolved 
human, 'scientific' evidence of his lower intelligence, his preoccupation with the animal 
pleasures and his voracious sexual appetite which renders the black man a veritable 
sexual predator.   Such popular beliefs serve to lend credibility to Reason's discourse 38
that the black object is not a proper legal subject on account of his defective humanity, 
which in turn justifies the exclusion of this object from the respect legal normativity 
demands towards autonomous beings.  
Reason in so rationalising the black object is claiming to respect the natural order, for 
the black object cannot help being what he essentially is, just as the moral agent 
cannot help suffering from emotional compulsion against the better judgement of his 
Reason.  In similar fashion the position of the female object is also discursively 
constructed in such a way as to deprive her of full autonomous standing.  The woman 
is prone to hysteria and psychological pathology, and therefore cannot exercise 
autonomy in certain actions such as marital sex, abortion, or sexual consent.   Again 39
 Levin and Mcdevitt, Hate Crimes Revisited America's War On Those Who Are Different, New York: 37
Basic Books, 2009, pg.30-31, a process the authors describe as 'infantalisation'.
 Ibid. pg.31.  This particular characterisation of the black object is commonly emphasised in the literature 38
on racism.  See generally: Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks. Pluto Classics. London: Pluto, 1986; 
Clarke, n.35.
 Marital rape exemption was only legally abolished in Britain in 1991, before which time women had 39
effectively no sexual autonomy in the bonds of marriage.  The biased view of women as promiscuous or at 
fault for inciting unwanted sexual attention is even now a prevalent social attitude given problematic 
expression in the treatment of rape and domestic abuse victims by police authorities and in trial 
proceedings.  Victim blaming and rape culture is a well documented area; see generally R. Campbell, 
’The psychological impact of rape victims’ experiences with the legal, medical, and mental health 
systems’,  American Psychologist,  68:  702–717; Mason  et al., ’Social support and risk of sexual 
revictimization’,  Journal of Community Psychology,  37:  58–72; Banyard, et al., ’Bystander education: 
Bringing a broader community perspective to sexual violence prevention’, Journal of Community 
Psychology,  32:  61–79.  See Menaker & Cramer, ‘The Victim as Witness: Strategies for Increasing 
Credibility Among Rape Victim-Witnesses in Court’,  Journal Of Forensic Psychology Practice,  12(5):
424-438 for how rape victims are judged according to gender and victim stereotypes when presenting in 
court.  
 83
such discrimination is justified upon the basis of naturalness and normalcy; it would be 
unjust to demand from subjects the stringent standards of Reason when they by 
nature are less capable, so they need not be accorded equal respect since they 
cannot conform to the dictates of Reason.  
Analogous to responsibility, discourse confronts the challenge posed by irrational 
emotional attitudes by interpolating itself through the body of the hated object, then 
immediately absolving itself of its emotional foundations.  By firstly depicting the 
problematic aspect of the subject as natural and outside the law, then denying the 
subject of Reason and full legal subjectivity, discourse effectively changes these 
subjects into objects.  As objects they may be passively regulated and integrated into 
the law, without their presence and the emotions they invoke posing a challenge to 
law’s normative foundations; in other words it is legally condoned to hate these objects 
as they are not afforded the protection granted to legal subjects. Owing to the 
fundamental opposition posited between Reason and emotion, Reason cannot 
explicitly provide a justification for emotionally driven social attitudes as the basis for 
law's normativity.  Thus Reason obscures the problematic subject of emotion by 
reducing it to an object whilst reinforcing the illusion that Reason is the defining 
characteristic of legal subjectivity and the only universally valid legitimation for legal 
normativity.  
It might be objected that law is a social fact and if prevalent social attitudes overlap 
with or reinforce law’s normativity, that is not inherently against Reason.  I am not 
arguing that it is a problem for legal normativity to be dependent or parasitic upon 
social norms which may or may not be irrational or emotional.  Legal normativity is 
premised upon a disjunction between empirical reality and normative ideal, the latter 
being determined objectively by Reason.  This means that the relationship between 
empirical emotions and the normative force of law is more than contingent, as the 
normative integrity of law rests upon a disavowal of emotion and an orientation 
towards the ideal.  Particular legal norms may reflect social attitudes, but their 
normative aspiration towards the ideal must transcend the empirical and the 
impermanent.  This transcendence of legal normativity is what enables past legal 
norms to be judged as outdated and deplorable mistakes of thinking in light of current 
legal norms which represent a progress of human Reason.  
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One might argue that it is disingenuous to judge past transgressions by the standards 
of modern enlightened thought, that the past endorsement of prejudiced social 
attitudes in the law was a result of a combination of contemporaneous social and 
political attitudes independent of law.  Moreover in changing how those substantive 
emotions may be expressed in society by changing law in light of more progressive 
thinking proves a triumph for the ideals of Reason, and reinforces the normative force 
of law as the proper authority of social justice.  Despite the insidious continued 
presence of racist and sexist attitudes in society, what is important is law's recognition 
of the correct answer, and the renewed normativity of legal standards which will 
promote a better nomos.  However this narrative of moral progress towards a better 
normative position is in my view at best optimistic, at worst apologetic.  This may be 
illustrated in the current popular rhetoric adopted towards the perceived threats of 
terrorism and immigration in Western societies.  Terrorism has been denounced as 
indiscriminate and senseless destruction, so cast as the very incarnation of evil.  40
Similarly immigrants are painted as criminals who threaten local culture and value, 
undeserving claimants of social benefits, economic parasites who threaten local 
employment and opportunities.   Underlying these social caricatures are the same 41
psychological mechanisms which motivate hatred in general, the inability to penetrate 
the jouissance of the other, hence the fear of not knowing what the other desires.  42
Therefore terrorism is cast as irrational and senseless in order to efface it as a 
potential source of meaning, and immigrants are cast as possessing a foreign element 
which gives them unfair advantage in economic competition.   The discourse of 43
Reason which is capable of only cognising the other as a competing moral agent 
transforms what is an irrational fear into reasons it can rationalise.  However this is not 
moral progress, but merely a change to the identity of the eternally ostracised column 
of society predetermined by irrational emotion.  
What is capable of change is the specific content of emotion and the legal norm which 
reflects it; what cannot change is the dependence of legal normativity on the tension 
between Reason and emotion.  Because of the way Reason’s discourse has 
 See Parrish who describes the violence of terrorism as purely destructive, thus incapable of positive 40
meaning creation; Rick Parrish,  Violence Inevitable : The Play of Force and Respect in Derrida, 
Nietzsche, Hobbes, and Berlin Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006
 See Margaret Mccartney, 'Racism, Immigration, and the NHS.' BMJ 354 : I4477 for a topical discussion 41
on Brexit, immigration, and the NHS.
 Žižek, n.36.42
 Witness how normally positive characteristics such as diligence and hard working are perverted to 43
derogatory meanings when applied to foreigners, and seen as a potential source of threat or competition. 
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constructed the legal subject and civil society, legal normativity is always premised on 
the threat of external intrusion, whether that be the disruptive chaos of unbridled 
emotion upon the rational mind, or the unmitigated war of selfish subjects destroying 
the precarious peace of society.  This threat is made materially present in the foreign 
body of the other, abetted by the propagation of myths surrounding the object of 
repulsion.  The abstract image of the enemy is made constantly visible in the physical 
presence of the alien body which is always in excess.   So the black person embodies 44
the threat of black men towards white femininity, and the foreigner embodies the threat 
immigrants pose towards economic opportunity.  The state of competition in the state 
of nature is perversely recreated in civil society.  However, instead of acting the 
impartial referee between equal legal subjects competing on objective and fair social 
terms, the law attaches parasitically to partisanship and prejudice and rationalises 
them to conform to Reason.  It carves a space for legal normativity between the 
imminent threat of social dissolution and ideal nomos, all the while disavowing its 
dependency upon the base emotional interactions between its embodied subjects.  For 
legal normativity the object of emotional trauma is substitutable, but the tension 
between that and Reason is irrevocable.
The foregoing assertion may appear unduly generalising, amounting to the claim that 
because humans are naturally emotional beings, the normative role of law lies simply 
in the promotion or suppression of emotions according to its own normative standard. 
If so, the connection between legal normativity and emotion would be one-directional 
as law seeks to order and direct emotion whilst remaining beyond emotional influence. 
The relationship would be necessary only insofar as legal subjects need to incessantly 
curb and constrain those emotions which threaten to undermine normative behaviour. 
However I argue that the relationship is not a simple opposition between emotion and 
legal normativity, for legal normativity is transformative of emotion as much as emotion 
is supportive of legal normativity.  If legal normativity necessarily resides in the tension 
between reality and nomos, it is dependent upon the constant presence of the threat 
which reality poses towards achieving nomos.  Reason is capable of mediating only 
between rationally autonomous agents competing for relative advantage.  However 
when the base emotional nature of the subject predetermines a class of persons as 
intrinsically threatening, Reason must discursively rationalise that fundamental impulse 
 For Levin & McDevitt this emphasis upon the bodily presence of threat is expressed in the excessive 44
physical brutality inflicted on the victim's body in instances of hate crimes, a characteristic which 
undermines the notion of hate crimes as 'thought crimes’; Levin & McDevitt, n.37  pg.17-18.
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in accordance with its general principles.  In doing so Reason rationalises irrational 
hatred by discursively constructing the threat of the other as a valid and legitimate 
concern for society.  Legal normativity transforms the emotional response into a 
reasonable social act of defence against threat.  This transformative force of law is 
aptly demonstrated through Reason's discourse on punishment, with its constituting 
elements of justice and retribution.
3.3.2 Punishment as mortification of the body
The literature on theories of punishment is vast, it suffices to paraphrase the pertinent 
debate on retribution and the vengeful element in punishment.   For Hobbes and Kant 45
punishment in the state of nature is nonsensical, for there is only force and coercion 
according to each individual's power.  Without publicly determined rights there is no 
objective standard by which to measure transgression and mete out punishment.  The 
notion of punishment differs from mere physical hardship by the element of social 
censure and moral condemnation for an action which may not even result in actual 
harm.  To be punished is to suffer a stigmatisation or judgement for a freely chosen act 
of will.  However the situation is arguably different for the victim of crime, who in the 
state of nature may well find vengeful expression in an unilateral act of retaliation.  In 
civil society such unilateral expressions of emotion must be prohibited to maintain the 
legitimacy of law.  Hence it is equally necessary for law to transform the experience of 
the condemned from hardship to punishment, as well as the experience of victim from 
revenge to righteous vindication of his rights.  The common element consists in the 
shared nature of lawful punishment not present in private revenge, what Murphy calls 
'retributive hatred' which is defined as an empathy with the victim and shared 
condemnation of the criminal.   46
 Theories of punishment range from deterrence; Anthony Ellis, 'A Deterrence Theory of 45
Punishment.' Philosophical Quarterly 53(212): 337-51, to moral expression of censure; Thaddeus Metz, 
'Censure Theory and Intuitions about Punishment.' Law and Philosophy 19(4): 491-512; J. Glasgow 'The 
Expressivist Theory of Punishment Defended.' Law and Philosophy 34(6): 601-31; B. Wringe, 'Rethinking 
Expressive Theories of Punishment: Why Denunciation Is a Better Bet than Communication or Pure 
Expression.' Philosophical Studies 174(3): 681-708.  The pertinent issue for me is that common across 
these diverse theories is the use of the body as the object for punishment, whether as the receptor of 
physical pain and incarceration, or as an instrument for some moral message.
 Jeffrie Murphy, 'Retributive Hatred’, in Frey, & Morris, Liability and Responsibility : Essays in Law and 46
Morals. Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Law. Cambridge: CUP, 1991. For an account of the 
expressive element of punishment see Jean Hampton, 'Theory of retribution’ in Liability and Responsibility 
ibid.
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What is significant in theories of punishment is the inevitable presence of emotion, 
specifically the hatred and anger of the victim and society which is given legal 
expression.  This facet of sociality and communal experience resonates through the 
ability of legal norms to transform and mediate personal experience into social action. 
Human subjects feel hatred, but more importantly they wish to feel vindicated in that 
hatred.  Law is able to achieve this by 'lifting the burden of hatred'  from the individual 47
and placing it onto society and the law itself.  Thus the legal subject is able to 
vicariously share in the punitive experience without directly engaging in its violence, to 
vicariously express his most irrational emotions and hatred without directly confronting 
the victim of his hate.  Analogous to responsibility, the law takes on the role of 
repository for society's emotions, structures them according to justifiable objective 
standards of Reason, and presents them as independent and universal standards of 
justice.
In contrast to retributivist theories of punishment, deterrence theories represent the 
prominent alternative approach based on a discourse which ostensibly emphasises 
utility over retribution.  Deterrence has as its object the prevention of future 
wrongdoing by threat of physical hardship should the subject be tempted to transgress 
a legal norm, a threat made immediately visible through the bodily punishment of 
criminals.  To suppress present incentive for pursuit of advantage through the threat of 
future evil or pain resonates precisely with that simplistic notion of the legal subject as 
primarily a being of sensible desires.  That pain will successfully deter the subject from 
certain action reinforces the conception of the subject espoused by Hobbes and Kant 
as one who must be presented with a material motivating force, the aversion to pain, 
to secure conformity to law.  Reason’s discourse on deterrence is one which implicitly 
adopts the simplistic conception of the legal subject, the unruly body which shrinks 
from pain and is the belligerent object of Reason's instructions.  The legal subject 
possesses sensible compulsions of body, so is capable of being deterred from 
wrongdoing by fear of physical pain, along with a degree of rationality which enables 
him to take into account the possibility of future punishment as a result of present 
action, so justifies punishment as the proper response for his present voluntary choice 
to commit wrongdoing.  
 Murphy, ibid.47
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Norrie advances a similar argument in his criticism of liberal ideologies of 
punishment.   He asserts that there is an inherent contradictoriness within the liberal 48
discourse which is the result of the limits of ideology in the face of material reality.  For 
Norrie both Hobbes and Kant face an irreconcilable disjunction between their 
abstracted conception of juridical individualism capable of autonomous action and thus 
the proper object of punishment, and the concrete individuality which is embodied, 
determined, and irrational.  Hobbes' theory stumbles in his empiricist conception of the 
human subject as both naturalistic, thus responsive to sensual stimuli, and possessed 
of a reasoning faculty which makes juridical freedom possible.  Similarly Kant's theory 
of moral retributive punishment is only justifiable for fully moral autonomous agents 
who arguably do not commit crimes from passion.  For both theorists the legitimacy of 
punishment is justified solely through Reason, and yet the entire notion of punishment 
is articulated in terms of the body’s disposition towards pleasure and fear of pain.  I 
would argue that if the threat of punishment and its exercise is efficacious when aimed 
solely at the body, a purely Reason-based justification presents an impoverished 
account of punishment.  
Fundamentally the theories of punishment have not successfully made redundant the 
embodied nature of the legal subject, so have sought to discursively anchor their 
normative arguments along the principles of Reason.  In addressing their validity to 
Reason, theories of punishment ignore their dependence on the body as the 
instrument of meaning and the site of moral redemption.  The idea of retributive 
punishment is to achieve a form of moral reckoning or redemption by subjecting the 
body to physical hardship.  Similarly deterrence threatens the body with future pain as 
the appropriate moral exchange for its pursuit of present pleasure.  This preoccupation 
with disciplining the body through brute force or incarceration, a material act given 
symbolic communicative significance through law is neglected in legal rhetoric.  Why 
the normativity of legal punishment should find its expression through the body of the 
subject, whilst addressing its legitimacy exclusively to the subject's Reason presents 
an anomaly in law's discourse.  
 Alan Norrie, Punishment, Responsibility, and Justice a Relational Critique. Oxford ; New York: OUP 48
2000.
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3.4 The core of counterintuition 
I have attempted to penetrate the core of law’s counterintuitiveness by tracing the fault 
lines along two themes.  I have argued that the lived experience of the law is often 
irreconcilable with the predominant legal rhetoric.  Legal duties and obligations which 
purport to place the burden of social responsibility upon autonomous legal subjects are 
in fact a lived experience of alienation from sociality and an abdication of 
responsibility; objective and impartial arbitrage between competing rights through law 
necessarily feeds upon the irrational base of emotions prevalent within society.
At a glance the claim that modern law’s counterintuitiveness lies in the disjunction 
between the theoretical discourse that underpins it and its material operation might 
appear a straightforward claim: theoretical ideals cannot be fully translated into 
practice due to the limits of empirical existence.  However my claim is somewhat 
different; I believe that the necessity for law to manifest itself through the embodied 
beings of individuals, whilst simultaneously attempting to disavow that embodiment 
leads to the counterintuitive encounter of experience and discourse.  The normative 
force of law is necessarily demonstrated through the actions of legal subjects who are 
embodied and situated beings, so necessarily encounter law through their embodied 
and situated positions.  Correspondingly the law concedes to this embodiment by 
addressing its threat of punishment and appeals of attraction to the body and the 
sensible emotions of these subjects.  However it also explicitly disavows this 
embodiment by presenting itself as aligned with ideals beyond the material, with 
Reason and the nomos, and legal normativity as grounded upon these immaterial 
ideals.  It is this simultaneous dependence yet disavowal of embodiment which 
highlights the counterintuitiveness of law. 
3.5 Conclusion
In summary the inadequacy of a Reason-based account of legal normativity leads to 
disjunctions between law’s rhetoric and its material experience, which emerge as 
counterintuitive features and stubbornly resist discursive subsumption.  I have 
illustrated this counterintuitiveness through the themes of responsibility and emotion 
by arguing how their discursive relationship with Reason in constituting legal 
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normativity is often at odds with reality and the particular legal theories which seek to 
better represent the experience of law.  The source of this dissonance is the intrusively 
material body of the legal subject who is also the locus of normativity; a dilemmatic 
aspect for Reason which endeavours unsuccessfully to engulf it under a reified 
discourse.
This and the two preceding chapters form the field within which my thesis is situated.  I 
have outlined the theoretical pitfalls idealism and determinism pose for a theory of 
normative action, and identified a peculiar aspect of counterintuitiveness which 
requires explication.   The proceeding chapters will form my attempts to construct a 
material theory of normative action which avoids the problems, and answers the 
issues presented thus far.  I will begin by reconfiguring the terms used to understand 
reality, drawing on the concept of habit as the mechanism of action, before combining 
them to form my vision of material normativity.
 91
4  
Re-imagining Materiality 
In the foregoing chapters I have advanced my arguments against theories which 
ground the normative force of law solely on Reason and neglect to account for the 
legal subject as an embodied being.  I have suggested that this rejection of 
materialism presents an impoverished understanding of legal normativity as it fails to 
address corporeal being and action as significant aspects of human living.  In chapter 
1 I analysed the theories of Hobbes and Kant as preeminent representatives of a 
tradition of philosophy from which much of modern legal theory draws inspiration.  My 
central dissatisfaction with these theories lies in their assumption of a mind/body 
dualism which exclusively associates the normative with the disembodied cogito, and 
denies the body normative significance.  I asked whether Marx’s conceptions of 
material social relations address this neglect of the body.  Whilst Marx offers valuable 
insight with his notion of man as the nexus of social relations, there is in Marxian 
theory a tendency to slip either into economic determinism by being overly 
preoccupied with the primacy of economic relations over other social relations, or to 
focus excessively on the superstructure and lose sight of the material base of 
existence.1
In chapter 2 I explored whether Foucault’s theory offered a possible solution to the 
theoretical chasm between ideal Reason and materiality, and encountered a similar 
problem of determinism in Foucault’s conceptions of subjectivity and social discipline. 
Whilst Foucault’s conception of subjectivity is valuable insofar it begins from a notion 
of the human body as malleable to social discipline, it does not offer a solution to the 
primary challenge of establishing an account of embodied normative action.  Indeed 
Foucault’s theory presents a different form of determinism in terms of socially 
determined disciplinary mechanisms.  
 Gramsci is one Marxian proponent whose claim of overlapping spheres of political and civil society and 1
the manufacturing of consent arguably loses sight of the material conditions which are not separable into 
force and consent, but present both benefit and constraint as an integrated condition of living.  See 
Joseph Femia, Gramsci's Political Thought Hegemony, Consciousness and the Revolutionary Process. 
Oxford: Clarendon, 1987 chapter 3.
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Having established the general outlay of the problems confronting a theory of 
embodied legal normativity, I proceeded in chapter 3 to analyse what I perceived to be 
counterintuitive features within the law.  Through the exploration of responsibility and 
emotion as two major themes in legal literature, I attempted to demonstrate how these 
counterintuitive features are symptomatic of the disjunction between law as a lived and 
embodied experience, and the rhetoric of a legal discourse which fails to 
accommodate for that embodiment.  I aim to account for these counterintuitive 
features in my account of embodied legal normativity.
Pursuant to constructing such a theory, I believe it is necessary to reframe much of the 
elements involved, such as subject, consciousness, norms, and actions, in material 
terms in order to facilitate a reconfiguration of their interrelations; the terms of 
representing reality used by theorists hitherto examined are not conducive to relaying 
the ideas I wish to advance.  In changing the terms of representation I will be better 
placed to construct new conceptions of subject, norms, and action which are not 
posited as mutually exclusive, therefore combine more easily into a new account of 
normative action.  In this chapter I will construct a material framework for analysing 
and understanding the material world, as foundation for understanding material norms 
and action going forward. 
4.1 (Re)presenting material reality 
My normative framework comprises objects, object-relations, and signifying chains 
which together form the embodied category.   The ‘embodied category’ is a term I use 2
to refer to that mode of human existence which consists of acting in the material world 
in an intentional manner, a way of ‘being in the world’  which is constituted in most part 3
by material action not reducible to simple mechanistic or deterministic descriptions. 
The fundamental way of being in the world is engaging in meaningful activity, and by 
this I do not have in mind any content-rich conception of meaningful action, such as 
 These are not metaphysical concepts or categories, but are simply terms to denote already familiar and 2
established concepts.  My concern is not to establish a new metaphysical foundation for understanding 
the world, instead my use of these terms is aimed towards constructing a fundamentally material 
approach to norms and action by separating the material object from any particular symbolic 
representation of it.
 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception Routledge Classics. London: Routledge, 2002 3
Part III Chapter I
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being goal-oriented or rational, but merely that any action will contain a minimal 
element of intentionality,  so that it is not entirely a cause and effect phenomenon 4
explainable in mechanistic terms.  5
I concede that if measured in terms of the proportion of total action a human regularly 
engages in throughout the course of his life, mechanistic and involuntary actions likely 
constitute the vast majority of action.  Indeed they are absolutely necessary in 
maintaining the very life of the human organism.   If this is the case it may appear 6
strange to contend that the sort of action the human being engages in most often and 
necessarily are not the sort that counts as human activity in the embodied mode of 
living.  My choice to refrain from directly addressing these modes of human action is 
driven by my intention to separate and identify one specific characteristic of human 
action which appears to elude such mechanistic descriptions.  This is the element of 
the normative, a characteristic which distinguishes mechanistic from intentional 
action.   The normative is evidenced in the action, which both constitutes the norm in 7
its embodied modality, and reinforces the norm for further repetitions.  Instead of the 
norm exhibiting its force by determining human action through reason or reflection, I 
argue that the normative is manifested in the corporeal and intentional actions of 
humans.  These actions are not ‘normative’ in the sense of being explicitly norm-
 Intentionality is a much philosophised concept, the intricacies of which are not directly pertinent to my 4
thesis.  I use the term intentionality to denote that way of relating to the material world which consists of 
practical action and active engagement with material things.  This conception has similarities to 
phenomenological accounts of intentionality as developed by Husserl and Heidegger.  For an overview of 
phenomenological conceptions of intentionality, see Kriegel,  Phenomenal Intentionality. Philosophy of 
Mind Series. New York: OUP 2013.  My foremost disagreement with a phenomenological account is its 
emphasis on experience over material action, and its preoccupation with internal states of being.  Cf. John 
Searle, Making the Social World, OUP, 2010, chapter 2 on his realist conception of intentionality which is 
based primarily upon perception and action.  I agree with Searle in most part, except for his claim that 
intentionality is propositional.  Likewise I hesitate to use the term ‘intention’ due to its connotation of 
particular philosophical theories of agency and action causation which I do not subscribe to, especially in 
its robust forms of intending to achieve a certain result.  See Antony Duff, Intention, Agency and Criminal 
Liability : Philosophy of Action and the Criminal Law: Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990.  U. Heuer, ‘Intentions, 
permissibility, and the reasons for which we act’ in Pavlakos & Rodriguez-Blanco (Eds.), Reasons and 
Intentions in Law and Practical Agency: CUP: 2015.  For an interesting contrast to intentionality as an 
internal state see William Bauer, 'Physical Intentionality, Extrinsicness, and the Direction of 
Causation.'  Acta Analytica  31(4): 397-417.  I believe a more realist conception of intentionality better 
serves my aim of constructing an account of normative action which emphasises the material as opposed 
to the phenomenology of experience.  
 Involuntary muscular reflexes or contractions such as the heart beating, the motions of digestion, 5
flinching away from pain or heat, are examples of actions without intentionality.  In neuro-physical terms 
the body’s state is regulated largely through the mechanisms of proprioception and interoception which 
operate without conscious control by the human being.
 Here I have in mind most specifically those biological mechanisms outlined above.6
 The more common understanding of normative action is they are driven by intangible causes such as 7
reasons, and cannot be reduced to purely empirical accounts of cause and effect.  Likewise normative 
action is often described in terms of ought and should.  Geoffrey Brennan, et al., Explaining Norms. OUP, 
2013, chapter 1.  Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Norms. Oxford: Clarendon, 1991, chapters 1 & 2.
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determined, but they are nevertheless an adequate iteration of a norm in its embodied 
modality. 
A human’s senses, sensations, and actions necessarily occur through the medium of 
his corporeal being; humans come to engage both with the world and themselves by 
incessantly interacting with their material surroundings through the use of their bodies, 
and not by discovering immutable truths through internal reflection or reasoning.  8
Materiality is the first significant characteristic of the embodied category, and 
immaterial norms, ideals, and meanings must be embodied in some tangible form, 
whether in the guise of intentional action or physical objects.  The second 
characteristic of the embodied category is the aspect of dynamic motion; human living 
is constituted by ceaseless corporeal and cognitive activity.    9
Although materiality is the predominant mode of existence in the embodied category, it 
is overlaid by symbolism.  Human living consists of physical interactions with the world, 
but also of symbolic and linguistic representations of that world and their experiences 
within it.  Symbolism operates to structure meaning in the embodied category and 
determines the outer limits of its reach; what cannot be represented, either 
symbolically or linguistically in however tenuous a manner, does not ‘exist’ insofar as 
the embodied mode of human living is concerned.   The ability to communicate 10
through symbolism is important for the transmission of meaning through discourse.  
The embodied category is that mode of human existence characterised by corporeal 
activity which forms the entirety of lived experience.  Put simply it is what confronts us 
immediately as the world around us, the environment, the field of experience.  It is the 
world we not only see, but perceive through the lens of familiarity, and of which we 
have a certain degree of understanding.  It is the world we navigate with the use of our 
 E.g., Cartesian notions of reason.8
 By cognitive I do not refer to reflection in the traditional sense of inward thinking, but active cognition 9
such as recognition, identification, intention, etc.
 I am not subscribing to a theory which states the world may be faithfully mapped through symbolic 10
representations such as language, only stating that symbolism is fundamental to the human capacity to 
represent and reiterate meaning.
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experience of it, which structures our expectations and in turn influences how we act 
within it.11
4.1.2 Constructing the embodied category
The embodied category consists of objects, object-relations, and signifying chains 
which together form the world as we experience it.  When humans act in the world, 
they engage directly with the objects which surround them and make up their material 
environment.  They respond to these objects according to the object-relations which 
are those contingent reactions appropriate to their situation.  These actions and 
experiences are organised into series and networks by the signifying chains which 
connect together otherwise disparate events to form a coherent narrative of meaning. 
The objects, object-relations, and signifying chains form the ternary which serves as 
the foundation for the ceaseless activity of sustaining and reproducing human living. 
In turn these objects, object-relations, and signifying chains depend upon human 
activity to reproduce them in an embodied mode.  In other words the embodied 
category invites us to engage with the world in a familiar way conditioned by the 
objects, object-relations, and signifying chains, and in doing so creates the conditions 
for its repetition and reproduction.  
I will develop each part of the ternary in turn; I am not concerned with establishing an a 
priori moment from which these events originate, instead pursue an approach which is 
situated in media res, and begin from the immediately available experience of the 
world.  When I refer to the initial moment or to any suggestion of an originating event, I 
will only be referring to a specific example, or using the term as a theoretical 
convenience without denoting any metaphysical origin.
 This definition of the embodied category bears resemblances to Slavoj Žižek’s symbolic order as social 11
reality (The Sublime Object of Ideology. Phronesis. London: Verso, 1989), and Pierre Bourdieu’s 
conception of the material world as social space (Pascalian Meditations. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000). 
Similarities can also be drawn with Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the material world (n.3), and John 
Searle’s conception of social reality as constituted by institutional facts (The Construction of Social 
Reality. London: Penguin, 1996).  I perceive these conceptions of the world to share a common idea that 
the reality we are confronted with is already saturated with a determined meaning, as opposed to that 
meaning being subsequently imposed through ideal categories.  
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4.2 Objects
Objects in the embodied category are those material things which humans are capable 
of interacting with.   They may be inanimate, such as tables and chairs, or animate 12
when they are attached to or form part of an organism, such as animals and body 
parts.  The vast majority are perceivable by the physical senses, and these are what 
make up the commonplace daily environment for humans.  There may be some 
objects not directly accessible to the senses such as electricity or atoms, which 
nonetheless may also count as objects due to their being manipulated by human 
action. Intangible or immaterial objects such as spirits or ghosts I would regard as 
either a specific modality of an object, or as a specific signification of an object.  13
Similarly for all intangible ideas, concepts, features, I contend these must be 
instantiated within a material object as the embodying medium in order to exist in the 
embodied category.  
The human actor encounters the embodied category primarily through his corporeal 
interaction with his physical environment.  This is not an epistemological claim that the 
foremost or only source of knowledge must come through physical sensation, only that 
humans experience the world by interacting and engaging with physical objects 
through their bodies.  Rather than a disembodied cogito coming to consciousness of 
its own existence through reflection, or becoming conscious of the external world 
through a priori categories of understanding, I would argue that physical contact with 
 I am not postulating a metaphysically or ontologically distinct category of objects, simply grouping 12
ordinary tangible things together under one referent.  The exact ontological status of objects and 
contentions between different philosophies of ontology such as realism or deflationism are not directly 
pertinent to my thesis.  Theodore Sider, Writing the Book of the World, OUP, 2011, chapter 9.  Neither am 
I preoccupied with questions such as whether objects would ‘exist’ without being perceived, as is claimed 
by Berkeley.  For my purposes a theory of ontology similar to Kant’s separation of the phenomenal from 
the noumenal, without proving the latter’s existence would suffice.   
 I use the term modality to denote a particular mode in which an object exists, such as by being known, 13
represented, or experienced.  As I believe an object is capable of possessing multiple modalities, this 
would imply that I am a ‘de re modal conventionalist’; see Sider above n.12.  According to Alan Sidelle, 
'Modality and Objects' Philosophical Quarterly 60(238): 109-25, this would be incompatible with realism 
about objects, a point with which I am not directly concerned.  However I would reject forms of modal 
monism and essentialism which claim there is only one possible or essential feature of an object.
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material objects is a necessary condition before any sort of conscious awareness or 
understanding of that object can be formed.  14
4.2.1 Naming
Objects in the embodied category are capable of being objects for human interaction, 
such as use, production, exchange, or knowledge.  For this to be possible objects 
must be invested with a modality in the form of a meaning, function, or value, through 
which the human actor is able to grasp or express that object.   A ubiquitous modality 15
is to invest an object with a name, thereby assigning it a symbolic and linguistic 
meaning.  This enables that object to be identified, invoked, and represented by 
human actors by the use of its name in speech and other actions.  It also enables the 
object to be placed in relations of difference, similarity, and reference to other objects 
along chains of signification.   The name of an object is no different in theory from any 16
other form of modality, however because naming occurs with frequency I have chosen 
to present it separately, as the most basic mode of objects’ existence.  So even for 
objects which one cannot define or describe, the use of the name is sufficient to 
designate the object through the act of speech.   In the embodied category where the 17
two media of existence are material presence and symbolic representation, assigning 
and articulating the name of an object is the standard way of interacting with that 
object.  I believe that the names given to objects constitute both their being and modes 
of being but do not ultimately determine the entirety of their qualities or states;  the 18
name specifies the linguistic mode of an object’s embodied being.  
 I am concerned only with practical knowledge and its implications on action, hence I need not deny the 14
validity of theoretical or metaphysical knowledge such as mathematical or a priori truths.  The claim that a 
human actor is able to know or understand mathematical propositions without a corresponding physical 
sensation or experience does not substantially undermine my claim.  For example, the knowledge that a 
triangle is mathematically defined as a three sided shape with angles totalling 180º is feasibly held by a 
human who may have never seen a physical triangle.  However I would suspect that in order to identify or 
draw such a shape upon request would most likely require prior contact with material triangles.  See 
Goldstone et al., ‘A well grounded education: The role of perception in science and mathematics’ in 
Manuel De Vega et al., Symbols and Embodiment : Debates on Meaning and Cognition. Oxford ; New 
York: OUP 2008, chapter 16 for a discussion on how the ability to transfer scientific and mathematic 
knowledge is aided by learning patterns of similarity within embodied situations.
 See Kripke on naming as ‘baptism’ of an object, which preserves only the name as reference; Saul 15
Kripke, Reference and Existence: The John Locke Lectures. OUP 2013, pg.13.
 Ibid. 16
 This mode of existence is different from a speech act, since the object must already be materially 17
present, but rendered capable of human interaction, in this case to be cognised or acknowledged through 
the invocation of its name. 
 Here I differ from Searle who asserts that objects do possess intrinsic features which are independent 18
of any intentionality; Searle, n.11 chapter 1.  Although he does not mention essentialism, as his theory of 
external reality is a formal supposition rather than substantive theory of essence.
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I now discuss the naming process and how it invests an object with meaning, function, 
and value.  For the purpose of clarity I address each modality separately, however 
these distinctions are largely artificial, and it will become apparent that the modalities 
of an object are highly intertwined and mutually constitutive.
4.2.2 Meaning
As I am not concerned with tracing the genealogy of objects or their names, I will not 
attempt to reconstruct what might be the original moment of naming the first object in 
the world.  I assume that there exists numerous named objects in the embodied 
category, and should any novel objects come into being through discovery or 
invention, its naming process must take place within the existing network of named 
objects.  If assigning a name is the basic designation of symbolic representation and 
enables a human to point to an object and utter its name, then assigning a meaning to 
that name enables the object to be positioned in relation to other objects and to be 
grasped in that mode,  that particular quality or aspect through some more generic 19
reference.   For example an apple can be understood in its quality of redness, which 20
is itself an already established generic referent consisting of other red objects.  So the 
redness of the apple is a meaning which is grasped through the concept of red, a 
meaning which enables the apple to be expressed through comparison with other 
objects sharing that same generic quality.   The public and generic character of 21
 Whilst this sounds similar to Wittgenstein’s idea of names signifying that which is the indestructible 19
elements making up the world, and meaning as the ability to use the name in language games, the 
fundamental difference is that I do not believe there are objects which exist in and for themselves, and 
which are the proper objects corresponding to names.  I would instead regard names of objects in the 
same vein as meaning, function, and value, but simply a more generic modality which may encompass 
many of these particular modalities, or none at all.  In the sense that names enable objects to be objects 
of human interaction, so used in some way, it is more akin to Wittgenstein’s concept of meaning.  Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations. Past Masters. Charlottesville, Va.: InteLex Corporation, 1998 
Part I ss.37-46.   
 Kripke n.1520
 Insofar as my conception of generic referents are empirically constructed through comparison between 21
objects, my approach is closer to internalism whereby objects are identified according to subjective 
knowledge, as opposed to externalism which holds that names refer to unwavering facts about objects. 
See Hilary Putnam,  Philosophical Papers Vol.2, Mind, Language, and Reality, CUP, 1975, as a 
representative theory of externalism.   However neither do I uphold any form of solipsism, which Putnam 
has asserted is a result of rejecting externalism.  For a critique of Putnam see Crane, T.  ‘All the difference 
in the world’ The Philosophical Quarterly, 41: 1–25.  Cf. Jylkka et al. ‘Psychological essentialism and 
semantic externalism: Evidence for externalism in lay speakers’ language use’ Philosophical Psychology 
22(1): 37-60, for an argument that psychological essentialism plays a role in lay speakers’ apparent 
externalism.  My notion of referents are ‘generic’ in the sense of being both public and requiring the 
involvement of at least two objects.  The publicity is an implication from Wittgenstein’s denial of private 
language, and the generic from my rejection of essentialism which means no name or reference is unique 
to any object.
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referents implies that specific objects can come to invoke or symbolically represent the 
other objects which share a referent, and point beyond themselves to other objects 
through their shared meaning.22
Most objects will be invested with multiple meanings, and the appropriate reference 
will depend on the particular context.  An object’s meaning in any particular context 
acts almost as a specific embodiment of a generic quality or referent, and can also be 
used as a proxy for something else.  The most straightforward example would be a 
simile or metaphor where an object is explicitly used as a comparison or stand in. 
However I would argue that because objects exist only in position and relation to other 
objects and not independently for or in itself, any articulation of meaning would invoke 
to some degree the relations between that object and the other objects which share 
that meaning. 
4.2.3 Function
The function of an object refers to its utility and capacity for use or to serve a particular 
purpose.  It also includes symbolic functions whose purpose and effects are not 
directly materially manifested but create a change in a symbolic fashion which is then 
materially manifested in other ways, such as by influencing the corporeal actions of 
humans.  
I have argued that mechanistic actions do not form part of my conception of the 
embodied category, likewise I am not concerned with mechanistic functions of objects 
such as the heart pumping blood, or plants converting sunlight into energy.  Such 
functions of these objects will persist regardless of any human consciousness of their 
operation, so for my purposes they are not functions pertinent to intentional action. 
However that does not mean that hearts and plants cannot serve a normative or 
intentional function when engaging in their mechanistic functions of pumping blood or 
absorbing sunlight.  When they are taken as objects of action and knowledge  their 23
mechanistic function is transformed into an imposed normative function which is 
 I have in mind a very basic form of relationship between objects which share a point of reference, akin 22
to simile.  I will argue later that this is a rudimentary signifying chain.
 Foucault has argued that taking the subject’s body as the object of power and knowledge enables 23
disciplines to fix normative standards by deriving average norms which are then used to judge and train 
previously inert bodies.  Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish : The Birth of the Prison Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1979, chapter 5.
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capable of being measured and manipulated, in other words capable of human 
interaction.   24
We only know of the ostensibly mechanistic fact that hearts pump blood because we 
have studied the human form through the discipline of biology, which is a normatively 
structured system of knowledge based on a particular understanding of objects in the 
world, specifically the object of the human body.  So what was once a mechanistic 
function now becomes the object of knowledge, which enables the object to be 
measured and manipulated through a normative system of knowledge, such as to be 
judged as faulty or defective and subjected to medical intervention.  It might be argued 
that merely describing a mechanistic function does not change that function from being 
an objectively mechanistic one to a normative one.  However I would argue that any 
ostensibly objective description is actually an intentional human action of ordering and 
representing the world through a particular discourse which assigns meanings, 
functions, and values to objects according to its normative system.   Humans have 25
been alive long before they have accumulated any scientific knowledge of the 
conditions of their existence as valorised by modern science.  The more important 
observation is the tendency for humans to produce discourse in order to explain the 
conditions of their existence, which likely maintains the strong hold of ideas over 
action.  26
Certain functions are relatively more obvious, such as the function of edible items to 
be consumed for sustenance.  Other functions might be results of invention, such as 
the functions of tools and other human made objects, limited only by the imagination 
and ingenuity of humans.  I am more interested in the symbolic function of objects 
 Searle asserts that all functions of objects are ‘observer-relative’ and therefore imposed, and are 24
normative in that they are supposed to achieve something; Searle n.11 chapter 1.  His category of 
agentive and non-agentive functions correlate broadly with my own categories of normative and 
mechanistic functions respectively.  Cf. Lindahl who uses the terms understanding and interpretation to 
refer to these different ways of interacting with objects, where the former refers to the practical 
manipulation of things, and the latter refers to the thematic reflection upon norms.  For Lindahl these 
different approaches apply to all things, and is not restricted to function, however his assertion that 
interpretation of action entails making the action the object of knowledge is similar my own argument. 
Hans Lindahl, Fault Lines of Globalization: Legal Order and the Politics of A-Legality, OUP, 2013.
 That knowledge and truth is not a spontaneous or eternal and free from power is the critique advanced 25
by Foucault towards traditional philosophy; Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality. Vol. 1, The Will to 
Knowledge, London: Penguin, 1998 Part III.  Similar to the power-knowledge structure of discourse, all 
meanings to be found in the embodied category are also produced through action, and cannot be 
detached from that material existence.
 Social psychology has offered many explanations as to this tendency of humans for producing 26
superstitions, beliefs, narratives, in short forms of discourse.  For an interesting discussion on the 
particular topic of souls, see Jesse Bering, ‘The cognitive science of souls: Clarifications and extensions 
of the evolutionary model.’ Behavioral and brain sciences 29(5): 486-493.
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which I believe plays an integral role in how immaterial norms are able to produce 
material effects by influencing human action.  As the foregoing has indicated, function 
and meaning are intimately entwined, so difficult to demarcate clearly.  They are also 
necessarily embedded in a particular discourse which invests the objects with those 
particular meanings and functions.  It is through demarcating and designating objects 
that a discourse is able to construct itself and manifest its norms through the corporeal 
actions of humans.  27
Symbolic function occurs when objects come to act as proxies for something else 
through their meaning, so act as a sign or symbol or sorts.   Symbolic function 28
operates through that meaning to change the symbolic state of affairs in a discursive 
system according to its inner logic,  which is then materialised into reality by 29
influencing the corporeal actions of humans.  These symbolic effects are played out in 
the material reality by humans acting as if these discursive effects are real.  In other 
words the material reality is constructed according to the discursive reality through 
human actions which simultaneously construct and react to their material world 
according to a particular normative framework, so construct the normative reality by 
embodying those norms.   30
I will take the example of the ritual of Holy Communion wherein bread and wine are 
objects serving symbolic functions of standing in as Christ’s body and blood.  Through 
the perspective of an observer not familiar with Christian doctrine, the actions of eating 
bread and drinking wine would only indicate their functions of serving as edible 
objects.  However within the discursive ritual of Holy Communion, the bread and wine 
are capable of effecting a symbolic change in the supplicant and his relationship to 
Christ, God, and the Church.  Partaking in the bread and wine under those 
 This may be likened to a system reproducing itself and the environment which makes its existence 27
possible, so enters into the autopoetic action of self-referencing meaning; Niklas Luhmann, Social 
Systems. Writing Science. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1995 chapter 5.
 Searle asserts that such symbolic functions are institutional facts which have the constitutive rule of ‘X 28
counts as Y in C’, whereby an object of action is ascribed a different meaning or significance depending 
on the circumstances; Searle n.11 chapter 4.  Lindahl in drawing upon the theories of Husserl and 
Heidegger asserts a similar argument that the meanings to be found within the world are ‘disclosed’ in the 
formulation of ‘the disclosure of something as something’; Lindahl n.24 pg.123-124.
 Lindahl refers to this as the co-disclosure of the entire system, or the ‘unity of ought-places, ought-29
times…when something can appear as something’, ergo the legal order which gives these things their 
legal meanings; ibid.
 Whilst I refer to reality being constructed according to discourse, it is important to state here that it is not 30
the discourse which actively orders reality, but rather the corporeal actions of humans which manifest the 
discourse into material reality.  The specific relationship between discourse and human action I will 
explore in later chapters.  
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circumstances symbolises the redemption of the soul and acts as a reaffirmation of 
that relationship between Christ and human kind.  The bread and wine are capable to 
serving this symbolic function by virtue of their symbolic meaning bestowed through 
Christ’s words in the Bible.  In turn the Bible and the ritual in general consist of material 
objects and corporeal actions invested with their meanings and functions by the wider 
discourse of the Christian faith so on.   31
What is important is not what is happening at the discursive level, but rather the 
powerful influence that exerts at the embodied level of corporeal human action.  In this 
case the action is partaking in the Communion, and its material effects evidenced by 
the changed experience of the supplicant and treatment of him by others as a result of 
the ritual.  More broadly the actions of going to church, baptism, praying, all manner of 
rituals involved in Christian worship are evidence of the symbolic functions of objects 
influencing human action.  It is these actions which reiterate the meanings and 
reinforce the functions of objects according to the particular discourse.  Ritual is a 
highly visible and formalised example of how discourse can influence action.   In 32
everyday life one can identify numerous mundane symbolic functions; penning a 
signature serves the function of giving authoritative consent, displaying ID cards as a 
function of verifying identity, writing names on objects as a function of demarcating 
ownership.   All these and more mundane symbolic functions make use of objects to 33
reiterate the meanings permeating social living according to the particular logic of a 
legal capitalist society.  
4.2.4 Value
The value of an object refers to the relative rank or discursive significance placed upon 
it.  It also acts as the measure of commensurability or equivalence between objects. 
Like function and meaning, the value of an object is embedded within a particular 
 Norman Doe, 'Baptism, Confirmation and Holy Communion.' In Canon Law in the Anglican Communion, 31
OUP 1998 chapter 10
 Rossano & Hinshaw, 'The Essential Role of Ritual in the Transmission and Reinforcement of Social 32
Norms.' Psychological Bulletin 138(3): 529-49.  Less formalised but more insidious cases of ritual I would 
equate with the notion of performativity, a process which feminist critics have argued constructs and 
sustains gender and sexual roles in society.  See Judith Butler, 'Performative Acts and Gender 
Constitution An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist Theory.' Theatre Journal 40(4): 519-531; Butler, 
Gender Trouble : Feminism and the Subversion of Identity Routledge 1990, pg.171-180.  Deborah 
Cameron, 'Performing gender identity' in Language and gender: a reader. Malden, MA: Blackwell 1998.  
 These objects are described by Searle as ‘status indicators’ which serves to maintain and reinforce the 33
use and acceptance of institutional facts by the community; Searle n.11 chapter 5.  
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discourse, so must be placed within its discursive network in order to be fully 
appreciated.  Objects with perceived higher values tend to exert more influence over 
human action, as they become objects of desire or aspiration.  Correspondingly they 
might hold higher value by virtue of some symbolic meaning accorded to them, such 
as being units of social capital or indicators of status or goodness.  
Value can also sustain a greater degree of personal investment, such as objects which 
hold sentimental value because they serve as a material embodiment of some 
personal experience.  Such sentimental value objects may be said to possess a 
meaning or serve a function for an individual which is difficult to communicate through 
language or physical interaction.  I would interpret such situations as indicative of the 
relatively mutable character of the value modality, compared to the meaning and 
function modalities which require a greater degree of common action to sustain. 
However that is not to say value is radically mutable depending on any arbitrary 
position, as there are hegemonic discourses on value which tend to render all objects 
commensurable according to a particular set of norms.  34
I would propound that capitalism is at present the most hegemonic value discourse, 
converting value into monetary terms and rendering objects commensurable according 
to its model of exchange.  Within the capitalist system all objects are imposed with the 
meaning and function of commodities to be used and exchanged.   In turn the values 35
of those commodities are reduced to their exchange value expressed in the unitary 
measure of money.  The object is still capable of sustaining other values not 
commensurable with money or commodity, however due to the hegemonic status of 
capitalist discourse the predominant value of objects is their commodity value.  In 
evidence when we speak of some object as being valuable, the preeminent meaning is 
of monetary value, and should that be contextually inappropriate we can only 
appreciate non-monetary value in a vague moral, sentimental, or idealistic way.  I am 
highlighting what I perceive to be the most concrete and material experience of objects 
 Here using hegemonic in its meaning of dominating ideologies in society, a concept developed by 34
Gramsci; see Femia n.1. For concise overview see David Coghlan, and Mary Brydon-Miller. The SAGE 
Encyclopedia of Action Research. 2 vols. London, : SAGE Publications Ltd, 2014, pg.400-403.
 Karl Marx, Capital. Everyman's Library ; No.849. London: Dent, 1951 v.I chapter I section 4.35
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in their value modality; humans in a capitalist system overwhelmingly confront their 
material surroundings as a collection of property or commodity objects.   36
 
4.2.5 Naturalisation of object modalities
Why is it that certain names of objects and certain meanings, functions, and values 
tend to present themselves as intrinsic, therefore natural attributes of those objects?  37
The pertinent claim is there are facts or states in the world which occur independently 
of any human action, so are objectively true and valid in all given situations.  I would 
argue that this is a result of a process of naturalisation  which occurs with strong and 38
incessant repetition of an object in a particular modality.  
As an object’s meaning, function, or value is reiterated and reenacted by human action 
which invests the object with its modalities, the action becomes obscured by the 
material object itself.  The active process of investing meaning through action is 
obscured behind and reified onto the object, which alone suffices to invoke meaning, 
function, or value, and the action relegated to a secondary reaction to, or an effect of 
the object.   This process is repeated ad infinitum and with every objectified action the 39
meaning, function, or value is increasingly grafted onto the object, until it comes to be 
 This would be an instance of commodification described by Marx which is a result of alienation from the 36
products of labour and reification of the commodity form; Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic 
Manuscripts of 1844. New Ed.]. ed. London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1970 pg.331-333.  More detailed 
discussion on Marx see chapter 1.  The object which most obviously defies this monetary value is the 
human body which is portrayed in common discourse in terms of an absolute value.  Although in actuality 
the human body has already undergone substantial commodification, in the selling of labour, body parts, 
surrogacy, ownership of organs etc., the predominant discourse determining the meaning, function, and 
value of the human body in its guise as living being remains one which valorises life and idealises human 
rights.
 Searle, n.11 claims that things have intrinsic properties.37
 I have chosen this term in reference to the social psychology category of natural kinds and their integral 38
role in explaining psychological essentialism.  Basically psychological essentialism demonstrates a 
‘natural kind belief’ which elides social categories into natural categories, along with beliefs of the latter’s 
immutability, inherence, etc.  See Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, ‘Essentialist beliefs about social 
categories’ British Journal of Social Psychology, 39(1): 113–127.  Haqanee,, Lou, & Lalonde, ‘Natural kind 
and entitative beliefs in relation to prejudice toward mental disorders’ Journal of Applied Social 
Psychology, 44(2): 145–153.  Social psychology works usually focus on the human categories rather than 
material objects, which are largely viewed as proper natural kind categories.  However my argument is 
that objects’ modalities are norms imposed by human action, thus social in a true sense of being socially 
constructed in their meanings, which are mistakenly perceived to be natural and immutable as a result of 
‘natural kind beliefs’ in human psychology.  I do not use naturalisation to refer to philosophical naturalism, 
which is similar to materialism and a philosophical stance I agree with.
 This is akin to the ‘inductive potential’ of essential categories where category membership itself is 39
furnishes information regarding the member. Rothbart, & Taylor, ‘Category labels and social reality: Do we 
view social categories as natural kinds?’  In Semin &  Fiedler  (Eds.),  Language, interaction, and social 
cognition, London: Sage 1992 pg.11-36.  In my case the object itself is believed to be the originator of 
meaning, rather than the product of a meaning imposing human act.
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perceived as an innate and natural property of the object itself.  Instead of wearing its 
modality on its surface like a veneer, the object appears to be the potent source of that 
modality.   40
Naturalisation is how power is invested in objects.   Whilst I agree with Foucault’s 41
argument of how power-knowledge relations define reality, his matrix is constructed 
through immaterial social relations which take material bodies as objects of 
manipulation.  Foucault’s power is limited to human agents, so loses that element of 
external constraint and necessity imposed by non-human factors illuminated by 
Marx.   My aim is to preserve the true locus of power within the human actor, but 42
integrate materiality into power such that the limit of human action is not subjectivity, 
but material reality.  In short it is to find a middle path between determining action 
through immaterial subjectivity and material economic conditions, while preserving the 
agentive capacity of the human.   I believe this may be achieved by naturalising 43
power onto objects through their modalities.  44
4.3 Object-relations
The ceaseless activity of human living fundamentally consists of physical interactions 
between human actors and the objects which make up their material world. I term this 
activity object-relations,  for it refers to the relations between humans and objects in 45
 The process is very similar to Marx’s argument of productive potential becoming alienated from living 40
labour which is the true source of production, and reified onto capital which is only the accumulation of 
dead labour; Karl Marx, The German Ideology Great Books in Philosophy. Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus 
Books, 1976 p.99.  Deleuze & Guattari refer to the ‘socius’ of a social body which is its imaginary sign or 
determinant, and for the capitalist social body it is capital; Deleuze & Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus : 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia London : New York: Continuum, 2004. chapter 1.
 Discussed below 4.3.241
 Foucault’s agents are limited by their subjectivities and general discipline, which I find dissatisfactory for 42
the same reason of their being immaterial social processes; Foucault n.23 and n.25.  
 On this issue my position is closer to Foucault’s in positing a non-ideal self-determining subject who is 43
socially conditioned.  
 This process may sound as if it is occurring on an ideological level of alienation, however I claim that 44
the power invested in objects is real at the level of material composition of objects and bodies.  The 
theoretical tools which enable this is habit, to be discussed in chapter 5.
 The term ‘object relations’ appears in the psychoanalytical works of Freud to denote the object of drive, 45
although the term ‘object relations theory’ has now become detached from Freud’s original usage to 
encompass a range of approaches in psychoanalytical theory.  For further exposition of the use of object 
relations in psychoanalysis, see Jay Greenberg & Stephen Mitchell, Object Relations in Psychoanalytical 
Theory, Harvard University Press 1983.  My use of the term object-relations is in no manner connected to 
the similar term used in psychoanalytical theories.  Mine is a much more limited concept which is 
restricted to denoting a moment of human action as a reaction towards material objects, without any 
implication for that actor’s external or internal states of being. 
 106
their active dynamic aspect.  An object-relation is the reaction a human actor has 
towards an object.  Object-relations are normative in the sense of being instituted 
through intentional action.  They can be appropriate or inappropriate according to the 
normative standards which pertain to the object-relation.  Object-relations constitute 
the totality of human activity within the embodied category; whenever humans engage 
in action or cognition, they are engaging in an object-relation.
4.3.1 What is an object-relation?
The basic definition of an object-relation is a reaction to an object, and it must be one 
of dynamic action; it refers to the relation between human and object in its active 
modality.  Such action can be a physical action observable through the senses, but 
can also be a cognitive or mental action which, whilst not directly exhibited in physical 
action, are nonetheless active in the sense of effecting a change in the state of the 
human, whether by him taking up an attitude, belief, or knowledge.   Some if not most 46
of these cognitive object-relations are precursors of, and intimately related to any 
physical actions which may follow.  Theoretically there is no difference between 
physical and cognitive object-relations, but for clarity I will artificially separate them.  In 
so doing I hope to avoid any confusion which may arise regarding the exact relation 
between these two types of actions, such as the cognitive causing the physical, which 
can descend into idealism, or physical causing cognitive, which suggests some form of 
determinism.  I am satisfied at this stage to proceed with a theory of action which 
assumes a non-causal concurring relation between mental states and physical action. 
Object-relations include interrelations between human beings in their guise as 
composites of corporeal body parts, who interact with others in a manner akin to 
objects.   A human being is never simply a discrete being, but rather a collection of 47
embodied objects, of limbs and organs, sexed and raced body parts.   The object-48
relations pertaining between humans, but also between a human and his own body 
are multiple and complex, and implicate the interpellation of self and subjectivity.  This 
inter-object character of human interrelations aims to subvert notions of relations 
 I have in mind actions such as an act of identification which may entail the articulation of an object’s 46
name; or an act of recognition which may entail acknowledgement of an object’s meaning or value; or an 
act of understanding, etc.
 Not in the Kantian sense of objects as means.47
 Foucault’s theory of disciplines fixing the truth and individuality of subjects onto their physical bodies. 48
Foucault, n.23.
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between rational subjects, not by reducing others to objects, but recasting the terms of 
subject.  Suffice to say that humans are also objects to which others react, and the 
object-relations will vary according to the objects which compose that human’s 
corporeal being.  
Object-relations include those mindless or habitual actions which form the majority of 
action, as well as those deliberative and conscious decisions which occur less 
frequently.  Object-relations are triggered when a human is confronted with an object 
which prompts him to react in a certain way, by physical action or by taking up a 
cognitive state.  Non-deliberative bodily reactions do not require any conscious 
reflection or decision, and operate on auto-pilot response triggered at the corporeal 
level.  In other words the object has triggered a reaction in the body before any 
conscious mental decision of what to do has been arrived at.   However these actions 49
are not strictly automatic in the mechanical sense, such as a body being manipulated 
through physical force.  Auto-pilot actions still maintain a degree of intentionality by 
having a purpose or point to their enactment; they are simply not actions arrived at 
through a process of conscious deliberation.   50
I believe that such auto-pilot actions form the vast proportion of everyday activities; 
waking up, walking, sitting, talking, are all actions we do unthinkingly.   In order for 51
humans to live it is necessary to relegate as much action as possible to this muscle 
memory to relieve the burden of conscious deliberative action.  In evidence recall how 
difficult it was initially learning to tie shoelaces, then imagine what would happen if we 
never mastered that task so that we must spend five minutes struggling with our shoes 
every time.  Then multiply that scenario to all the tasks we accomplish everyday 
without conscious thinking, and the result would be a dysfunctional life.   So, the 52
majority of object-relations consists of such automatic physical and cognitive reactions. 
 Searle also uses the term ‘intentionality’ and describes it as being ‘potentially conscious’ in the sense 49
that whilst not necessarily a fully conscious state, it can be brought into conscious awareness.  Searle n.
11 chapter 1.
 Non-conscious goal pursuit, see Kruglanski, et al.. ‘A theory of goal systems' In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), 50
Advances in experimental social psychology, 2002 pg.331-378.
 Referred to under the umbrella term of ‘automaticity’ in psychology, although precise models of the 51
concept remain in dispute.  See general definition in A. Moors, 'Automaticity' in The Oxford Companion to 
Consciousness, 2009.  
 There are such people with cognitive disabilities which prevent them from accomplishing these tasks 52
and necessarily live under constant care, for example Parkinson’s disease.  For an interesting account of 
how well functioning physical sensations are a vital but overlooked aspect in the philosophy and 
psychology of action, see Christopher Eccleston,  Embodied : The Psychology of Physical Sensation : 
OUP: 2016, who argues that the physical sensations are complex mechanisms vital to supporting human 
action, and explores instances of when these sensations are disrupted.
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The other part would consist of those actions which are the result of conscious 
deliberation and decision-making.   53
4.3.2 Power of objects
My conception of human action as object-centric is premised on a notion of power as it 
pertains between human actor and object which rejects the view that objects are 
simply inert and passive objects for manipulation. Objects exert a certain power of 
influence over human action.  Restructuring the relationship of power between human 
actors and objects is instrumental to grounding normative action in materiality, and 
preventing it from floating into metaphysical notions of agency. 
My conception of power is not a force or ability which is able to be possessed or 
exerted by an entity or organisation.   Power is not a capacity to mechanically 54
manipulate or psychologically coerce other humans to certain action; in other words it 
is not sovereign power.  Neither is it a formative force constituted by relationships 
between humans.   I understand power as something which is gradually reinforced 55
and built up through the repetition of a specific object-relation, which through 
habituation and discursive reiteration becomes detached from the action and reified 
onto the object.  When an object-relation is strongly reinforced, the space where the 
moment of action occurs becomes increasingly obscured, such that the object almost 
appears to exert a causative force upon the reaction which becomes a natural and 
expected effect of the presence of the object.   The stronger the connection between 56
the object and the reaction the more power can be said to be exerted in that object-
relation.   This is how objects exert power over human action, by triggering a reaction 57
which is experienced as compelling beyond question.  So material objects make up 
 I will argue in the next chapter that this is achieved through the mechanism of habit.  It is a debated 53
issue amongst psychologists as to the precise mechanism which enables automaticity in action.  
 Contrast to Searle’s conception of power as the ability to do something, such as performing a speech 54
act; Searle, n.11 chapter 4.  Similarly Hobbes’ conception of power as the mechanical ability to perform 
actions without physical impediment; Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan : Or, The Matter, Forme and Power of a 
Commonwealth, Ecclesiasticall and Civill: London: Printed for Andrew Crooke, 1651: Reprinted 
Cambridge, 1904, chapter X.
 Foucault’s conception of power as being formative of relationships between subjects, and power as 55
something which must be exercised in a relational context; Foucault, n.25 pg.91-93.
 Akin to Marx’s notion of the move to M-C-M where money becomes the reason and result of exchange; 56
Marx, n.35 v.I chapter 3.  The object here is money, and the reaction desire, attachment of value, etc.
 Concurrent to the process of naturalisation; the actual locus of power remains with the human actor 57
who actively invests objects with their ‘power’ by interacting with his environment in particular ways.
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our external surroundings and in their forceful presence the human is pulled to and fro 
and is forced to react in a compulsive manner.58
The power that objects exert over human action is not one of causation, either in the 
mechanical sense or in the reason for action sense.   It can be likened more to a 59
catalyst which when introduced into a solution causes the expected reaction.  However 
that analogy is inexact, for unlike the chemical solution which is predetermined, the 
‘solution’ which is the human as active being is constituted by the totality of his object-
relations which together represent his experience of the world.  As such if the reaction 
has only one possible outcome, it would become a cyclical self-fulfilling tautology. 
Instead the force acts more like a strong influence by creating the positive conditions 
for action and simultaneously reinforcing the action as positive.    Characterised in 60
this way the possibility of change or difference opens up in the moment of action which 
resists the influence.  61
4.3.3 Instituting object-relations
Object-relations are instituted in various ways, not necessarily in an explicit or 
conscious moment of action or decision.  An object-relation can arise gradually 
through an action which is repeated in a non-reflective manner; simple customs or 
habits generally exhibit these traits.  An object-relation can be formally instituted by 
explicitly designating actions with authoritative status, such as the case with formal 
legal rules and regulations, or be non-authoritatively instituted, such as media and 
advertisements designating social status onto action.  Most importantly all object-
relations institute the normative terms of human to object relation, regardless whether 
they are explicitly expressed as such.  62
 Akin to Marx’s notions of commodity fetishism and the reification of capital which appears as the social 58
relation between things, which in turn confronts humans as an independent determining power;  Marx, n.
56 pg.80.
 Causative force either physical or psychological over human action in the sense of determining the 59
action.  However the object exerts force more than simply posing a negative physical obstacle 
constraining possible human action, such as how a cliff might obstruct a human from advancing on foot.  I 
would phrase the force as akin to strong positive conditioning, which precipitates strongly reinforced 
patterns of behaviour without negating the possibility of alternative behaviour. 
 Similar to how Searle asserts the primacy of process of over, of institutional facts as collections of 60
activities which are also ‘conditions for possible future activities’; Searle n.11 pg.56-57.
 This might be achieved through the breaking of habits and becoming aware of the aporia of decision.  I 61
will discuss this issue in later chapters. 
 By this I mean object-relations need not be expressed explicitly in terms of ought, should, or other 62
prescriptive terms; apparently descriptive expressions of behaviour are equally prescriptive by being 
embedded in a particular normative framework. 
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Customs, norms, and social attitudes are not causes or reasons which prompt 
reflection and action. Instead these immaterial norms are embodied in the object-
relation and manifested in their material aspect through corporeal human activity.  So 
when I say that object-relations are norms and vice versa, I am referring to the norm 
as it exists in the embodied mode, as action rather than as an abstract idea.  I would 
argue that when humans refer to norms as their reason for action in the sense of 
taking it into deliberation or acting because of the norm, that is a case of rationalisation 
which refers to the proliferation of discourse behind the object-relation.63
Assuming that object-relations are so instituted, their manner of dissemination and 
transmission throughout a group can also be explicitly reinforced or implicitly spread. 
Object-relations may be transmitted through imitation, a method of learning most 
common during the early stages of human growth.   Object-relations may be explicitly 64
taught through instruction and reinforced through positive affirmation and punishment 
for breach.   They may be transmitted quickly to a wide audience through the use of 65
modern media and advertising techniques, so become popularised amongst a large 
group.  I would posit that the majority of a human’s object-relations are resultant of the 
process of socialisation which occurs by simply inhabiting a particular social world or a 
particular position within the social world.  66
4.3.4 Object mediated relations
Hitherto I have discussed object-relations only as between human and object.  I will 
now discuss the relations between human actors in terms of object-relations, and 
argue that human interaction is mediated through objects.   In oversimplified terms, 67
 I am rejecting the notion that human agents’ reported reasons for action are adequate and true causes 63
of their action.  See Kieran Setiya, Reasons without rationalism, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press 2007 for a view on reasons as cause of action.  However I do not deny the possibility that agents’ 
reasons can precipitate action, only the claim that such reasons are the only valid cause of agentive 
action.
 Imitation is a basic learning mechanism humans share with members of the natural world, including 64
certain birds, mammals, and social animals.  It is not a simple concept of simply mirroring action, and can 
be sensitive to context and effect.  See Richard Byrne, Evolving Insight. OUP, 2016 chapter 11. 
 Foucault and discipline, n.23.65
 Marx’s conception of human nature as the nexus of economic relationships, chapter 1.66
 Girard’s theory of mimetic desire which is acquired by two human actors both desiring the same object, 67
shares similarities with my claim that human relations are all object mediated, although Girard’s claim is 
based in psychoanalysis.  R. Girard, ‘Mimesis and violence: Perspectives in cultural criticism’, Berkshire 
Review, 14: 9–19.  
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humans relate to each other primarily through how they interact with objects, which 
determines the terms of their mutual relationship.  Instituting object-relations is an act 
which involves multiple human actors, either acting in concert or simply implicating 
others as another object factor in action.  Formally instituted object-relations such as 
legal regulations are characterised by thorough discursive articulation and explicit 
designation of the various roles and positions of the human actors interacting in that 
context.   The object mediates the relation between human actors in a clearly defined 68
way which is less susceptible to variation.  For example an authoritatively instituted 
object-relation which dictates that a material object bearing the marks of ownership 
cannot be appropriated except with the owner’s consent is clearly dictating the terms 
of the relationship between the proprietor and all other humans engaging in that 
object-relation.  However it is not by establishing relations between humans which 
make the object private property, but a mode of interacting with objects which creates 
certain relations between humans, abstracted and formalised into authoritative rules of 
property.  This mode of interaction with others is not deduced from a priori natural 
rights or freedoms,  but is likely one particular mode of object-relation amongst many 69
already extant within a community, whose continued existence depends on its 
manifestation through repetition of the relevant action.
The priority of object-relations in establishing the terms of human relations means the 
latter is necessarily mediated by objects.  The possibility of a way of human 
interrelation is first established through interaction with objects, before its implications 
for human interrelations are made evident or explicit.   Objects are able to serve this 70
mediatory role due to the power they exert over human action.   Because the object-71
relation not only constitutes the reaction to the object, but also the terms of how one 
human relates to another in respect to that object, acting in conformity with the object-
relation is acting in regard to the other according to the terms of that object-relation.  If 
I refrain from unilaterally appropriating objects, I am acting in conformity with an object-
 This is akin to Lindahl’s formulation of ordering, which he states as ‘we jointly disclose something as 68
something in order to’; Lindahl n.24 pg.125-127.  The similarity with my argument lies in both the 
disclosure of something as something, and instituting an appropriate object-relation entails a change in 
the treatment or significance of the object concerned.
 Contrast Hobbes and Kant, chapter 1.  69
 This might seem to undermine my earlier contention that object-relations may be instituted by mutual 70
decision and collective action, which seems to suggest a form of collective agency.  The answer to this is 
that the central role afforded to objects as the topic of collective action demonstrates objects are pivotal 
rather than incidental to human relations.  If human interactions always seem to revolve around or 
implicate objects in some form, it is an indication of the indispensability of objects to human relationships, 
hence the pivotal locus of such relationships.  
 See 4.3.3 above.71
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relation pertinent to the norms of private property, so I am effectively bringing about a 
state of affairs wherein other human actors are proprietors of objects.  Importantly this 
reaction is primarily triggered by the presence of the object and not the presence of 
the other who may be physically absent.  It is not the proprietor whose presence or 
words demand the recognition of his status as proprietor, rather it is the presence of 
the object in its modality as private property which exerts a power over human action. 
If the action conforms to that power then by proxy the status of the proprietor is 
affirmed, and the objects has mediated human relations according to the norms of 
private property.   
Whereas for formally instituted object-relations the terms of that mediated relationship 
are relatively stable across contexts, for informally instituted object-relations the 
mediating effect is much more context- and actor-sensitive.  An example of informally 
instituted object-relations may be a child imitating others’ actions and repeating that 
action with external reinforcement until he becomes adept.   As the relevant object-72
relation is not presented in isolation or explicitly instructed, but is embedded within 
particular contexts and placed amongst various other object-relations, what is learned 
through imitation and observation is a more holistic and intuitive understanding of the 
object-relation in its contextual variations.   As such it is difficult to pinpoint the exact 73
moment in which the object-relation is instituted.  It is also difficult to articulate the 
precise content or terms of the object-relation, and it is likely that there is no discrete 
object-relation standing in isolation, but rather a myriad of variations which share 
points of commonality.   
Informally instituted object-relations mediate human relations in the same manner that 
acting towards objects brings about a certain relationship between human actors, with 
the difference that terms of the relationship are not explicitly specified.  However 
object-relations do not remain in this implicit state, for there appears to be an 
inclination to proliferate discourse in order organise and explain the object-relations 
and attribute to them an explicit purpose or meaning.   Such inquisitiveness into the 74
reason or motivation for human action is what drives the proliferation of discourse 
which seeks to order action and experience.  For now let me only emphasise that 
although most object-relations arise in an informal and non-deliberate way, the drive to 
 Byrne n.6472
 Essentially a process of socialisation.  Similar to pre-interpretive practices as described by Ronald 73
Dworkin, Law's empire, Oxford: Hart. 1998.  
 Akin to Dworkin’s stage of pre-interpretive and interpretive practice; ibid. chapter 2.74
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theorise is applicable in equal measure to formal and informal object-relations.  The 
important effect is human actors tend to rationalise their actions in terms of these 
theories, particularly in the case of those unconsciously assimilated object-relations 
where the norm of action is not so immediately transparent.
4.4 Group object-relations
I have stated that objects’ modalities are public and require social action to maintain. 
That social action comprises of object-relations which are instituted by a collection of 
human actors, whose interrelations are constituted by these object-relations.  These 
claims imply that object-relations rarely, if ever, pertain to an individual in isolation 
without mediating the relation between him and any other individual.  This leads to the 
conclusion that object-relations must arise from and be embedded in a setting 
consisting of multiple human actors, in short a group.  This raises the issue of group 
formation and action, especially pertinent to law as a group phenomenon; how these 
concepts may be constructed from my theory of object-relations will form the topic for 
this section. 
Object-relations are different from imperatives or motivations of individuals which are 
usually thought of as exclusive to the individual will or subject.   Motivations such as 75
desire, fear, passion are generic categories applicable to all humans who have 
capacity for feeling, but the manner in which these motivations are theorised into 
causes for action posits an atomised human actor as the locus of internal causation of 
action.   Similarly categorical imperatives which ostensibly apply to all humans with 76
equal force are completely dependent on the individual will of the actor to determine 
action.   Neither conceptions of motivation or will take account of the object except 77
insofar as a potential object of desire, or of the other humans whose presence lies 
behind the object and for whom the object acts as a proxy. 
On the assumption that object-relations necessitate or implicate a situation where 
multiple human actors are acting with minimal conscious coordination, there is a need 
 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Rev. Ed. / Translation Revised by Jens 75
Timmermann. ed. Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy. Cambridge: CUP, 2012 4.446-4.448. 
Hobbes n.54.
 Hobbes n.54. 76
 Kant, n.75.77
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to construct a model of group action.  I have discussed in previous chapters the 
dissatisfaction I have with the theories of group action which depend on atomised 
conceptions of the individual as a conduit of motivation and will.   Such theories 78
ultimately seem to collapse action into a purely subjective issue and reduce group 
action to a simple aggregation of individual action multiplied by a constant to create a 
homogeneous mass consisting of individual units.  
In contrast I would argue that object-relations which are instituted and engaged in by a 
group form the building blocks of group action; these are group object-relations by 
virtue of their particular relation to the group.   Where object-relations constitute the 
appropriate reaction to objects simipliciter, group object-relations constitute the 
appropriate reaction to those objects designated as group objects. Where objects 
mediate between human actors, so group objects mediate between the individuals and 
the group itself, and also between the individuals within the group.  The relational 
structure of the group is a dynamic conglomeration of human actors and objects which 
are not prior to the group entity, but constituted by and through group relations.  The 
group entity maintains its existence only insofar as the individual actors respond to 
group object-relations in the appropriate way, which is to say the group entity 
maintains its integrity by the individual human actors behaving as if the group entity is 
real.  79
4.4.1 What is a group object?
The group object is prior to the group entity, being the material embodiment of the 
latter which is a non-physical conceptual entity. For the following discussion I will 
simply assume there is a ready formed and identifiable group comprising multiple 
human actors.  A group object is an object which has been designated a name by the 
group, so invested with a meaning, function, and value specific to the group.  These 
group modalities need not be unique in the sense of being wholly novel meanings or 
inventions, but they must be additions which invest something more in the object that 
is specifically pertinent to the group.  That is whilst the objects’ modalities may remain 
the same in actuality, it must gain some significance for the group which is not 
 Chapter 1.78
 This is because group entities lack a direct material presence in the world, unlike human beings and 79
objects, so their material existence must be manifested through group objects and the corporeal actions of 
humans who uphold the integrity of those group objects.  
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accorded to non-group objects.  Dubbing the object as a group object is sufficient for 
this purpose.  
The first objects to undergo this group designation are likely to be the bodies of the 
individual humans who together constitute the group.  This occurs by designating their 
bodies the name of ‘group member’, so they now hold a meaning, function, and value 
which is particular to their relation with the group.  A ‘member’ denotes being an 
integral part of a whole, being an object and extension of a group and its associated 
discourses.  A member’s function is to embody the group and its norms, to act as a 
conduit for the group’s actions and objectives.  A member’s value may be to bolster the 
group’s capital and presence in the wider community.  
It is important to note that even though the individual members are materially prior to 
the group, it is the group which is conceptually prior to the members.  A collection of 
individuals do not make a group, but by acting as if they are a group through group 
object-relations, that is by treating others as members of the group, they are 
constituting the terms of group membership.  Take the case of the social contract 
which is the coming together of all members of community to form the group known as 
civil society. It is not a matter of individuals each exerting an act of autonomy 
individually by binding themselves to the social contract.  Rather they are already 
acting in the manner of a social contract before being constituted as individuals 
equipped with those capacities necessary for the formation of such contract, namely 
Reason and autonomy to place oneself under social contract, endowed with freedom 
which is voluntarily curtailed.  Just as the human body is composed of disparate parts 
which take their names and meanings from life sciences,  so too do human objects as 80
the members of a group take their names and meanings from the group discourse. 
These might be State and its collection of individual citizens with rights and freedoms, 
or capitalist economy and its collection of rational and selfish property owners.  This 
discursive individual is manifested into material form by the human acting in conformity 
with the relevant group object-relations and in turn constituting the group entity.81
Other objects may be designated as group objects by being controlled, owned, used, 
or coming into any other relation with the group entity.  A group entity cannot be 
 Foucault n.25 Part V80
 I will argue in later chapter that this is a process of interpellation, which in conjunction with the 81
proliferation of discourse contributes to the foundations of forming normative frameworks.
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without some material object which embodies it and acts as the group’s material 
aspect.  Aside from the bodies of its members, any group will likely require some 
further material object to serve as a sign of its existence, such as physical or virtual 
territory, possessions and products, emblems, symbols.  These group objects are 
invested with modalities particular to the group and its members, which also means 
such group objects will have object-relations instituted at the group level which 
constitutes the particular terms of interacting with group objects and with group 
members.   Instituting object-relations at the group level entails both formalised 82
instituting whereby group members act in concert to determine the object-relation, and 
informal instituting whereby group members by prolonged repetition of certain actions 
form customs and conventions pertinent to the group.
4.4.2 Group objects and obligation
Given that group object-relations are instituted at the group level, the appropriate form 
of a group object-relation uses the identifying pronoun of ‘we’, hence ‘we think’ or ‘we 
do’.   This ‘we’ is not a purely conceptual construction based on the amalgamation of 83
multiple ‘I’s’, rather it is an aspect embodied in the group object-relation itself.   This 84
‘we’ is not like ‘we the people’ in social contract theory, which is a retrospective 
reconstruction of political fiction.   The group entity is constituted by humans acting 85
 Searle defines such group object-relations in the form of ‘we accept (S has power (S does A))’ as the 82
permissive form of allowing the exercise of power by individuals under certain conditions; Searle n.11 
chapter 4. 
 Group intentionality is a contentious issue, with views ranging from the collectivity as a phenomenon 83
distinct and separate from the individual, to claims that there is a continuity between individual to group. 
Searle posits the collective intentionality as a ‘primitive phenomenon’ which cannot be reduced to 
individual intentionality and meta-beliefs.   He also uses the term ‘we’ to denote this collective 
intentionality; Searle n.11 chapter 1. Whilst I agree group or collective intentionality cannot be reduced to 
a ‘I think that you think that I think…’ series of meta-representations, I do not agree with Searle in positing 
the group intentionality as something qualitatively different from individual intentionality.  Cf. Lindahl n.24 
who denotes this collective intentionality as the ‘first personal plural perspective’ which is not reducible to 
a multiple of first person singular perspectives, and is characterised by a form of joint action wherein all 
the group participants are engaged in acting together in accordance with the point of group action.  My 
view tends towards reductionism, meaning that I do not believe there is a metaphysically separate 
category of collective minds or agency, but only a complex of individual minds and agents.  See Michael 
Bratman, 'Shared Intention.' Ethics 104(1) :97-113.  Cf. Kirk Ludwig, From Individual to Plural Agency: 
Collective Action I OUP 2016 chapters 15 & 18.  I would venture further towards reductionism and claim 
that plurality in the form of intentional planning and coordination is not necessary for collective action, 
including large scale group actions such as maintaining a legal system.  Cf. Scott Shapiro, Legality 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 2011.
 The conceptual and temporal unity between the group intention and the individual action which 84
embodies it amounts to my rejection of planning, agreement, or any other conscious coordination between 
individuals as the providing the source of group action.  There is no prior formation of group before the 
collective action, so the action itself constitutes the collective, whilst remaining ‘individual’ in the sense of 
originating from a singular actor.  I will develop my conception of group action further in chapters 5 & 6.
 See chapter 1.85
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‘as if’ they are already members, this acting ‘as if’ is simply acting in accordance with 
group object-relations; it is the group object-relation which constitutes terms of acting 
in the ‘we’ sense.  The ‘we’ is not conceptually prior to group action, but is embodied in 
the group object-relation, and materialised at the same moment of the various 
members acting in conformity with the group object-relation of ‘we do x y z’ norm.86
This ‘we’ indicates a significant effect of group objects and their object-relations, which 
is to found the conditions of obligation.  Obligation is an other-regarding or other-
directed attitude which is characterised by a mutual demand.  Group objects are able 
to mediate obligation between group members because they are controlled by the 
group and not by any individual member unilaterally, so are shared objects in the 
sense that each member has some claim or connection to the object by virtue of their 
membership status.   The terms of the mediated relationship can sustain any content, 87
and must be set at the group level.  So a group might institute a norm whereby only 
certain members may have access to group objects, which would constitute the 
respective object-relations of the privileged and non-privileged members towards that 
object.  Excluding access or denying positive claim does not sever the shared aspect 
of group object, it is simply instituting a positive object-relation with a negative content. 
In contrast if any member unilaterally monopolises group objects without regard to 
group object-relations, such action undermines the shared aspect of group objects.88
Obligation arises from this shared aspect of group objects as members have a minimal 
capacity to enforce this sharing, in other words to demand that group object-relations 
be upheld.  Conforming with group object-relations constitutes forming and maintaining 
the group entity, so conversely any action which undermines group object-relations 
 I am assuming groups exist and interpellate the human as member; in other words humans cannot exist 86
in isolated or atomised fashion, but are always designated through a wider discourse.
 Margaret Gilbert makes a similar assertion in relation to joint action, which she claims is the source of 87
entitlements, claims, and obligations between the participants of that joint action; Margaret Gilbert, On 
social facts, London: Routledge 1988 Part IV s.3
 If a group places absolutely no constraints on access to objects, it cannot be said to either control the 88
object or to be instituting group object-relations.  When I say shared I am not implying any notion of equity 
or egalitarian ideal, but only that the object-relations instituted by the group constitutes the terms of 
member to member, and member to group relations which cannot be arbitrarily altered by individual 
members.  The group object mediates a three-way relationship which constitutes its existence as group 
designated object.  Its name and modalities, and its object-relations are shared, so used in common 
amongst the group and are imposed by and onto members, without necessarily implying that its concrete 
terms must also be substantively equal.
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threatens to undermine the group entity.   Members whose interrelations are 89
mediated by group objects to which they share a connection have a mutual obligation 
by virtue of the object-relation they each hold towards that object.  Put simply their 
respective object-relations instituted at the group level already set out the terms of 
their respective positions and actions.  By acting in conformity to that object-relation 
they will be acting with regard to the group and other members and so acting 
according to their obligation to both parties.90
I am keen to recast group action and obligation in terms of material objects and object-
relations in order to avoid relying on immaterial notions of agency as foundations for 
group phenomenon.  Group entities such as institutions, State, family, which lack an 
immediately observable physical entity must be manifested into physical form through 
the actions of their human members.  However these entities also exert a very material 
force in the form of objects which they control, and object-relations which they institute 
and use to influence human action.  Their method of realisation is not simply through 
discursively rationalising human action, but physically using the power of objects to 
mediate human relations in a way conducive to the perpetuation of a particular set of 
object-relations.  
In summary object-relations constitute the appropriate physical and cognitive reactions 
of humans towards objects, including other humans as composites of objects.  These 
reactions are triggered by the forceful presence of objects which exert an influence 
over human action by compelling or pressuring a certain reaction.  This power exerted 
by objects enables them to act as mediating objects in between human interrelations, 
by operating as the proxy for the other who is physically absent, or for the group entity 
which lacks a physical presence.  The object-relations constitute the terms according 
to which humans act as if those relations are real, and in doing so (re)creates that 
normative reality and constructs their material world. 
 Whilst Lindahl makes a similar assertion that the group or collective is sustainable by each individual 89
acting in accordance with the terms of joint action, however inarticulable, his conception of the collective is 
overall a more cohesive conception, built upon the notions of selfhood and sameness.  Whereas I would 
argue that my notion of group, constituted through group object-relations, is a more open textured 
concept.  Lindahl n.24 pg.191-193.
 My conception of obligation is not one consisting of rights, claims, or powers, but a something less 90
discursive.  It denotes a sense of being put under obligation, of being compelled by the membership 
status towards certain appropriate actions.
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4.5 Signifying chains
Throughout the foregoing I have made frequent references to discourse and discursive 
meaning without explicitly defining or explaining those terms.  I will now elaborate on 
the signifying chains which overlay the material framework of objects and object-
relations with symbolic significance, and together constitute the embodied category as 
normative reality.   
Signifying chains are formed through the medium of symbolism, linguistic or other. 
They differ from objects and object-relations in that they lack an immediate material 
presence in the world.   Objects can point to a material thing as the reference for its 91
name, and object-relations can point to a human action as its material aspect.  In 
contrast signifying chains have no immediate material presence, but must be 
embodied in some other material thing such as an object or a human action.  92
Signifying chains form the networks which transmit meaning; they enable 
communication, understanding, and reasoning.  A basic signifying chain is formed 
when an object’s modality refers to a generic referent through which its meaning is 
grasped, and the object placed in position and relation to other objects which share 
that referent.   These relations and references which connect objects together 93
constitute a rudimentary signifying chain.  It figuratively strings objects into a coherent 
series which is identified by the common generic referent through which each object in 
that series is grasped in that specific modality.   The common referent is the signifier, 94
the objects in the series are the signifieds.   95
In a spurious way a signifying chain can be described as word associations where 
objects indicate or call to mind other objects based on their shared signifier.  Objects 
 I refer to the semantic aspect only, and not to material signs or symbols, which I would classify as 91
objects.
 Invoking meaning involves activation of motor or perceptual features in the brain; see de Vega, ‘Levels 92
of embodied meaning: from pointing to counterfactuals’, in Symbols and Embodiment n.14 pg.285-292.  
 The meaning of symbols, in this case words, are determined by their relation to other symbols in 93
context; Walter Kintsch, ‘Symbols systems and perceptual representations’, in Symbols and Embodiment 
n.14 chapter 8.  The use of imagery is integral to human understanding and retention of symbolic 
meaning; Paivio and Cofer, 'Mental Imagery in Associative Learning and Memory.'  Psychological 
Review, 76(3): 241-63.
 For example the object of an apple can be understood in its meaning modality as being a red object; 94
here the generic referent is the quality of redness which is acting as the signifier for a signifying chain of 
red objects such as blood, red roses, red flags, etc.
 This structure of signifiers and signifieds forming chains or networks of reference is very similar to that 95
posited by Slavoj Žižek, Enjoy Your Symptom! : Jacques Lacan in Hollywood and out Routledge Classics. 
New York: Routledge, 2008. 
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can act as proxies of other objects by invoking these signifiers and signifying chains 
and calling to mind the relevant quality they attempt to represent.   Objects may do 96
this through the medium of language, such as in straightforward similes and 
metaphors, or through their material presence, by presenting visual or other sensory 
stimuli to invoke memory.  It may seem a spurious observation to say that objects and 
words remind us by association of other objects and meanings, however I would argue 
that human symbolic communication occurs precisely in this spurious fashion.  97
Although signifying chains form connections of meaning between objects, these 
signifiers must be embodied in material signifieds in order to sustain their meaning.  In 
other words there is no quality of redness that can be expressed except through red 
objects, and when we think of red, we think not of the idea of red but of a red object, 
grasped in its particular shade of redness exhibited by the object in mind.  98
Furthermore we do not simply think of redness in a purely mental fashion, but in a 
perceptual act of sight which registers redness in our material world as a quality of 
objects, and connect them together under their shared generic referent.   Objects are 99
capable of being integral signifieds of multiple signifying chains, which enable them to 
symbolically invoke meanings and references which share no apparent visual or 
linguistic relation.
Signifying chains form a symbolic network from material objects by connecting them 
through their various modalities.  These chains of meaning are not fixed, but are 
capable of fluctuation and change.  Some will prove more stable, some more fluid; 
their character could be described as one of plasticity.  The meanings, functions, and 
values of objects are capable of changing through being ascribed different meanings 
and being put to different uses.  This plasticity is evidenced in the relative stability and 
endurance of certain objects’ modalities which resist change due to strong 
naturalisation and reinforcement.  These more stable modalities can operate like nodal 
reference points which prevent the signifying chains from fluctuating radically.
 Similarity of appearance is a significant factor in human identification of common properties between 96
objects; Solomon and Barsalou. 'Representing Properties Locally.' Cognitive Psychology 43(2): 129-69. 
Calling to mind is analogous to the process in psychological literature referred to as ‘priming’.
 I would point to the abundant use of symbolic techniques in rhetoric, poetry, and humour which are 97
designed to evoke affect and empathy by invoking as greater a number of signifying chains as possible.
 Paivio et al., n.93.98
 Referent is not limited to meaning, but encompasses function and value modalities.  A doorstop 99
designed for that purpose and any wedge shaped object would share a function signifier; gold and 
precious stones share a value signifier as being intrinsically valuable. 
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4.5.1 Discourse
Signifying chains form the symbolic structure of discourse by organising objects’ 
modalities into series and networks by reference to common signifiers.  The question 
is whether these series and networks amount to discourse in the sense of propounding 
an internally coherent view of the world.  I argue even rudimentary signifying chains do 
amount to discourse; by designating the relevant objects to be included in its network 
and determining the particular modalities of these objects, the signifying chains are 
really constructing a normative narrative of the material world.   This capturing of 100
objects into networks of signifying chains forms the foundations upon which more 
complex discourses are proliferated.  In the embodied category there are no objects 
which are free from being integrated into signifying chains, so no objects which do not 
hold some discursive import.  
The material world is encountered in the form of normatively significant objects.  101
However this does not imply that the world is represented through sophisticated forms 
of discourse, but rather encountered foremost in the form of objects in their material 
immediacy.  The significations of objects are understood at a bodily level without the 
need to refer to more complex or schematic discourses through cognitive reflection.  102
This is connected to my argument that most object-relations are automatic reactions 
triggered by the forceful presence of objects, which entails a combination of embodied 
understanding of an object’s signification and a response triggered by bodily 
compulsion without any need for deliberative reflection or decision.   This bodily 103
conditioned response is important to avoid collapsing all action into an effect of 
reflection, and maintains the materiality of discursive objects by grounding their 
embodied modalities at the bodily level.   104
 Much like how systems of discourses differentiate themselves from other systems by determining both 100
their inner functions and outer environment; Luhmann n.25 chapter 5.
 Akin to Heidegger’s ‘referential whole’, or ‘readiness’; Martin Heidegger, History of the Concept of 101
Time, Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press 1985 pg.187.
 Ibid. pg.189.102
 Bourdieu describes a very similar situation when he asserts that the habitus is disposition inscribed at 103
the bodily level, alternatively describing the habitus as history objectified in bodies; Pierre 
Bourdieu, Pascalian Meditations. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000 pg.150-155.
 The specific neurophysical mechanism which enables how semantics are related to their material 104
counterparts, is not pivotal to my thesis.  It is sufficient for my purposes that human actors react in an 
embodied manner, either by action or active cognition towards objects, such that action is not solely 
determined by ideal notions of agency.
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4.5.2 Organising meaning
Signifying chains organise objects into series and networks of meaning to form a 
discursive construction of the material world into a normative context with which 
human actors are able to navigate and engage.  Simultaneously signifying chains 
organise object-relations into networks of cohesive actions and transforms them into 
social practices and behaviours.  The discourse behind object-relations organises 
disparate actions into a systematic network which refers to something beyond the 
immediate act.  That is to say discourse invests action with a point  or purpose which 105
is not immanent to the action,  but is imposed upon and reconstructs the action’s 106
meaning according to the terms of discourse.  
Discourse achieves this by organising a collection of object-relations into an orderly 
group connected by signifying chains, and imposing the shared signifier as the quality 
of those object-relations.  This gives meaning and significance to disparate actions 
which would otherwise be mutually unintelligible by imposing a common quality to form 
a coherent activity, a series of actions in chronological, spatial, or symbolic order.  107
Discourse is to some extent reflexive  as it makes action the object of knowledge 108
and analysis, and posits reasons, justifications, and rationalisations for action.  I would 
characterise this as a reflexive process of reconstructing action according to a 
particular normative system of understanding, likely in order to determine future paths 
of action informed by a contrived purpose.  109
 I do not use the terms point or purpose to mean a normative ought or end, but in a more mundane 105
sense of simply being intelligible or comprehensible action.  That is action which serves some meaning, 
function, or value beyond the physical motion itself.  
 Immanent in its ideal sense of some ultimate end or value being realised through action.  Although I 106
conceive of action as embodying norms and values, the embodiment is a material process of ascribing 
meaning to action, so different from the ideal notion of meaning being immanent within action.
 The discursive order of action can be as rudimentary as the activity of walking, which comprises of a 107
chronological series of bodily movements, to the symbolically complex such as the activity of purchasing 
goods.  Likewise the discourse can be more or less complex irrespective of the complexity of the activity; 
the apparently straightforward activity of walking may be the subject of immensely complex theories of 
human biology.  What is important is the discourse as a particular frame of normative understanding which 
imposes meaning post facto.
 Used in the same sense as reflexive practice, both entails a folding back and reexamination of action. 108
If discourse were purely reflective, it would undermine my claim of cognitive activities occurring at an 
embodied level, so I use the term reflexive to differentiate reflection which I associate with ideal forms of 
reason.  See 'Being-in-the-world as incarnate reflexivity.' 275-290; and 'Practical reflexivity' 291-317; 
In Reflexivity & The Crisis of Western Reason, Taylor & Francis Ltd / Books, 1995.  
 This is akin to Lindahl’s notion of taking up the mode of interpretation, which consists of reflexively 109
theorising actions and practices which were previously undertaken in the mode of understanding; Lindahl, 
n.24.  Similarly Dworkin’s notion of interpreting pre-interpretive practices also entails previously 
unquestioned practices coming under reflexive examination; Dworkin n.73.
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Social practices are instances of discourse proliferation as they seek to (re)organise 
object-relations according to contrived normative terms.  Human actions and 
interactions display substantial similarities across both temporal and geographical 
space, however the discourses of human experience are variable and contingent. 
That is to say we find ourselves engaging in repetitive actions displaying great 
historical and cultural resemblance, yet our particular narrative which is the way we 
reconstruct our experience can greatly vary or be in direct conflict with the narratives of 
others.   Focusing on discourse obscures the more predominant mode of experience 110
which is the object-relation itself.  The social imaginary might be constantly changing, 
but the menagerie of human activities remain relatively stable.  
4.5.3 Proliferation of discourse
Humans exhibit a tendency to communicate along with a capacity for reflexive meta-
cognition; these assumptions for my purposes are sufficient to set up the conditions for 
the proliferation of discourse.   Put simply in their compulsion to understand and 111
control the world, humans not only engage in physical actions within the world, but 
also make up narratives which gives their actions significance.   In that process the 112
objects in the world are normatively structured into a familiar environment, and the 
activities of humans are discursively represented as having meaning, affect, 
purpose.   Groups are one potent source of proliferating discourse, especially 113
coherent and complex discourses such as systems of knowledge or ideology.  Other 
 Evolutionary social psychologists would tend to argue that all forms of human culture are borne from 110
evolutionary drives common to the human race, so similarities in cultural practices, in particular sexual 
and religious practices, are necessary.  See generally Barkow, Cosmides, & Tooby, The Adapted Mind : 
Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture. New York: OUP 1992.  Cf. Geoffrey Lloyd, 
Cognitive Variations: Reflections on the Unity and Diversity of the Human Mind Oxford : New York : OUP: 
Clarendon Press 2007 chapter 7.  Although I do not subscribe to the evolutionary psychology argument 
that human culture is directly conditioned by genetics, I would agree with the idea that cultural differences 
across human populations do not reflect fundamental differences in human character or behaviour, but am 
not concerned with discovering the proper cause of that behaviour.  In regard to my thesis cultural 
narratives as signifying chains do have a role in constituting human living as a normative and intentional 
activity permeated by meaning and symbolism. However the predominant mode of experience remains 
that of corporeal engagement with the material world.
 I refer to the empirical concepts of folk psychology and theory of mind.  Stich & Nichols. 'Folk 111
Psychology.' In Collected Papers, Volume 1 OUP 2011 chapter 15.
 Scott Atran, In Gods We Trust the Evolutionary Landscape of Religion Oxford: OUP 2002, presents the 112
religious drive in humans as evolutionary urges to overcome the unknown of death and other natural 
forces.
 Žižek’s symbolic order presents many similarities to my conception of discourse as a proliferating 113
network of signifying chains.  Specifically the symbolic order also takes on the role of giving meaning and 
identity to human subjects by covering over the original loss or lack; Žižek n.95.
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forms of discourse such as customs and folk beliefs might be gradually developed by 
being transmitted through generations and widespread social imitation.
I believe this tendency to proliferate discourse is significant as discourse is easily 
reified into the source of normative meaning and obscure the object-relations which 
constitute it.  Signifying chains which are symbolic connections between object-
relations subvert that relationship and come to dominate object-relations by claiming to 
be their determinant.  The claim discourse makes is that without it there can be no 
meaningful or purposeful action, that all action takes its direction and significance from 
the discourse, specifically the ideal it espouses.  This valorising process can lead to 114
particular discourses gaining hegemonic influence over human action, hence limiting 
the possible fields of action and homogenising meaning.  When human actors take the 
discourse as their guide to action, they reflexively change their reactions to objects, so 
effect a change in the object-relations according to the logic of the discourse. 
However they also simultaneously render other potential paths of action impossible, 
which may problematically foreclose choice and change.  Although signifying chains 
are necessary to the constitution of normative action, ossification of discourse does 
not promote, but limits the space for potential normative action.  
I do not believe that this process of reifying and valorising discourse over human 
action is the inevitable result of the interaction between signifying chains and object-
relations.  Owing to the ease of discourse proliferation, their influence over object-
relations is likely much less than suggested above.  Humans in majority of cases do 
not take discourse as the reason for action, and even if they did the sheer amount of 
discourse or reasons applicable means that none are determinative over action in the 
final instance.   The ordering of object-relations through discourse is a highly volatile 115
and arbitrary process, and only hegemonic discourses which are those clusters of 
object-relations deeply entrenched in the population possess the privilege of exerting 
significant influence over human action.  Such hegemonic discourses are sustained 
not only by their signifying chains, but by the strong force of habituation in their object-
relations.  Although object-relations and signifying chains mutually constitute and 
reinforce each other, material object-relations form the necessary foundation upon 
which discourses proliferate and seek to impose their particular meanings and orders.  
 This is akin to the discourse of Hobbes’ and Kant’s Reason which claims that all morality stems from a 114
particular conception of Reason, without which the human as corporeal being is not capable of realising a 
meaningful existence.
 I am rejecting the notion of conclusive reasons.115
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The tendency for proliferation is coupled with a drive towards totalisation of object-
relations under a particular discourse,  and the expulsion of outliers as anomalies, 116
mistakes, exceptions.   In order to form an internally coherent narrative of the world, 117
foreign elements such as meanings not designated by the particular discourse cannot 
be recognised or reconciled into the narrative.   I believe all discourse assumes a 118
totalising perspective, such that whilst there is communication between discourses, 
their mode of existence through determining the signification of objects and object-
relations cannot be completely reconciled.   By this I mean that every discourse 119
insofar as it claims to be a distinct normative account of the world must claim 
prerogative over determining the names of objects and meanings of object-relations it 
subsumes within its signifying chains.  This leads to situations of mutual reinforcement 
between discourses, but also situations of conflict which reveal the space for choice 
and normative action.120
4.6 The Ternary
I term the combination of objects, object-relations, and signifying chains ‘the ternary’; 
the variables are separate but mutually determinative, and all serve as functions of the 
whole which is the embodied category.  The three components interrelate on a 
constitutive level, there can be no objects without the object-relations which constitute 
their material manifestation of meaning, function, and value.  Nor can these be without 
the signifying chains which order objects’ modalities by positioning them into series 
and networks.  Likewise signifying chains depend upon the signified objects and 
object-relations for their material embodiment, and its basic form is the relations 
between objects which construct the world into normative space.
 Bourdieu on elision of ‘is’ and ‘ought to be’, n.103 pg.111-127.116
 Lindahl refers to this as designating that which is unorderable, so non-significant for the ordering 117
system; n.24.  Unlike Lindahl I do not believe normative discourses or systems achieve closure by 
expelling the unorderable, rather my conception of discourse as normative systems is more open-
textured.
 Ibid.118
 For Žižek that which cannot be integrated into the symbolic order is the Real which is the source of 119
trauma, from which the symbolic order cannot completely detach, so seeks to cover up by producing the 
objet petit a, or the object of jouissance; Žižek n.95.  For Luhmann this would be a case of 
interpenetration between systems; Luhmann n.25.
 Discussed in chapter 6.120
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The embodied category is constructed along this ternary framework of objects, object-
relations, and signifying chains.  All three components exhibit plasticity which enables 
change to occur, so that the status quo is not set in stone, the meanings and human 
actions found in the world are always in flux, and the particular contents of objects and 
object-relations are contingently determined.  However the embodied category also 
exhibits a remarkable stability and familiarity across temporal and geographical space, 
which indicates that whilst theoretically radical change is possible, in actuality change 
is generally stilted and haphazard.  
4.7 Conclusion
My aim throughout this chapter has been to establish the beginnings of a normative 
framework thoroughly grounded in materiality, especially for the concepts of cognition 
and agency.  Pursuant to that I have (re)presented a method of construing and 
analysing the world by recasting it in terms of the ternary.  Material objects form the 
physical units of reality and compel human actors to interact with their material 
surroundings.  These human reactions are object-relations which constitute the 
entirety of human activity and manifest human interrelations into materiality.  This 
material frame is overlaid by symbolism and semantics transmitted along signifying 
chains which connect object and action into coherent normative orders.  Each 
component occurs in unison in a material moment of world-building.  Having 
established this workable framework, I proceed in the following chapter to elaborate on 
the aspect of action and explore how habit may be integrated without jeopardising the 
element of normativity.
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5 
Habit and Action
In the previous chapter I established the foundations of an alternative normative 
framework which takes a fundamentally material approach to developing a theory of 
normativity.  I represented the world in terms of the ternary of objects, object-relations, 
and signifying chains, which together constitute the mode of human activity in the 
embodied category. I have so far defined action in terms of object-relations, which are 
human reactions to objects triggered at the bodily level, and have referred to how 
repetition of particular object-relations functions to entrench patterns of behaviour. I 
have not yet explained how both are made possible.  My aim in this chapter is to 
explore the concept of habit as the mechanism of transforming disparate object-
relations into enduring patterns of behaviour.  Habit is suitable for my purposes as it is 
primarily treated as an empirical phenomenon in philosophy, along with other bodily 
aspects such as emotion and passion, and opposed to the metaphysical aspects of 
Reason and rationality.  Habit as an embodied mechanism of action offers an 
alternative to notions of ideal agency.  As a driving mechanism it does not ultimately 
determine action, so allows a role for deliberation and choice which saves action from 
external determinism.  1
This chapter will focus on analysing the concept of habit particularly in relation to 
object-relations at both the individual and group levels.   It will also address questions 2
of habit and discourse, the public nature of habit, and habit and normativity.  I will 
proceed by analysing habit and object-relations first at the individual level, before 
extending this to the group in order to construct an account of group action which is 
capable of sustaining social practices such as law.
 Habit is often treated as antithetical to normative legal action by many legal theorists, Hart being a 1
preeminent opponent and fierce critic of Bentham’s ‘habit of obedience’.  See H.L.A. Hart The Concept of 
Law. 2nd Ed., 1st Pbk. ed. Oxford : New York: Clarendon Press ; OUP, 1997;  I will address the problems 
of habit and normative action in the next chapter.
 I will not be analysing habit as a general concept in great depth, so questions such as the psychological 2
conditions of habit will not be addressed in detail.  My approach to habit will be based on social theory as 
opposed to neuropsychological theories.
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5.1 What is habit?
Let me start with a preliminary account of what I conceive to be characteristic of habit.3
First, there is a conservative aspect to habits of any kind; the engagement of a habit or 
habitual action implies a repetition of a same or similar action enacted previously. 
Habit is the repetition of action, and possessing a habit means consistent reenactment 
of the action over time.  Habit in its conservative aspect is repetition of the same or 
similar action under certain enabling conditions.   Conservative habits tend towards an 4
automatic quality such that the habitual action may be triggered solely by the presence 
of a certain set of enabling conditions, and become correspondingly more unthinking.  5
Two observations can be made about this conservative aspect of habit.  Firstly this 
habituation operates on a bodily rather than mental level; as implied by the 
increasingly unthinking quality of the action, the cognitive element is reduced as the 
body becomes the primary site for triggering the action.   Secondly and related to the 6
previous point, the action becomes increasingly easy and natural to perform, and there 
may be an increase in the level of dexterity of the performance.   The conservative 7
aspect of habitual action does not reduce intentional action to a strictly mechanistic 
action in the sense of being beyond conscious awareness.  The action itself is still 
intentional,  but habituation has reduced active cognition of the various efforts involved 8
in its enactment by inscribing the sequence of efforts onto the body and making the 
action feel effortless.  Likewise awareness of the various efforts is changed from direct 
 In setting out my conception of habit I am merely emphasising those characteristics of habit which I 3
perceive to be most salient to my own argument.  I am not claiming that these characteristics are 
representative or paradigmatic of habit as a general concept, of which there is a rich theoretical history. 
For a more in depth analysis of the general concept of habit see Clare Carlisle, On Habit. Thinking in 
Action. 2014.
 Carlisle discusses in greater detail the philosophical intricacies of repetition as a defining aspect of habit; 4
ibid. chapter 1.
 Dewey also details this deadening effect of habit which renders action mechanical and repetitive, 5
however he identifies the cause of this deplorable result as the rigid attachment to old customs and habits 
in the external conditions which stymie the expression of contemporary instincts; John Dewey, Human 
Nature and Conduct : An Introduction to Social Psychology New York: H. Holt, 1935 Part I Sections III, IV, 
V.
 This claim is reflective of Bourdieu’s arguments on bodily hexis which he defined as a ‘durably modified 6
body’ imprinted with social forces; Pierre Bourdieu, Pascalian Meditations. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000 
pg.141-144.
 Merleau-Ponty’s description of the acquisition of skill beginning from novice to expertise stage; Maurice 7
Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Smith, London: Routledge, 1962.  Interestingly he 
refers to the acquisition of skill as ‘habit’, so even the seemingly innate motor skills of the human body is 
for him an acquired habit, such as walking, dancing, etc.
 For my definition of intentionality see chapter 4.8
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attention into an instinctive feel or appreciation of the action in its holistic form.   For 9
example; in the learning of a new sport the actions feel unnatural and stilted in the 
beginning, and requires constant attention to the body’s form, but through repetition 
the actions themselves begin to feel natural, and attention gradually changes to an 
instinctive ability to survey the state of the game and one’s own performance.  10
Another characteristic common to all habits, but particularly noticeable in the case of 
undesirable habits, is their active driving force and the feeling of compulsion towards 
fulfilling the habitual action.  Here the habit itself becomes a trigger for the action, so 
rather than passively waiting for habit to be triggered, there is an impulse to engage in 
the habitual action.   I would state this marks the difference between acting in line with 11
habit, and acting from or out of habit.   This compulsive or ‘spring like’ aspect of habit 12
contributes in large part towards its perpetuation and the drive to create the external 
conditions which enable its enactment.   Having an active habit will drive the actor to 13
seek out or create opportunities for the habit to assert itself.  This compulsive force of 
habit implies an overriding of its automatic quality, for its strength is most starkly 
evidenced when bodily impulse overrides other drivers of action such as conscious 
deliberation.  The quality of action has gone from unthinking to compulsion which 
resists conscious control.    14
 This would be akin to the expertise stage in Merleau-Ponty’s theory, n.79
 Dewey refers to this dexterity as ‘mechanism of action’ which he claims is ‘indispensable’ and 10
distinguishes from ‘unintelligent automatism’.  For Dewey skill is another term for habit, and artistic 
practice is repetition of skill rather than the mechanical acquisition of skill; Dewey n.5 pg.70-72.  
 This compulsion is similar to Merleau-Ponty’s description of solicitation by the environment which is 11
attuned to the skills of the body; n.7.
 Carlisle discusses this active aspect of habit under various headings such as disposition and inclination, 12
all of which share the common theme that habit is causative of action.  She also refers to this as the 
potentiality of habit, as opposed to the actuality which consists of habit’s repetition; Carlisle n.3 pg.7-9.
 Bourdieu defines habitus as actively working to bring about the conditions most conducive to its 13
actualisation; Bourdieu n.6 pg.147-150.  He also notes that in times of crisis where the habitus is 
confronted with radically different conditions, they can become dysfunctional; pg.160-161.
 Three points: 1) this rendering between bodily action and mental deliberation may appear to affirm a 14
body/mind dualism which argues that the contumely body should be brought under control.  I would argue 
it affirms the opposite, as the control of mind over body is evidently not a simplistic matter of issuing 
orders for action, as the body seemingly rebels even against its own passions and desires.  2) on the 
issue of motivation, I have not presented any detailed conception of what motivates an actor, beyond 
rejecting that reported reasons for action are adequate drivers of action.  Motivation as a mental exercise 
tends towards notions of agency I have rejected, whilst motivation as solely doing what one desires fails 
to capture the experience of being compelled by habit against one’s (reported) desire.  I believe my thesis 
may progress without a detailed account of motivation and habit, since I reject a body/mind dualism, habit 
and conscious deliberation may serve equally as sources of motivation.  However insofar as motivation is 
constituted by habit, its internal workings are likely not penetrable by mental effort, and as I am not 
concerned with how habit works neuro-physiologically, I will simply treat habit’s effects as prima facie.  3) 
the compulsion against control is a quality of experience; the action appears to be beyond control as the 
actor is not able to fully resist the habit, but the physical action itself remains intentional and within the 
locus of motor capacity.
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Another facet of the compulsive aspect of habit is the drive to adapt to varying 
conditions which expands the situations conducive to that habit, so creates greater 
opportunities to compel its fulfilment.  This is a mode of creating conditions favourable 
for habit’s fulfilment, by adapting one’s actions to support and maintain the habit.  For 
example, in financially straitened circumstances an individual might maintain certain 
luxuries to which he has become accustomed and feels unable to do without, and save 
on more essential expenditures despite its economic irrationality.  In this way he may 
be said to be driven by habit to alter his actions in the face of changed conditions in 
order to bring about habit’s fulfilment.   The habit has effectively expanded itself into a 15
new situation, and due to its conservative aspect may quickly settle into a new habitual 
routine.  The greater the compulsive force of habit, the greater this expanding 
tendency.16
Although all habits exhibit both the conservative and compulsive aspects, some 
actions become compulsive more easily than others, and require less repetition to 
establish its influence over action.  What explains this difference lies outside of the 
action itself, in some incidental external trigger or effect of the action.  These might 
range from physiological changes to the body, such as in the case of drug use, to the 
state of external group conditions which make the performance of certain actions 
disproportionately opportune or easy, such as engaging in excessive consumption of 
commodities. 
These conservative and compulsive aspects form the basic functions of habit and 
habituation, and can be used to explain habit’s other, more wide-ranging effects.  In 
the following I will examine how habit can construct a body with a particular normative 
 The internal structure of habit and how it drives these sorts of actions is unclear; the individual might 15
justify his choice in terms of luxuries being important for various reasons, or have formed an emotional 
and psychological attachment which causes anxiety when denied. The specific cause which gives habit 
this compulsive force is beyond this thesis, which requires only that habit prima facie exhibits the features 
I describe.  What is evident is the inability to explain these complex internal structures in terms of desire, 
motivation, or rationality; habit is arbitrarily allied and opposed to these states, and is not transparent even 
to the possessor of habit.
 I would argue that this expansive force of habit is an active mode of its preservation and resistance to 16
change.  Hence this would fall in line with Carlisle’s double law of habit in its active and passive aspects. 
Carlisle in reading Proust noted how habit formed the ‘mould’ by which the Proust’s successive romantic 
relationships were shaped, resulting in similar obsessive romantic attachments; Carlisle n.3 pg.87-89. 
This expansive force of habit is also reflective of how habitus actively shapes the individual’s environment 
by surrounding him with those things which are most adjusted to his habitus; Bourdieu n.6 pg.150.  For 
Dewey this expansive force of habit may be likened to his discussion on how the body is incessantly trying 
to achieve a state of equilibrium between habits and instincts through manipulation of the external 
conditions; Dewey n.5 pg.178-179.
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orientation towards the world, and condition action by virtually constructing possible 
future courses of action according to a human actor’s history of object-relations. 
5.2 Habit and object-relations
To recapitulate, object-relations are reactions by human actors towards objects 
presented in their various modalities.  These reactions can be physical in the sense of 
movements of the body, or cognitive in the sense of registering, recognising, 
identifying.  For the purposes of analysis I will refer to a particular object-relation to 
designate a simple discrete action, and multiple object-relations to designate 
composite activity, although this distinction is artificial and will later be abridged.  
If all action can be understood in terms of object-relations and habit in its conservative 
aspect is the repetition of action, then the relationship between object-relation and 
habit consists in the latter being constituted by repetitions of the former.  Object-
relations, when repeatedly enacted, come to cultivate a habit, and habits comprise a 
series of object-relations in repetition.  The object-relation reenacts a particular 
modality of the object by instituting a peculiar and contingent reaction towards that 
object; peculiar in the sense of being unique or specific to an individual, group, or 
discourse, and contingent in the sense of being arbitrary and coincidental, as opposed 
to necessary or integral.  As objects are invested with multiple modalities, there are 
multiple object-relations which may be the appropriate reaction to an object in any 
given instance.  The effect of habituation upon a specific object-relation is to 
strengthen the connection between the object and that specific object-relation as the 
appropriate reaction to that object, tending towards a unity between the object and the 
human reaction.   The result is that particular reaction to the object, which is peculiar 17
and contingent, comes to be perceived as the natural and necessary way of interacting 
with that object.   
This tendency towards automatic reaction relates to the conservative aspect of habit 
which renders action unthinking as well as enables action to become natural and 
 Similarly Dewey states ‘stimulus and response are mechanically linked together into an unbroken chain’ 17
through the operation of habit, which results in absentminded, thoughtless action.  Dewey, n.5 pg.173. 
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effortless.   In terms of objects and object-relations, habituation in an object-relation 18
correlates with the naturalisation of the object’s related modality; as objects 
increasingly subsume a modality into a natural property, so is the object-relation 
reaction to that modality further entrenched through habituation and vice versa.  In 
other words as a certain reaction to the object becomes habituated and unquestioned, 
the modality to which the object-relation responds appears to the human actor as a 
natural property of the object, rather than something which his action imposes on it. 
This is because habit is a reiteration of a particular meaning, function, or value through 
acting out that modality in material action.  
So the conservative effect of habit on object-relations is to strengthen the association 
between the object and the object-relation facilitating the ease and likelihood of future 
repetitions.  Let us call the result ‘habitual object-relations’.  These are characterised 
by their automatic and effortless manner of enactment, their being highly likely to be 
triggered by the presence of the object, and their reduced deliberative aspect which 
renders them unquestioning and obvious actions.  
Moving on to the compulsive aspect of habit and its relation to object-relations, the 
effect operates in parallel with and reinforces the conservative force that habit 
exercises.  Recall the power that objects are capable of exerting over human action by 
compelling a certain reaction to their forceful presence.  The compulsive aspect of 
habit is what enables objects to exert such power over human action.  The power 
exhibited by objects is invested in them through the processes of naturalisation of their 
modalities and habituation in the relevant object-relations which reenact these 
naturalised modalities.  These processes together reify the human action, which is the 
real source of power, onto the object and gives it potency.  This may be illustrated by 
the example of objects of desire, wherein objects are perceived to be the cause of 
 The two trends share a strong correlation, so the higher the degree of automaticity, the less cognitive 18
and physical effort is expended, and the more unthinking the action becomes.  I make no claims as to 
whether these correlations are necessarily related, i.e., whether increasing automaticity requires a 
corresponding decrease in mental activity.  Mindfulness ostensibly offers an alternative of attentive and 
skilful action, through severing the connection between stimuli and intention, thereby breaking habitual 
reactions.  See Bishop, et al.. 'Mindfulness: A Proposed Operational Definition.'  Clinical Psychology: 
Science and Practice 11(3): 230-41. 
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desire such that it is because of the object and its innate features that desire is elicited 
within the human actor.   19
This is not a case of projecting some inner desire onto external objects, then 
misattributing to objects the cause of desire.  The desire itself is rather an effect of the 
compulsive aspect of habit which strives to perpetuate itself by obtaining the external 
conditions conducive to its enactment.   The desire exists because of the habit which 20
is not fulfilled.  The conditions of that desire, namely the presence of the habit and the 
absence of the object, are reified onto the object itself, and invest it with a potency as 
the cause of desire.   In this way each repeated instance of satisfaction of the desire 21
by the presence of the object reinforces the power of that object over future action.  It 
also reinforces that particular modality of the object as an innate natural property 
which is causative of desire in general, thereby making the relevant object-relation into 
the inevitable, matter of course reaction to the object.  For example, if my felt lack of 
satisfaction is alleviated every time by buying things, then I come to see every problem 
or dissatisfaction as capable of being solved by having more things or more money, so 
I attribute the cause of my desire to these objects and in turn my behaviour becomes 
increasingly influenced by their power, such as engaging in more actions aimed 
towards their acquisition. 
Thus the interaction between habit and object-relation results in repetitions of the 
object-relation which entrench the reaction by strengthening the connection between 
 This notion of desire is almost diametrically opposed to theories which posit desire as an inherent 19
human capacity which is exercised arbitrarily, or according to some predetermined order of natural goods. 
I believe any notion of desire as organic or spontaneous, and not subject to external manipulation may be 
refuted by the ubiquitous presence of marketing, advertising, branding, and other media activities 
designed explicitly to manipulate consumer desires.  Similarly the amount of financial investment by food 
producers into researching and developing taste combinations most guaranteed to replicate addiction in 
consumers, I would argue are ineluctable indications that human desire is subject to extensive external 
manipulation.  See Kornberger, Brand Society: How Brands Transform Management and Lifestyle : CUP: 
2010, chapter 8 on the ethical questions of branding.  Even seemingly personal expressions of desire 
such as sexual partners are revealed to be largely determined by racial discourse and fetishisation.  See 
Chong-suk Han, 'They don't want to cruise your type: Gay men of color and the racial politics of 
exclusion.' Social Identities 13(1): 51-67; D. Murray, ’Laws of Desire? Race, Sexuality, and Power in Male 
Martinican Sexual Narratives’, American Ethnologist, 26: 160–172.  Insofar as desire is conditioned to 
such an extent by external factors, I would argue that this amounts to the cultivation of habits of desire, in 
the same manner as other bodily habits.
 Bourdieu n.6 pg.147-150.  Dewey n.5 pg.178-179.20
 Dewey advances a notion of desire as the driving force of living beings, which is experienced as desire 21
when the drive encounters obstacles in the environment.  The relevant object presented as the goal of 
desire then becomes that object in the environment which, if present, would unify the partial and 
competing life activities.  Dewey n.5 pg.249-251.  I agree with Dewey insofar as desire is a creation or a 
result of a misalignment of a human’s habit or impulse and his environment which obstructs the assertion 
of that habit or impulse.  
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object and reaction.  It also reinforces the power of the object and renders it capable to 
exerting more influence over future action.
5.3 Habit and individual
I will now discuss how this combination of habit and object-relations operate at the 
level of the individual human actor.  The main argument is that habit enables the 
human actor to engage with the world by providing the basis for practical knowledge 
as appreciation of the present, and by establishing continuity between past and future 
which enables goal-oriented and anticipatory action.  But firstly I would like to address 
the reasons for this artificial distinction made between the individual human actor and 
the human as integral to a group.  
The material aspect of the embodied category means that it is not reducible to a purely 
discursive or symbolic description, whilst the embodied aspect means that the 
activities which construct the embodied category are not reducible to purely 
mechanistic action.  Material reality is constructed through human actions which 
establish and reinforce the meanings and activities in the world.  The human actor by 
engaging in his life activity is actively constructing his reality, whilst simultaneously 
responding to that reality in a cycle of production and interpellation of meaning 
operating in synchronic rhythm.   22
I believe it is important to maintain emphasis on this material aspect in order to avoid 
hypostatising the normative into a system of abstraction.  This might be difficult to 
achieve if analysis proceeds from a group perspective.  There is a tendency to take the 
group as a collection of homogeneous individuals engaging in mass undifferentiated 
action, which obfuscates the primary locus of activity generated by the individual units 
of that mass.  Moreover by positing the group as the primitive unit begs the question in 
that it takes as given what ought to be the subject of analysis.  In the interest of 
establishing a theory of group action as a continuation of individual action, and 
keeping the material aspect at the forefront, the individual human actor will be posited 
as the locus of study. 
 Very similar to Marx’s conceptions of human senses only coming into being through being objectified, 22
and humans creating their conditions of living from the world passed onto them.  See See Erich 
Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man. Milestones of Thought. New York: F. Ungar, 1961.
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Another important aspect of the embodied category which needs reemphasising is its 
active, dynamic aspect.  Things and concepts are the results of processes and 
mechanisms which must be analysed, rather than unproblematic foundational units of 
analysis.   By taking the practical perspective this active and dynamic aspect may be 23
kept at the forefront.  By practical I simply mean that the human actor is placed in the 
urgency of the situation, and his perspective constrained to the immediate 
practicalities of action as material possibilities and effects, as opposed to their 
normative status or validity.   This situated view does not amount to a ‘subjective’ view 24
in the sense of it being informed by subjective or personal preferences.  It is to say that 
all questions are framed in the form of the practical; the question of ‘what ought to be 
done’ is changed into ‘what must be done in this situation in order to…’, without any 
reference to universality in the form of action.   The practical perspective is the only 25
stance a human actor is capable of taking in his present urgency, and it is the 
perspective most conducive to action and activity.   26
In advancing an account of how the practical actor is capable of constructing his 
embodied reality through his habitual object-relations, the crux rests on how arbitrary 
actions may be transformed into meaningful activities, and how the activities 
generated are capable of constituting the embodied category when taken in their 
entirety.  In chapter 4 I argued that object-relations are organised by signifying chains 
into coherent networks which transmit meaning along the disparate object-relations, 
but they are not the source or cause of meaning or action.  I now develop these 
 In similar fashion Dewey asserts that things are always processes and events, not finished objects. 23
Things are hypostatised states of their histories.  Dewey n.5.
 This does not deny that human actors are capable of engaging in theoretical or meta-cognition.  I am 24
primarily concerned with the quality of action from the first person perspective and its associated bodily 
aspects, and not cognitive states in general.
 Dewey in discussing the nature of aims asserts that ends are always ‘ends in view’, understood as a 25
means in present action, as guiding the direction of present activity rather than as a remote and 
immutable goal to be attained.  For Dewey any ends which are attained are only positions from which 
further ends may be pursued.  In this way I read Dewey as advocating a practical or pragmatic conception 
of aims which parallels my own conception of the practical perspective.  Dewey n.5 pg.223-237.  He 
applies this contextually mediated conception of ends also to moral principles and explicitly rejects Kant’s 
universalisation as the principle of action in attempting to establish fixed moral laws; pg.245-247.  My 
approach of taking a situated practical perspective is in opposition to Kant’s universalisation as the 
principle of action, and I would agree with Dewey that this situated perspective also applies in the case of 
moral and normative actions.   
 In his discussions on the proper method of sociology, Bourdieu frequently remarks that the site of 26
primary experience must be the perspective of the participating agent, which excludes the objectification 
of the scholastic point of view, defined as the theoretical reconstruction of the participating agent’s 
experiences.  Bourdieu points to the tendency of imputing the scholastic viewpoint onto the experiences of 
others; Bourdieu n.6 pg.50-56.  I agree with Bourdieu insofar as he places as the proper site of 
experience the agent engaging in the practice.
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arguments by drawing on habit and its effects of conditioning knowledge and 
generating anticipation to argue that habitual object-relations drive meaningful activity 
by constructing an enduring picture of the world and compelling repetition in human 
action. 
5.4 Habit and activity
The crux of the problem is how to transform arbitrary and disparate actions into 
meaningful activity.   Object-relations reenact an object’s modality into reality and 
manifest the human actor’s grasp upon the object through a particular modality.  For 
example, if I use a screwdriver to tighten a loose screw then evidently through my 
action I manifest my understanding of a particular function of the screwdriver. 
Moreover it may be further inferred that my grasp of the object is not limited to that 
specific object in that specific modality, that I have a grasp of the relevant signifying 
chain in which that specific modality is a signified.  So it would not be unwarranted to 
infer that I also grasp the object of the screw, and the common signifier between 
screwdriver and screw as tools.   
Modalities of objects must be grasped through something beyond the specific object 
itself, namely the common signifier.  This signifier is public in the sense that other 
humans also grasp these objects through the same signifier, so enabling 
communication amongst humans.  These signifying chains are reiterated every time an 
object-relation reenacts their connections through material action.   However this still 27
begs the question of how these seemingly disparate object-relations, these instances 
of human action can be understood as embodying a meaningful gesture, or as modes 
of communication.  If I point to a rose and utter the word flower, it is taken for granted 
that I am invoking the meaning of the object, but what is there to deny the possibility 
that all I am uttering is a meaningless grunt, or that in pointing to something I am not 
indicating to that object but only making a rude gesture?   In general terms how are 28
the meanings, functions, and values of object-relations, of actions themselves to be 
 Further see chapter 4.27
 For a discussion on the relationship between gestures and embodied cognition see Mitchell Nathan, ‘An 28
embodied cognition perspective on symbols, gesture, and grounding instruction’, in Vega, et al., Symbols 
and Embodiment : Debates on Meaning and Cognition. Oxford ; New York: OUP, 2008.
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understood such that they are capable of communication and intelligibility?  The 
problem is framed as one of transforming arbitrary actions into meaningful activity. 
Just as an object points to something beyond itself for its meaning, so too does an 
object-relation point to something beyond itself, to the common signifier which 
connects disparate object-relations together to form networks.  These networks of 
object-relations are what I would designate as activity.  Activity is action under a 
particular modality, that is action which is integral to, and directed at a certain meaning, 
function, or value which is beyond the action itself.  For example, a human actor by 
drinking water is indicating by his action towards the activity of satiating a physical 
need, a common signifier which might also include the actions of eating or sleeping. 
Similar to the common signifiers of objects, the signifier of physical need is not 
reducible to any one particular need, so in this sense it is somewhat independent of 
the actions it signifies.  However in order to grasp the meaning of the signifier, the 
human must have undergone actual experience of, and engaged in the actions of 
physical needs before he can understand the concept of having physical needs.   The 29
common signifiers of object-relations are abstracted points of similarities and 
differences between object-relations which enable them to be linked together in 
relative positions to form a signifying network.  Engaging in intelligible activity 
manifests a grasp of the action and its position and reference within the network of 
connected actions.   
This grasp upon objects amounts to knowledge, which I would define as appreciation 
of the modalities of objects and object-relations encountered in the world.  This 
conception of knowledge is uncontroversial in that it entails a discriminatory filtering of 
all available data into an ordered and normative body of facts which then form the 
content of knowledge.   From the practical perspective knowledge is not static 30
appreciation of abstract ideas or concepts, but is always in the service of actions; 
know-how or practical knowledge.   Finally, knowledge is not some ideal or innate 31
 Dewey makes a similar argument that food cannot be understood as a good until one has undergone 29
the experience of eating food; Dewey n.5.  Cf. Marx and human senses, in Fromm n.22.  More broadly the 
idea that purely ungrounded symbolism alone may provide only a limited source of meaning, see Arthur 
Glenburg, ‘The Limits of Covariation’, in Symbols and Embodiment ibid.  Although his arguments are in 
the field of semantics, I would view the same criticisms may be applied to my conception of object-
relations, since they are reactions to an object’s semantic meaning.
 Kant’s categories of understanding which operate to organise the data of sense experience may be 30
read as an ideal conception of a similar mechanism of filtering and organising the raw data encountered in 
the world. Immanuel Kant, & Norman Smith, Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. London: 
Macmillan, 1933, section III.
 Merleau-Ponty’s n.7.31
 138
capacity of the human, but is the accumulation of experience, recollection, and 
anticipation which are synthesised into a particular bodily orientation towards the 
world.  Moreover this depends in large part on the operation of habit in buttressing 
action against volatile change, which makes possible the syntheses of past actions 
into reliable predictions of future actions.   In short habit is the condition of a 32
conception of knowledge which depends on repetition of actions and events to 
construct the present reality, and from that reality virtually construct the future paths of 
action.  33
5.4.1 Habit and present
I propose that the process of forming a habit is a process of learning and accumulating 
knowledge through the accumulation of experience.  These historical experiences are 
sedimented and synthesised to form a vision of the world through which the meanings 
and significations of the present can be appreciated.   This knowledge of the present 34
entails appreciating the material objects in their various modalities and the appropriate 
object-relations towards those objects through contextual discrimination.  The actor is 
able to recognise the various objects, to grasp their relative signifying positions, 
intuitively be aware of their various modalities, and readily react to any particular 
modality.  The world is ordered into an intelligible space and situation which are 
permeated with meaning and significance.  
 This conception of knowledge as bodily habit shares many similarities with Merleau-Ponty’s; ‘To 32
understand is to experience harmony between what we aim at and what is given, between the intention 
and the performance - and the body is our anchorage in the world’; n.7 pg.144.
 This assertion of habit as the condition of knowledge is contrary to ideal philosophical traditions, which 33
either relegates habit to the empirical state of being removed from the ideal concepts of knowledge, or 
denigrates habit as restrictive of thought and truth seeking.  Philosophies which advocate a mind and 
body dualism, such as Descartes, Kant, and to an extent Hobbes, tend to conceive of habit as belonging 
to the empirical body along with passions, desires, emotions, whilst the proper attainment of knowledge 
lies at the level of the abstracted cogito.  In contrast are the philosophies of empiricists, notably Hume, 
phenomenologists, and pragmatists who advance a more naturalistic conception of knowledge.  For more 
in depth discussion see Carlisle n.3 chapter 2.  In the pragmatist tradition Dewey explicitly asserts that 
habits are the conditions and means of intelligence; Dewey n.5 pg.176.
 Although I use the term recollection, I do not denote any representational form of mental recollection, 34
such as content from a memory database.  Likewise my conception of knowledge is not representational 
or content based, in the sense that practical actors when engaging their knowledge to achieve certain 
goals or actions need not form mental representations of their goals, or compare the substantive elements 
of their current situation to past experiences in order to act.  From the practical perspective, knowledge is 
skill and ability which is obtained through repetitive practice; see Hubert Dreyfus, ‘The Current Relevance 
of Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Embodiment’, in Perspectives on Embodiment, Haber and Weiss 
(eds.) Routledge, New York and London 1996. In the moment of action, knowledge is a synthesis of 
recollection and anticipation working to move the body without conscious mental representation.  That the 
actor may be inferred to have a certain ‘knowledge’ is a post facto discursive understanding of his actions 
in normative terms and context.
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Space and situation are normative structures of the material world which condition the 
interaction between human actor and the world.  Space denotes that materiality which 
directly confronts the human actor as a bounded and situated piece of the embodied 
category.  Knowledge includes a discriminatory filtering of available data into a 
normative body of facts, which for the practical human actor constitutes his 
understanding of the present space he finds himself in.  The raw data is filtered and 
structured into an intelligible space by bringing the actor’s history of experience to bear 
on the world and ordering it into a space wherein he is able to interact with objects 
according to his experience.   A bounded space is constituted by the objects within 35
that space, all connected together through their modalities and signifying chains and 
located in relative positions of spatial and symbolic signification.  An example of a 
space would be a bedroom, which the human actor constructs from his experience of 
similar spaces by identifying the various objects within that space, such as walls, door, 
bed, and so on.  The objects present their appropriate modalities; the walls constrain 
the spatial expanse, the bed functions as place of rest, and the human actor makes 
practical sense of the space by virtue of his past experiences of such spaces.  A 
disjunction might arise where an object is not easily integrated into the network of 
signifying chains constituting a space, such as finding a bed on a beach.  In that case 
the modalities of the objects may need to change in order to integrate the disjunctive 
object into the space, in effect changing the signifying chains and the meaning of that 
space and the objects within it.36
Situation is the dynamic mode of the embodied category.  Whereas space suggests a 
static network of objects connected through their appropriate modalities, situation 
suggests a dynamic potentiality of interaction.  The objects inhabiting a space 
condition how the human actor interacts with that space by compelling the object-
relations appropriate to the objects’ spatially relevant modalities.  Situation is simply 
the dynamic mode of space manifested through the material actions of the human 
actor.  Where space is constituted by objects and signifying chains, situation is 
 This practically or purposively constructed space is akin to Merleau-Ponty’s account of how the external 35
world is opened up by a body of skills, such that the world solicits a bodily response.  Merleau-Ponty n.7 
Part I s.3; Part II s.2.
 This conception of space as a normatively constructed setting is largely in agreement with what 36
Bourdieu conceives of as the ‘social space’ which is ‘a structure of juxtapositions of social positions’. 
Moreover Bourdieu also asserts that the relative position-takings, that is the points of views of the agents 
within that space are both determinates and determinants in reconstructing the social space.  Bourdieu n.
6 pg.182-185.  This is parallel to my argument that space as the bounded instance of the embodied 
category is actively constructed by the human actor.  
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constituted by the object-relations which pertain to those objects in their spatially 
appropriate modalities. 
This combination of space and situation together constitutes the present moment as it 
is known by the human actor.  He constructs a bounded space from the raw data of 
the material world according to his past experience, and within that space is able to 
interact with the objects in their appropriate object-relations.  All space is situated in 
the sense of being embedded and constrained by a setting of particular objects 
connected in their particular modalities.  All situations are spatial and material in the 
sense of being manifested through the potentiality of objects to compel human action. 
The present is made up of space and situation, which may be equated to the material 
and dynamic modes of the embodied category respectively. 
This knowledge of the present does not arise from a formal faculty which transcends 
the material world it orders into intelligible facts, but is forcefully invoked by the objects 
confronting the human actor, and triggering that body of knowledge to reaction.  37
Knowledge of the present is a familiarity with the objects, object-relations, and 
signifying chains presented within a constrained space, and is attained by synthesising 
multiple past encounters of similar spaces. These synthesised encounters are 
recollected when confronted with objects placed in a familiar space or situation.  The 
presence of the material objects which constitute the space and situation are crucial 
for knowledge of that space to arise, both in order to trigger reaction in the human 
actor, and to provide the material space within which he can interact with the objects. 
His knows the space and situation he is presently located within by knowing its familiar 
objects and knowing how to conduct himself.   Moreover this knowledge is built up in 
 This transmission of knowledge onto the external world is known as cognitive offloading, a process 37
which serves integral functions in learning and evolving adaptive behaviours.  Basically it entails storing 
information in the external world instead of in the internal mind, and retrieving that information when 
needed.  The concept is central to literature on embodied and embedded cognition, as knowledge is 
effectively made part of the material world and connected to the actor through his bodily reactions.  See 
Wilson,  ‘Six views of embodied cognition’  Psychonomic Bulletin and Review,  9,  625–636; Droll 
&  Hayhoe,  ‘Trade-offs between gaze and working memory use’  Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Human Perception and Performance,  33: 1352–1365.  That cognitive offloading does not prevent 
cognitive progress or development, see Martin & Schwartz, ‘Physically distributed learning: Adapting and 
reinterpreting physical environments in the development of fraction concepts’ Cognitive Science, 29: 587–
625; Carvalho, & Nolfi, ‘Cognitive Offloading Does Not Prevent but Rather Promotes Cognitive 
Development’ PLoS ONE, 11(8).
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habits of the body, hence my claim that habit is the condition of practical knowledge, 
since the latter is really a hypostatisation of the former.   38
For example, a human actor encountering a glass of water is instructed to drink, and in 
doing so may experience a quenching of thirst.  This object-relation is repeated until a 
habit is formed whereby the presence of water triggers the recollection of past 
experiences of drinking, so furnishes the present knowledge that the appropriate 
reaction to water is to drink it.  In this case it may be said that the human actor has 
cultivated a habit of drinking water, a habit which is triggered to action by the presence 
of the object associated with the habit.  However I would extend the example beyond 
this simplistic conclusion and say that the human actor has acquired both a habitual 
knowledge of water as drinkable, and a habitual knowledge that drinking quenches 
thirst.  This formulation opens up the object and object-relation to their wider 
respective modalities and signifying chains connecting them to other objects and 
object-relations.  In doing so the human actor is not limited to knowing that water is to 
be drunk, but can grasp the function of water in its modality as drinkable liquid, and 
through that signifying chain understand other liquids as sharing the same function.  39
As a result, when confronted with a liquid he can have recourse to his accumulated 
experiences of drinking in order to discern whether the liquid is drinkable or not.  This 
reaction to liquids in perceiving their potentiality as beverages is a habitual response 
which has recourse to a history of experience also sustained through habit.  40
What has been described so far is exhibitive of habit’s conservative aspect.  Habit’s 
compulsive aspect is exhibited by the human’s drive to seek for water or other liquids 
 Dewey describes knowledge as a combination of recollection, observation, and planning, which 38
together discriminates and identifies objects; Dewey n.5 pg.182.  He explicitly states that ‘what we 
known…are the conditions which have been mastered, incorporated in the past’; pg.184.  It would appear 
that knowledge in the sense of knowing the meanings and significances of objects is a result of the 
functioning of habit.  For Dewey the operation of habit alone would result in mechanical and repetitive 
action without place or necessity for thought.  He asserts that it is a combination of habit and impulse 
released by the perpetually changing environment which generates an intelligence, defined as practical 
knowledge.  This knowledge is geared towards unifying the old habits and new impulses so bringing the 
organism back into equilibrium with its environment; in short it is used to guide action.  For Dewey habit 
‘supplies content, filling, definite, recognisable subject-matter’ for the impulse to action into unknown 
territory; pg.172-180.  
 See generally on the topic of learning by analogy; Vosniadou, ‘Analogical reasoning as a mechanism in 39
knowledge acquisition: A developmental perspective’ ; Cf. Bransford,et al., ‘New approaches to instruction: 
Because wisdom can't be told’ in Vosniadou & Ortony (eds),  Similarity and Analogical Reasoning. 
Cambridge: CUP, 1989.
 Interesting study on how children learning fractions exhibit more or less receptivity to the external 40
environment depending on their level of conceptual mastery; Martin, & Schwartz n.37.  Cf. Study of how 
actions serve not only an instrumental, but also epistemic function; Kirsh & Maglio, ‘On Distinguishing 
Epistemic from Pragmatic Action’ Cognitive Science, 18: 513–549.  
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in response to a feeling of thirst.  The knowledge that drinking provides the desired 
effect of quenching thirst is again a habitual response to the feeling of thirst, built up 
through past experiences of quenching thirst by drinking.  41
The foregoing analysis of how habitual practical knowledge may be cultivated is an 
artificial and simplistic account.  In reality such experiences are not presented as 
isolated object-relations to be habituated, but as composite and complex situations 
involving multiple objects and object-relations.  Furthermore the most fundamental 
object-relations which I believe form the foundations for more sophisticated actions 
come as they are embedded in every moment of living.  The habits of living are less 
explicitly instructed and repeated, but are necessarily engaged in, and through gradual 
corrections come to be inscribed onto the bodily knowledge of the human actor without 
any great level of cognitive attention.  So surreptitiously through the passing of time 
and maturation of his biological being, the human actor has connected his arbitrary 
actions into a meaningful activity of living.  He knows how to sustain his life by 
engaging in those object-relations relevant to living, such as finding sustenance, 
finding shelter, resting in safety.  42
Although it might be argued that simply knowing how to fulfil a biological need does 
not amount to knowing the meaning of that action, from the practical perspective 
meanings come in the form of effects and consequences; knowing the meaning of 
foodstuffs and the consequences of eating amounts to a knowledge of their normative 
import.  The discursive knowledge of the biological digestive system, mechanisms of 
hunger, energy density of foods, are not expressions of a higher or more objective 
knowledge, but a different normative ordering of the world which entails a different set 
of habits and habitual object-relations.  
5.4.2 Habit and future
In the foregoing I advanced my conception of a habit conditioned knowledge as bodily 
familiarity with present contexts which enables interaction with the world.  This is 
 Dewey argues that a man must have experienced water as a good in some concrete past experience in 41
order to know it as an end, a goal of action.  This is analogous to my argument of habitual knowledge.
 Dewey states that the ‘sensible intimation of the practical function of knowledge has led men to identify 42
all acquired practical skill, or even the instinct of animals, with knowledge’, although this must be read in 
light of his later statements on the deadening of thought by rigid habit. Dewey n.5 pg.177-178.  However 
insofar as this applies to the know-how of living, which is a process of bringing habit to bear upon 
changing environments, it does amount to knowledge as Dewey defines it. 
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reinforced by how habit functions to maintain temporal order and continuity in action. 
The dual functions of habit, namely of making the present familiar through recollection, 
and making the future accessible through anticipation,  together transform arbitrary 43
action into meaningful activity which constructs the embodied present and future.   My 44
aim in exploring the temporally dynamic aspect of action is to establish how habitual 
object-relations condition not only behaviour in the immediate present, but also 
possible paths of future action, such that human activities display a temporal stability 
sufficient to maintain and ossify into enduring group institutions and practices.  If 
theoretically object-relations are unique instances of action capable of radical alterity, 
their degree of predictability and the limited range of imaginably feasible future actions 
present an issue.45
From the human actor's perspective the present moment is both the concrete material 
space which confronts him, and the ephemeral situation which quickly extends into the 
next moment.  As the present is constituted by bounded space and situation, the 
possibilities of the future are also bounded by the present objects which compel the 
object-relations appropriate to their situated modalities.   This predictable stability 46
allows the human actor’s perception of time to be congealed into blocks consisting of 
actions and events, rather than as infinite ephemeral present moments.  This simply 
means that we tend to think of the past, present, and future in terms of repetitions of 
events.   This ‘thinking of’ does not mean conscious examining or even visualisation 47
 I use the term anticipation, rather than projection, in order to avoid the representational or propositional 43
connotations of the latter.  Anticipation is the term used by Merleau-Ponty to describe the bodily response 
by skilful actors towards a situation, a form of looking into the future without mental planning or 
representation of future scenarios or goals.  Merleau-Ponty n.7 Part I s.3.  I use the term in a very similar 
fashion.
 Dewey refers to this process as deliberation, which is a process of furnishing possible future courses of 44
action through the imagination, as constructed by recollections of past experiences.  Dewey n.5 pg.
190-192.
 The issue as I perceive it is essentially how human actors, with or without innate freedom, become 45
subjected or subjectivities to a particular narrative of ideas or behaviours.  Social theorists have offered 
various answers such as the oppressive force of doxa (Bourdieu n.6), hegemony (Antonio Gramsci, 
Hoare, & Nowell-Smith, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci. London: Lawrence and 
Wishart, 1971), ideology (Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels,  The German Ideology. 3rd Rev. ed. Moscow: 
Progress Publishers, 1976); and on the bodily subjection side, discipline (Michel Foucault, Discipline and 
Punish : The Birth of the Prison. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979), libidinal desire (Herbert Marcuse, One-
dimensional Man : Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society. 2nd ed. London: Routledge, 
1991), etc.  In my answer I aim to relate the acting body with its material environment in a fundamentally 
contingent relationship, stabilised by the mechanism of habit.
 Dewey remarks on the impossibility of accurately calculating the future because it is dependent on 46
some future state and circumstances which are independent of the present.  He argues that imagined 
future pleasures and pains are inevitably evaluated through the present circumstances.  Dewey n.5 pg. 
202-203.  I would read this as analogous to my claim that the future is bounded by the present.  
 I refrain from using terms such as experience or memory here for the same purpose of avoiding 47
connotations of the past being stored and recollected as mental representations.  Event is a relatively 
neutral word which unifies both the objective reality and the action.
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of the past or future, but rather an intuitive sense that the past and future are not here 
in the present, but have the same or similar qualities as the present.  In other words 
there is a sense that the past was how the present is right now, and the future will be 
how the present is right now.    What determines the quality of the now are the objects 48
which we directly confront, the situation which requires urgent action. 
Habit constructs this continuity of past and future in very specific terms according to 
the specificity of the present situation, and with it the human actor’s body of 
knowledge.  The knowledge furnished by the present is a synthesis of past history 
which is extended backward into the past, and forward into the future; recollection is 
not simply an act of remembering the past accurately, but involves an element of 
discriminatory reconstruction based on the urgent qualities of what is directly present. 
Likewise anticipation of the future is not a faithful transposing of the past, but a prior 
identification of those salient factors which function as the signposts for paths of 
action.  These are not purely mental exercises in the sense of remembering and 
planning, but material bodily reactions compelled by the forceful presence of specific 
objects, and sustained through the force of habit.      49
Objects also exhibit a temporal dimension by their enduring presence, which affects 
how human actor’s react in anticipation.  For example, if I see a coin lying on the table, 
I would not expect it to disappear in the next few seconds.  In contrast if I see a soap 
bubble, I would expect it to burst in the next few seconds.  In grasping the temporal 
dimension of these objects I am actually making predictions about their future based 
on my past experience of them.  Since I have habitually encountered coins as 
maintaining their shape for long periods of time, I will habitually anticipate that coins do 
not change in shape or form, and attribute the disappearance of coins to some 
external action rather than as a modality of the coin itself, such as it was taken or 
spent.  Applying this temporal dimension to objects in a situation constructs a dynamic 
 Husserl has addressed this overlaying of past, present, and future in terms of similar experiences 48
invoking the similar, an approach which Merleau-Ponty rejected; see Hubert L. Dreyfus, ‘Intelligence 
without Representation: the Relevance of Phenomenology to Scientific Explanation’, Phenomenology and 
the Cognitive Sciences, 1(4): 367–83.  Cf. Dermot Moran, ‘Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology of 
Habituality and Habitus.’ Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 42(1): 53-77.  My notion of the 
intuitive sense is more akin to bodily familiarity as opposed to mentally drawn comparisons or analogies of 
experiences, regardless of how unconscious or instantaneous they are.  Moreover my agreement with 
cognitive offloading means that information need not be stored in the human actor’s mind, so it falls to the 
external objective environment to provide the conditions of familiarity.
 Similar point made Aarts & Dijksterhuis, ‘Habits as knowledge structures: Automaticity in goal-directed 49
behavior.’ Journal Of Personality And Social Psychology, 78(1): 53-63.
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picture of the present in terms of arcs of time and motion.   For example, the activity 50
of walking consists of arcs of actions such as moving my legs in a synchronised 
fashion, avoiding external objects, directing movement towards a destination.  These 
actions are linked together temporally into a meaningful activity which we understand 
as walking, without the need to have regard to each component action.   Moreover 51
this intelligibility of walking as a composite action is sustained through habit; we walk if 
we wish to get somewhere, without paying attention to the mechanics of the activity 
which is ingrained through the conservative aspect of habit.  If we were to consciously 
regulate our walking, we would find it jilting and unnatural.  52
The important point is that when a human actor responds to the forceful presence of 
objects which compel him to enact his habitual object-relations, the reaction is not 
fragmented into disparate actions which are later synthesised into coherent activity. 
Rather entire organic activity is what is being compelled.   The content of these 53
activities might be relatively simple or complex; the simple act of drinking is as familiar 
as the complex act of repairing an engine to the seasoned mechanic.  This is because 
these actions have been habituated in their holistic contexts, rather than as isolated 
component actions.  It is habit in its conservative aspect which binds these actions 
together into coherent activity, and a triggering situation sets off the entire chain of 
actions, rather than having to trigger each component action.   This is not to say that 54
the activity becomes wholly automatic; any component part may be brought into 
conscious awareness, usually by being interrupted, such as reaching for an object only 
to find that it is not there.  
Habit functions to link multiple object-relations together into sets of meaningful activity 
through associated action repetition.  That is how habit is able to construct the future 
through anticipation of these arcs of action as possible future courses of action. 
Operating in conjunction with the habitual knowledge of the present which enables the 
human actor to discern and discriminate situations, the appropriate series of object-
relations may be recalled and anticipated.  In this way habit is also able to link together 
arcs of action into more complex networks which may be referred to as patterns of 
behaviour.  The salient factors of the present situation trigger those bodily habits of 
 Similar but not exactly corresponding to Merleau-Ponty’s intentional arc, n.7 Part.I s.3.50
 Dewey n.5.51
 Dewey n.5.  Merleau-Ponty describes this state as ‘I can’, n.7 Part.I s.352
 Merleau-Ponty ibid.53
 Ibid.54
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anticipating the possible courses of action according to a past body of knowledge and 
skill which is continually adapting and regenerating to the future.55
5.5 Habitual object-relations and signifying chains
Thus far I have referred to meaningful action only from the strictly practical 
perspective, as temporally and spatially coherent arcs of action which are meaningful 
in the sense of being appropriate to the context.  In this section I will explore how such 
actions are symbolically and discursively meaningful, or how they are made sense of 
in light of generic significations beyond the first-order experience of action itself.  The 
discussion will be brief, focusing around the relationship between social practice as 
discourse and the habitual actions constituting the practice, and how habit can explain 
why such practices are not determinable through discourse alone.
The arcs of action and networks of these arcs which are linked through habitual 
association are the networks along which signifying chains connect and proliferate. 
Because of the tendency for signifying chains to proliferate into discourse, the 
discursive constructions of these networks of habitual object-relations are prone to 
variation and fluctuation.  However the networks themselves, that is the arcs of action 
which are closely associated through habitual repetition, remain relatively stable.  I 
have said that the meanings of activities will change with changes in the signifying 
chains and discourses, which might appear to undermine my earlier argument that 
signifying chains do not determine the meanings of object-relations.  To clarify, whilst 
the practical meanings of actions with reference to their immediate situation do not 
change, their discursive meanings do.   The differentiation between practical and 56
discursive signifying chains is one of degree and perspective, as arcs of actions are 
simply norms of action habituated to the degree of automaticity, and discourse is post 
facto reflexive reconstruction of the action under a different signifier.
 This is similar to Merleau-Ponty’s notion of habit as ‘knowledge in the hands’, acquired skills which are 55
able to adapt to changing demands n.7 Part.I s.3
 This could be rephrased as the relationship between pre-reflexive actions and their interpretation, 56
although the significant difference lies in that interpretation of action in this case does not necessarily 
entail a change or reflexivity of the action itself.  I would surmise that the more entrenched habitual object-
relations are, the less prone they are to change through discursive reflection.
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For example, I move to open a door and notice there is a person on the other side also 
moving towards the door and my reaction is to hold the door open for them to pass 
first.  This situation may be analysed through its component object-relations; my 
object-relation to the door is to push or pull it open, my object-relation to the other 
human is to avoid collision by going through the door first or standing back to allow 
them to pass.  The situation analysed as a composite of object-relations would be an 
example of an activity of social etiquette, that is my arc of action exhibits the meaning 
of showing politeness.  This meaning is attributed to this set of actions by virtue of the 
signifying chains which link together these object-relations along with other related 
object-relations into a discursive network denoted as social mannerisms.  However the 
discourse is not what drives me to engage in this particular set of object-relations, of 
holding the door open rather than barging through.  It is more likely that I have 
cultivated a habitual association of these component object-relations through 
repetition, and being confronted with the triggering situation sets off the arc of action. 
My habitual object-relations enable me to discriminate the salient factors of the 
present; the door, myself, the other person.  They also virtually construct the various 
possible paths of future action; opening the door, waiting for the other person to open 
the door, barging through.  The option most strongly anticipated is taken, usually the 
one most habituated and ingrained.  The entire exchange is performed effortlessly and 
unthinkingly, out of habit rather than out of a discursively constructed reason to act 
politely.  
This is not to argue that signifying chains and discourse do not influence action 
whatsoever, or that actions cannot be deliberately oriented towards a discourse.  For 
actions not yet ingrained into habit, engaging in that action often involves a concerted 
effort or pause between opportunity and action, which I believe is due to the greater 
cognitive effort needed to construct the present situation and anticipate the appropriate 
future action.   For example, in learning the social etiquette of a foreign culture the 57
human actor will orient his actions towards the predominant discourse of what 
constitutes good manners in that culture.  In this way discourse plays a potentially 
significant role in structuring the associations and meanings of object-relations.  
Nevertheless, signifying chains and discourses are dependent upon the object-
relations and their habitual reenactment.  The human actor cannot grasp the meaning 
 Akin to Merleau-Ponty’s ‘novice’ level of skill.  Analogously see Martin & Schwartz n.37 on how children 57
in learning process are more or less receptive to environmental structures.
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of a signifier until he has engaged in an object-relation which refers to that signifier. 
He must first be habituated in the actions of opening doors, pulling out chairs, 
expressing thanks, before he can discursively link these disparate actions together as 
activities exhibitive of manners.  Moreover he cannot think of manners except through 
these concrete examples which are simply reconstructions of his past actions under a 
particular signifier.  Becoming cognisant of this particular discourse colours both his 
recollection of the past, such that he reconstructs as instances of good or bad 
manners actions which previously went unnoticed or understood in a different 
signification, and transforms his virtual construction of the future such that mannerisms 
now feature as an added modality to possible paths of action.  His habitual object-
relations have been linked together in a new network under the signifier of social 
mannerisms, and from there it may grow in sophistication by subsuming further object-
relations into its network as his experience increases. 
5.6 Habit and group
Throughout the foregoing I have focused on the artificially isolated individual human 
actor as the locus of habit and object-relations.  In what follows I will focus analysis 
upon habit and its relationship with the group entity, specifically how habit affects 
group level object-relations.  This requires dissolving the artificial division between 
individual and group, and restoring the human actor to his proper place as an integral 
unit within the wider group entity.  This does not entail a conception of the group entity 
as either a homogeneous mass, or a collective of individuals acting in coordination. 
Neither will I adopt an approach which assumes or attempts to construct some notion 
of a collective will which is capable of replacing the individual as the locus of action.  58
My intention is to advance an account of how group level action is made possible 
through human action as hitherto set out, constituted by habit and object-relations, 
without resorting to notions such as ideal Reason, social covenant, social planning, or 
consensus.  In doing so I hope to establish a theoretical foundation upon which social 
 My approach is similar to Lindahl’s notion of the first person perspective and the first person plural 58
perspective, which is equivalent to my own notions of the individual and group respectively.  However 
Lindahl’s notion of the collective, or the plural perspective, is characterised by a closure based on 
inclusion/exclusion which my notion of group does not contain.  Although Lindahl asserts that the paradox 
of representation means there is no original closure, only reclosure by the collective joint action, I would 
still envisage my own conception of the relationship between individual and group action to be relatively 
more contingent and open textured than Lindahl’s account.  Hans Lindahl, Fault Lines of Globalization: 
Legal Order and the Politics of A-Legality, OUP, 2013 pg.180.
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norms, customs, and institutions may be analysed through the familiar terms of the 
ternary, by establishing continuity between the actions of individuals and the actions of 
the wider group.  
To recapitulate, group object-relations are object-relations pertaining to group objects, 
and group entity is constituted through the material actions of members engaging in 
group object-relations.  The group exists because its members respond to certain 
objects in ways appropriate to their group membership.  This means the group entity is 
not merely an intangible connection or idea shared amongst a collection of humans, 
but manifests a very material existence through the objects it controls, namely its 
members’ bodies, things, places.  If human actors by engaging in group object-
relations constitute the group entity, it follows that habit’s conservative and compulsive 
effects will affect these group object-relations in the same way as any other object-
relation.   
The conservative aspect will preserve group object-relations from change, and through 
repetition render their performance natural and predictable.  The primary effect is to 
stabilise and maintain the group entity by enabling a high level of stability in its 
dynamics, so ensuring its preservation.  In other words, as the individual group 
members become habituated in their group object-relations, they will engage in those 
object-relations with a high level of reliability, and be able to anticipate the actions of 
other members with corresponding reliability.  Since the group entity depends entirely 
upon the continued engagement in group object-relations by its members, this effect 
also extends to maintaining the very group entity itself.  Insofar as group object-
relations embody norms relevant to the group, the conservative effect of habit is to 
entrench and strengthen those norms and increase the likelihood of their expression 
by habituating individual members to those object-relations.  
If the conservative aspect of habit contributes to the maintenance of a group status 
quo, then the compulsive aspect of habit is likely to contribute to a drive for group 
expansion.  In the individual a compulsive habit drives him to engage in the habit, and 
to adapt action to varying conditions to support the habit.  In the case of group object-
relations this compulsion amounts to an expansion of the group entity by increasing 
the expression of group norms.  In other words insofar as individual members may be 
conceived of as vessels of the group entity, by compulsively engaging in group object-
relations they are effectively manifesting the group’s norms and expanding the group’s 
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presence.  This drive to adapt both the external conditions and the member’s own 
behaviour in accordance with habitual group object-relations will have a knock-on 
effect when it comes to establishing the hegemony of certain groups in constructing 
conditions conducive to their dominance.  
In reality all object-relations are group object-relations in the sense of belonging to 
some institution, practice, custom, or social norm.  And insofar as individual actors’ 
histories, experiences, and knowledge are constituted and enabled by their habits, it 
could be said that the human actors are composed of a myriad of group object-
relations vying for expression.  This point may be spuriously observed in that we are 
simultaneously members of multiple groups, and often find our loyalties to these 
groups at odds with each other.  To take an extended illustration, object-relations 
constituting the group entity of capitalist market economy typically involve acquiring 
and disposing of objects through exchange with a view to maximisation of value, so 
members of the market economy group are habituated in their bodily knowledge of 
objects as valuable goods, and anticipate relations with other members to be defined 
by gains in value.  In contrast, the habit of value maximisation does not feature as 
typically in the object-relations constituting group entities such as family or friendship, 
where exchange of objects operate more along a gift economy.  The same human 
actor who is a member of both groups may find a stable balance between his 
potentially conflicting habits, such as demarcating by context.  Conflict may arise 
where the group entities overlap, such as the case in family businesses or market 
transactions with family members, and the respective group object-relations come into 
opposition and throw the smooth functioning of habit into disarray.   The human actor 59
cannot fulfil his market economy habits when confronted with a family context and vice 
versa, hence he perceives the situation to be problematic.
 Interesting study into the dynamics of family businesses which preliminarily suggests that the 59
demarcation between family and business relations are blurred; Stoilkovska, et al., ‘The Influence of 
Family Relations on Decision Making in Family Businesses’, UTMS Journal of Economics 4(1): 17-26.  Cf. 
Study of genetic ties in the boardroom and implications for nepotism; Collin & Ahlberg, 'Blood in the 
Boardroom: Family Relationships Influencing the Functions of the Board.'  Journal of Family Business 
Strategy 3(4): 207-19.  Cf. Context of family inheritance and conflicts arising between family members; 
Titus, et al., 'Family conflict over inheritance of property.' Family Coordinator (1979): 337-346.
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Habitual behaviour is performed unthinkingly, and often only when its performance is 
interrupted does the situation become problematic.   Moreover often the habit itself 60
remains unquestioned, and attention is focused on the perceived problem which is 
actually the conflict between habits vying to be fulfilled.  In the ordinary course of life 
the human actor experiences no such conflict as his various habits find a settled 
rhythm which is maintained by their conservative aspect.  As such he feels no difficulty 
in resolving the many moral choices he encounters when engaging in his habitual 
object-relations.  He does not even perceive them to be moral questions as his 
habitual object-relations construct the context in normative terms consistent with his 
habitual knowledge and actions.   It is often a change which precipitates a conflict, by 61
changing the normative terms of the present and future into a problematic one.  
For example, a non-vegetarian habitually responds to meat products in their modality 
as edible goods, so engages in the relevant object-relation of eating meat.  A change 
in external conditions or experience, such as visiting an abattoir might become a 
catalyst for a violent rendering of his habitual object-relations relating to meat, such as 
associating it with violence or slaughter.  In responding to meat there is now a possible 
alternative meaning of the object, so a different object-relation arises in conflict with his 
previous habits.  Although this example might be phrased in the discourse of ethics or 
morality, as a moral dilemma between the treatment of animals and the assertion of 
human preservation, I would instead argue that it is a change in the human actor’s 
bodily knowledge which now colours how he constructs the present.  Meat objects 
once constructed in their modality as edibles is in accord with the habitual object-
relation of eating meat.  Now they are constructed in another modality as objects of 
slaughter which is not in accord with the habitual object-relation, so conflict arises and 
demands to be resolved in order for action to progress, such as by giving up meat, or 
only eating organic.  
Rephrased in terms of group object-relations, the human actor might be cast broadly 
as first engaging in object-relations of those groups for which eating meat is 
appropriate, which would include the majority of Western populations.  Then engaging 
 This is akin to what Heidegger terms ‘presence at hand’, where tools cease to be useful and hence 60
becomes the object of thematisation; see Gail Soffer, ‘Phenomenologizing with A Hammer: Theory or 
Practice?’ Continental Philosophy Review 32(4): 379-93 for critique.  Cf. Dewey who would view this as 
an example of disequilibrium between the organism and its external environment, which releases the 
instincts and necessitates a choice; Dewey,n.5 Part.3 s.3.
 Similar to Bourdieu’s claim that practices can only remain in their practical state if their fundamental 61
principles are taken for granted; Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge, CUP, 1977.
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in object-relations of those groups for which avoidance of eating meat is appropriate, 
such as animal rights groups, certain religions, environmentalists, and so forth.  Insofar 
as the human actor engages in a group object-relation, he materially constructs the 
respective group entity and reiterates in some part those peculiar objects, object-
relations, and signifying chains pertinent to that group.  He achieves this through his 
action of not eating meat, which reenacts a particular modality of the object of meat 
products as products inappropriate for consumption.  This is not to say that by not 
eating meat the human actor somehow invokes the entire body of politics of animal 
rights groups, or that he has effectively avowed his loyalty to some political or moral 
camp.  The reasons or rationalisations for his actions are of secondary importance; the 
primary change is the change in his habits and how he constructs past and present 
and virtually anticipates future paths of action.  He acts as a vessel for a certain group, 
without necessarily explicitly realising or endorsing their discourse.  His view of the 
world has changed and become aligned contingently with certain discourses or 
politics.  
5.7 Group habits
I have argued how group entities are constituted by the material actions of individual 
human actors engaging in relevant group object-relations which reinforce a particular 
network of significations pertinent to a group.  I have also explained how being 
habituated in their object-relations extends directly into human actors becoming 
vessels for certain group entities.  Actions which are practically meaningful for the 
actor, are simultaneously symbolically meaningful in their invocation and reenactment 
of particular discourses; they constitute the signifying chains of group discourse, but 
are conditioned and maintained by habit.  Building on this foundation, I will now 
explore how certain sets of group object-relations come to be habituated by large 
proportions of a population to the extent of approximating collective action, such that 
their group entities appear to exert hegemonic influence over human behaviour.  I will 
term these actions group habits, a reference to group object-relations which are those 
pertinent to multiple individuals, and habit which is the driving mechanism of action; 
essentially group habits are object-relations which are habitual for large proportions of 
a group population.
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Group habits comprise networks of group object-relations which are sufficiently 
common and stable throughout a population to the extent that they appear to be 
coordinated collective action rather than coinciding actions of individuals.  Prevalent 
social norms and institutions exhibit this trait of apparent independence, as the actions 
which sustain them are reified into entities and forces which determine human action.  62
For example, the law is presented as a collection of written laws and courtrooms which 
are determinative of legal norms, rather than the activities of law-abiding and law-
making, punishment and enforcement, which together constitute the group habit of 
legal action.  
Group habits are fundamentally habitual object-relations, however the degree of 
influence they are capable of exerting over human action warrant their separate 
analysis.  Group habits construct the landscape of the external conditions according to 
their peculiar discourse by constructing the past, present, and future through the group 
members’ bodies of knowledge.   These individual normative visions of the world then 
coincide to give the appearance of a collectively determined normative discourse.  In 
other words the way in which individuals in a group understand the significations of 
their present overlap to a sufficiently high degree that they appear to share a particular 
knowledge of the world.  This also applies to how they envision their shared past and 
future actions, such that they act in sufficient concert to approximate collective 
action.   63
For example, it is common knowledge that we live in a world where money is 
exchangeable for goods and services.  This modality of money compels human actors 
to engage in actions which attest to the value of money, such as to spend, save, or 
invest in anticipation of its continued value.  This institution of money, or rather this 
group habit towards a modality of the money object, constitutes a large part of the 
social reality we live in, and demonstrates how group habits can effectively structure 
the normative external conditions.  The proceeding discussion will centre around these 
 Much like how labour power is reified onto capital and makes the latter appear productive and powerful; 62
Karl Marx, Capital. Everyman's Library ; No.849. London: Dent, 1951 v.I chapter I section 4.
 I emphasise that whilst I speak of actions instituted at the group level, I do not intend any conception of 63
group as a collective or a joint entity.  The group entity is entirely composed of the coinciding actions of 
individuals acting in accordance with group object-relations, as such it is a highly volatile entity maintained 
by the contingent forces of habit and the external conditions.  In this respect I differ from Lindahl’s notion 
of a collective which he defines as sharing a normative point or practice, with its individual participants 
viewing themselves as acting in joint fashion, or ‘collective self-identification’; Lindahl, n.58 pg.191-197. 
For my notion of group it is not required that the members view themselves as participating in the group 
action, either deliberatively or unthinkingly; it is sufficient that they act in alignment with relevant group 
object-relations irrespective of their reason or attitude.
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group habits and how they are produced and maintained, specifically in relation to the 
cultivation of habit and the external conditions.  I aim to address the question of how 
hegemonic norms and institutions are constructed and maintained by analysing them 
through the mechanisms of object-relations and habit.  
Group habits are those actions which exhibit sufficient similarity amongst individuals. 
This does not mean they are replicas which are directly interchangeable. The 
individual human actor is the locus of embodied action, and this means that all 
individual actions are unique in the sense that they are produced from a unique 
personal history.  These unique actions are not harmonious; rather they coincide to a 
significant degree.  Group habits as collective action do not proceed from some prior 
plan or agreement reached through rational discussion.  There is agreement in the 
basic sense of having in common a particular body of knowledge which is not explicitly 
articulated, however this agreement is not consensus, but denotes the coinciding of 
individuals’ habits which are manifested through their actions.  In this sense it could be 
tentatively likened to a common presupposition which forms the foundation for group 
habit, until it is rendered explicit through disagreement or conflict.    64
5.7.1 Cultivating group habits
Group habits are essentially networks of group object-relations, so cultivating these 
into habit follows the same process I have outlined above.  Owing to the ubiquity and 
hegemony of group habits in the external environment, exposure is systematic, but 
habituation likely occurs in an organic and haphazard manner.  In other words an 
individual living in society will be persistently exposed to its prevailing norms and 
institutions in his everyday life.  These encounters are most likely not in formalised 
situations, but are insidiously woven into mundane routines, which gradually familiarise 
the individual with complex social norms through repetitions of simple actions.   For 65
the purpose of analysis I will assume that group habits are present and well 
established within the group.  As I have indicated previously, the majority of a human 
actor’s habitual object-relations are not presented singly, but contextually as variations 
and permutations in a network of object-relations.  The group habit lurks in the 
background and particular object-relations and signifying chains are selectively 
 Similar to Bourdieu’s doxa, n.6 pg.98-102.  The difference lies in that I do not view this implicit 64
presupposition to entail any organising principle.
 Similar to Foucault’s description of the ubiquity of discipline and punishment in society; n.45 chapter 7.65
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brought to the fore depending on the context.  Through repeated exposure and 
engagement in this group habit the human actor gains knowledge of the network of 
object-relations by synthesising the haphazard partial exposures to form a picture of 
the whole.  
Despite my using terms which suggest there is a predetermined whole picture which is 
immutable,  the picture of reality is interpellated through the particular history of the 
individual.  There is no universally coherent system of group habits, only innumerable 
interpellations by disparate individual histories.  However this does not preclude these 
interpellations from sharing considerable commonality, which I would argue is 
achieved by the cultivation of group habits holistically as shared experiences in 
contexts of physical proximity. 
The process of cultivating group habits begins from the moment of birth, and the 
contact a human actor has with his surroundings.  His alien environment is gradually 
made familiar through his accumulation of experience which synthesises into 
knowledge, which entails the learning of names of objects, their modalities, and their 
appropriate object-relations and signifying chains, by being taught, instructed, and 
repeatedly exposed to similar contexts.  For example, a child being instructed in the 
group habit of social manners will be exposed to various contexts demanding 
permutations of appropriate object-relations, such as being instructed on how to 
express gratitude in different situations, which synthesise into a knowledge of the 
intricacies of reciprocation. 
This general process is replicated to some extent by human actors’ being in the same 
space of the same group, so encountering the same collection of individuals whose 
actions they mimic, whose instructions they follow, whose teachings they absorb, 
resulting in substantially overlapping bodies of knowledge.  This space might be as 
limited in scope as the classroom, or as enlarged as the town, city, or country.  In 
general as the human grows so does his scope of contact with the world expand to 
accommodate different experiences and persons.  Generally the foreign is approached 
through the lens of the familiar, and the matured human actor who has already 
cultivated group habits will selectively assimilate foreign experiences through minor 
shifts in his existing habits.  This is due to the plasticity of habit which operates to 
entrench habitual object-relations, so limiting the scope of change whilst shoring up 
those changes which have occurred.  
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The spaces and human actors involved in cultivating group habits are synthesised 
holistically into knowledge of that space and situation as permutations of appropriate 
object-relations.  Because human beings in a shared space will have shared histories, 
the particular objects, object-relations, and signifying chains presented in that space 
will constitute some part of their respective individual histories.  I believe this is how 
humans as distinct members of a group can assimilate very similar bodies of habit and 
knowledge, whilst maintaining their unique compositions of experiences.   Group 66
habits are characterised by bounded multiplicity, a multiplicity of unique individual 
histories contained by the contingent forces of physical proximity and habit.    67
5.7.2 Group habits as presupposition and discourse
Group habits comprise of entrenched networks of object-relations and those signifying 
chains which connect them into a coherent order according to their common signifiers 
to form an intelligible and meaningful pattern of activity.  These signifying chains 
constitute group habits’ discourse, prosaically presented as customs, normative 
systems, and institutions, and although they perform the crucial function of transmitting 
meaning, they are not determinants of action.  Signifying chains change depending on 
the modalities of the objects and object-relations specific to the context, which are 
mostly conditioned by the histories of human actors, so the same set of actions may 
bear different meanings for individuals and different significations depending on 
context.  Group habits are relatively more stable in their particular composition of the 
ternary across different individuals and contexts; in other words the same set of 
actions are connected together in the same set of significations for a large proportion 
of human actors and contexts.  This commonality and stability allows group habits to 
condition the foundations of public meaning and communication, and act as centres for 
proliferation of discourse.  
I have argued that arbitrary actions are given intelligibility by reference to their 
immediate situation and associated actions to form an activity which is intelligible 
within its normative context.  Whilst this may be true of the individual actor, the 
question remains how other human actors are able to make sense of that action, or 
 Experience is not replicable; Merleau-Ponty n.7 Part.I s.3.66
 Bounded multiplicity entails a lesser degree of cohesion between the individual units than accounts of 67
joint or collective action, since their relationship is conceptually contingent.
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conversely how a human actor through action is able to communicate meaning or 
intention to others.  It is group habits that enable that seemingly effortless 
phenomenon of communication.  The greater the shared commonality of group habits, 
the more intuitive is the understanding of the actions of others, which obviates the 
need to explicitly examine the foundations of communication.  In other words humans 
proceed from an intuitive presumption of mutual understanding until something 
disrupts that effortless operation of habit, causing communication to become more 
consciously reflective.68
Recall that group habits are cultivated through incessant exposure to shared spaces 
and histories, which results in the development of very similar habitual object-relations 
in the bodies of all those human actors involved.  This also involves shared dynamic 
situations which cultivate habitual knowledge of the actions of others, and from there 
infer their past intentions and anticipate their future actions.  The human actor 
synthesises this knowledge and comes to anticipate how others will react to certain 
objects and stimuli, and correspondingly infer what has occurred based on presently 
observable actions.  The accuracy of inference and anticipatory ability grows in 
sophistication as the breadth of knowledge widens and the human actor is able to 
make increasingly fine discriminations according to the context and the actors 
involved. 
This ability to anticipate and infer the meaning and intention of others’ actions enables 
communication through a material form of intersubjectivity.   Insofar as the human 69
actor has experienced a situation, likely from various relative positions, he is able to 
anticipate how each actor in that situation is likely to respond with a degree of 
sophistication.  It is a process of virtually constructing the future by placing different 
actors into different relative positions and bringing his personal knowledge to access 
the intentions of others.  This requires a certain level of identification with other 
humans, but I would limit this to a recognition of others as the same species of living 
being as oneself.  Just as the human actor can recognise all apples in their sameness, 
so too can he recognise all humans in their sameness.   This means he can virtually 70
 Bourdieu n.6.  Lindahl and difference between understanding and interpretation n.58.68
 See Gallese on how second person simulation is a form of intersubjectivity; Vittorio Gallese, ‘Bodily 69
S e l v e s i n R e l a t i o n : E m b o d i e d S i m u l a t i o n a s S e c o n d - p e r s o n P e r s p e c t i v e o n 
Intersubjectivity.'  Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological 
Sciences 369, no. 1644.
 Human are psychologically prone to essentialist judgements; Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, ‘Essentialist 70
beliefs about social categories’ British Journal of Social Psychology, 39(1) :113–127.
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project himself into the place of others by constructing them as versions of himself and 
interpellating the situation according to his personal body of knowledge.  71
I argue that in this model of communication, group habits condition the most basic and 
intuitive conditions of human interrelation by virtue of their sheer ubiquity and 
entrenchment.  The most apparent example is the act of speech, which is an almost 
universal human mode of communication.  The practice of speech is made possible 
through habit and object-relations; we are habituated in the act of making sounds 
towards other humans as a mode of communication, and grasp the meaning of this 
action as attempts at speech, which explains why even incomprehensible sounds such 
as foreign languages are acknowledged as attempts at communication.  We ascribe to 
the act of speech the intention and meaning of attempting to communicate some 
content, because we ourselves habitually engage in speech with that intention and 
presume the same for others.  We respond to any sounds issued towards us as 
addressing us, because we so habitually address others. 
The above implies that there is a highly intuitive presupposition amongst humans 
when it comes to the action and meaning of speech, which is disrupted with relative 
infrequency.  Same for those most prevalent group habits where humans tend to 
approach a situation with the presumption of shared knowledge.   So for group habits 72
such as bodily and facial gestures, manners, paying for goods, and such, the human 
actors involved tend to take for granted that everyone present is in possession of the 
same habitual object-relations as themselves which enable comprehension and 
mastery of the situation.  In contrast to when in an unfamiliar neighbourhood or in 
company of persons of a different culture, the human actor might find his habitual 
object-relations ill-equipped to master the situation.  In consequence it is likely that he 
will often ask for explanations, in order to grasp the modalities of objects and 
meanings of object-relations as they pertain to that unfamiliar context.  
In actuality all confrontations with the world are gradations of the familiar and the 
novel.  We intuitively presume a fundamental understanding of the world that we share 
with all other human beings, and depending on the particular situation our intuitive 
knowledge, determined by our personal habitual object-relations, might be sufficient to 
enable us to operate without attention, such as for everyday routines.  Or the situation 
 Gallese n.69.71
 Akin to Bourdieu’s common-sense, n.6 pg.98.72
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might stymie the procession of intuitive habit by posing unfamiliar objects in our path, 
in which case we resort to those more foundational habits in order to orient ourselves, 
such as inquiring for information through speech, gestures, and such.  
Let me now discuss the proliferation of discourse centring around group habits, which 
entails the creation of complex signifying chains in greater permutations of objects and 
object-relations.  A paradigm example of discourse would be theory, which claims to 
propound practice by ordering action into a coherent and internally logical system. 
Group habits are prime sources for proliferating discourse, owing to their widespread 
and entrenched character.  Their widespread enjoyment means significant numbers of 
individuals each have a unique interpellation of that habit, so a correspondingly vast 
number of mediums through which the habit is expressed.  Their entrenchment means 
the material actions which constitute the group habit can withstand conflict and 
irreconcilable differences in discourse.  For example, you and I may have 
irreconcilable discursive understandings of whether consuming meat is a moral wrong, 
yet we will likely continue in our habits regardless of the other’s persuasions.  The 
more object-relations are entrenched through the conservative aspect of habit the less 
they are prone to change in spite of rational argumentation and conscious effort. 
Group habits insofar as they are deeply entrenched habits are likewise relatively 
immune to any destabilising effect of discourse, so are able to support the proliferation 
of multiple discourses.  In other words strong customs, institutions, and social norms 
are relatively immune to change simply by arguing or theorising about them. 
Discourse is unable to significantly direct the development of group habits, which 
implies that neither is discourse the foundation of their longevity.
5.7.3 Group habits and external conditions
I remarked earlier that group habits structure the external conditions by constituting 
large parts of what is perceived as normative reality.  Group habits as a collection of 
objects, object-relations, and signifying chains presenting their particular modalities 
enjoy a privileged and hegemonic status in constructing the embodied category 
according to their peculiar meanings and logic.  In physical terms group habits have 
greater mass compared with other object-relations, so distort the social space with 
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their magnetic influence.   They form present reality into landscapes, in which they 73
are the guiding normative landmarks for navigating that reality.  
This influence group habits exert on the external conditions is two fold.  The first lies in 
their hegemonic influence over human action.  By being the more deeply habituated 
set of actions, group habits induce human actors to engage in the response 
appropriate to their significations, and in doing so they ensure future repetition through 
the conservative aspect of habit.  The second effect lies in the compulsive aspect of 
habit which drives human actors to bring about the external conditions favourable for 
the expression of group habits.  The tendency to resort to intuitive presuppositions in 
order to orient oneself in foreign situations means group habits have the privilege of 
being default guides when deliberating action.  In other words the external conditions 
are distorted by group habits into conditions conducive to the fulfilment of those habits, 
so makes their perpetuation easy and opportune.  A change of the conditions into 
something unfamiliar will prompt a drive to change them back to the familiar, so that 
entrenched habits may find fulfilment.  Group habits make certain actions easier, and 
compel human actors to construct their surroundings in accordance with those actions. 
Thus the pressure exerted by group habits towards conformity is so strong, both 
externally and habitually, that they suffice to ensure widespread and enduring patterns 
of behaviour which may be likened to collective action.  I have hitherto discussed 
group habits mostly from the perspective of the acting individual, as if his internal 
habits and narratives are causative of action and communication.  Now that I have 
established that group habits actively shape the external conditions, I will supplement 
the foregoing account by arguing that human actions and their meanings are 
compelled and imposed from without by the external conditions of the situation.
Objects compel reaction by their forcefully presented modalities, and object-relations 
relevant to group habits are constantly being compelled, as group habits actively 
structure the external conditions according to their particular significations.  This 
applies also to other human actors and their anticipated reactions.   For example, I 
refrain from making loud noises in public, likely not out of some conscious decision to 
appear polite, but through habit and the forceful presence of those around me who 
might resort to tutting and nasty looks if I make nuisance.  Insofar as I am habituated 
 Akin to Bourdieu’s assertion of social space as the site of struggle for knowledge; n.6 pg.187-8.73
 161
to the reactions of others towards my actions, their presence in my surroundings exert 
a forceful influence over my actions.  To further illustrate how group habits construct 
normative situations, consider how public displays of affection are reacted to with 
averted glances, jeering, and contempt, which are reenactments of object-relations 
reiterating the message that sexual activities are only appropriate in private situations. 
These significations of actions are not sustained through discourse or through the 
relatively impotent actions of any one individual, but the coinciding of multiple human 
actors engaging in their common group habits.  In doing so they are actively 
constructing the normative reality and sustaining its future reproduction.  For any 
particular human actor, finding himself in this normatively charged and pressured 
situation, his acting in conformity is rendered highly likely, and seen from the overall 
perspective, such conformity with group habits does indeed appear to be discursively 
determined collective action.
5.8 Conclusion
In this chapter I advanced my analysis of the mechanism of habit, and combined it with 
my conception of the ternary to form a preliminary account of how habit drives and 
sustains human action.  I have argued that habit enables meaningful activity by 
conserving experience into a form of bodily knowledge, and compelling repetition by 
structuring the external conditions according to a particular set of habits.  Throughout I 
have emphasised that habit is the active mechanism which conditions and drives 
human action, and discourse is proliferated upon the stable foundation of behaviour 
sustained through habit.  Although I have presented such a preliminary account of 
human action, it remains to be explored whether this form of habitual action is capable 
of sustaining normative action without collapsing into determinism.  This issue of 
habitual action as the embodiment of normativity will form the topic for the proceeding 
chapter.
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6 
Normative Action
In the preceding chapters I presented a material framework of reality, and explored the 
concept of habit as a driving mechanism for meaningful action.   This chapter will 
address norms and normativity in greater detail, and combine them with the 
mechanism of habit to advance a conception of normative action.  The foremost 
challenge is to combine norm and habit, which are often treated as antithetical 
concepts in theories of legal normativity.   Habit is philosophised as an empirical fact 1
falling foul of legal normativity, either because habitual action is not determined by 
morality,  or it lacks the ‘internal aspect’ which distinguishes rules from threats.   Whilst 2 3
habit does not pose an existential challenge to normativity, in the sense that there may 
be an habitual element to normative action, to ground and justify the normative basis 
of law on habit would appear to undermine law’s normative status in its standard 
understanding.  
My approach is to reconfigure both the constitution of norms and normative action in 
order to incorporate the mechanism of habit as the condition of both.  I will focus on 
norms in the first section of this chapter, by firstly reimagining normativity in terms of 
   Natural law theories are not overly concerned with habit as they tend to based law’s validity on morality 1
or other natural values.  However for positivist theories Hart’s critique of Austin’s and Bentham’s theories 
which severed completely the positivity of law from any normative aspect, and relied on the ‘habit of 
obedience’ to establish the grounds for law’s validity, complicated the neat dichotomy between law’s 
conditions of existence and validity.  For me Hart’s insistence on the ‘internal point of view’ in the very 
conceptual constitution of law as rules, which I understand to denote an irreducibly normative aspect, and 
his rejection of habit’s adequacy of serving this role revived a search for a new nonmoral basis for law’s 
validity aside from coercion, force, or habit.  After Hart’s critique it is difficult to claim that law is obeyed 
either out of habit or coercion, for both would undermine the internal point of view which distinguishes the 
‘ought’ from ‘is’.  H.L.A Hart, The Concept of Law. 2nd Ed., 1st Pbk. ed. Oxford : New York: Clarendon 
Press ; OUP, 1997.  For further discussion onHart’s concept of normativity, and law’s relation to habit, see 
Sylvie Delacroix, ‘Hart’s and Kelsen’s Concepts of Normativity Contrasted’, Ratio Juris, 17(4):501-520; 
Sylvie Delacroix, Law and Habits (January 8, 2016). Available at SSRN:  https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2744694.  Other theoretical efforts to substantiate Hart’s internal aspect of rules include 
conventionalism (Andrei Marmor, ‘The Conventional Foundations of Law’, in Bertea, Stefano, and 
Pavlakos, New Essays on the Normativity of Law Hart Publishing, 2011), social planning (Scott Shapiro, 
‘Planning agency and the Law’, in New Essays), variants of practical reason (Joseph Raz, Law and 
Authority; Stephano Bertea, ‘Law and Obligation’, in New Essays).  
 Immanuel Kant, and Mary J. Gregor, The Metaphysics of Morals. Cambridge Texts in the History of 2
Philosophy. New York: CUP, 1996, 6.389-398.
 Hart, n.1.3
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the ternary,  and secondly by constructing a material account of norms.  This will 4
facilitate the combining of norms with the mechanism of habit in the later sections to 
develop an account of action which is both habitual and normative.  The relationship 
between norms and action is one of embodiment and manifestation occurring in 
material unison.  Norms are embedded in the very materiality conditioning action, so 
normative action will not be undermined by habit.  
6.1 Materiality of norms
The embodied category is constituted by the ternary and characterised by materiality 
and activity, therefore norms must also be materially embodied and actively 
manifested through the same ternary framework.  I take norms to be phenomenal  and 5
dependent on material embodiment as their basis of existence, as opposed to 
common understandings of norms as abstracted and independent from material facts. 
Abstracted norms are posited as general and independent from specific facts, which 
are not a sufficient condition for norms’ criteria of validity.   Even social conceptions of 6
norms still posit them as something qualitatively different from actual events or actions 
from which they are abstracted.  7
I reject this abstracted notion of norms in favour of a one which is constituted by 
materiality and activity.  Insofar as norms exert a perceptible influence in the world, 
they do so through human action which manifests them into materiality by embodying 
them in objects, spaces, and bodies.    Norms in the embodied category are material 8
things and not immaterial ideas or values.  For the purpose of analysis I will artificially 
hypostatise ‘norms’, and separate these from ‘normative action’, the latter denoting 
action which manifests the norm.  I will first address norms, focusing on their material 
 Chapter 4.4
 Reference to Kant’s position of phenomenal and noumenal planes of existence, with norms belonging to 5
the latter.  Kant n.2 Critique of Pure Reason.
 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Norms OUP, 1991, chapters 1-2 for categorical assertion of the Is/6
Ought dichotomy.  For more detailed criticism of the dualism between fact and norm and its genealogy 
within philosophy, see John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty : A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and 
Action. Gifford Lectures ; 1929. London, 1930,  chapter 3.
 Cristina Bicchieri, Norms in the Wild : How to Diagnose, Measure, and Change Social Norms, New York: 7
OUP, 2017; in chapter 1 she presents a diagnostic toolkit to identify social norms from what she terms 
‘independent behaviours’ which explicitly includes habit.  In legal theories which conceive of law as a 
social phenomenon would include conventionalism and social planning. 
 I am not endorsing an ideal theory of immanence, such as Hegel’s theory that the actual is rational.  My 8
own conception of norms is thoroughly based on a material approach.
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aspect, before proceeding to address normative action, focusing on its active aspect. 
This division between norms and normative action is artificial and solely for the 
purpose of clear analysis of norms understood in their common, but I would argue 
mistaken, guise as rules or ideals.  I will elaborate on how norms are related to each 
part of the ternary separately for the purpose of clarity, however this distinction is also 
artificial as the three component parts occur in unison. 
6.1.1 Norms as objects
Norms as they relate to objects express a hypostatisation of a particular meaning, 
function, or value of the object in relation to a particular context; a norm is simply a 
representation of an object in a particular modality in a decontextualised fashion.  9
Norms hypostatise a particular modality of the object by invoking that modality and 
reinforcing the connection between the object and that particular modality.  Moreover 
since norms are usually expressed in a decontextualised manner, they explicitly 
hypostatise a particular modality of the object, and assume the contextual conditions 
of that modality.  So an object is presented as having a particular modality without 
referencing how that modality is made possible by a particular material and discursive 
context.  10
 
As objects are capable of sustaining multiple modalities, it follows that objects are also 
capable of multiple normative representations.  Since the modalities most strongly 
presented by objects change according to the particular space and situation which 
renders certain modalities more or less appropriate, an object’s normative 
representation is always changing depending on the context within which it appears. 
At any particular moment, an object will have a meaning, function, or value depending 
on how it is positioned in relation to other objects around it, but only so long as that 
particular space persists, and changes in the space will precipitate changes in the 
object’s modality.
 I use representation in the direct sense of norms portraying or presenting objects in a particular modality, 9
usually symbolically. 
  The important point is not whether the norm designates a context, such as ‘in case of x, norm is y’, but 10
assumes the material conditions of the possibility of both contextual facts and generalised norms, usually 
as different.  In other words what is necessary and sufficient to establish an object, is not identical to 
establishing a modality; the former is usually presented as empirical fact and the latter as norm.  My claim 
is there are no two distinct phenomena, and objects which are necessarily grasped through a modality are 
therefore necessarily normative.
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As the norm represents a particular modality of the object, it is embodied in the object, 
and its materiality is manifested through the particular meaning, function, or value the 
object presents in the world.  For example, the norm that banknotes function as a 
measure of value is embodied in the material objects of slips of paper placed securely 
in wallets and pockets.  As the material objects of banknotes continue to be produced 
and used as a measure of value, so their normative representation hypostatises its 
modality as monetary value and object of desire.   The existence of the norm is 11
evidenced in the force the modalities of objects exert in the embodied category, 
produced by their influence on human action.  It is the act of placing money into 
wallets, or exchanging money for goods which embodies money with its normative 
import as measure of value, not the normative discourse of the money institution.  The 
hypostatised norm as value is only a limited representation of a material reality already 
present in the world through the objects it invokes and the actions it influences. 
Insofar as norms are embodied within objects, those objects exert normative import 
and cease to be merely inert things.   To say that objects are normative is simply 12
another way of expressing the idea that objects embody those modalities which are 
invested in them through human action, and norms which represent particular 
modalities are embodied materially in the object presenting that modality in the world. 
In conjunction the process of naturalisation renders certain modalities so closely 
associated with the object that they appear to be innate qualities, so the norms relating 
to those naturalised modalities can appear to be the norm, in the sense of being the 
axiomatic or irrefutable value of the object.   13
To summarise, norms in relation to objects are hypostatised representations of a 
particular modality in a particular but inexplicit context. Norms are manifested 
materially in the embodied category to the extent that the relevant modality of the 
object is actually effective, such as through being used or acknowledged.  Norms are 
embodied within objects, and depending on the strength of association between the 
object and the relevant modality, norms make their existence more or less palpable 
through the forceful presence of the objects which embody them.  
 Marx’s account of money value subverting exchange priority; Karl Marx, Capital. Everyman's Library ; 11
No.849. London: Dent, 1951 v.I chapter I section 4.
 Chapter 4 wherein I rejected the notion that objects can have intrinsic features which are natural and 12
non-normative.  
 Ibid.13
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6.1.2 Norms as object-relations
Norms, as they relate to object-relations, are representations of a particular object-
relation towards a particular object as appropriate to the implicitly assumed context. 
Since object-relations are reactions of human actors towards objects appropriate to 
the context, the relevant norm may be said to hypostatise the object-relation as the 
proper action in a decontextualised manner, so making norms and object-relations 
similar in content.  For example, the norm which states that goods should be 
purchased with money hypostatises the object-relation towards money as a valuable 
object, and connects them in an explicitly normative manner. 
Although in terms of content object-relations bear the closest resemblance to norms, 
both being prescriptions of action, the two remain distinct.   Norms are not translatable 
directly into object-relations for the simple reason that norms are hypostatised 
representations of object-relations in a decontextualised manner, whereas object-
relations are unique responses to the unique context within which the action occurs. 
Norms are able to be reiterated, whereas events are unique and unable to be repeated 
in replica.14
Norms are manifested into materiality through the human actions which constitute the 
relevant object-relations.  The human actor’s physical action and the effects it 
produces by reacting to an object in a particular way produces a materiality according 
to the terms of the norm, thereby making it real.  Norms are not the causes of actions 
which are their material effects, rather the norm gains materiality simultaneously and 
by virtue of the action which manifests it, and the effects of that action which linger in 
the world by changing the objects and external conditions to be conducive to future 
repetitions of the norm.  Neither is this manifestation of norm in action the realisation of 
an ideal immanent in the action,  rather the material action always comes first, and in 15
that moment a norm is manifested into existence.  There is no norm independent of 
the action, which means the norm does not ex ante cause, nor ex post facto validate 
the appropriateness of the object-relation.  Object-relations simply are normative in 
themselves, the significant aspect is only which particular normative terms they 
manifest and reinforce over other possibilities.
 This is not a barrier to the manifestation of norms through action, as I will argue later artificial and 14
outward conformity with norms is sufficient to materialise them.
 Such as Hegelian ideal immanence.15
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6.1.3 Norms as signifying chains
Norms, as they relate to signifying chains, invoke a particular signifier and its relevant 
network of significations which operate as the context in which the norm becomes 
meaningful and intelligible.  This context is not the concrete material context which I 
define as constituted by space and situation, but a symbolic context which connects 
objects and object-relations together into a particular order of relations such that their 
meanings have reference to a common signifier.  
Unlike objects and object-relations, signifying chains have no direct material existence, 
so must be embodied in the objects and object-relations which are its signifieds.  In 
this respect signifying chains are the same as norms, which are also symbolic 
expressions devoid of material substance.  Norms presuppose a particular set of 
signifying chains, which they invoke by reference to an object’s particular modality and 
its appropriate object-relation,  and by implication the wider network within which that 16
particular modality is integrated.  For example, the norm of purchasing goods with 
money presupposes the banknote’s modality as measure of value, so invokes the 
signifier of monetary value and implicates the symbolic context of a money economy. 
In other words the norm presupposes a context in which goods are measured in 
monetary terms, and placed in relations of comparison with commodities and contrast 
to gifts.  The norm presupposes that money is a meaningful object which can be 
identified in the world, along with the action of exchange, and connects the two in a 
normative or prescriptive relationship.  In this way the norm may be said to have 
explicated a signifying chain by explicitly hypostatising the connection between an 
object and an object-relation.  
Norms and signifying chains overlap to a significant degree, especially in the case of 
discourse and its proliferation.  Discourse includes formal theory, practices, institutions, 
and belief systems.  A norm necessarily presupposes a network of signifying chains in 
order to establish meaning within a stable symbolic context, or explicitly refers to the 
broader practice or normative system of which it forms a part.  For example, a norm 
which refers to law or legality will invoke the entire institution of law as a social 
phenomenon, with its signifying implications of State, coercion, and the like.  It is 
 This is not a theoretical presupposition like Searle’s ‘Background’, but a simply assuming a state of 16
affairs persists which is evidenced by the action.  John Searle,  The Construction of Social Reality. 
London: Penguin, 1996, chapter 6.
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easier in such cases to appreciate how norms presuppose a network of signifying 
chains, since the norm explicitly refers to the discursive context which gives it meaning 
and significance.  However, all norms must presuppose some normative 
understanding of the world in order to communicate any meaning effectively.  Although 
norms and signifying chains often overlap, signifying chains have much greater reach 
than norms, so norms may be said to explicate a small part of a wider network of 
signifying chains by explicating a particular modality or signifier.  Norms bring into 
sharp relief a small part of a network of signifying chains by denoting particular objects 
and object-relations in relation to a particular signifier, over and above the wider 
network of meaning which fades into the background of presupposition.   17
So far I have discussed how norms relate to each of the ternary in isolation from each 
other.  This artificial division may now be abridged, since objects, object-relations, and 
signifying chains form a unity and occur in simultaneity.  A norm is embodied in 
material form in the shape of objects presenting particular modalities.  Those 
modalities are manifested in material fashion by the human actions which constitutes 
the object-relations appropriate to those modalities, compelled by the forceful 
presence of the objects.  These material occurrences happen against a context which 
is not only material, but imbued with symbolic import and constituted by the signifying 
chains which connect the relevant objects and object-relations into meaningful action.   
6.2 Habit and norms
It might be objected that norms are only embodied in objects and manifested by 
object-relations by virtue of their being posited against a particular symbolic context. 
In other words it is the posited norm which imbues the material with normative import, 
and without the continuing validity of the norm any normative representation of reality 
would not be possible.  In this section I aim to ground the force of norms as it were in 
the same materiality which embodies its content.  I propose to do so through the 
mechanism of habit, specifically how it conditions knowledge and action.  By 
combining this with the foregoing account, I hope to advance a thoroughly material 
conception of norms by grounding both its conditions of existence and validity in the 
same empirical reality.
 Pierre Bourdieu, Practical Reason : On the Theory of Action. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998.  17
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To recapitulate, habit makes the world familiar and accessible to human actors by 
constructing a meaningful and intelligible vision of the present reality.  It does this 
through habitual knowledge of the objects directly confronting the human actor, who 
through his habitual object-relations is able to navigate and interact with his 
surroundings.  Habit also serves virtually to construct past and future through 
recollection and anticipation, so habitual knowledge conditions deliberation and the 
construction of possible courses of action.  Habit forms the foundations of the human 
actor’s personal history and knowledge, so conditions how he constructs and interacts 
with material reality.  
Norms in the embodied category are an hypostatisation of particular modalities of 
objects and their appropriate object-relations.  However they cannot exist dormant 
inside objects, but must be manifested into materiality through human action.  Habit 
enables repetitive manifestations of particular norms by entrenching the modalities and 
object-relations which embody them, so cementing their dominance over other norms. 
This is achieved through the force of habitual knowledge and action.  Knowledge is an 
active bodily stance the human actor takes towards the world, constituted by an 
amalgamation of cognitive actions such as recognising, identifying, registering.  18
Knowledge is identifying objects and their salient modalities to construct a coherent 
vision of the world, and anticipating possible future developments of the dynamic 
situation.   Knowledge is an active state of knowing, a bodily reaction triggered by the 19
objects confronting the actor. 
Extending this conception of knowledge to norms means to know a norm is to 
recognise a particular modality of an object relevant to the norm, which is also to 
embody it in an object and manifest it materially through the act of knowing.  The norm 
now constitutes a part of material reality by forming part of the knowledge of that 
reality, invoked by the forceful presence of the object which embodies it.  Normative 
knowledge means recognising objects in a particular modality, appreciating the object-
relations appropriate to that modality, and discriminating the relevant network of 
signifying chains within which that modality is signified.  Insofar as reality is constituted 
by the ternary, it is also constituted by norms; it is normative ipso facto.  Abstract 
 Dewey n.6 chapter 918
 Ibid.19
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norms are secondary reports of that knowledge of the world which was already 
established the moment the human actor interacts with his surroundings. 
Having established that norms are constitutive of material reality by forming part of the 
knowledge of reality, the next step is to explore how habit might affect this conception 
of norms.  The conservative aspect of habit strengthens the association between an 
object and a particular norm, and renders action increasingly unthinking and 
automatic.   This effect of habit when applied to the object-relation of knowing results 20
in unreflective and uncritical patterns of thinking, causing habitual normative 
constructions of the world to appear natural and necessary.  In other words certain 
norms of objects and object-relations become so habituated and strongly reinforced 
that they are taken as the proper order of the world without further question.  In this 
way what is an active construction of a normative order of reality through human action 
is turned into a hypostatisation of a particular normative order which ossifies into a 
fixed order of reality.  Habit operates to obscure the normative aspect through a 
process of entrenching particular normative constructions as inevitable.  This effect 
occurs at a bodily level, by habituating the human actor's body into fixed relations with 
his external environment according to particular norms, so drives their repeated 
manifestation through habitually compulsive actions. These actions change the 
external conditions by affecting and acting upon objects and other humans to produce 
conditions more conducive to the norms’ future repetition.  In other words as humans 
act according to their habit, their interactions with the world will produce material 
effects in accordance with their habitual knowledge and shape their surroundings in 
such way that repetition of the habitual action is rendered more likely.     21
Object-relations which were initially instituted as reactions towards objects which 
manifest a particular norm, through the effects of habit become natural and almost 
spontaneous ways of reacting to the world.  Similarly, the theoretically endless 
possibilities of normative constructions of the world become deadened into ossified 
ways of representing the world.  It would not be unfair to term these norms as habitual 
norms, norms which are so entrenched through habit that they become obvious and 
unquestioned representations of reality.    
 See chapter 4.20
 Similar to how Bourdieu’s notion of habitus strives to create the most friendly and suitable environment 21
for itself, by surrounding itself with those objects and persons most conducive to its operation.  Pierre 
Bourdieu, Pascalian Meditations. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000, pg.146-150.
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6.3 Norms, ideal or practical?
In the foregoing analysis I have reimagined norms in their materiality and argued how 
they are embodied and manifested through the ternary to constitute the material fabric 
of the embodied category.  I also claimed that the reality which directly confronts us is 
a normative construction conditioned by our habitual norms of knowledge and action. 
Humans can only interact with a world which is normatively ordered and oriented 
towards their intentionality.   When we make statements about our reality, we are 22
actually making normative representations from the perspective of a particular 
normative stance.  The apparent self-evidence of many of these representations is not 
due to their nature as empirical facts, but the effects of habit which renders knowledge 
and action automatic and compulsive, and obscures the moment of norm construction.
Advancing this material conception of norms, I have not only claimed they are 
empirical phenomena, but also that they occur in unison with the objects and actions 
which embody them.  This raises a potential issue of determinative order, for if norms 
only exist through the action, there is no temporal or conceptual separation between 
them.  This seems to preclude the possibility of norms acting as guides or 
determinants of action, and by extension how normative systems such as law whose 
explicit purpose and effect is to order human action can be explained.   Moreover the 23
denial of norms’ independence of material reality would preclude the possibility of 
normative judgements on the desirability or legitimacy of action.   I would deny the 24
existence of ideals insofar as they are posited to be transcendental or elevated beyond 
influence from human action.   However I do not commit to a wholesale rejection of 25
the possibility of norms functioning as guides to action.  Norms are capable of guiding 
 I use the term intentionality here to denote an attitude which is less reflective or deliberative than 22
purposive, but retains an active aspect of mental and physical engagement.  Human actors engage in the 
world with intentionality, so not necessarily deliberative or reflective in pursuing their purposes, but 
nevertheless consciously controlling and coordinating their actions in order to produce certain material 
effects.  See chapter 4.
 Norms take human action as the object of their operation; Kelsen n.6 chapter 22.23
 The idea that law is not simply a matter of posited rules and their enforcement, but as a social institution 24
must serve some aspirational role of striving towards a nomos, is clearly asserted by Cover.  Similarly the 
idea that interpretation of law must be a moral exercise which justifies and legitimises the violence of law 
is asserted by Cover and Dworkin.  Robert Cover,  Narrative, Violence, and the Law : The Essays of 
Robert Cover. Law, Meaning, and Violence. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993.  Ronald 
Dworkin, Law's Empire. Oxford: Hart, 1998.  I understand the theme in common to be it is not sufficient for 
law to efficaciously command and enforce action, without also justifying its grounds for legitimacy in the 
same action.
 See chapter 1.25
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choices and paths of action, without having to do so from an ideal status.   They do 26
so by being manifested in the alternative choices available to the human actor, 
presented as material possibilities rather than immaterial reasons or rules.  This 
material foundation of norms enables human action to be undetermined by retaining 
the element of choice.  27
Norms as guides or rules of action are materially and actively constituted, which 
carries two implications.  First, norms are constituted by the particular context in which 
they arise, so the content of norms is context-dependent, like all normative 
significations in the embodied category.  Second, situations carrying normative import 
are far more ubiquitous than is recognised; since the world is structured normatively, it 
follows that all action undertaken are of normative import.  The important issue is how 
contingent and imposed normative orders become persistently perpetuated despite 
their theoretical alterity.  This is achieved through the functioning of habit cohering 
actions with context, so obscuring the normative construction of reality and making it 
familiar and natural.  Certain meanings and relations between objects become so 
naturalised that they are taken to be phenomena beyond the influence of human 
relations, so beyond the remit of normative regulation.  28
Normative dilemmas are most often thrown up when there is a disjunction between 
habit and context which obstructs the smooth operation of habitual action and renders 
the element of choice explicit and unavoidable.  For example, for a vegetarian a 
situation where meat is consumed is rife with ethical questions, as there is a 
disjunction between his habitual actions and what is occurring in actuality.  These 
moments of conflict will often precipitate a need for practical deliberation to harmonise 
the disjunction and enable further action, and discourse is proliferated when this 
conflict between practical norms is detached from its concrete context and abstracted 
 Dewey refers to this as ‘ends in view’, which he opposes to ultimate ends such as morality.  John 26
Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct : An Introduction to Social Psychology, New York: H. Holt, 1935, pg.
223-237.
 Choosing between the available material alternatives, as opposed to choosing the action itself, which is 27
the common understanding of autonomy; see Christine Korsgaard, ‘Origin of value and scope of 
obligation’ in Korsgaard, & O’Neill,  The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge ; New York: CUP, 1996. 
chapter 4; Christine Korsgaard, 'The Normative Constitution of Agency.' In Rational and Social Agency, 
Chapter 9. OUP, 2014.
 Dewey also refers to this dichotomy between the provinces of scientific and philosophical thought, 28
which he rejects as an attempt by philosophy to hold on to immutable truths.  Dewey n.6 chapter 3.
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to become a conflict between ideals.   So in this example what is a situationally 29
constituted instance of misalignment between habit and context which precipitates a 
need for choice, is valorised by discourse into a moral problem which is resolvable 
only by reconciling ideals or principles, such as sanctity of life, ethical treatment of 
animals, concerns for health and environment, pitted against the ideals of freedom of 
personal choice and sovereignty of humans over nature.  Such discourse of ideal 
norms portrays material events as incidental fodder which must be ordered by ideals 
that transcend beyond the specific context.  Moreover material normative resolutions 
can only approximate ideals, so are compromises to the limitations of material reality.  30
Against this I argue that all ideal norms are manifestations of a particular normative 
signification through material human action; they are embodied in the material context 
by the objects and object-relations which constitute both their existence and content. 
Norms are context-dependent in the strong sense of being constituted by the particular 
context, and limited by those objects, object-relations, and signifying chains forming 
that context.
I raise this issue in anticipation of my upcoming argument that choice is the linchpin of 
normative action, by indicating that normative choices are ubiquitously embedded in 
contexts of all human interactions, and it is only by the effect of habit that potential 
normative dilemmas are glossed over.  In reality human actors are constantly 
engaging in actions which manifest and reinforce a particular normative order, such as 
maintaining the market economy through their mundane actions of paying for goods 
and services, refraining from trespass or shoplifting.  The moral and ethical import of 
these mundane actions go mostly unnoticed owing to their habitualness.  It is only 
when there occurs a change in the human actor’s experience which forces a conflict in 
his bodily habit that situations become normatively problematic.  Changes in context 
and experience effectively change how the very norm is constituted, rather than just 
change the specific case to which ideal norms are applied.  
Norms as generalised rules may be abstracted and synthesised from multiple 
contexts, however norms as rules of action cannot be totally divorced from the material 
space or situation which originally constituted them.  They cannot have an existence 
independent of their immediate material context, of the objects, object-relations, and 
 Action proceeds upon attainment of a new equilibrium between internal instinct, which form a potential 29
new habit; this process if one of practical deliberation, not ideal reflection.  Dewey n.26 pg.89-71 & pg.
107-111.  
 Dewey n.6 Part III s.IX.30
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signifying chains which manifest the norms and construct the present reality.  Norms 
influence action not by presenting ideal reasons, but by constructing the various 
feasible paths of action and possibilities of reality, constrained by the particular 
collection of objects presented in that moment.  
6.4 Normative action
Having established the groundwork of how norms are embodied materially in the 
ternary, and how they may influence human action through habit, I will in this section 
proceed to analyse how the normative aspect pertains directly to action.  This means 
shifting from the artificial hypostatisation of norms as embodied meanings, to looking 
at norms in their active state as normative action.   The analysis will proceed from the 31
practical perspective of the acting individual as the locus of normative action.  This 
practical perspective entails the formulation of problems with regard to their pertinence 
to action.  Knowledge is practical knowledge comprised of recollection, inference, and 
anticipation, and virtual constructions of the world are oriented around the central 
hypothesis of what must be done.  32
The foremost issue is how norms and action interrelate such that the result may be 
characterised as normative action.  I argued in the previous section that all actions are 
normative, or carry normative import, since all meanings and significations found in the 
world are normatively constructed and imputed through human action, so it becomes a 
logical extension to define normative action as simply all action in the embodied 
category.  I now elaborate in detail the relation between norm and action, focusing on 
the particular case of norm-guided action.  I understand norm-guided action to denote 
action which consciously and deliberately takes some norm to determine the means or 
ends of action.   This implies an active cognitive element to the action, and a 33
conscious choice of a particular course of action over others by virtue of the norm’s 
 This is not a conceptual dichotomy; I perceive normative action to be the locus of normativity, the basic 31
unit of normative ontology as it were.
 I am not asserting that there is no purely theoretical knowledge, or knowledge for its own sake.  For the 32
purposes of my argument I am not directly concerned with such knowledge.
 Norm following, in Brennan, et al., Explaining Norms, OUP, 2013, chapter 9; norms must feature in 33
some way in the agent's practical reasoning in order to count as norm-oriented action.  Cf. Joseph 
Raz, The Authority of Law : Essays on Law and Morality. Oxford: Clarendon, 1979; on norms as reasons 
for action, and law as preemptive reasons.  Even Hart whose notion of rule following is relatively 
normatively undemanding requires at the very least an ‘internal point of view’ on rules which suggests 
some form of recognition of them; Hart, n.1.
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influence or determination.  I believe norm-guided action best represents those cases 
of action commonly denoted as rule-following, moral action, or conforming to 
standards.   Although I conceive of all action to be same, I am happy for present 34
purposes to maintain this artificial distinction between norm-guided action and other 
actions, and take the former to exemplify normative action.   
I begin with the foremost issue of how action is capable of being guided by norms. 
Idealist theories often resolve this issue by asserting a conception of will which is the 
causative force behind action, and ideal Reason which is the causative force behind 
will.  Reason dictates norms to the will, which must overcome other human faculties 
such as desire and passion in competing to determine action.   The mechanism used 35
to integrate norms and action is a combination of Reason and will, both of which are 
posited as beyond empirical determination.   Human actors are endowed with the 36
capacity to orient their action towards norms through an exercise of Reason and will, 
but need not necessarily do so, for it is also open and easier for them to orient action 
to desires and passions, in other words to act in their natural character.   To the extent 37
that action is directed solely by will and Reason, it is normative.   To the extent that 38
action is directed by desires and passions, it is on the same level as animals directed 
by their innate nature to act in certain ways.  
Instead of the foregoing account, I advance a conception of normative action which is 
constituted through the ternary and susceptible to the mechanism of habit like any 
other action.  Habit does not undermine normative action, rather it is the mechanism 
which both conditions and sustains normative action by driving its repetition and 
stabilising the normative orders of reality.  Habit obscures the normative aspect of 
action by familiarising the action onto the human actor’s body, thereby reducing the 
 Cf. Brennan ibid., chapter 10; norm conforming is not an example of norm following, as it takes the 34
norm only as an instrumental reason for action. 
 I have discussed the theories of Hobbes and Kant, which I take to be representative of ideal theories of 35
will and reason in human action.  Whilst for Hobbes both will and reason are defined in somewhat material 
terms, the former being the ‘last appetite in deliberation’ and the latter being a form of high intelligence, 
these concepts remain independent from changes in material circumstances, and as such can be 
described as ideal in the sense of transcending the material.  By comparison Kant adopts much more 
explicitly ideal notions of will and reason, placing them in direct confrontation with passion which is 
grounded in the phenomenal sphere.  The Kantian Reason is grounded in the noumenal sphere, therefore 
beyond the influence of the material world, and is made active to the extent it can direct the will according 
to its maxims.  Further see chapter 1.
 Ibid.36
 Ibid.37
 Ibid.38
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cognitive effort involved in the action and rendering it increasingly automatic.   In 39
other words action which began as conscious efforts guided by norms becomes 
habitual action impressed onto the body and triggered by conducive external 
conditions.   Habit has not changed what began as norm-guided action into non-40
normative action, conversely the norm-guided action is facilitated and sustained by 
habit which compels repetition so reinforces the norm’s endurance. 
For example, the process of learning a new skill requires the human actor first to 
familiarise himself with the norms which constitute the proper performance of that skill. 
In learning how to play the violin, the student must by guided by the norms of proper 
violin playing, such as how to hold the instrument, handle the bow, how to apply 
pressure, and so on.  Necessarily implicated in this period of explicit instruction is 
constant attention to these norms by deliberately conducting his bodily movements in 
accordance with them.   Insofar as norm-guided action is defined as explicit rule-41
following, this deliberate and conscious effort of controlling bodily movement to 
conform to norms would appear to be the epitome of norm-guided action.  However 
the student cannot continue to engage in such a manner of action if he wishes to 
progress in his skill, since the cognitive effort required in performing and reflexively 
adjusting his bodily movements must become effortless in order to free up attention for 
other considerations, such as nuances in the score and music.  The mechanism which 
enables this bodily dexterity  is habit; through practice which is repetition of bodily 42
action, the student imprints on his body those actions necessary to playing the violin.  43
In other words the norms of proper performance are imprinted onto the body such that 
he is able to play without much cognitive attention to every detail of his movement. 
Habit has reduced the necessary cognitive effort by imprinting the actions onto the 
bodily level.  44
 Dewey n.6 Part I s.IV; Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception. Routledge Classics. 39
London: Routledge, 2002 Part I s.3
 Bourdieu n.21 pg.138-142.40
 Merleau-Ponty gives an example of the acquisition of skill in learning a sport, which results in the 41
actor’s body becoming areas of sensitivity magnetised towards his surroundings; Merleau-Ponty n.39 Part 
I s.3 
 Bourdieu, n.21 pg.142-146.42
 Merleau-Ponty n.41; Cf. Bourdieu who claims that subjects take up institutions roles and ‘make it their 43
own’; n.21 pg.150-155.
 Bourdieu n.21 pg.138-142.   Dewey n.6 pg.64-71. This does not mean the action becomes 44
unconscious, for it is still conscious and deliberate, just less deliberative.
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Although the element of conscious attention and deliberate effort has been significantly 
reduced, this does not change what began as an explicit case of norm-guided action 
into non-normative action.  It is clear that the actions are still norm conforming, in the 
sense that the student plays the violin in conformity with the proper norms of method. 
The norm-guided aspect has been shifted from cognitive attention to bodily hexis 
through the operation of habit.  Now it is the habit, specifically the habitual actions, 
rather than cognitive attention to the norm, which condition and sustain the normative 
action.   Habit conditions the normative action because it renders action increasingly 45
aligned with the actor’s body and away from the explicit norm, evidenced by the 
possibility of developing bad habits of playing, which denotes habitual movements not 
in conformity with the norms.  Habit also sustains the normative action because it 
renders the action effortless and compulsive, so less subject to change and 
examination; this is why it is important to cultivate good habits in the acquisition of 
skills, in order to facilitate actions in conformity with the norms and avoid falling into 
bad habits which are difficult to change.46
I have referred to normative action as norm-guided action and norm-conforming action 
in turn; both are the same in the sense of action manifesting a norm.  Whether an 
action conforms to a norm as a result of direct or intentional orientation towards that 
norm, or simply by accident, does not change the signification of that action as a 
material manifestation of that norm.   Neither am I concerned with norms in relation to 47
motivations for action.  From the practical actor’s perspective there can exist myriads 
of motivations, however the material effects of his actions will manifest and reinforce 
certain public norms independently of his mental state.  Normative action is both norm-
guided and norm-conforming insofar as the action outwardly conforms to the norm, 
and such actions will effectively be material manifestations of that norm, regardless of 
what motivation lay behind the action.  
6.4.1 Habit of normative action
It may be argued that even if habituation in the norms of mechanics of action, as 
presented in the foregoing example of learning an instrument, does not change the 
 Bourdieu n.21 pg.155-163.45
 The norm through habit is grafted onto the actor, who takes the norm onto himself, and thereby 46
changes the norm through his unique manifestation of it; Bourdieu ibid..
 Cf. Brennan et al., n.33.47
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normative import of the action since habituation is merely an accumulation of 
expertise, the same cannot be said for normative action understood in its moral aspect 
which takes norm to be both the cause and the goal of action.  Whereas the 
habituation of a skill involves the use of norms as instrumental means for the 
attainment of the further end goal of greater expertise, the same cannot be said of truly 
norm-oriented action which takes the norm as the end goal.  If an action is performed 
out of habit, and only incidentally in conformity with a norm, then it cannot be said to 
be properly normative.    48
Such arguments are variants of theories which espouse norms as metaphysical ideals 
placed in opposition to habit which is considered to be a part of the empirical world. 
The fundamental dualism of ideal norms and material habit means there can be no 
integration or harmonisation between them, since they are seen as antimonious.   It 49
would be helpful first to clarify what is meant when terms such as moral, ethical, or 
principled are used specifically in opposition to terms such as instrumental or 
functional.  Instrumental often refers to the means by which the desired end may be 
attained, and for normative action that end should be determined by norms rather than 
by desire.   By this formulation instrumental norms are at best rational in their ability 50
to attain the end and can apply to any goal-oriented action, whereas properly 
normative action has the norm as one of or even the sole end goal.  My arguments 
against such conceptions of norms as ideals I have already elaborated, and will not 
repeat here.  Instead I would like to address directly this idea that only action 
determined by or aimed at norms constitute normative action, and argue that is not the 
only way action can exert normative import.
 
Norms are not separable from their material manifestation in human actions, so it 
follows that even mundane actions can and do carry significant normative import; they 
implicate human relationships by acting out the normative conditions of how humans 
relate to each other and to their material world.   Every instance of action exerts a 51
 The epitome of this conception of moral action would be the Kantian theory of categorical imperatives. 48
Kant n.2.  Cf. Hart who rejects Austin’s notion of the habit of obedience as an unsatisfactory account of 
rule-following behaviour, for its lack of recognition of the internal aspect of rules; Hart, n.1. The similarity of 
both critiques lies in that for habitual actions the rule itself does not feature as a determinant or reason for 
action.
 Ibid.49
 Brennan et al., refers to these as ‘externalised norms’, n.33.50
 I refrain from asserting whether relations with other living organisms such as animals or the 51
environment would also count.  Such cases could be included since they affect the terms of the 
relationship between humans and their environment.
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normative force which affects not only the individual actor, but other human beings, as 
he actively constructs a material reality structured by those norms embodied in his 
actions.  These normative terms condition not only the actor's own relation to the 
world, but also cause material changes to the external environment which can have far 
reaching implications for how other human actors relate to him, to each other, and to 
the world in general.  In other words, with every act a human actor is constructing a 
material world in accordance with his personal history and knowledge, and imposing 
these norms onto the world at large.
Objects mediate between human actors, who by severally interacting with objects in 
particular ways simultaneously institute the terms of their relationship vicariously 
through the objects which operate like stand-ins for other human beings.   Human 52
beings as objects cannot exist in isolation; they are immersed in a wider group from 
which it becomes possible to differentiate them as individuals in their various 
modalities.   This multiplicity means the individual always relates to others whenever 53
he engages with objects, by manifesting the norms which condition their 
interrelationships.  This mediation through material objects avoids disembodied 
accounts of subject interrelations without denying the subject related nature of reality 
building; a form of inter-object-subjectivity.  Objects standing in for generic others who 
are more often than not materially absent from the context allow interrelations to occur 
without physical or psychological communion.   The disparate actions in which each 54
individual routinely engages suffice to construct and maintain the normative order 
conditioning all human interrelationships.
For example, a human actor confronted with the object of a fence might react to that 
object by not crossing over it, provided he possesses the relevant habit, so effectively 
reenacting its modality as boundary marker.  He has also effectively instituted the 
terms of his relationship with the potential owner of the fence and the property 
according to the norms of privacy and private property.  There is no need for any 
intersubjective communication to establish this normative order, as the forceful 
presence of the object compelling the human actor to engage in his habituated 
response suffices to construct a particular normative context.  Such habit conditioned 
 To clarify this ‘standing in’ is not one of direct representation or substitution, but more like an avatar.52
 The individual is an abstraction of the group is a topic I have discussed in greater detail in chapters 1 & 53
2.
 I envision this avoids reliance on modes of intersubjective relations such as agreement, joint plans, 54
recognition, cooperation, which are common forms of human relations used to build social action.  
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actions are not done or chosen because of any intersubjective regard or recognition, 
the actor simply acts out of his habit in that particular context.  The resultant action is 
nonetheless one which reenacts in normative terms the relationship between the 
human actors.
6.4.2 Habit and choice
Assuming it is accepted that habit does not eliminate the normative element from 
action, and allowing the possibility that habit and norms may occur in concert, it could 
still be objected that such habitual actions are so mechanical in quality that their 
normative significance is negligible.  Normative action must contain an element of 
choice by the actor in order to fulfil the standards of responsibility.   Machines which 55
are programmed to perform some action cannot be said to be responsible for those 
actions, regardless of their normative effect, so machines are not capable of normative 
action in any meaningful sense of those terms.  Similarly if humans are simply 
programmed through habit to engage in certain actions, this would liken them to 
machines and render them incapable of meaningful normative action.  
Fully mechanistic action indeed cannot be sensibly described as normative.  However 
habitual action is not fully mechanistic.  One effect of habit is to diminish the conscious 
cognitive element in action and therefore to cause action to become increasingly 
unthinking and automatic, even compulsive.  However this is merely a change in the 
quality of action as experienced by the human actor possessing the habit, and not a 
change in the action itself.  I define mechanistic actions as those which are beyond 
conscious control of the human actor, such as muscular convulsions, or movements 
caused by external physical forces such as gravity.   These are examples of 56
involuntary actions which cannot be controlled by the human actor through the use of 
his motor-capacities.  All other human actions I define as intentional, in the minimal 
sense of being voluntary physical or cognitive actions which have intentionality.   The 57
necessary cognitive element for action need not amount to conscious reflection, 
deliberation, or reasoning, in order to be intentional.  The direction or movement of 
limbs in a certain way, or the intention to achieve some material effect through the use 
of the corporeal body is sufficient to establish intentional action.
 Korsgaard, Normativity n.27.55
 See chapter 456
 Merleau-Ponty on intentionality as motility; n.39 pg.158.57
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Given that habitual action is not mechanistic as I have defined the term, the pertinent 
question is how habitual action can claim to be normatively imputable to the human 
actor.  Intentional action is within the control of the human actor, so is a result of the 
actor’s choice.  It is the element of choice which enables the action to be imputed in 
normative relation to the human actor.  Put simply, if I moved my body in certain 
motions of my own volition, such as striking at something, then that action would be 
imputable to my choice to strike at something.  I may object that I only engaged in that 
action through habit or even unconscious reflex, such as if I struck at a bug on my 
shoulder out of a fear of bugs.  That objection would not change my action from an 
intentional to a mechanistic action, since it is only required that I intentionally moved 
my body in a certain way rather than the more stringent intention of striking the bug off 
my shoulder.58
Habitual actions retain this element of intentionality, so may be imputed to the human 
actor as a result of their choice, an event which is obscured by the effects of habit.  59
Habit makes action feel effortless and natural, and precipitates the action through 
bodily compulsion which likely preempts deliberative decision, resulting in the human 
actor acting in an absentminded fashion, allowing his body to operate while his 
attention wanders.  If the habit is relatively compulsive, the human actor might find 
himself actively creating the necessary conditions for habit’s fulfilment.  Given these 
powerful effects of habit it is easy to perceive how the element of choice in action is 
obscured, as the body automatically and compulsively adopts its habituated stance 
towards the world, leaving scant opportunity for critical reflection.  Regardless of how 
scant the window of opportunity is for deliberative choice, I argue it sufficient for action 
to be imputed normatively to the actor.  Although habitual actions may appear to be 
natural and inevitable, awareness of their voluntary quality opens the moment of 
choice to exploitation.  In other words by severing the shackles of necessity which bind 
thoughts and actions together into rigid habitual behaviours, the moment of choice is 
made more apparent and opens the possibility of alternative paths of action.  By 
approaching reality as a contingent rather than inevitable possibility, the realm of 
potentiality becomes accessible.  
 There will be ambiguous examples, such as moving during sleep, however the issue is not directly 58
pertinent here.
 Imputed only in terms of arising from his intentionality as opposed to arising mechanistically.  This is a 59
development on my definition of intentional action, which must all have a choice element; I make no 
further claims regarding the responsibility or liability of the actor.
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I am not advocating that material reality is capable of being changed simply through a 
change in thought or perspective.   In contrast I place great emphasis on the 60
materiality of reality and its limitations on possible human action.  Human actors are 
constrained in their knowledge and action by their material external environments.  By 
highlighting the element of choice as the possibility of realising freedom I simply aim to 
release normative constructions of the world from the rigidity of necessity, render the 
meanings of reality contingent and envision different ways of interacting and being in 
the world.  61
6.5 Habitual actions and subjectivities
Following from the foregoing discussion on choice as the normative pivot, I proceed to 
briefly address the possible challenge that habitual actions are akin to disciplined 
subjectivities, so susceptible to that same determinism I have rejected in Foucault’s 
theory.   I will compare the notions of subjectivity with habitual action, with the aim of 62
resisting the claim that human action conditioned by habit is deterministic by 
demonstrating the possibility of radical contingencies between human action and their 
external conditions.  
 I reject theories which propound that reality is essentially an extension of thought, and so capable of 60
being transformed through thought alone, such as variants of Cartesian skepticism; Tim Button,  The 
Limits of Realism, OUP, 2013, chapter 7.  Changes in thought reflect changes in the meaning 
significations of reality, which may be fundamental and sudden such as in the case of epiphanies or 
revelations.  However these significations remain constituted by the unchanged material reality, so limited 
to an extent, but they are nevertheless constitutive changes in that they change how the world is, or 
should be.
 This attention to the moment of choice is also important in elevating blind habit into conscious practice, 61
which is the deliberate repetition of action aimed at refinement rather than ease.  The practitioner aims to 
refine his actions and thoughts through repetition, and instead of lapsing into unthinking habit perfects the 
practice through constant attention to his actions.  Clare Carlisle, On Habit. Routledge. 2014.  The 
emphasis placed on choice is common to the practice of mindfulness, which teaches a neutral approach 
to emotions and thoughts, with the aim of separating these from action by severing the cause and effect 
relationship which keeps action compulsive.  See Lea, Cadman, & Philo, ‘Changing the Habits of a 
Lifetime? Mindfulness Meditation and Habitual Geographies.' Cultural Geographies 22(1): 49-65. I would 
argue that this significance of choice is not ideal in character, so is unlike that ideal conception of freedom 
such as Kant's categorical imperative and will, but neither is it fully pragmatic such as economic rationality. 
This choice is very much material in that it involves a cognitive effort of awareness to one's own corporeal 
state, including feelings, thoughts, emotions, and the external situation, but also normative in its meta-
cognitive approach to these internal and external states.
 Chapter 2.62
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Firstly let me recapitulate the conception of subjectivity as simply as possible.   A 63
subjectivity is a human being who is disciplined through social mechanisms to behave 
in a certain way.   The human ‘subject’ is formed and moulded through training and 64
discipline into a particular ‘subjectivity’, and comes to act in accordance with the 
training and discipline he has undergone.   This creation of subjectivity is not one of 65
restricting some innate and boundless freedom of the subject to some determined 
subjectivity.  Rather the discipline is formative, as it endows the human with powers to 
act but only as far as his discipline allows.   In other words the human is programmed 66
much like a machine, and through repetition of training is given his powers of prowess 
and action.  But these powers are exercised only to reproduce the human in that 
subjectivity, that determined mode of acting.  This is how subjectivities restrict the 
possibilities of action, and by implication render action deterministic.  67
Human actors who are constituted by habitual object-relations share many similar 
characteristics with humans as subjectivities.  Habit is also formative of the human 
actor by enabling the consolidation of skills onto the body through repetition of bodily 
motions, which requires expenditure of time in order to construct a body with a 
physical history.  Both subjectivity and habit seem to suggest the creation of a 
particular mode of human who conforms to his training, so is capable only of those 
actions predetermined by his training.  A human subjectivity acts in accordance with 
his disciplining, and a human of habitual actions acts in accordance with his habits.  
Whilst there are similarities in the process of forming subjectivities and habits, 
nevertheless habit as I conceive of it is more malleable and contingent compared with 
subjectivity.  This is due to the greater influence of external conditions and their 
contingent relation to habits.  Habitual action is not solely precipitated by the habit, but 
needs the corresponding external conditions to trigger and serve as the medium for 
 Ibid.63
 The conception of subjectivity I am concerned with is mostly provided by Foucault's theory of the 64
disciplined subject.  Although I would identify many similarities and overlaps with Marxian theories of 
human nature which in general propound an economically conditioned or determined human subject.  I 
have discussed the problem of economic determinism in Marxian theory in chapter 1.  I have also referred 
in passing to Bourdieu's theory of habitus, which I would perceive as falling into the broad tradition of 
Marxian theories, in chapter 5.  
 The reference to discipline is explicitly Foucauldian, however training understood as repetitive action is 65
a common factor in the creation of the subject for both Foucault and other theorists such as Bourdieu and 
Merleau-Ponty.
 That discipline and power are formative of the subject, rather than constraining, is a characteristically 66
Foucauldian claim, see chapter 2.  
 Ibid.67
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action.  A habit without the necessary external conditions to trigger its fulfilment cannot 
manifest in action, whilst the external conditions cannot be apprehended by the human 
actor except through his habits.  So habitual action is a two-way process of 
constructing the external conditions and reacting to them as conditioned by habit.  It is 
a synchronic process of interpellation of the world and of the human actor.  
6.5.1 Interpellation of world and actor
The material world as perceived by the human actor is actually an interpellation 
through accumulation and synthesis of his past experiences into a coherent whole. 
Through episodic exposure to the world as bounded instances of space and situation, 
a picture is gradually built up which forms his vision of the world, which may also be 
called his knowledge, as both are constituted by the entirety of his personal history, 
thereby making them unique to that actor.  That is to say for every human actor their 
interpellation or understanding of the world is different and unique to themselves by 
virtue of their possessing unique personal histories.  In actuality there are areas of 
significant coincidence between these disparate interpellations, since humans who 
necessarily share space and time, and communicate, will have accumulated many 
shared experiences, resulting in similar personal histories.  Nevertheless this does not 
detract from the unique quality of human interpellations of the world, and the nuances 
of difference which are capable of being manifested as significant differences in action.  
A human actor who is conditioned by his habitual object-relations will interpellate his 
present reality in terms of what is familiar to him by habit, and by engaging in these 
habits he is in turn interpellated into an object with a particular modality, or a 
‘subjectivity’ who embodies the norms of his actions.  However this is only a 
momentary process of interpellation and not a fixation.  The interpellation of world and 
subjectivity are entirely dependent on the material objects placed in particular relations 
to each other to constitute the space and situation for action.  For example, the 
material objects of chairs, desks, walls, books must be present in a particular order for 
the human actor to interpellate the context as a classroom, and for him to be 
compelled in his habitual actions which interpellate his subjectivity of student or 
teacher.  
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This dependence on material external objects to condition the possibilities of reality 
and action renders interpellation different from subjectivity in significant ways.  Firstly, 
every context is a unique moment containing a collection of objects, persons, and 
places which are capable of infinite permutations of relations and significations. 
Theoretically any moment may be interpellated into radically different realities, by 
investing objects with radically different meanings, so allowing infinite possibilities of 
action.  In contrast a theory of subjectivity would suggest that action is determined in 
the acting human who acts to reproduce his subjectivity.  The actions appropriate to a 
subjectivity are sufficiently ingrained on the body, such that those actions become 
ways of being in the world which imply a constancy of action in the face of fluctuating 
external conditions.  I concede that subjectivity also requires the necessary conditions 
to trigger the appropriate action, which implies a necessary degree of coordination 
between subjectivity and external factors.   Nevertheless the causative locus of action 68
lies with the human as subjectivity; there is an implied fixity of subjectivity which 
endures almost independently from the mechanisms of discipline.   69
Secondly it is not only the context which is unique, but every human actor is also 
unique in his particular personal history.  This implies that the interpellations of reality 
and the appropriate actions within that reality are unique and personal to that actor, 
and that there are as many interpellations of the world as there are unique human 
beings.  This also means every action undertaken in the world is both non-replicable 
and non-substitutable in its quality and meaning.  Because of the irrevocable 
differences of personal history, the meanings attached to objects and actions cannot 
be identical between human actors.  In actuality there will be significant similarities, 
resulting in shared and communicable significations, however this is merely a 
coincidental rather than a necessary homogeneity.  In contrast subjectivity would 
suggest that disciplinary processes operate to produce a population of humans 
 At least in the early stages of training coordination between body and the inorganic is vital; Michel 68
Foucault, Discipline and Punish : The Birth of the Prison. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979, chapter 5.
 Discipline is not a one-off event, but an ongoing and incessant process transmitted through relations of 69
power, which I would assume requires a level of stability and homogeneity across both context and the 
mechanisms themselves.  For example, Foucault's description of the disciplinary process of the school is 
couched in terms of homogeneous activity, although I would not venture that Foucault imagined such 
processes to be truly homogeneous across all schools.  Nevertheless for a theory of disciplinary 
mechanisms to be viable, there must be considerable constancy and homogeneity throughout the 
disciplinary process, in order to ensure sufficient outputs of subjectivities across time.  If a disciplinary 
mechanism varied day by day, there will be no adequate time for training and memorising the necessary 
bodily actions.  
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characterised by a degree of homogeneity in body and mind, action and thought.  70
Moreover this homogeneity is a necessary characteristic, since subjectivities are 
formed according to the fixed terms of the disciplinary mechanism.  In other words 
there seems to be implied a fundamental core likeness amongst subjectivities which is 
a necessary part of the formative process.71
The combined effect of the uniqueness of context and action results in a state of 
fluctuation and contingency brought into coincidence by habit.  Against the 
theoretically infinite possible combinations of reality and action there is established the 
actuality of enduring constructions of reality and group action bordering on collectivity. 
This is not a result of deliberate efforts to order divergent actions into coordinated 
ones, whether through rational cooperation or through disciplining the body.  Each 
participating human actor is merely acting in response to the world he inhabits 
according to his bodily knowledge, without any regard to any social plan or goal.  The 
significant commonality in actors’ knowledge of the world are a result of coincidental 
similarities in personal histories which occur with a high degree of frequency owing to 
the necessity of humans living in communities to share space and time, so constitute 
their histories from shared experiences and situations.  These shared experiences are 
ingrained in habit, and come to condition the knowledge and action of large 
proportions of human actors in a given community.  
The interpellation of reality is unique to every human actor, so allows for radical 
divergence and constant flux between reality and action.  To be sure, although 
theoretically any given moment is entirely unique both in its material and symbolic 
constitution, in actuality there is significant continuity between past and future, and 
limitations on the feasible possibilities of reality.  The fundamentally contingent and 
fluctuating relation between action and context is tenuously stabilised by the 
mechanism of habit, and a change in either action or context could disrupt the 
 I would refer to Foucault’s theory of the subjectivity of petty criminal class as an extreme example of a 70
class being conditioned through social processes in order to achieve a manipulated homogeneity. 
Foucault propounds that the petty criminal in society is in fact part of a strictly controlled population whose 
members are essentially trained in the ways of criminality, by being passed through the disciplinary 
institutions of police, courts, and prison.  They are kept under constant surveillance.  Foucault presents a 
theory of criminality which subverts more commonplace notions of criminality as aberrance or anomaly; 
instead Foucault asserts that criminality is an actively formed and disciplined class necessary to society.  I 
would read this as Foucault arguing for the necessity of a relatively homogeneous and stable population 
of petty criminals whose actions are disciplined and managed through those mechanisms which produce 
this particular subjectivity.  Foucault n.67 chapter 9. 
 There is absolutely room for variation and divergence, but I would argue that without a core of 71
homogeneity the concept of subjectivity as an enduring way of being would be jeopardised.
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precarious order.  What results is a precarious state wherein each participating human 
actor through the force of his habitual object-relations acts in coincidental conformity 
with others, so contributes to the contingently maintained order of society.
6.5.2 Habit and normative choice
Refocusing the issue on the problem of determinism being antithetical to normative 
action, since habitual action does not impinge choice, normative change through 
habitual action is possible.   Habitual action is not curtailed in its free choice element, 72
but through the conservative and compulsive effects of habit comes to compel the 
human actor to react to his reality rather than actively choosing the terms of his 
construction and engagement with the world.   The possibility of normative choice is 73
opened up by fundamental conflicts of habit. 
A state of stability and coordination of action amongst collections of human actors 
which is not the result of some predetermined disciplinary process or preconceived 
social agreement is relatively more contingent and precarious.  The mechanisms 
which condition this semblance of coordination are bound by contingent rather than 
necessary factors, so a change in those external factors is liable to cause a potentially 
significant and sudden change in action.  This is because habitual actions are always 
changing and adapting with the synthesis of new experiences.  Adaptation of habitual 
action and knowledge comes from the human actor and his ability to interact with his 
surroundings in an intentional fashion, to adapt his behaviour according to the 
demands of the present.   The process is one of interactive influence between 74
external context and action, rather than a one-directional determination by agency. 
Adaptiveness of habit entails not only application of current skill and knowledge, but a 
reconstitution of the actor’s entire habitual body, a process which reoccurs incessantly 
as long as his action persists.   So adaptation already implies normative change, and 75
its organic nature means change may occur without deliberate manipulation. 
 My emphasis on choice has similar resonance with Kant’s theory of the infinitely free will, however my 72
conception of choice differs fundamentally in that I do not envision choice as a disembodied exercise of 
reason.
 Cf. Bourdieu whose theory of habitus is comparatively more deterministic; habitus is determined by the 73
place it occupies in the economic structure.  Bourdieu n.21 pg.184-186.
 Cf. Merleau-Ponty who conceives of habit as intelligence and skill, rather than rigid repetition; n.39 Part 74
I s.3.
 Bourdieu, n.21 pg.138-142.75
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If the potential for change is an indication of the possibility of freedom, habitual action 
allows for many opportunities for change.  This is because whilst habitual actions are 
considerably stable and predictable across time and context, they are also unique in 
the two-fold sense of being constituted by a particular human actor as a unique 
collection of habits, and acting within a particular context constructed by its unique 
objects.  This means two human actors placed in the same context might ascribe very 
different meanings to the objects they confront, hence interpellate two very different 
realities.  This difference is due to the unique personal histories of each actor 
consisting of diverging habitual object-relations in response to those objects, so 
resulting in different ways of acting given the same context.  I would argue that this 
possibility of difference opens the space for change and choice, for when confronted 
with disagreement the necessity for choice and the chance to change habitual action 
arises.  I submit that habitual action can allow for fundamental conflicts, and by 
implication give rise to situations calling for genuine normative choice and resolution.   76
As argued above, normative dilemmas and resolutions are not characterised by 
general ideals being applied to specific situations, but are constituted by the specific 
situations and their significations.  Normative conflicts arise from conflicting 
interpellations of reality and their relevant appropriate actions, and since every 
interpellation is unique to an actor’s personal history, this implies that conflicts are 
symptomatic of different normative realities.  Such a conception of conflict precludes 
any solution which depends on achieving assent on the discursive content of norms, 
whether through discourse, rational argument, or Reason.   This is because the 77
differences originate from the very interpellation of normative reality through unique 
personal histories; they lie at the basic foundations of how reality is constructed in 
normative terms.   This is a fundamentally constitutive level, both of the human actor 78
and the material world they engage in, and change provoked by conflict entails a 
fundamental reconstruction of reality along the lines of those new norms, rather than 
simply a change of ideas in the mind.79
 Fundamental in the sense of occurring at the level of constitution rather than representation. 76
 Cf. Robert Audi, ‘Cognitive Disparities’ in Christensen, Phiroze, and Lackey,  The Epistemology of 77
Disagreement : New Essays, OUP, 2013 on a cognitive approach to defending rationalism.  Cf. Jonathan 
Kvanvig, ‘Perspectivalism and Reflective Ascent’, in ibid. on a different approach to rationalism.
 That there are multiple moral truths is a claim I share with moral relativism; Gilbert Harman, 'Moral 78
relativism explained.’ Problems of Goodness, New Essays in Metaethics, 2012.
 Bourdieu, n.21 pg.169-172.79
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Undeniably, there is also necessarily a change in the mind or ideas of the human actor, 
in the sense of discursively representing the world in a different way.  For example, a 
human actor who has become a vegetarian might change his discursive 
representation of reality to include espousing the benefits of vegetarianism.  However 
this change is both constituted and maintained at the more fundamental level of how 
the human actor constructs his normative reality, specifically how he invokes the 
modalities of animal products which precipitates changes in his reaction to them.  His 
changed material actions manifest a different norm into the world, so constructs a 
material world upon these new norms.  Whilst the human actor may espouse various 
reasons for his changed behaviours, they are of secondary importance compared to 
the direct and material changes to the external conditions caused by his changed 
actions.
Although the way in which normative conflicts are expressed is mostly through 
discursive rationalisation, namely by explicating the signifying chains which form the 
symbolic context for the contentious norms, and attempting to connect the signified 
objects and object-relations into a new normative order.  In actuality normative 
conflicts reflect differences in interpellating reality, and by extension the different 
choices habitually committed to by each human actor, so are genuinely normative in 
the sense of being the results of choice, and genuinely in conflict in the sense of 
arising from a place of irreconcilable difference.  I believe that this image of reality as 
constituted by multiplicities of normative standings maintains the individual humans in 
their uniqueness, and also characterises collective action as bounded multiplicity with 
the constant potential for irruption.  
6.6 Norms and group habits
The above discussion has gradually shifted the focus of analysis from the relation 
between norms, normative action, and habit as perceived from the practical actor’s 
perspective, to emphasise the potency and normative significance of the external 
conditions.  The power of the external conditions in constituting both the interpellation 
of reality and the possible courses of action within that reality means human actors are 
compelled by the forceful presence of material objects in their surroundings to react in 
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particular ways and to construct a reality in accordance with the meanings most 
strongly presented by those objects.     80
The external conditions carry a magnetic normative force which compels human action 
in certain ways.   So far, I have only spoken of reality as being either a normative 81
construction or an interpellation, both terms suggesting a passivity of reality.  Now I will 
emphasise how the external conditions actively condition and compel action according 
to particular terms.  External conditions do not fully constitute human actions, for that 
would suggest determinism, however they do exert a magnetic and potent influence on 
action on a constitutive level.  They do not only present physical obstacles for action, 
but form the conditions of possibility for action and their normative meaning.   These 82
conditions are not normatively neutral, but are structurally biased towards the 
hegemonic normative orders constituted by group habits.   
I have defined group habits as habits which are widely common in constituting the 
personal histories of human actors in a community.  In other words amongst a 
population of human beings those habitual object-relations which each possess in 
common with many others may be regarded as group habits of the population, ossified 
into prevalent social norms and customs.  Group habits are no different from other 
habits in that they must be materially manifested through the objects and object-
relations which constitute them, however they seem to exert a force in shaping the 
normative landscape of reality by virtue of their widespread habituation, so constitute a 
common and enduring interpellation of reality.      83
Whilst theoretically interpellations of reality are unique, in actuality disparate 
interpellations are sufficiently similar so that there appears effectively only one 
dominant interpellation of reality.   I use the term ‘appear’ since the overlaps and 84
similarities between individuals’ habits are not identical in the sense of being replicas 
or having the exact same ternary constitution.  Rather the similarities are sufficiently 
close to engender an appearance of sameness, and this apparently same 
 This compulsion is neither rational persuasion or physical coercion, but a force of habit which 80
magnetises body and world interactions.  See Merleau-Ponty, n.39.
 Akin to Merleau-Ponty’s assertion that the world consists of 'areas of sensitivity’ which corresponds to a 81
human actor’s body; ibid..  However my argument is that instead of the environment responding to the 
actor’s bodily movements, conversely it is the external environment which shapes and moulds the actor’s 
body into particular actions as conditioned by his habitual object-relations.
 Both physical/mechanical and normative/meaningful possibilities.82
 See chapter 5.83
 Akin to Bourdieu’s doxa (presupposed beliefs), and illusio (unreflective adherence); n.21 pg.98-102.84
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identification of reality operates as a presupposition shared by human actors.   In 85
other words, human actors presuppose that they inhabit a reality constituted in 
identical terms, that the objects, object-relations, and signifying chains all have 
effectively the same meaning so as to enable mutual communication and 
understanding.  This also implicates a presupposition of the normative terms 
constitutive of that reality, taken as the unquestioned natural order of reality.   86
This presupposed common identification of reality is not sustained solely through the 
force of each human actor’s own habits, but is reinforced by the material objects in the 
external environment presenting particular modalities.  More specifically the objects 
are presented most forcefully in their group habit modalities due to their constant 
reinforcement by sheer repetition of particular spatial relations of objects, and 
reenactment by situational relations of others’ actions.   In other words as objects are 87
placed in a material space according to the normative terms of group habits, such as 
beds being placed in bedrooms, the sheer frequency of encountering that space 
renders that particular set of modalities increasingly powerful.  In conjunction the 
material effects of others’ actions create a situation which reinforces the normative 
dominance of group habits.  This implies that the presupposed symbolic context is 
structured along those signifieds pertinent to the group habits.  The process of 
naturalisation is likely favourably to bias group habit modalities by strengthening their 
connection to objects and increase the power they exert over action.  Concurrently the 
effect of habit renders group habit object-relations increasingly automatic and 
compulsive in reaction to those objects.  Presupposition is not a theoretical or pre-
material concept; it is grounded in the material body which adopts a habitual and 
compulsive interpellation of reality that appears natural and inevitable owing to the 
quality of habit, a process writ large across the community.  88
The dynamic between the interpellation of reality in accordance with group habits and 
the active production of a material external environment which embody those group 
habits is a cyclical and synchronic feedback loop.  The process continues apace as the 
 I do not mean a theoretical or conceptual presupposition, such as Kant’s a priori categories or Kelsen’s 85
Grundnorm.  This presupposition is material and mundane, and is evidenced variously in the unspoken 
assumptions made in ordinary speech, the use of gestures and expressions in communication, use of 
single word imperatives, etc.  Cf. Bourdieu ibid.; also his ‘structuring structures’ which are socially 
constructed categories of understanding; n.21 pg.172-180.
 Ibid.86
 Akin to Bourdieu’s two-fold inscription of the social in things and bodies, which brings about 87
correspondence between objectified fields and bodies; n.21 pg.150-155, pg.180-182.
 Ibid. pg.172.88
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effects of habit and material reinforcement together drive further entrenchment of 
group habits.  The more the external environment is reproduced by human action to 
embody the norms of group habits, the surer is their continued interpellation of reality. 
For example, if through habitual knowledge and experience I anticipate that engaging 
in a certain action will produce a certain material effect, and find it vindicated at every 
turn, it becomes a self-evident cause and effect relation or even a natural law, and 
difficult to challenge or question the conditions of that action.   89
To take an extended example, the external space consisting of a road and a pavement 
is charged with the norms of traffic rules embodied in the material objects of road, 
pavement, curb, traffic lights.  The situation consisting of cars driving on the road and 
pedestrians walking on the pavement is charged with the norms corresponding to that 
space, as humans actors acting in the appropriate manner embody the rules of traffic. 
The scene may appear to be one of norm determined rule following behaviour by the 
human actors as participants in a shared project of coordinated action.  That is 
because the drivers and pedestrians all act in conformity with the formal rules of traffic, 
their actions are taken as evidence that they are obeying the rules of traffic, so they 
must be determining their actions in accordance with the rules.  In other words the 
formal rules are posited as bringing order and structure to the situation by dictating the 
appropriate norms of action, and causing those actions by exerting influence on the 
will or minds of the human actors.  
It is not norms as rules, but material objects embodying norms which constitute the 
situation in a biased fashion such as to compel action conforming to those norms.  The 
context is set up in such a way that the material objects present particular modalities 
forcefully, so compel human actors to react by engaging in the object-relations they 
have habituated.  Both the modalities and the habitual object-relations likely embody 
the norms of group habits, so result in actions which conform to the norms outwardly, 
but are not caused by the norms in the sense of being norm determined action.  The 
driving mechanism is habit, so implies that those habits which are most ingrained will 
exert a greater influence in conditioning knowledge and action.  If the human actor has 
most often encountered the objects of road and pavement in their modalities as places 
for cars and pedestrians respectively, the force of habit will impress these modalities 
most strongly upon him.  The habitual knowledge of the objects will lead to an almost 
 Bourdieu n.21 pg.191-195; ‘two-fold truth’.89
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automatic recognition of the space in those particular terms, and override alternative 
possible interpellations of that space.  The situation would arguably be different if there 
were no cars on the road late at night, so a pedestrian might feel freely able to jay 
walk.  This is not a case of flouting the rules in the sense of deliberately disobeying 
rules, but rather the absence of the objects of cars change the interpellation of the 
space and situation.  
I would argue that the significance of this biased construction of external conditions 
demonstrates how group habits are maintained through apparently rule-following 
behaviour which are actually habitual behaviours coincidentally conforming to formal 
rules.  Because group habits are so prevalent, they lend themselves to transmission 
through mimesis and instruction.   In turn these habits come to constitute part of that 90
human actor’s knowledge and ways of interaction, so bias his interpellations of reality 
towards those habits and the norms they embody.91
6.6.1 Group habits and normative action
The foregoing may suggest that group habits exert an almost homogenising force on 
action.  Since group habits are able to affect the fundamental constitution of external 
conditions in ways favourable to their perpetuation, there would appear to be no room 
for any other habits or courses of action to intervene, as hegemonic group habits tend 
towards homogeneous self-reproduction and preclude the possibility of change. 
However this is only on the assumption that group habits are successful in maintaining 
action at the unthinking automatic level of repetitive habit, which requires a 
consistently smooth and effortless fulfilment of that habit.  In other words both the 
action and the external conditions must be kept in sufficiently constant correlation so 
as to preclude any external obstacles which might impede the unthinking operation of 
habit.  
In actuality this is unfeasible, since not only is every context unique in its composition 
of material objects and human participants, there are also multiple group habits vying 
for fulfilment.  Moreover the greater the spread of a particular group habit across a 
population, the greater the number of interpellations exist for that habit, since 
 Learning processes often described in theories of socialisation; see chapter 4.90
 Bourdieu n.21 pg.190-195.91
 194
interpellations are conditioned by the unique histories of disparate human actors.  In 
other words as a group habit becomes more prevalent, it also encompasses a greater 
variety of personal histories.  Unique histories entail differences which are nuanced yet 
irrevocable, so cause interpellations of the group habit to become less homogenous 
and stable in its possible meanings.  As long as interpellations of reality remain unique 
this multiplicity exerts a destabilising effect upon group habits by increasing the 
chances of conflict between competing interpellations.  
I would argue that the tendency of group habits towards homogeny and totalisation is 
offset by the destabilising effects of multiplicity and proliferation of discourse. 
Multiplicity and discourse mutually imply the other, since discourse is another term for 
the discursive representation of interpellated reality, and multiplicity denotes the 
innumerable unique interpellations to be so represented.  The pertinent issue is to 
demonstrate how these two forces operate to destabilise group habit and open the 
possible space for normative change.
I have said that as long as all the participant human actors are not impeded in their 
habitual actions, group habits will remain at the level of presupposition.  The human 
actors will act upon the presupposition that they are in agreement in their 
interpellations of reality, so enabling the group habits which structure that reality to 
remain implicit and powerful.  An irruption or change might occur through either a 
change in the external conditions, or the revelation of a conflict between individuals’ 
habits.   Both would cause a sudden disruption in the smooth functioning of habit in 92
the form of an external obstacle.
Regardless of the source of irruption, the effect is to force the group habit into 
conscious deliberation, which is likely to entail a discursive explication of its 
constitutive signifying chains.  The presupposition can no longer remain presupposed, 
but becomes an object for examination and deliberation.   This deliberation is not 93
reasoning or debate between rational agents, but an invested process directed 
 Lindahl details the irruptive force of illegal behaviour which momentarily brings into explicit relief the 92
joint action of legal ordering, so forces the interpretation of that joint action.  Hans Lindahl, Fault Lines of 
Globalization : Legal Order and the Politics of A-legality Oxford Constitutional Theory. 2013, pg.26-30.  
 Ibid.93
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towards the continuation of action.   Since the presupposition which once facilitated 94
smooth habitual action is now rendered asunder, action becomes blocked, so the 
imminent question becomes what course of action to take.  This necessity of choice 
reveals the moment of normative action, of opportunity to choose the next step and the 
necessity of being guided by norms in making that choice.  95
At the individual level such conflict is usually resolved by having regard to other habits 
furnished by experience.  For example, if I find that my preferred drink is not available, 
I might imagine based on my past experience what the second best option is for 
satisfying my thirst in that particular moment, given the entirety of my present state.  Or 
failing that, defer to instruction or advice from others; if I have no experience with 
choosing wine, I might defer to the recommendations of the sommelier, and through 
repeated experience build up a knowledge of wine and my own preferences.  In both 
instances there is a reconfiguration of my body of habit upon synthesising the my 
experiences.  The process at group level is similar, only instead of deliberation there is 
likely to be precipitated a proliferation of discourse, which is the expression of multiple 
interpellations of the situation.  Multiple and competing constructions of the context 
may be advanced as the ‘right’ one, all of which are conditioned by the unique 
personal histories of the human actors involved.  A straightforward example would be a 
situation where each person involved holds a different opinion on the significations and 
the desired outcome.  Situations of normative conflict are the same in quality, despite 
the predominant use of prescriptive language in the giving of normative judgements. 
From the practical perspective, norms are no different from opinions in that both aim to 
influence proceeding action.  
I believe this fundamentally material source of conflict between bodily habit and 
external conditions can explain why social movements are often instigated by human 
actors whose bodies are the sites of conflict.  Bodies of the female, raced, 
transgendered human actors who find their bodily habits impeded by the external 
conditions, unable to fulfil their habitual personal histories, so often at the juncture of 
 This would largely preclude a solution of conciliation, which is where belief in a proposition is 94
suspended when faced with indeterminate epistemic claims; David Christensen, ‘Epistemic Modesty 
Defended 1’, in The Epistemology of Disagreement n.76.  This is because action cannot be suspended in 
entirety, and whenever an actor engages in action there is manifested some normatively important effect, 
which necessarily implicates a committed belief, in spite of the actor reporting skepticism or otherwise.
 Norms are materially constituted as feasible action possibilities.95
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impeded action and choice.   The explicit expressions of these conflicts as moral or 96
political is not a case of discovering a defective application of ideal norms, such as 
equal treatment or human rights.  The conflict comes to light owing to disjunctions 
between habit and their external conditions which can no longer sustain the 
presupposition of the issue as unproblematic, so forces the necessity of choice of 
action and opens up the space for the proliferation of discourse.   The habit which is 97
irrupted no longer obscures the active normative construction of that particular context 
so allows competing interpellations to vie for dominance. 
6.6.2 Materiality of norm conformity
Throughout I have emphasised the primacy of the materiality of reality over its 
discursive aspect.  The foregoing discussion on the destabilising effects of discourse 
does not alter the assertion that human actions are foremost conditioned by the 
material realities they find themselves situated in.  Hitherto I have approached action 
from the constructive aspect, focusing on the human activity of manifesting the norms 
which structure material reality.  There is a danger that focusing solely on the human 
as active being gives the impression that humans through volitional action are capable 
of changing the normative structure of reality.  Whilst in theory I would argue this is 
true, in actuality human actions are constrained by the external conditions which are 
perceived more as externally imposed conditions of necessity as opposed to positively 
constructed conditions of possibility.   98
External conditions both enable and constrain action; they enable those actions which 
correspond to the normative structure of reality, and constrain those which are not in 
conformity with the normative structures.  Rather it would be more accurate to say that 
the field of possible action itself is constrained by the normative structures of the world, 
and actions which lay outside that field are perceived as implausible, unthinkable, 
fantastical.   These external conditions are constituted by habitual actions of all 99
human actors in a community, and mutually reinforce their reproduction.100
 Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks. Pluto Classics. London: Pluto, 1986; Mitchell J. Wood,  'The 96
Gay Male Gaze.' Journal of Gay & Lesbian Social Services 17(2): 43-62.
 Embodied conflict which is tenuously covered over by discourse; see chapter 3.97
 Akin to Bourdieu’s ‘fields’; n.21 pg.98-102.98
 This claim is parallel to Lindahl’s notion of systems of order designating that which is unorderable, 99
therefore outside the field of actions possible to the order; n.91 pg.175-6.
 Bourdieu, n.21 pg.150-155.100
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This grounding in habit and materiality is why discourse is relatively impotent in 
determining action.  By implication norm conforming actions are also not the results of 
discursive reasoning and will, but are reactions towards the objects in the 
environment, compelled by their forceful presence and constrained by external 
conditions to a narrow field of possibility.  Human beings do not act in conformity with 
the prevailing norms and rules of society because they accept or endorse them, and 
consciously orient their actions in line with those norms.  Rather the norms and rules 
constitute the terms of possible material action, and by being embodied in objects they 
are part and parcel of the external conditions. 
For the practical human actor, living means actively engaging with the world in an 
intentional fashion to bring about material effects which are conducive to the 
prolonging of action.  When faced with norms embodied in the external conditions, 
these are perceived as external obstacles which human actors take into account in 
deliberating their actions.  These norms are simply taken as given, as irrevocable 
constraints on action, and deliberation is shifted towards how to act given these 
constraints.   For example, if I wish to drink a soft drink, my actions will be 101
preoccupied with going to a store and purchasing one.  Or if I cannot afford to 
purchase the item, my actions will be preoccupied with deliberating between methods 
of acquisition such as stealing and the chances of detection or punishment.  My 
choices are externally constrained by the normative institutions of law, property, and 
money which I reenact and embody in my actions of either purchasing the item, or 
surreptitiously taking it.  The possibility of simply taking the item boldly and walking out 
without paying, but also without the fear or risk of punishment or any incentive of 
running away is not presented as a plausible course of action.   102
 Ibid. pg.98.101
 Such courses of action are mostly undertaken as explicit demonstrations of protest which seek to 102
subvert directly the norms of action.  Examples include occupying public spaces, sit-ins, rallies, etc. 
However I would take note that demonstrations are usually events which are characterised by both 
symbolic and material isolation, and crowd participation.  Protests are isolated and cut off from everyday 
material and symbolic living, and constrained to its own limited space, both symbolically by labelling it as 
protest and using jargon to convey its messages.  But also materially by cordoning off the protest from 
other public spaces, using uniformed police and other partitioning objects to contain the protest in a 
physical manner.  Similarly the relative ease for a crowd to engage in protest compared to the difficulty 
and rarity of lone protestors would attest to my assertion that the external conditions are very important in 
conditioning the possibilities of action.  It is easier to break free of habitual conformity when crowd action 
no longer reinforces the habitual group habits of conformity.   Cf. Lindahl’s category of the a-legal action, 
of action which calls into question the very boundaries of the legal order; n.91 pg.36-38.
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When anticipating out the possible courses of action, those norms of the situation are 
perceived to be necessary and irrevocable, rather than contingent and particular.  I 
have to pay for the drink, or I have to steal it without being caught, is an accurate 
description of the situation.  It is highly unlikely that in such a situation the norms of 
property and money will be critically examined and their validity reflected upon. 
Indeed I might consciously rebel against the unfairness of capitalism and deny the 
legitimacy of the money institution, however as long as my possible courses of action 
are anticipated to be limited by the constraints of those institutions, my resulting 
actions will necessarily conform to those norms.  The force and solidity of these 
constraints are sustained by the force of habit my habitual reactions towards the 
objects in my immediate surroundings.  
This is how norm conforming behaviour is maintained in the world: by prevalent group 
habits structuring the external conditions in a biased way so as to limit the field of 
possible action.  Moreover norm conforming behaviour is not dependent upon the 
reinforcement of psychological belief or acceptance of those norms, but by presenting 
the material external conditions as the necessary and irrevocable environment which 
the human actor must navigate as best he can in order to achieve his aim.  Where 
discourse exerts a potentially destabilising effect is to reveal the apparently necessary 
normative structures in their contingency and offer up alternative possibilities for 
action.  So rather than being preoccupied with what must be done, action is oriented 
towards what can be done differently.   There is potential for discourse to change the 103
normative terms of the external conditions, but only if discourse is effectively 
materialised by action.  
I have stated that choice is not a matter of thinking or reflecting, but being conscious 
and active in choice at the moment of action.  Similarly society cannot achieve a 
desired state by only proliferating discourse on the relative merits or validity of social 
norms and institutions in hopes of hitting upon the correct answer.  There must be 
effective change in the material external conditions in order to enable different 
possibilities of action, outside of those currently constrained to conform with prevalent 
social norms.   As long as human actors continue to engage in action which 104
 Bourdieu n.21 pg.106-111.103
 This may be likened to Lindahl’s notion of reordering or redrawing the boundaries of a system of order. 104
However I would emphasise that the difference with my claim lies in the primacy of the material, which 
necessitates not only a discursive change in the meanings or significations of the order, but must be 
preceded by a change in the material conditions themselves, such as a different placement of objects.
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conforms to extant institutions they will continue to anticipate their possible actions to 
be constrained by the institutions as a necessary and irrevocable fact to be navigated. 
6.7 Conclusion
I have presented my theory of normative action by combining the ternary framework 
with the mechanism of habit to produce a material and action based account of norms, 
by presenting the relationship between norms and action as spontaneous 
manifestation, rather than cause and effect.  To the objection that habit is antithetical to 
normative action, I have argued that the element of choice between material 
possibilities allows habitual actions to be normatively imputed to the actor, without 
resorting to ideal conceptions of agency and autonomy.  The possibility of radical 
alternatives to the constructions of reality and fields of action maintains the 
contingency which prevents normative action from sinking into fixed and determined 
repetitions.  The stabilising effects of habit maintains the precarious coordination 
between action and context, and explains the considerable hegemony of certain 
normative orders.
The vital claim is that norms are manifested by intentional action, and are effectively 
manifested regardless of the cause of action.  This allows me to equate the normative 
significance of actions explicitly determined by norms with actions which are purely 
coincidentally norm conforming.  This normative equivalence is important in 
anticipation of the proceeding chapter which will focus on legal normativity, for I will be 
arguing that coincidentally law-conforming actions form the bulk of legal normative 
action.  
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7  
Legal Normativity 
I have developed in preceding chapters an account of embodied normative action 
which treads a middle path between theories which depend on ideal Reason, and 
those determined by social and economic forces.  Norm and action occur in unison, in 
a moment of action which manifests particular norms into materiality.  Action is 
conditioned by normatively structured external conditions which are biased towards 
the most habitually prevalent norms in society.   Every instance of action is unique and 
affords infinite possibilities for world building; likewise every context is unique in its 
composition and possibilities for action.  Their fundamentally contingent and unstable 
relationship is brought into coincidence by the force of habit, which drives particular 
patterns of behaviour and constrains the possible interpellations of reality.  These 
repetitive areas of coincidence ossify to become group habits, or prevalent social 
norms and institutions, which cement their hegemony by constructing external 
conditions conducive for their reproduction.  This cyclically reinforcing process is 
primarily driven by habit operating to stabilise and compel activity, all in a non-
teleological and undetermined fashion.
In this chapter I will return to my original aim of constructing a theory of embodied legal 
normativity by exploring how my account of normative action is played out in the 
specific domain of law.  I will argue that legal normativity is manifested through law-
conforming action which is primarily driven by habit rather than determined by legal 
norms.  The prevalence of law-conforming action makes law a group habit, so implies 
the presence of strong and ubiquitous forces in the external environment which 
support and condition legal behaviour.  This conception of legal normativity as legal 
action is thoroughly grounded in materiality, in the corporeal legal actor and the 
external conditions which embody legal norms. 
Pursuant to my in media res approach, I will proceed upon the assumption that law is 
readily present in society as identifiable norms and institutions.  I will constrain my 
enquiry to examining the mechanics of legal action along with the conditions of its 
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possibility and reproduction.  Furthermore I take law to be a social phenomenon which 
has its foundations in the empirical world, and reject any conception of law as an ideal 
a priori category of norms or principles.  I will take the form of law most familiar to 
generic modern liberal societies, epitomised by State law, as my working material.  I 
begin by firstly recasting law using the language of objects, object-relations, and 
signifying chains, so representing law as a haphazard collection of material objects 
and actions as opposed to a system of norms.  I then focus on the element of legal 
action and its two enabling factors of habit and external conditions.  The legal actor is 
advanced as the locus of normativity, and legal action as the materialisation of 
normativity.  Lastly I offer some observations on how the counterintuitive features of 
law might be explained by my account of legal normativity.
7.1 The materiality of law
Re-imagining the materiality of legal normativity necessitates a re-characterisation of 
law as constituted by material legal action as opposed to a system of rules.  This 
entails examining the everyday actions of individual actors which serve as 
manifestations of law as the most basic form of legal action, which in their aggregation 
constitute the entirety of law.   This organic approach eschews conceptions of law as a 1
coherent system of discourse, a collective social practice, or any other suggestion that 
law is somehow an autonomous and self-enclosed phenomenon.  Instead I envision 
law to be a haphazard collection of disparate and coinciding actions which are 
contingently related to a common signifier.
The first step is to re-present law in terms of the ternary, and detail how law is 
embodied in objects, manifested in object-relations, and organised through signifying 
chains into a symbolic context for legal action.  This enables the relationship between 
legal norms and legal action to be reconfigured in accordance with the account 
advanced in the preceding chapter; legal action is that which manifests legal norms 
but not necessarily determined by them, driven by habit and compelled by external 
conditions favourable to their repetition.  The normative force of law is maintained 
through already habitual actions of individuals which coincide to form the group habit 
 My aim is to explore the conditions of legal normativity, however for brevity I will use the terms law and 1
legal to refer to the same notion of law being manifested into materiality; I do not conceive of law as 
separate from legal normativity, but simply another aspect of the same phenomenon.
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of law, then organised under the signifier of law to become legal discourse.  Discourse 
does not form the condition for law’s normative force, and actions which conform to 
and manifest law are not testaments to law’s discursive claims. 
7.1.1 Law as objects
Objects embody various modalities which lie dormant until they are manifested 
through action.  Which particular modality is presented most strongly depends on the 
presence of and relation to other objects in the spatial vicinity which conjures up the 
modality appropriate to that space.  These modalities are how norms become 
embodied in material objects, so when an object presents a particular modality it 
embodies a particular norm and contributes towards a normative construction of the 
world congruent with that modality.  As a particular modality may be congruent with 
many normative orders, an object is capable of embodying multiple norms 
simultaneously.  This also implies conflation and a degree of mutual conformity and 
reinforcement between potentially competing normative orders.          2
Law is embodied in material objects which present a meaning, function, or value which 
is either designated by law, or is in conformity  with the relevant legal designation.  I 3
call these legal modalities simply to denote their law-embodying character.   Formal 4
designation occurs when an object is invested with a modality peculiar to law, such as 
being named by the law explicitly in legislation.   This may entail the object is treated 5
 I use the term normative orders to refer to networks of signifying chains which form sophisticated and 2
coherent discourses, such as law, religion, etc.  However these are not orders in the strict sense of being 
autonomous or distinct from each other, as I perceive them to all be instances of group habits designated 
under varying signifiers.  
 I define conformity as non-conflict rather than compliance.  Non-conflict need not be fundamental or 3
conceptual in the sense of no possibility for conflict; there only needs to be lack of conflict in specific 
actual situations.
 Throughout I will use the term legal in this loose sense to denote being relevant to law in some manner, 4
such as being formally or informally designated, forming part of another normative order which supports 
and reinforces law, enabling legal activity, or simply not posing direct challenges to law’s operation.  As 
such I may refer to certain objects and actions which have no apparent connection to law, but I perceive to 
contribute in some way to law’s sustained manifestation in the world.  This is a necessary part of my 
project to break down the familiar structures of law as statutes, rules, institutions, practices, etc. into the 
most basic unit of human action, and reforming these into a new conception of law.  
 This may be likened to Lindahl’s formulation of a collectivity disclosing something as something, which is 5
similar to my conception of investing an object with a modality, so treating it as something.  This is 
particularly so from the perspective of the legal discourse, or Lindahl’s legal collectivity, however the 
difference lies in my conception of modalities is context dependent rather than discourse dependent. The 
modality exhibited by an object, so the modality it embodies into materiality, is conditioned by the 
presence of other objects and their spatial relations which constitutes the material context, and invokes a 
particular symbolic context. Hans Lindahl, Fault Lines of Globalization; Legal order and the politics of a-
legality, OUP, 2013, chapter 4.
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or used in a different way, such as banknotes being used as legal tender, a function 
which is made possible solely by formal legal criteria being met.   More often the 6
object will continue to be used in already established ways, but simply formally 
integrated into law, such as foodstuffs continuing to be treated by law as consumables 
when legislating on food safety regulations.  Most of these ready established legal 
modalities are designated informally, by being implicated in a presupposed fashion;  7
law for the most part takes as given the common and mundane modalities of objects 
found in the world, and occasionally would designate them with a modality peculiar to 
law.  Thus law is embodied in objects presenting a modality which is either formally 
designated as peculiar to law, or more often informally and implicitly reiterated by law 
in a mode it already possesses.
Since law is a group phenomenon, it follows that law must designate certain group 
objects which it controls for its members.  To take the example of the archetypal State 
law, a legal State entity cannot arguably be maintained without the bodies of its 
members designated as citizens under criteria peculiar to that State.   By implication it 8
also needs a territory whose boundaries and access are formally designated.   Not 9
strictly necessary but often present would be formal designations of objects located 
inside the territory, the most ubiquitous modality being private property.   Significantly 10
this designating of group objects also creates obligations amongst group members; as 
the most ubiquitous legal modality is private property, it follows that the most common 
and basic obligation between human actors as members of the group is mutual 
respect for others’ property in the form of material commodities and bodily integrity.  11
 Foreign and counterfeit banknotes not meeting criteria peculiar to a legal system demonstrates how a 6
familiar object may lack a familiar modality.
 The most ubiquitous modality is objects as property; this is the default setting for law, in conformity with 7
other normative orders such as economy and general society.
 Rules of citizenship, passports and identifications, etc.8
 Whether this must be physical territory is now a disputed issue in legal theory.  I would argue that some 9
form of material embodiment is necessary, such as a domain name for virtual territory; the issue is more 
about actual control than physical borders. 
 With the spread of capitalism physical boundaries no longer present much obstacle to the movement 10
and subsumption by capital of bodies and spaces; see Hardt & Negri, Empire. Cambridge, Mass. ; 
London: Harvard University Press, 2001, Part 3.6.
 I clarify that the legal group envisioned here is not any robustly or explicitly delineated collectivity, such 11
as Lindahl’s notion of the legal collectivity.  Rather it is a more haphazard community which is maintained 
mostly by the necessity of sharing space and resources.
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7.1.2 Law as object-relations
Whilst objects are capable of embodying the law by presenting their law-conforming 
modalities, it is the human action reacting to the object in a manner relevant to law 
which manifests it into material reality.  Those object-relations which are capable of 
manifesting law constitute legal action, and the totality of such object-relations together 
constitute the entire body of human activities of creating and maintaining law.  Legal 
action is therefore not an effect of a causative deliberation determined by legal norms, 
nor is it evidence of the efficacy or validity of law’s normative force, but is the very 
manifestation of law through material action.  
Object-relations are capable of manifesting law when they are instituted by law so that 
their enactment constitutes a legal norm, or they are instituted through other means 
and their enactment conforms to, and does not conflict with actions prescribed by law. 
Any action which conforms to legal norms either by direction and compliance, or by 
coincidence and non-conflict, counts as legal action.  Legal action is not restricted to 
those explicitly determined by legal norms, but includes actions which are simply law-
conforming in that the norms they reenact do not pose direct challenges to law.  I 
believe that whilst object-relations formally instituted as legal norms may appear to be 
the archetype, the maintenance of legal normativity through continued reproduction 
and reenactment of law depends mostly on informally instituted and coincidentally 
conforming actions.   
A legal norm can be seen as an object-relation that is formally instituted by law as 
peculiar to it.  The object-relation denotes action which is appropriate to law as legality, 
and simultaneously denotes its negative as illegality.  In this way both legality and 
illegality are manifestations of the same legal norm, as they are simply the same 
object-relation expressed in positive and negative terms.   This means actions which 12
transgress the law are equally instances of legal action; they do not undermine law, 
but reinforce a material reality which preserves the integrity of law.   13
 Cf. Lindahl n.5 pg.138-140.12
 Here I differ in my conception of illegal behaviour by positing them as instances of positive 13
manifestation of law, from Lindahl who sees illegality as a moment of irruption which is smoothed over by 
subsequent reaffirmation of the legal order through legal action, such as arrest; Lindahl, ibid.. There is no 
sharp distinction between actions which undermine or reinforce law, since actions are unique and defy 
neat normative categorisation.  I am only highlighting illegality as another mode of law’s manifestation.
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Legal actions which are not instituted by legal norms occur through human actors 
engaging in their habitual and familiar actions which coincidentally conform to law; 
these actions manifest law in conjunction with any other norms they are compatible 
with.  The most common example would be interacting with objects in their modality of 
property, such as not appropriating or destroying objects, monopolising objects, and 
engaging in exchange.  These various object-relations are all in conformity with the law 
in relation to property ownership, contract, and theft, in conjunction with other 
prevalent norms of the market economy, money institution, and private property. 
Actions manifest multiple norms simultaneously, so human actors can actively 
manifest law through their actions without necessarily having any knowledge of their 
doing so.   14
By engaging in legal action, the group entity of law is materialised and maintained. 
For State law this entity would primarily consist of the group legally designated through 
its legal activities, such as producing and enforcing domestic legislation, entering 
international treaties as a sovereign State, not submitting or recognising foreign laws 
in its territory.   More specifically formal legal institutions such as court systems, and 15
legal practices such as contracts, which may be viewed as unit entities of law, are 
similarly manifested by the legal activities of individual actors.16
7.1.3 Law as signifying chains
Finally, these legal objects and object-relations are connected together through 
signifying chains to form the discursive order of law as a coherent collection of formal 
rules and institutions, of statutes, courts, legislatures and such organised into an 
autonomous and enclosed system.  An archetype of a formal legal signifying chain 
would be a written statute, which designates the relevant legal objects, institutes the 
appropriate legal object-relations, and connects them in a coherent and discrete piece 
of symbolic legislation.  Going a step beyond, areas of law are compartmentalised into 
distinct specialisms such as contract and employment, and are all constituted by their 
 This is similar to Lindahl’s argument that the legal collectivity is maintained through the actions of its 14
individual participants acting in line with the collective legal ordering, irrespective of their consciousness or 
awareness of their doing so; n.5 pg.86-88.
 Actions all undertaken by members of the group; group entities are maintained by members behaving 15
‘as if’ the group exists; see chapter 4.
 Mundane actions such as appearing in court and standing in the dock; paying money in exchange for 16
goods; being arrested and incarcerated. The wilful voluntariness or motivation of these actions are 
irrelevant, what matters is their material and public effects; see chapter 6.
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respective networks of signifying chains which group together objects under their 
peculiar significations.  The proliferation of these signifying chains continues and 
expands into discourses which attempt to encompass all of law, in other words legal 
theory. 
Signifying chains transmit meaning, but they cannot sustain those networks of 
meaning without the necessary material support of objects and object-relations.  This 
means that whilst a statute might be the formal representation of a legal signifying 
chain, it is more accurately viewed as an object of written document, created by the 
object-relations of enactment by legislature, and maintained in its materiality by being 
actually enforced or kept in the statute books.   This also applies to legal practices 17
and institutions, which may not have their norms enshrined on paper, but are 
manifested through conventional and customary actions.   Furthermore these material 18
embodiments of law are not driven or determined by legal discourse, but are merely 
given discursive coherence ex post facto under a common legal signifier.
I believe that this fundamental materiality of law highlights the inadequacy of 
understanding law as a coherent system or discourse.  The networks of signifying 
chains which constitute legal discourse give apparent coherence to a collection of 
disparate activities by designating them under the common referent of law, hence 
giving the impression that these activities are object-relations instituted from a 
centralised source of authority.  In actuality law is a haphazard collection of objects 
and object-relations, some of which are peculiar to law, most of which are already 
established as commonplace actions not in conflict with or implicitly integrated into law 
by being reiterated under a legal signification.  The constitutive material elements of 
law are mutually non-coherent; law is fundamentally a haphazard collection of objects 
and actions.
7.1.4 Legal contexts
Having re-characterised law in terms of the ternary of legal objects, object-relations, 
and signifying chains, these may now be combined to form a dynamic picture of how 
 I realise I am presupposing normative constructs such as enactment which contains its own discourse; 17
the point is that all such legal phenomena is constituted by the same fundamental actions of law building.
 The relationship between normativity and efficacy is they are different aspects of the same legal action, 18
where efficacy denotes the material effects of the action, and normativity denotes the normative relations 
manifested and reinforced by the action.  
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law is manifested through the interaction between action and its context.  Although it is 
the action which manifests law, the possibility and potentiality of that action must be 
embedded in the material context.  Moreover legal action must be strongly and 
consistently compelled by the context in order to maintain the hegemony of law.  19
This means that the objects which constitute the physical surroundings present their 
legal modalities most strongly to compel the enactment of their legal object-relations, 
thereby manifesting the norms of law into being.  
I call these legal contexts, comprised of spaces and situations constructed along 
objects’ legal modalities.  Legal contexts are not exclusively constructed along legal 
modalities, but may simultaneously present other modalities not in conflict with law.  20
The important characteristic of legal contexts is not that a space or situation can be 
represented by legal discourse, but that the norms of action which are compelled by 
the forceful presence of objects are biased towards manifesting law, either because 
they are peculiarly legal norms, or they are norms which conform to law.21
Legal space is formed by material objects placed in particular spatial relations to 
invoke most forcefully their legal modalities, thereby create a space which compels 
legal action.  For example, a shop is a legal space with the objects on display 
presenting their modality as goods for purchase, the shop walls and doors as the 
boundaries of private property, and the counter as the proper area to engage in the 
contract for sale.   This is not a matter of simply representing the material space in 22
legal terms, conversely it is the relative spatial positions of the objects which first 
 Used in Gramsci’s definition of dominant ideology, which I argue law currently holds.19
 Lindahl terms this coexistence of norms ‘compossibility’, a notion which is similar to my notions of 20
conformity and non-conflict, in that the coexisting norms must not be mutually exclusive; n.5 chapter 5.
 There is rich literature on the topic of how spaces condition actions and experiences, and how law 21
intersects to shape both.  Mario Berti, 'Handcuffed Access: Homelessness and the Justice System.' Urban 
Geography 31(6): 825-41 for a study of the relationship between public places, legal regulation, and the 
homeless.  Moore, Freeman, & Krawczyk, ‘Spatio-therapeutics: Drug treatment courts and urban space’, 
Social and Legal Studies 20: 157–172.  D. Moran, ‘Carceral geographies and the spatialities of prison 
visiting: Visitation, recidivism and hyperincarceration’, Environment and Planning D 31:  174–190.  M. 
Benson, ‘Mining sacred space: Law’s enactment of competing ontologies in the American West’, 
Environment and Planning A 44:  1443–1458.  J. Gillespie, ‘  A Legal Geography of Property, Tenure, 
Exclusion, and Rights in Cambodia: Exposing an Incongruous Property Narrative for Non-Western 
Settings’, Geographical Research, 54: 256–266. 
 Lindahl gives a similar example of the space of a shop, and how one proceeds by the proper means to 22
purchase goods in an unquestioned matter of fact fashion.  Lindahl n.5 pg.134-5.  It is important that the 
legality in both Lindahl’s and my own examples is maintained through the unquestioning action of the 
individual participants who need not be explicitly aware they are engaging in legal behaviour.  However 
whilst Lindahl emphasises the collective ‘we’ element in participation, I differ in that I do not envisage the 
human actors to be participating in a collective, but rather merely acting from their own habitual 
experience.
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conjure up a reality which is amenable to legal construction.  It is the orderly 
placement of objects on shelves with labels indicating a price which invokes those 
objects’ relevant legal modalities, and these in turn compels their relevant legal object-
relations.  In contrast, if those same objects were strewn on the ground, or the 
windows of the shop were smashed, they would likely not invoke their legal modalities, 
and a legal space would not be constructed.   The norms of law are imbued into the 23
surroundings without fully determining the significations of that space, as it is not a 
space which is discursively delineated in legal terms, but in the process of constituting 
space law is invoked organically by the material objects embodying legal norms. 
Similarly the legal situation is constructed by human actors engaging in legal object-
relations.  A shop situation is constructed by other actors behaving as customers, such 
as choosing goods and paying for them, and refraining from shoplifting or disruptive 
behaviour.  The placement and movement of these objects and bodies enable the 
human actor to read the situation, so respond and react in a manner appropriate to 
that situation; in this case acting in conformity with law.   Again this acting in 24
conformity with law is not a matter of consciously complying with legal norms, but 
engaging in those object-relations most strongly compelled by the situation, which are 
also coincidentally legal.  
Context as legal space and situation gives law a materiality which influences action in 
a direct bodily manner.  Legal space directs our physical movements by constructing 
particular pathways which strongly compel us to place ourselves in certain spatial 
positions.  Similarly legal situation constructs a particular relational dynamic which 
compels us to move our bodies in particular ways of relation to others’, as informed by 
our bodily knowledge.  These material prompts are presented by objects strongly 
invoked in their legal modalities, and encountering these objects we are compelled to 
respond in the appropriate legal action.
 A reference to the ‘broken window theory’, now largely disproved, but remains an influential theoretical 23
idea; see Johansen, Neal, and Gasteyer. 'The View from a Broken Window: How Residents Make Sense 
of Neighbourhood Disorder in Flint.' Urban Studies 52(16): 3054-069.  Cf. J. Fulda, ‘The ‘Broken Windows’ 
Theory and the New York Experience Reconsidered’, Economic Affairs 30(1): 101-02.
 Kotabe, Kardan, & Berman, 'The Order of Disorder: Deconstructing Visual Disorder and Its Effect on 24
Rule-Breaking.' Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 2016.
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7.1.5 Legal action
I have already defined legal action to be any action which conforms to law; I now 
discuss how legal  norms and action interrelate in further detail.  Conscious knowledge 
of law is not a necessary condition of legal action; whilst any context can be recast in 
terms of its legal signification, the human actors interpellating and creating that context 
need not have any knowledge of formal legal norms to reproduce a reality which 
manifests those norms.   25
The materiality of law means legal norms compel action at the bodily level, and it is the 
bodily action itself which manifests the legal norm by reenacting it into material 
existence.  This unity of norm and action means action need not be determined or 
guided by norm; action need only pose no direct challenge or conflict to norm, in the 
sense of manifesting another norm which is not compatible with law.  A human actor 
who refrains from causing bodily harm to others may be determined by any number of 
factors, such as timidity or physical frailty, however this does not detract from the 
material effects of his actions, among which is the manifestation of law.  In refraining 
from causing bodily harm, the human actor is actively constructing a material reality 
wherein humans do not physically harm each other, and reinforcing others’ actions of 
doing the same.  Collectively these human actors will have constructed a reality which 
appears to be determined by law through their contingent yet mutually conforming 
actions.  Hence the significance of action lies in its outward material effects, and not in 
its ultimate cause, and action which conforms to legal norms is capable of manifesting 
those norms without being ultimately determined by them. 
As the human actor engages in legal action, he is interpellated into a legal subject,  26
and becomes the locus of legal normativity as he manifests law through his actions. 
This process of interpellation is converse to the theories of subjectivity which suggest 
the creation of a subject through the mechanisms of legal discipline.  The legal subject 
 Contemporary jurisprudence generally operates with a concept of legal action as action guided by legal 25
norms, whether as reason for action or constraint upon action. See chapter 1.
 My conception of legal subject is not active legal agency or subjection to law, but rather the embodiment 26
of law in the actor.  It may be more accurate to view the actor as an object of law, a material unit which 
constitutes law’s existence, however I refrain from using the term object in order to maintain a distinction 
between the human actor and true legal objects which are those objects possessing legal modalities. 
Whilst the human actor can be said to also embody law, the element of action is the crucial medium 
through which modalities and noms are materialised, and the human actor as the locus of action is 
therefore not an object in the strict sense.   
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is simply a member of the legal entity, and a member’s fundamental function is to 
reproduce the group entity, including his own self as member.  A coincidentally law-
conforming action is sufficient to interpellate the actor into a legal subject irrespective 
of his conscious knowledge of law; he becomes a vehicle or conduit for law without 
necessarily becoming subjected to law in the sense of either being persuaded of its 
validity or disciplined to its standards.  It is not a matter of creating a subjectivity whose 
thoughts and actions are conditioned by particular mechanisms, but rather the outward 
conformity of action and norm which is important for manifesting legal norms into 
materiality.  
7.2 Maintaining the law
I now examine how law is maintained in its guise as hegemonic social practices and 
institutions, by detailing how legal actions are persistently reproduced on a widespread 
scale.  I believe this is made possible by the dual operations of habit upon legal 
actions, and structuring the external conditions to facilitate their fulfilment, thereby 
increasing the likelihood of their repetition.  Both habit and external conditions are 
likely integral to other normative orders which conform to or actively reinforce law, so 
are legal but not determined by law.  The result is a group of individual human actors 
each possessing habits which are coincidentally legal, together manifest an apparently 
homogenous order of law.  What draws these contingent actors and actions together is 
the external environment structured in terms conducive to the reproduction of legal 
action.  
7.2.1 Habitual legal action
Legal action need only conform to law without being determined by it, so habitual legal 
action is habitual action which conforms in some manner to legal norms without being 
determined by them.  I do not pose the more stringent requirement that action 
conforms fully to that determined by legal norms, since conformity with law is 
coincidental and contingent, therefore highly unlikely to replicate action which is 
explicitly norm determined.  This means habits which are not necessarily cultivated 
through instruction by legal norms are still capable of manifesting the materiality of law. 
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An habitual action is characterised by its ease and reduced cognitive effort which is a 
result of repetition grafting the action onto the bodily hexis.   Habitual action is 27
precipitated when the necessary external conditions and triggers for action are in place 
to facilitate its fulfilment.   In order for an action to become habitual, there must be 28
some time invested to allow repetition to graft the action onto the body, and for 
experiences of the various contexts which calls forth the action to accumulate into 
knowledge.  The two processes occur concurrently to construct a human actor with a 
habitual action which is both robust in its repetition, but also capable of adapting to 
changing contexts.
Given that the formal norms of law are largely peculiar to its legal system, are often 
centrally instituted, and are largely internally coherent, it might be concluded that that 
only explicit instruction and training as informed by the proper legal norms may result 
in habits which are properly legal.   However I would argue that for most of the 29
population habituation in legal behaviour is mostly achieved through general 
socialisation, without much explicit input from formal legal norms.  Most human actors 
in their everyday actions engage in legal behaviour as a result of their habits cultivated 
through processes such as education and upbringing.   This contingency between 30
habit and legal action is stabilised by the external environment which typically 
comprises of legal contexts conducive to the fulfilment of habitual legal action.  The 
haphazard actions of individuals are entrenched through habit, and brought into 
coincidence by the environment to maintain a precarious legal order.   
A human actor’s cultivation of habits begins from the very moment of first action, and 
through accumulation and synthesis of experience forms a body of habit and 
knowledge.   One of the first experience a human actor becomes familiar with is the 31
 Pierre Bourdieu, Pascalian Meditations, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2000, pg.138-140.27
 Ibid. pg.168-9.28
 For example, gaining the necessary skills of being Roman Catholic would require being instructed and 29
disciplined by the proper doctrines.
 I use the term socialisation loosely to denote the process of growth and development undergone by a 30
human being in a social or communal context.  I do not subscribe to any particular methodological or 
theoretical school in social psychology, and the intricacies of the comparative influences of environment 
and genetics are not pertinent to my thesis.  However I must acknowledge that environmental factors play 
a significant role in the establishment of a human being’s personal history, since my aim is to construct a 
materialist theory of normative action and to reject ideal conceptions of action.  I do not anticipate that not 
committing to the further claim that environmental factors are the sole determinants of personality or 
psychology, so allowing for some influence from genetic or other factors poses a great challenge to my 
central thesis.  For more detailed discussion on various approaches in psychology, see Hart & Smith, 
Blackwell Handbook of Childhood Social Development Part II, Oxford ; Malden, MA : Blackwell 2002.
 For a concise overview of the concept of socialisation see Frances Waksler, Studying The Social 31
Worlds Of Children, Routledge, 2003, chapters 1 & 2.  
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difference between their own body and the bodies of others, and by extension the 
appropriate ways of interacting through their bodies.   Habits of physical interaction 32
with others are deeply complex and highly nuanced, however it might be safe to 
assume that restraint from using force, keeping a certain distance, refraining from 
excessive contact are habitual responses to other’s bodies which are relatively 
common.  When human actors habitually approach each other’s bodies in ways which 
generally exclude the use of excessive force, inappropriate contact, and repelled 
interaction,  I would argue that these actions conform broadly to legal norms relating to 
harm to persons, such as the criminal laws of assault, rape, and bodily harm.  These 
actors are effectively engaging in legal behaviour, likely without input from relevant 
formal legal norms.  Moreover these habits are likely already to have been formed in 
the contexts of family and school, before the human actor becomes aware of any 
notion of law or legality.   33
Habits of interaction with material objects follow a similar course, and culminate in the 
common habitual response toward material objects as property.  This comprises of 
habits of monopolisation, manifested in actions such as writing names on possessions, 
and habits of acquisition, such as borrowing and exchanging things.  Through 
repeatedly interacting with objects as property the human actor forms a complex and 
nuanced set of habits which broadly conform to the legal norms such as theft, private 
property, and contract.   His previously cultivated habits present fertile conditions for 34
increasingly sophisticated legal actions such as deliberating economic choices, buying 
and purchasing assets, selecting the objects to surround himself.   35
I raise these instances as examples because I believe that for the largest part of the 
population their initial and ongoing contact with law comprises mostly of these actions 
relating to persons and property.  This also implies that these behaviours form a large 
 Jacques Lacan, and Alan Sheridan, Écrits : A Selection. London: Tavistock Publications, 1977, chapter 32
1; on the mirror stage.
 For a concise overview of the role of parenting in the development of prosocial behaviours in children, 33
see Laura Padilla-Walker, ‘Parental Socialization of Prosocial Behaviour’ in Padilla-Walker and Carlo (eds) 
Prosocial Development: a multidimensional approach, OUP, 2014.
 Research in children’s understanding of property indicate that concepts of ownership begin to form as 34
early as age 2, often exhibiting a bias towards first person possessor in establishing ownership.  See 
variously Blake & Harris, ‘Children’s understanding of ownership transfers’ Cognitive Development, 24 (2) 
133–145; L.E. Fasig, ‘Toddlers’ understanding of ownership: Implications for self-concept development’ 
Social Development, 9(3): 370–382; Neary, Friedman, & Burnstein, ‘Preschoolers infer ownership from 
'control of permission'’ Developmental Psychology, 45(3) :873–876; Rossano, Rakoczy & Tomasello. 
'Young Children’s Understanding of Violations of Property Rights.' Cognition 121(2) :219-27.
 Bourdieu, n.25 pg.172-180.35
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proportion of all legal action, hence are the foundations for maintaining law’s normative 
force.  Whenever we refrain from using others’ bodies with excessive force, or pay for 
goods, or refrain from entering gated areas, we are manifesting normative orders, 
including law, into materiality.   It is likely that law is not the uppermost concern in our 36
minds when engaging in these actions.   Their habitual nature would suggest that we 37
engage in these actions without much cognitive deliberation at all, however collectively 
these semi-automatic habitual actions constitute the foundation of a legal society.  This 
is not to say there are no instances of law breaking such as theft, bodily harm, or 
trespass, or that human actors who engage in such actions are somehow less 
habituated or more cognitively deliberate in their actions.   Nevertheless it is fair to 38
say most behaviours relating to the habitual treatment of others’ bodies and material 
objects conform to the relevant legal norms, and serious deviations from these norms 
are rare.   
7.2.2 Assimilating legal norms
I have argued that the large proportion of what constitutes legal behaviour is 
habituated through other non-legal norms, cultivated through the general process of 
socialisation.  This means that a human actor builds up bodily knowledge which 
enables him to adequately participate in a legal community even before his first explicit 
encounter with formal law.   Whilst theoretically it is possible to progress through life 39
without encountering or engaging with law, the ubiquity of law permeating and 
determining fields of action renders this highly improbable.  Since the human actor is 
likely to possess an already established body of habits before his initial encounter with 
law, what occurs is an assimilation of law into existing habits, possible changes in 
existing habits which are in conflict with legal norms, and possible introduction of new 
habits determined by legal norms.  The assimilation of law onto a human actor’s body 
renders quite a significant change in his discursive significations of action and context, 
so how he discursively represents the world and his actions within it.    
 This is similar to Lindahl’s notion of disclosing something as something anew, which I understand as a 36
reinforcing of a certain ordering of oughts; n.5 chapter 4.4.
 Ibid.37
 Law breaking behaviour may be equally habitual, and still reenact the law by being performed in a 38
surreptitious or guilty way.
 Bourdieu, n.25 pg.184-186.39
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To assimilate the law into habit means to become aware of the peculiarly legal 
modalities of already familiar objects, appreciating the legal significations of already 
established habitual object-relations, and connecting these into new networks of 
significations peculiar to law.  For example, the existing habit of exchanging banknotes 
for goods might take on the additional layer of legal signification by introducing the 
formal legal modalities of objects as merchandise, and the act of paying as purchasing 
or contracting.   This additional facet of formal law, or legality to objects and object-40
relations is not limited to a new interpretation of past actions, but constitutes a 
fundamental change in habit which affects the virtual construction of possible future 
actions.  It is as if the human actor has attained law as a concept through which to 
analyse and reintegrate his actions and environment into a new network of 
significations.   Although this may entail a broadening into new possible fields of 41
action, it also implies a narrowing of action along the fault lines determined by law.  42
The practical human actor encounters the world through activity, and knowledge is in 
the service of action rather than passive reflection.  For example, a human actor is 
able to navigate the context of a shop using his habitual bodily knowledge of selecting 
and purchasing items; he might organise these practical options under moral signifiers 
such as right and wrong, notions which are likely instructed and habituated through 
upbringing and socialisation.   Assimilating law into this context entails the 43
introduction of legal signifiers, most pertinently the notions of criminality and legal 
punishment.  The knowledge that it is wrong to steal now gains an additional meaning 
of criminality; that stealing is not only wrong in a generic sense, but also wrong in its 
criminal or illegal aspect.  Similarly the threat of punishment which was likely limited to 
admonitions from parental or teacher authorities now encompasses the policeman as 
 There are suggestions that understandings of law and legal concepts are not developed until age 10, 40
and most knowledge acquired in early stages are derived from second hand sources, such as television 
and parents.  Blackwell Handbook n.28 chapter 24.
 Like a change in the ‘structuring structures’, Bourdieu n.25 pg.172-180.This is not an ideal type concept 41
which is prior to legal action or experience, but simply another meaning or aspect added to existing 
knowledge, or perceiving action in an additional way.
 In the sense that what could have been possible ways of interacting with objects is now closed off.  This 42
is akin to what Lindahl describes as relegating to the unorderable; n.5 pg.175-6.
 Kohlberg has argued that the categories through which humans understand morality is separable into 43
distinct stages which begin from obedience to authority and fear of punishment, progressing to 
appreciation of universality and morality.  Lawrence Kohlberg, The Philosophy of Moral Development : 
Moral Stages and the Idea of Justice. 1st ed. San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1981.  It is interesting to 
show that changes in the terms used by humans to describe a situation, which I would liken to changes in 
the signifying chains used to construct a context, is a fundamentally qualitative change in ways of thinking. 
However I do not agree that changes in understanding occur in a determined hierarchy of stages.  
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a figure of coercive authority capable of meting out punishment in the form of arrest 
and incarceration.   44
These newly assimilated legal significations of objects and object-relations may initially 
be confused and vague, however it is likely that a working knowledge of law is quickly 
albeit haphazardly accumulated through repeated exposures to law.  The relative ease 
with which law insinuates and latches onto established habits is owing to the high 
degree of conformity between law and those already established common social 
behaviours.  The human actor is essentially primed for legal action, and increasing 
habituation to these new legal significations refines the discriminations between future 
actions and their discursive meanings.  For example the habit of not unilaterally 
monopolising objects is refined by the additional legal significations of private property, 
criminality, and punishment, which increasingly entrench the objects as private 
property axiom, and foreclose other possible ways of interacting with objects.    
7.2.3 Cultivating peculiarly legal habits
The above discussed the assimilation of law onto established habits and how the 
addition of legal significations precipitates an almost wholesale reintegration of a 
human actor’s body of knowledge.  I now address those habits which are more likely to 
be cultivated primarily in their legal signification and are peculiar to law.  Norms 
peculiar to law are not somehow distinct or separate from other norms of social 
interaction with which they may overlap, they simply have the addition of being 
instituted by law.  The foremost examples of mundane legal norms would be traffic 
laws, and matters of bureaucracy, such as paying taxes, maintaining personal 
identification, and registrations.  It is not necessary that the human actor undergoing 
habituation in these actions is explicitly aware of their formal legal status or accept 
their normative validity, as long as he takes them as guides to action  and cultivates 45
habits accordingly.   
 Ibid.  I emphasise the police instead of the State as authority due to the former’s more material 44
presence and visibility, as opposed to the more disembodied and abstract character of the latter.  Material 
presence exerts greater influence on reinforcing habitual actions and structuring the external environment. 
Furthermore involvements with police plays a significant role in legal socialisation; Fagan & Tyler, 'Legal 
Socialization of Children and Adolescents.' Social Justice Research 18(3): 217-242.
 In the practical sense of presenting material possibilities for action; see chapter 6.45
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For the majority of the population, their peculiarly legal habits and knowledge are likely 
to be limited to those which enable and facilitate their everyday living, such as 
complying with traffic laws, purchasing goods, and paying taxes.  For those whose 
professions necessitate the assimilation of formal legal knowledge, the participants 
likely embody this knowledge into their workplace habits.  Or those human actors who 
have regular contact with police may develop habitual behaviours deeply 
interconnected with the legal system, such as extensive experience of the criminal 
justice system through repeated experiences of being stopped and searched, arrested, 
indicted, and so on.   46
I would argue that recidivism offers a strong challenge to a common assumption in 
jurisprudence that knowledge of law should form a condition of its normative force. 
Repeat offenders are arguably not ignorant of the law, and are likely more familiar with 
legal rules and proceedings compared to individuals who have not been exposed to 
the same experiences.   This indicates the significance of legal contexts in compelling 47
legal behaviour, and the corresponding ease of criminality in situations lacking the 
necessary material possibilities for legality.   For most of the population, their contact 48
with formal law is limited to that which sufficiently enables them to continue their 
everyday living. These legal activities inordinately comprise of non-violent physical 
interaction with others, and refraining from misappropriating property, two activities 
which have their habitual foundations in non-legal normative socialisation.
 Foucault has defined such cases as forming a criminal class with which the police is intimately involved 46
in actively managing their criminal activity, by cycling the population through the various mechanisms of 
surveillance and incarceration.  Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish : The Birth of the Prison, 
Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1979.  Research in legal socialisation also indicate that for youth offenders, 
negative involvements with police and courts are predictors of reduction of perceived legitimacy of law 
and legal authority, which is negatively correlated with compliance;  Fagan & Tyler n.44.  Furthermore the 
use of police stop and search powers are exercised with disproportionate frequency against certain 
demographics, notably black people; Bowling & Phillips, ‘Disproportionate and discriminatory: Reviewing 
the evidence on police stop and search’, The Modern Law Review 70(6): 936–961.  I would argue that the 
combination of these factors suggest greater involvement with agents of the law both increases 
knowledge and experience of legal norms, but also likely decreases acceptance of their normative validity.
 There is rich research into recidivism and the factors which cause criminal behaviour, which is not 47
directly relevant here.  For a sample, see Chan, Lo, & Zhong, ‘Identifying the Self-Anticipated Reoffending 
Risk Factors of Incarcerated Male Repeat Offenders in Hong Kong.’ The Prison Journal 96(5): 731-51.
 Ibid.48
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7.3 Lawful environment
It might be opposed that my claim of legal action as habit is undermined by the 
presence of illegal behaviour, and the fact that human actors do take the law into 
account when deliberating their decisions.  To the first objection I have remarked that 
illegal behaviour is equally capable of manifesting the norms of law, so do not pose a 
problem by their actual presence.  The second I understand as an objection that rigid 
habitual action approximates determinism, for it leaves action with no freewill and 
effaces the element of meaningful normativity.  To this I would answer that every action 
is preceded by a moment of choice which preserves its normative aspect and enables 
action to be imputed to the human actor.  This moment of choice is obscured by the 
dulling effect of habit, but is not eliminated and comes into sharp relief when habit is 
impeded, triggering a moment of crisis.    49
The choice of whether to follow legal or other norms I would characterise as a moment 
of crisis when competing habits vie for expression.  Human actors simultaneously 
embody multiple norms in their various habits, which operate in a state of equilibrium 
to facilitate everyday activity.  When habit runs smoothly, legal norms are integrated 
harmoniously with other norms of action, all manifested simultaneously through the 
same habitual action.  When an impediment is encountered, the equilibrium is upset 
as habit can no longer conflate the various norms embodied in that action, with the 
result that legal norms may come into direct conflict with other norms.  This forces 
deliberation and choice against the backdrop of habits competing to be fulfilled, some 
of which embody law, some may not, and a choice between them would lead to law 
being manifested or not.  This is not a choice represented and determined solely 
through norms, but through habits embodying compounds of norms.   That is not to 50
say that discursive norms are completely impotent in guiding action, rather it is 
precisely in the moment of crisis and deliberation that the human actor might 
consciously have regard to norms when deciding his future action.  Nevertheless the 
relative likelihood of a norm being manifested over another still depends largely on the 
strength of their respective habits and the eternal conditions as the guides for action.          
 John Dewey, Human nature and conduct : an introduction to social psychology, New York : Holt 1922 49
For detailed discussion see chapter 5.
 Ibid.50
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The hegemonic status of law cannot depend solely on the force of individuals’ habits, 
since habits exhibit plasticity and are liable to change.  This is especially pertinent to 
legal action as the majority are not cultivated strictly through determination by legal 
norms, so from the outset are liable to diverge depending on the individuals’ personal 
experiences.   Habitual legal action requires an external environment which stably 51
and strongly reproduces conditions conducive to legal behaviour, and draws together 
the disparate individual habits into a collective legal action.  This environment is 
charged with the forceful presence of legal objects compelling habitual legal 
responses, in short a lawful environment.  
A lawful environment fundamentally consists of common and recurring legal contexts. 
These are not discursively constructed as formal legal contexts, but are likely to be 
familiar contexts interpellated through the actor’s extant body of knowledge which 
coincidentally conforms to law.  The explicitly legal significations are gradually and 
haphazardly assimilated into familiar contexts, and their introduction will in most cases 
not disrupt familiar habits, but refine and reinforce pre-established norms of action.  In 
other words socialisation already has furnished human actors with common 
interpellations of reality which conform to law, and the addition of legal significations 
enables more conscious and refined distinctions between familiar contexts.  The 
magnetic force of these external conditions are due to entrenched habits rather than 
the force of discursive law which for the most part piggybacks on these other habitual 
norms.    
This construction of context is highly dependent on the presence of objects placed 
particular spatial relations to invoke most strongly their legal modalities.  There must 
be cars and traffic lights on the roads, persons on the sidewalks, shop windows must 
remain intact, shop doors guarded with security, and people must peacefully share 
space.  In this lawful environment material objects are presented as property, bodies of 
others are seen as inviolable, and the power of the State and the risk of punishment 
are embodied in objects such as uniformed police, surveillance cameras, and security 
staff.  These objects pose not just physical obstacles to action, but act with a material 
 So even though disparate human actors all behave outwardly in conformity with the law, the habitual 51
actions and histories are unique to the individual human actors, which raises the possibility that a change 
in the external conditions would precipitate different responses from different actors.
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force upon human bodies by compelling action through the effects of habit.   The 52
norms of action confront human actors as possible courses of action within their 
material environment, and insofar as objects present their legal modalities, the legal 
norms of action are embodied into material reality. 
7.3.1 Precarious law
Whilst the foregoing may suggest that legal action is strongly bolstered by the 
concurrent operations of habit and environment, in actuality law is much more 
precarious.  Law shares a contingent relationship to those entrenched habitual norms 
it is parasitic upon, so the conflation between external conditions which embody law 
and other normative orders is coincidental and susceptible to rupture, resulting in 
conflict.  This also implies that for those legal contexts which are largely or exclusively 
peculiar to law, the objects possess legal modalities which do not overlap or conform 
with their other modalities, so raises the possibility that the environment may 
constructed along norms hostile to the enactment of legal action.   53
A change in the external environment can quickly change the norms conditioning 
action, and descend into a situation of unlawfulness.  This may happen during events 
such as rallies, strikes, riots, mob action, where the former lawful context is usurped. 
In such cases it is not that there is a sudden suspension or breakdown of law, rather 
the objects’ most strongly presented modalities have changed, so causing the 
construction of context to come into conflict with law.  When participating in a rally, the 
object of the police and other signs of authority suddenly change their modalities, 
becoming objects of threat and oppression as opposed to unassailable figures of 
power.   During a riot or mob action, the bodies of others are not longer presented as 
encased in an inviolable shell, but become visceral flesh which collide in physical 
opposition to each other.  Such dramatic shifts in the external environment is relatively 
rare, so provide few opportunities for such experiences to occur.  However once 
 This is similar to Searle’s notion of status indicators: John Searle, The Construction of Social Reality 52
London: Penguin, 1996.  However I would argue that the effect of objects is not limited to presenting or 
reinforcing a symbolic meaning, but precipitates material change by compelling the actions of humans 
which in turn reinforces their meaning and power.
 This is most likely to occur when law institutes novel modalities and object-relations, such as by 53
introducing legal regulations radically different from contemporaneous social behaviour. 
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experienced, a human actor’s bodily habits may undergo a fundamental change, which 
in turn changes the way he views and interacts with the world.54
Because such fundamental shifts in the external environment are rare, the 
precariousness of law is more likely exhibited in other, more frequently occurring 
manners of nonconformity.  Law is sustained largely through habitual actions which are 
contingently law-conforming, so conflicts or disruptions between the two are the likely 
source of illegal behaviour. 
Usually legal and nonlegal group habits coincide and reinforce each other to construct 
an hegemonic picture of reality.  For example, a prevalent social custom is to show 
favouritism towards family members, a fundamental norm of capitalism is possessive 
accumulation, and a ubiquitous legal norm is to designate objects as private property; 
these norms when habituated in a harmony results in a world wherein inheritance is 
both possible and treated as a natural practice.  These habits which may have been 
combined haphazardly dovetail to construct an enduring vision of the world at their 
interstices.  
However there are certain points of departure between these group habits which might 
disrupt their conflation and precipitate a moment of conflict necessitating choice.  One 
example might be economic relations between family members; capitalist habits 
dictate that maximisation of value is the primary goal, whilst family habits induce 
altruistic and compassionate behaviour, resulting in situations rife with conundrums.  55
Another example might be a conflict between the habits of family life and law’s 
prescription against violence.  Habituation to family dynamics and privacy might lead 
to tolerance for greater levels of violence, such as disciplining children, abusive or 
controlling spouses, displays of physical domination, actions which would otherwise 
not be tolerated outside the family setting.  So the habits pertaining to being a member 
 I would venture that this seismic change in a human actor’s fundamental orientation to the world has 54
been variously described as a process of politicisation, awakening the political consciousness, becoming 
aware of biopower, etc.  Donatella D. Porta. 'Eventful Democratization: When Protest Changes Relations.' 
in Mobilizing for Democracy : Comparing 1989 and 2011, First ed. OUP, 2014, chapter 2.  Cf. Gi-Wook 
Shin, 'The Historical Making of Collective Action: The Korean Peasant Uprisings of 1946.'  American 
Journal of Sociology 99(6): 1596-624.  Cf. Anderson & Mendes. 'Learning to Lose: Election Outcomes, 
Democratic Experience and Political Protest Potential.' British Journal of Political Science 36(1): 91-111.
 I have elaborated on this example; see chapter 5.55
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of family come into conflict with the habits of being a citizen, and the physical bodies of 
others are not as strongly expressed in their legal modalities.56
Group habits are forever vying to increase their influence upon action by determining 
the modalities of objects to compel those object-relations which manifest their 
particular norms.  When group habits come into conflict, a rift is created in the external 
conditions, which disrupts the operation of smooth habitual action, so prompts the 
human actor to find a new equilibrium for action.   The precariousness of law is most 57
strongly displayed in these moments of rift, especially if the conflicting habit is more 
deeply ingrained or better integrated into a human actor’s personal history.  If the 
human actor chooses to engage in habit which embodies law, then the normative force 
of law is manifested over other norms.  However the factors influencing choice are 
innumerable, and most definitely not restricted to endorsing the law’s validity.  If the 
law’s claims are given greater weight in deliberation,  I would venture this is due to 58
other habits such as fear of punishment, fear of shame and disappointment from peers 
and family, as opposed to any idealistic regard for law. 
7.4 Counterintuitive features revisited
I have previously claimed that law presents counterintuitive features, outlined through 
two broad themes of responsibility and emotion, and argued that these are 
symptomatic of discursive attempts to ground legal normativity in ideal Reason and 
efface the legal subject’s embodied aspect.  I posed the idea that the counterintuitive 
character of law as lived experience might be better accounted for by a material 
approach to legal normativity such as I have developed.  I now reexamine those 
counterintuitive features and asses how they may be understood through the lens of 
my account of embodied legal normativity.  
 Foucault asserts that the disciplinary mechanism of school is also used to monitor family life by 56
disseminating information between parents and teachers in the process of disciplining children.  I would 
argue that this may be similar to changing the habitual knowledge of children and their expectations of 
how they are to be treated by adults.  Foucault n.46 pg.211-2.
 Dewey, n.4857
 Ibid.58
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7.4.1 Embodied interrelations 
The first counterintuitive feature I identified centred around how human interrelations 
enabled and sustained mutual regard and obligation, explored through the concept of 
responsibility.  Discourse based on Reason presented a model of rational contracting 
to exemplify legal mutuality, and displaced the material other with immaterial notions of 
rights and duties.  My primary dissatisfaction is the artificiality of valorising one limited 
case of organic human interaction as the archetype of legal relations.  This is 
compounded by the seeming omnipresence of law in all areas of life, which means law 
does indeed mediate and establish obligation in human relations, but in a fashion 
which exceeds the limited model propounded by Reason.  My aim is to explicate that 
area of excess which is inadequately theorised.  
Objects mediate human interrelations, so objects in their legal modalities constitute a 
case of legally mediated interrelations.  The most ubiquitously presented legal 
modalities are objects as property and human bodies as inviolable, and acting in 
response to these modalities would institute a relationship with others constituted by 
respect for private property and for bodily integrity.    This mutuality is not established 
through intersubjective agreement, but by the individual’s habitual response to the 
objects of things and human bodies.  This habitual bodily action manifests the norms 
of law and materialises a reality constructed accordingly, and owing to the widespread 
commonality of such legal habits throughout society, these disparate individual actions 
coincide to construct the seemingly omnipresent entity of law.  Mutual regard and 
responsibility are incorporated into bodily habits which coincidentally embody legal 
norms; these are manifested simultaneously in action, which may give the appearance 
of law determining responsibility, but are actually facets of unified action.
The ubiquitous terms of legal interrelations of private property and bodily integrity 
pertain mostly between strangers, who by severally acting according to their basic 
legal habits institute these relationships with generic others.   This stranger to stranger 
relationship becomes increasingly displaced as the actors become more familiar, so 
more likely to mediate their relationship by instituting their own particular object-
relations and significations to objects which they share.  For example, objects which 
began as a vague piece of property come to be designated as shared property.  By 
engaging with objects in these new and different modalities, the actors change the 
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terms of their relationship and open it to other possibilities of action.   As they institute 
their own object-relations, they displace the law’s presence from their relationship and 
create their own particular external conditions and habits from the objects they 
surround themselves with.  A situation of cohabitation might result in this construction 
of a new familiarity, where cohabitants create their own rules of sharing space and 
resources.   The foremost example of cohabitation displacing law is the family, where 59
physical proximity is a significant factor in building the family entity whose relational 
dynamic presents a strong foil to legal relationships.60
Law is most present where there is an absence of familiarity.  We manifest law by 
simply interacting with the objects and bodies we encounter as private and inviolable 
property, a response which is for the most part habitual and effortless.  So by 
individually engaging in mundane and effortless habitual action, the ostensibly great 
task of keeping law and order is achieved.  Whereas the situations where mutuality is 
perceived most keenly, such as personal relationships where actions take on 
innumerable messy significations, the law is absent.
7.4.2 Emotional foundations
Another counterintuitive feature of law is its contrary character as both a repository for 
emotion, and its rhetorical denial of emotion and valorisation of impartiality.  Integral to 
Reason’s disavowal of embodiment is its rejection of subjective and irrational emotions 
as unsuitable grounds for an objective and rational system of rules.  My critique of this 
discourse focused on cases where action prescribed or endorsed by law is derived 
and justified by irrational fear and hatred, despite the contrary claims of discourse. 
Law is rife with emotions it cannot fully subsume under a totalising discourse, however 
it is able to contain their disruptive force by ordering them into manageable legal 
categories.  I believe this is achieved by aligning law with other normative orders and 
closely associating their respective habits.   61
 These tend to mirror ways of interaction the cohabitants are already familiar with, such as emphasis on 59
fair distribution of tasks, individuation of resources, reliance on rules rather than favour to structure 
coordination.  This may be explained by the operation of habit’s compulsive aspect which seeks to create 
the conditions most favourable to its fulfilment.  Bourdieu argues that the habitus will actively seek to 
create an external condition most favourable to its expression by surrounding itself with familiar things and 
places; Bourdieu n.25 pg.150-155.
 One factor amongst many; see chapter 3.60
 Law mirrors social norms, sometimes deliberately, often by coincidence.  The pertinent issue is the 61
incorporation of these norms in the same habit such that the content of emotion is mirrored in each 
normative order.
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Habit combines and structures the various factors which constitute action into 
harmonious equilibrium; it amalgamates our desires, impulses, and aversions into 
enduring preferences and ways of being.   Habitual actions are effortless but 62
purposeful endeavours based on our accumulated experiences of how to achieve our 
aim, whether that be happiness or the acquisition of money.  Habit may be seen as a 
conglomerate of various norms combined in ways unique to the individual, so a habit 
conforming to law has already combined the legal action with the actor’s internal states 
into a stable equilibrium.  In other words acting in accordance with the legal norm will 
not disrupt the steady flow of emotions because habit has already stabilised their 
interaction.  This steady state is reinforced by the presence of a stable external 
environment which induces legal habits and reinforces their particular combination of 
action and emotion.  Sustained coordination between habit and environment induces a 
presupposition of harmony, in this case between the legal normative order and the 
actor's unique interpellation of reality.
As long as this harmony persists there is no cause for the presupposition to be 
questioned.  A conflict may result in the actor finding his habits obstructed by his 
external environment, precipitating a moment of crisis necessitating change and 
choice in order to establish a new equilibrium for action.   In many cases this might be 63
accompanied by emotional upheaval, ranging from mild inconvenience to a 
fundamental doubt about one’s identity.   Legal action which is rendered from its 64
smooth integration with emotion becomes mired in the actor’s deliberations between 
his conflicting habits.  It may also be the catalyst of emotional turmoil if the obstruction 
to action is presented by a hostile legal environment, such as suffering arrest or police 
brutality.  The apparent schism between law and emotion is actually a disruption of 
habit and a disjunction between the actor's interpellation of reality, or how the world 
should be, and the formal norms of law.  Legal normativity is constitutively emotional at 
its core, but that element is simply obscured by the effects of habit.
 Dewey n.48 Part.II s.1;  chapter 5.62
 Dewey n.48 Part.II s.1.63
 Ibid.  Cultural displacement is a significant disruptor between habit and environment; see Jessica 64
Walton, 'Feeling It: Understanding Korean Adoptees’ Experiences of Embodied Identity.'  Journal of 
Intercultural Studies 36(4): 395-412.  Amputation as a disruptor of motility and the habits of movement; 
Senra, et al., 'Beyond the Body Image: A Qualitative Study on How Adults Experience Lower Limb 
Amputation.' Clinical Rehabilitation 26(2): 180-91.
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7.5 Contingent legal normativity
Legal normativity is conditional upon two contingent relationships, between law and 
other normative orders, and between legal action and environment.  These are brought 
into stable coincidence by the mechanism of habit.  Habit adheres legal norms with 
other norms, simultaneously manifests them in the same action, and entrenches their 
repetition through its conservative and compulsive effects.  Concurrently habitual 
constructions of external conditions conducive to law compel engagement in legal 
action and the reproduction of material legal environments.  I am not claiming that law 
cannot actively influence action, only that its normativity is not sustained through the 
force of its own rhetoric.  Law is not manifested through action by acting as a reason 
or determinant of action, but by insinuating itself into actions and behaviours which are 
already established and reinforced in other ways.  In doing so law becomes a habit 
which contributes to the mutually supportive maintenance of a particular construction 
of reality, one that is favourable to its perpetuation.  Thus legal normativity may be 
fundamentally contingent, it is nevertheless bolstered by these dual operations of 
habit.  
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Conclusion
This thesis has argued that legal normativity is better understood as a manifestation of 
norms through material action which contingently embodies norms of law without 
necessarily being determined by them.  The primary problem with philosophical 
approaches which centre upon Reason as the locus of normativity is their inadequate 
regard for the acting subject’s corporeality, and posit mind/norm and body/action as 
distinct and related by cause and effect as opposed to belonging in a unified moment 
of acting.  Opposing theories of materialism endeavour to reincorporate the body as a 
site of norm construction, but arguably fall into the same dualism only to reverse the 
cause and effect relationship to result in determinism, and the dismissal of normativity 
as ideology.  I have argued for an alternative conceptualisation of the relationship 
between norm and action as one of mutual constitution, so rejects any distinction or 
separation between them as separate events or ontologies.  Norms are embodied in 
action, which manifests them into materiality; likewise action must embody and 
manifest norms as part of their intentional structure.  Unified normative action is driven 
by the mechanism of habit, so maintains action through bodily impetus and obviates 
the need for Reason or rationality as cause of action.  Legal normativity is a specific 
albeit prevalent case of embodied action in society; law’s ubiquity and perpetuation is 
driven largely by habituation in legal behaviours and other mutually conforming 
normative actions, as opposed to the validity or legitimacy of law’s institutions and 
rhetoric.  
Throughout my efforts to construct a material account of embodied normativity, I have 
strived to reimagine the material aspect of norms and how they might exist as 
recognisable physical matter.  This led to the claim that physical objects are normative 
and exert a power to compel action, a power enabled by habit.  More importantly this 
led to a notion of a normatively charged external environment which is similarly 
interpellated through habit, but exhibits a power normatively to structure and order 
human action which rivals physical impediment.  The idea that the external 
environment is normatively saturated and somehow connected to human beings’ 
internal structural states, which operate in sync to produce certain actions is commonly 
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reiterated in social theories.   My interest is in the object and the human relation to it, 1
which I have termed the object-relation and used as the basis for my theory of 
embodied action.  Whereas I appreciate other theories have addressed how the 
external environment and internal human states interrelate, the focus is mostly upon 
the general context or situation, with specific objects taking centre stage only for 
illustrative purposes.   I believe my notion of object-relations provides an opportunity to 
explore further the philosophical structure of human relations to objects.
I am specifically interested in the case of objects as property, as things to be owned, 
monopolised, desired, protected from others and so on.  Property features prominently 
in my account as the ubiquitous modality which maintains the status quo of hegemonic 
orders such as capitalism and law.  Objects invariably feature as property in the most 
influential western philosophical traditions and constitute an integral part of being 
human, but often proceed no further than claims that humans need or use objects as 
property in order to achieve some other aim.   A fundamental tenet of property law is 2
that it is a right possessed by legal subjects with regard to things, so displaces the 
material interaction as the locus of the property relationship.   I believe that how 3
humans relate directly with objects in such fashion as to reproduce the material 
conditions for property as a normative construct is under-theorised.  In other words 
rather than beginning from the property as the norm, property should be analysed in its 
material elements of object and action, and the conditions supporting those structures.  
The potent power of the external environment over possibilities of human action has 
been widely asserted by social theories, and I have relied on the same in presenting 
how hegemonic norms ensure their repetition by warping the social fabric in their 
favour.  If the relationship between humans and objects is better understood, it may 
open up different possibilities to our current situation by changing the mundane ways 
we relate to objects.  This may lead to renewing the notions of public and private 
through the objects and actions which constitute them, such as built environments and 
 Pierre Bourdieu, Pascalian Meditations Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000; ‘structuring structures’.  John 1
Searle, The Construction of Social Reality London: Allen Lane, 1995; ‘Background’.  Edmund Husserl, 
The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology : An Introduction to 
Phenomenological Philosophy. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970; ‘Lifeworld’.
 John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government : (an Essay concerning the True Original, Extent and 2
End of Civil Government), And, a Letter concerning Toleration. 3rd ed. 1966; possessive individualism. 
Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals. Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy. New York: 
CUP, 1996; expression of natural freedom.  Georg W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1977;  objectification of self. 
 M.G. Bridge, Personal Property Law. 3rd ed. Clarendon Law Series. Oxford: OUP, 2002.  The same may 3
be said of most Western liberal legal systems.
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common resources.  It also poses interesting questions on how new technological 
objects change the structure of human interrelations and present possibilities for 
restructuring physical and virtual spaces.  Gaining these insights would enable a legal 
society to more effectively regulate and change the actions of its members in pursuit of 
its material conditions of nomos.
 229
Bibliography
Aarts, Henk, and Ap Dijksterhuis. "Habits as knowledge structures: automaticity in 
goal-directed behavior." Journal of personality and social psychology 78, no. 1 (2000): 
53.
Adorno, Theodor W., Horkheimer, Max, and Cumming, John.  Dialectic of 
Enlightenment. London: Verso Editions, 1997.
Alexandra, Andrew. "Should Hobbes's state of nature be represented as a prisoner's 
dilemma?" Southern Journal of Philosophy 30, no. 2 (1992): 1-16.
Allen, Amy. "Discourse, power, and subjectivation: the Foucault/Habermas debate 
reconsidered." In The Philosophical Forum, vol. 40, no. 1, pp. 1-28. Blackwell 
Publishing Inc, 2009.
Althusser, Louis, and Goshgarian, G. M. On the Reproduction of Capitalism : Ideology 
and Ideological State Apparatuses. English-language ed. Verso Books, 2014.
Althusser, Louis, and Matheron, François.  The Humanist Controversy and Other 
Writings (1966-67). London ; New York: Verso, 2003.
Anderson, Christopher J., and Silvia M. Mendes. "Learning to lose: Election outcomes, 
democratic experience and political protest potential." British Journal of Political 
Science 36, no. 1 (2006): 91-111.
Aristotle, and Saunders, Trevor J. Politics. Books I and II. Clarendon Aristotle Series. 
New York: Clarendon Press, 1995.
Atherton, Margaret. “Cartesian reason and gendered reason.” In Antony, Louise M., 
and Witt, Charlotte.  A Mind of One's Own : Feminist Essays on Reason and 
Objectivity. 2nd ed. Feminist Theory and Politics. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 
2002.
 230
Atran, Scott. In Gods We Trust : The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion. Evolution 
and Cognition Series. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.
Audi, Robert.  “Cognitive Disparities.” In Christensen, David, and Jennifer Lackey, eds. 
The epistemology of disagreement: New essays. OUP Oxford, 2013.
Austin, John,  The Province of Jurisprudence Determined. Great Minds Series. 
Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 2000.
Banyard, Victoria L., Elizabethe G. Plante, and Mary M. Moynihan. "Bystander 
education: Bringing a broader community perspective to sexual violence prevention." 
Journal of community psychology 32, no. 1 (2004): 61-79.
Barkow, Jerome H., Cosmides, Leda, Tooby, John, and MyiLibrary. The Adapted Mind : 
Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1992.
Barry, Brian. Political Argument. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965.
Bauer, William A. "Physical intentionality, extrinsicness, and the direction of causation." 
Acta Analytica 31, no. 4 (2016): 397-417.
“Being-in-the-world as incarnate reflexivity.” In Sandywell, Barry. Reflexivity And The 
Crisis of Western Reason, Volume 1 Logological Investigations: Volume One. London: 
Routledge, 1995:  275-290.  
Benson, Melinda Harm. "Mining sacred space: law's enactment of competing 
ontologies in the American West." Environment and Planning A 44, no. 6 (2012): 
1443-1458.
Bentham, Jeremy, and Božovič, Miran. The Panopticon Writings. Wo Es War. London ; 
New York: Verso, 1995.
Bentham, Jeremy, Burns, J. H., and Hart, H. L. A. A Comment on the Commentaries: 
And A Fragment on Government. Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham. Principles of 
Legislation. London: Athlone Press, 1977.
 231
Bering, Jesse M. "The cognitive science of souls: Clarifications and extensions of the 
evolutionary model." Behavioral and brain sciences 29, no. 5 (2006): 486-493.
Bertea, Stephano.  “Law and Obligation.” In Bertea, Stefano, and Pavlakos, George. 
New Essays on the Normativity of Law. Law and Practical Reason ; v. 3. Oxford ; 
Portland, Or.: Hart Publishing, 2011.
Berti, Mario. "Handcuffed access: Homelessness and the justice system." Urban 
Geography 31, no. 6 (2010): 825-841.
Bicchieri, Cristina. Norms in the Wild : How to Diagnose, Measure, and Change Social 
Norms. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017.
Bishop, Scott R., Mark Lau, Shauna Shapiro, Linda Carlson, Nicole D. Anderson, 
James Carmody, Zindel V. Segal et al. "Mindfulness: A proposed operational 
definition." Clinical psychology: Science and practice 11, no. 3 (2004): 230-241.
Blake, Peter R., and Paul L. Harris. "Children's understanding of ownership transfers." 
Cognitive Development 24, no. 2 (2009): 133-145.
Bourdieu, Pierre. Practical Reason : On the Theory of Action. Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1998.
———. Pascalian Meditations. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000.
Bourdieu, Pierre, and Nice, Richard. Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge 
Studies in Social Anthropology ; 16. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.
Bowling, Ben, and Coretta Phillips. "Disproportionate and discriminatory: reviewing the 
evidence on police stop and search." The Modern Law Review 70, no. 6 (2007): 
936-961.
Boyer, Pascal. "Cognitive constraints on cultural representations: Natural ontologies 
and religious ideas." In Hirschfeld, Lawrence A., and Gelman, Susan A. Mapping the 
Mind : Domain Specificity in Cognition and Culture. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994: 391-411.
 232
Bransford, John D., Jeffery J. Franks, Nancy J. Vye, and Robert D. Sherwood. "New 
approaches to instruction: Because wisdom can’t be told.” In Vosniadou, Stella, and 
Andrew Ortony, eds. Similarity and analogical reasoning. Cambridge University Press, 
1989: 470- 497.
Bratman, Michael E. "Shared intention." Ethics 104, no. 1 (1993): 97-113.
Brennan, Geoffrey, Lina Eriksson, Robert E. Goodin, and Nicholas Southwood. 
Explaining norms. Oxford University Press, 2013.
Bridge, M. G. Personal Property Law. 3rd ed. Clarendon Law Series. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002.
Bridgeman, Jo. "Accountability, Support or Relationship-Conceptions of Parental 
Responsibility." N. Ir. Legal Q. 58 (2007): 307.
———. “Parental Responsibility, Responsible Parenting and Legal Regulation.” In 
Bridgeman, Jo., Lind, Craig, and Keating, Heather M.  Responsibility, Law and the 
Family. Aldershot, England ; Burlington, VT: Asgate, 2008. 
Bridgeman, Jo., Keating, Heather M, and Lind, Craig. Regulating Family 
Responsibilities. Farnham, Surrey, England ; Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate Pub., 2011.
Brownlee, Timothy L. "Alienation and Recognition in Hegel's Phenomenology of 
Spirit." Philosophical Forum 46, no. 4 (2015): 377-96.
Buchanan, I. A Dictionary of Critical Theory. Oxford University Press, 2010.
Butler, Judith. "Performative acts and gender constitution: An essay in phenomenology 
and feminist theory." Theatre journal 40, no. 4 (1988): 519-531.
———. Gender Trouble : Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. Thinking Gender. 
Routledge, 1990.  
Button, Tim. The limits of realism. Oxford University Press, 2013.
Byrne, Richard W. Evolving insight. Oxford University Press, 2016.
 233
Cameron, Deborah. "Performing gender identity.” In Coates, Jennifer, ed. Language 
and gender: A reader. Wiley-blackwell, 1998.
Campbell, Rebecca. "The psychological impact of rape victims’ experiences with the 
legal, medical, and mental health systems." Applied ethics in mental health care: An 
interdisciplinary reader (2013): 149-178.
Carlisle, Clare. On Habit. Thinking in Action.  Routledge, 2014.
Carvalho, Jônata Tyska, and Stefano Nolfi. "Cognitive offloading does not prevent but 
rather promotes cognitive development." PloS one 11, no. 8 (2016): e0160679.
Chamberlain, Gary. "The Man Marx Made."  Science and Society  27, no. 3 (1963): 
302-320.
Chan, Heng Choon, T. Wing Lo, and Lena Y. Zhong. "Identifying the self-anticipated 
reoffending risk factors of incarcerated male repeat offenders in Hong Kong." The 
Prison Journal 96, no. 5 (2016): 731-751.
Christensen, David. “Epistemic Modesty Defended 1.” In Christensen, David, and 
Jennifer Lackey, eds. The epistemology of disagreement: New essays. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013.
Christensen, Kit. "Marx, Human Nature, and the Fetishism of Concepts." Studies in 
Soviet Thought 34, no. 3 (1987): 135-71.
Chudnoff, Elijah. Intuition. Oxford University Press, 2014.
Clarke, Simon. Social Theory, Psychoanalysis and Racism. Basingstoke, Hampshire ; 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
Coghlan, David, and Mary Brydon-Miller.  The SAGE Encyclopedia of Action 
Research. 2 vols. London, : SAGE Publications Ltd, 2014.
 234
Cohen, G. A. Karl Marx's Theory of History : A Defence. Expanded ed. Princeton 
Paperbacks. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001.
Collin, Sven-Olof Yrjö, and Jenny Ahlberg. "Blood in the boardroom: Family 
relationships influencing the functions of the board." Journal of Family Business 
Strategy 3, no. 4 (2012): 207-219.
Colman, A.M. A Dictionary of Psychology. Oxford University Press, 2008.  
Cover, Robert. “Obligation: a Jewish Jurisprudence." In Cover, Robert M., Minow, 
Martha, Ryan, Michael, and Sarat, Austin.  Narrative, Violence, and the Law : The 
Essays of Robert Cover. Law, Meaning, and Violence. Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1993.
Crane, Tim. "All the Difference in the World." The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-) 41, 
no. 162 (1991): 1-25.
Dane, Erik, and Michael G. Pratt. "Conceptualizing and measuring intuition: A review of 
recent trends." International review of industrial and organizational psychology 24 
(2009): 1-40.
Davies, Hayley. "Affinities, seeing and feeling like family: Exploring why children value 
face-to-face contact." Childhood 19, no. 1 (2012): 8-23.
Deigh, John, 'Reason and Ethics in Hobbes's 'Leviathan', Journal of the History of 
Philosophy, 34(1) : 47-60.
Delacroix, Sylvie. "Hart's and Kelsen's Concepts of Normativity Contrasted." Ratio 
Juris 17, no. 4 (2004): 501-520.
———. Law and Habits (January 8, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2744694.
Deleuze, Gilles, and Guattari, Félix.  A Thousand Plateaus : Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia. London : New York: Continuum, 2004.
 235
Della Porta, Donatella. “Eventful Democratization: When Protest Changes Relations.” 
In Della Porta, Donatella. Mobilizing for Democracy : Comparing 1989 and 2011. 
Oxford: First ed. Oxford University Press, 2014.
Dewey, John. Human Nature and Conduct : An Introduction to Social Psychology. New 
York: Holt, 1922.
———. The Quest for Certainty : A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and Action. 
Gifford Lectures ; 1929. London, 1930.
Doe, Norman. “Baptism, Confirmation and Holy Communion.” In Doe, Norman. Canon 
Law in the Anglican Communion a Worldwide Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1998.
Dreyfus, Hubert L. "The current relevance of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of 
embodiment." In Perspectives on Embodiment, Haber and Weiss (eds.) Routledge, 
New York and London 1996.
———. “Intelligence without Representation – Merleau-Ponty's Critique of Mental 
Representation The Relevance of Phenomenology to Scientific Explanation." 
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1, no. 4 (2002): 367-83.
Droll, Jason A., and Mary M. Hayhoe. "Trade-offs between gaze and working memory 
use." Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 33, 
no. 6 (2007): 1352.
Duff, Antony. Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability : Philosophy of Action and the 
Criminal Law. Philosophical Introductions. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990.
Dworkin, Ronald. Law's Empire. Oxford: Hart, 1998.
Eccleston, Christopher. Embodied : The Psychology of Physical Sensation. Oxford 
University Press, 2016.
Eekelaar, John. "Are parents morally obliged to care for their children?." Oxford journal 
of legal studies 11, no. 3 (1991): 340-353.
———. Family Law and Personal Life. New Ed.]. ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007.
 236
Ellis, Anthony. "A deterrence theory of punishment." The Philosophical Quarterly 53, 
no. 212 (2003): 337-351.
Etzioni, Amitai. The Parenting Deficit. London: Demos, 1993.
Fagan, Jeffrey, and Tom R. Tyler. "Legal socialization of children and adolescents." 
Social justice research 18, no. 3 (2005): 217-241.
Fanon, Frantz. Black Skin, White Masks. Pluto Classics. London: Pluto, 1986.
Farrugia, David. "Exploring stigma: Medical knowledge and the stigmatisation of 
parents of children diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder." Sociology of Health & 
Illness 31, no. 7 (2009): 1011-1027.
Fasig, Lauren G. "Toddlers’ Understanding of Ownership: Implications for Self‐Concept 
Development." Social Development 9, no. 3 (2000): 370-382.
Femia, Joseph V. Gramsci's Political Thought : Hegemony, Consciousness, and the 
Revolutionary Process. Oxford [Oxfordshire] : Oxford [Oxfordshire] ; New York: 
Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press, 1981.
Finnis, John, Natural Law and Natural Rights. 2nd ed. Clarendon Law Series. Oxford ; 
New York: OUP, 2011.
Fletcher, George P. "Law and Morality: A Kantian Perspective."  Columbia Law 
Review 87, no. 3 (1987): 533-58.
Foucault, Michel. "The subject and power." Critical inquiry 8, no. 4 (1982): 777-795.
———. “The Subject and Power.” In Hubert L. Dreyfus, Paul Rabinow, and Michel 
Foucault, Michel Foucault, beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics. 2nd ed. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1983.
———. The History of Sexuality. Vol.2, The Use of Pleasure. Penguin History. London: 
Penguin Books, 1992.
———. The History of Sexuality. Vol. 1, The Will to Knowledge. London: Penguin, 
1998.
 237
———. The Order of Things. Routledge Classics. London: Routledge, 2002.
Foucault, Michel, and Howard, Richard. Madness and Civilization : A History of 
Insanity in the Age of Reason. Routledge Classics. London: Routledge, 2001.
Foucault, Michel, and Sheridan, Alan. Discipline and Punish : The Birth of the Prison. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979.
Fraser, Nancy. Unruly Practices : Power, Discourse and Gender in Contemporary 
Social Theory. Minneapolis; Cambridge: University of Minnesota Press : Polity Press, 
1989.
Fromm, Erich, and Bottomore, T. B. Marx's Concept of Man. Milestones of Thought. 
New York: F. Ungar, 1961.
Fulda, Joseph S. "The ‘broken windows’ theory and the New York experience 
reconsidered." Economic Affairs 30, no. 1 (2010): 101-102.
Gallese, Vittorio.  “Bodily Selves in Relation: Embodied Simulation as Second-person 
Perspective on Intersubjectivity.”  Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of 
London. Series B, Biological Sciences 369, no. 1644.
Geras, Norman.  Marx and Human Nature: Refutation of a Legend. London: Verso, 
1983.
Gilbert, Margaret. On Social Facts. International Library of Philosophy. London: 
Routledge, 1988.
Gillespie, Josephine. "A legal geography of property, tenure, exclusion, and rights in 
Cambodia: exposing an incongruous property narrative for non‐Western settings." 
Geographical Research 54, no. 3 (2016): 256-266.
Girard, René. “Mimesis and violence: Perspectives in cultural criticism.” Berkshire 
Review, 14: 9–19.
 238
Glasgow, Joshua. "The expressivist theory of punishment defended." Law and 
Philosophy 34, no. 6 (2015): 601-631.
Glenburg, Arthur. “The Limits of Covariation.”  In Vega, Manuel De., Glenberg, Arthur 
M, and Graesser, Arthur C.  Symbols and Embodiment : Debates on Meaning and 
Cognition. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
Goldstone, R. L., David Landy, and Ji Y. Son. "A well grounded education: The role of 
perception in science and mathematics.” In Vega, Manuel De., Glenberg, Arthur M, 
and Graesser, Arthur C.  Symbols and Embodiment : Debates on Meaning and 
Cognition. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008: 327-355.
Golob, Sacha. "Subjectivity, Reflection and Freedom in Later Foucault." International 
Journal of Philosophical Studies 23, no. 5 (2015): 666-688.
Gramsci, Antonio, Hoare, Quintin, and Nowell-Smith, Geoffrey. Selections from the 
Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971.
Greenberg, Jay. Object relations in psychoanalytic theory. Harvard University Press, 
1983.
Habermas, Jürgen, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures, trans. 
Frederick G. Lawrence; Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987.
———. Between Facts and Norms : Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy. 1st MIT Press Pbk. ed. Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought. 
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998.
Hampton, Jean. “Theory of retribution.” In Frey, R. G., and Morris, Christopher 
W.  Liability and Responsibility : Essays in Law and Morals. Cambridge Studies in 
Philosophy and Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. 
Han, Chong-suk. "They don't want to cruise your type: Gay men of color and the racial 
politics of exclusion." Social Identities 13, no. 1 (2007): 51-67.
 239
Haqanee, Zohrah, Evelina Lou, and Richard N. Lalonde. "Natural kind and entitative 
beliefs in relation to prejudice toward mental disorders." Journal of Applied Social 
Psychology 44, no. 2 (2014): 145-153.
Hardt, Michael., and Negri, Antonio.  Empire. Cambridge, Mass. ; London: Harvard 
University Press, 2001. 
Harman, Gilbert. "Moral relativism explained." Problems of Goodness. New Essays in 
Metaethics (2012).
Harris, Paul L. "Thinking by children and scientists: False analogies and neglected 
similarities." Hirschfeld, Lawrence A., and Gelman, Susan A.  Mapping the Mind : 
Domain Specificity in Cognition and Culture. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994: 294.
Harris-Short, Sonia., and Miles, Joanna. Family Law : Text, Cases, and Materials. 2nd 
ed. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. 
Hart, H.L.A., The Concept of Law. 2nd Ed., 1st Pbk. ed. Oxford : New York: Clarendon 
Press ; OUP, 1997.
Harvey, David, Marx, Karl, and American Council of Learned Societies. A Companion 
to Marx's Capital. ACLS Humanities E-Book (Series). London ; New York: Verso, 2010.
Harvey, Martin. "Hobbes's Conception of Natural Law."  Southern Journal of 
Philosophy 37, no. 3 (1999): 441-60.
Haslam, Nick, Louis Rothschild, and Donald Ernst. "Essentialist beliefs about social 
categories." British Journal of Social Psychology 39, no. 1 (2000): 113-127.
Hassard, John, and Michael Rowlinson. "Researching Foucault's research: 
Organization and control in Joseph Lancaster's monitorial schools." Organization 9, 
no. 4 (2002): 615-639.
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Miller, Arnold V, and Findlay, J. N. Phenomenology of 
Spirit. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977.
 240
Heidegger, Martin. History of the Concept of Time, Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press 
1985 
Henle, R. J. Saint Thomas Aquinas, the Treatise on Law : [being Summa Theologiae, 
I-II; QQ. 90 through 97]. Notre Dame Studies in Law and Contemporary Issues ; v. 4. 
Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993.
Heuer, Ulrike. "Intentions, Permissibility and the Reasons for Which We Act.” In 
Pavlakos, George, and Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco, eds. Reasons and Intentions in 
Law and Practical Agency. Cambridge University Press, 2015.
Heyes, Cressida J. Self-transformations: Foucault, ethics, and normalized bodies. 
Oxford University Press, 2007.
Hobbes, Thomas, Leviathan : Or, The Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth, 
Ecclesiasticall and Civill: London: Printed for Andrew Crooke, 1651: Reprinted 
Cambridge, 1904.
Hofmeyr, Benda. "The power not to be (what we are): The politics and ethics of self-
creation in Foucault." Journal of Moral Philosophy 3, no. 2 (2006): 215-230.
Holmes, Jeremy. John Bowlby and Attachment Theory. The Makers of Modern 
Psychotherapy. London: Routledge, 1993.
Honneth, Axel, Butler, Judith, Geuss, Raymond, Lear, Jonathan, and Jay, 
Martin.  Reification : A New Look at an Old Idea. The Berkeley Tanner Lectures. 
Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
Hunt, Alan, and Gary Wickham. Foucault and law: Towards a sociology of law as 
governance. Pluto Press, 1994.
Husserl, Edmund. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental 
Phenomenology : An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy. Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1970
 241
Johansen, Rachel, Zachary Neal, and Stephen Gasteyer. "The view from a broken 
window: How residents make sense of neighbourhood disorder in Flint." Urban Studies 
52, no. 16 (2015): 3054-3069.
Jylkkä, Jussi, Henry Railo, and Jussi Haukioja. "Psychological essentialism and 
semantic externalism: Evidence for externalism in lay speakers’ language use." 
Philosophical Psychology 22, no. 1 (2009): 37-60.
Kant, Immanuel, and Gregor, Mary J. The Metaphysics of Morals. Cambridge Texts in 
the History of Philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Kant, Immanuel, Gregor, Mary J, and Timmermann, Jens.  Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals. Rev. Ed. / Translation Revised by Jens Timmermann. ed. 
Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012.
Kant, Immanuel, and Smith, Norman Kemp. Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. 
London: Macmillan and, 1933.
Kelsen, Hans. General Theory of Norms. Oxford: Clarendon, 1991.
Kintsch, Walter. “Symbols systems and perceptual representations.” In Vega, Manuel 
De., Glenberg, Arthur M, and Graesser, Arthur C. Symbols and Embodiment : Debates 
on Meaning and Cognition. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
Kirsh, David, and Paul Maglio. "On distinguishing epistemic from pragmatic action." 
Cognitive science 18, no. 4 (1994): 513-549.
Kohlberg, Lauwrence. The Philosophy of Moral Development : Moral Stages and the 
Idea of Justice. 1st ed. San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1981.
Kornberger, Martin. Brand society: How brands transform management and lifestyle. 
Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Korsgaard, Christine M. "The normative constitution of agency." Rational and social 
agency: The philosophy of Michael Bratman (2014): 190-215.
 242
Korsgaard, Christine M., and O'Neill, Onora. The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge ; 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
Kotabe, Hiroki P., Omid Kardan, and Marc G. Berman. "The order of disorder: 
Deconstructing visual disorder and its effect on rule-breaking." Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General 145, no. 12 (2016): 1713.
Kriegel, Uriah.  Phenomenal Intentionality. Philosophy of Mind Series. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2013.
Kripke, Saul A. Reference and Existence : The John Locke Lectures. Oxford University 
Press, 2013.
Kruglanski, Arie W., James Y. Shah, Ayelet Fishbach, Ron Friedman, Woo Young 
Chun, and David Sleeth-Keppler. "A theory of goal systems.” In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), 
Advances in experimental social psychology, 2002: 331-378.
Kvanvig, Jonathan.  “Perspectivalism and Reflective Ascent.” In Christensen, David, 
and Jennifer Lackey, eds. The epistemology of disagreement: New essays. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013.
Lacan, Jacques, and Sheridan, Alan. Écrits : A Selection. London: Tavistock 
Publications, 1977.
Lea, Jennifer, Louisa Cadman, and Chris Philo. "Changing the habits of a lifetime? 
Mindfulness meditation and habitual geographies." cultural geographies 22, no. 1 
(2015): 49-65.
Levin, Jack., and Mcdevitt, Jack. Hate Crimes Revisited America's War On Those Who 
Are Different. New York: Basic Books, 2009.
Lindahl, Hans. Fault Lines of Globalization : Legal Order and the Politics of A-legality. 
Oxford Constitutional Theory. Oxford University Press, 2013.
 243
Lloyd, Genevieve. “Maleness, metaphor, and the 'crisis' of reason.” In Antony, Louise 
M., and Witt, Charlotte.  A Mind of One's Own : Feminist Essays on Reason and 
Objectivity. 2nd ed. Feminist Theory and Politics. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 
2002.
Lloyd, Geoffrey Ernest Richard. Cognitive variations: Reflections on the unity and 
diversity of the human mind. Oxford University Press, 2007.
Locke, John, and Gough, J. W. The Second Treatise of Government : (an Essay 
concerning the True Original, Extent and End of Civil Government), And, a Letter 
concerning Toleration. 3rd ed.  Oxford: Blackwell, 1966.
Ludwig, Kirk. From individual to plural agency: collective action I. Oxford University 
Press, 2016.
Luhmann, Niklas, Bednarz, John, Baeker, Dirk, and Knodt, Eva M. Social Systems. 
Writing Science. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1995.
Lukács, György.  History and Class Consciousness : Studies in Marxist Dialectics. 
London: Merlin Press, 1971.
Łuków, Paweł. "The Fact of Reason. Kant’s Passage to Ordinary Moral 
Knowledge." Kant-Studien 84, no. 2 (1993): 204-21.
MacCormick, Neil.  Practical Reason in Law and Morality. Law, State, and Practical 
Reason. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
Marcuse, Herbert. Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud. London: 
Ark, 1987.
Marcuse, Herbert, and Kellner, Douglas. One-dimensional Man : Studies in the 
Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society. 2nd ed. London: Routledge, 1991.
Marmor, Andrei, 'Legal Conventionalism.' in  Coleman, Jules L.  Hart's Postscript : 
Essays on the Postscript to The Concept of Law. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2001.
 244
———. “The Conventional Foundations of Law.” In Bertea, Stefano, and Pavlakos, 
George. New Essays on the Normativity of Law. Law and Practical Reason ; v. 3. 
Oxford ; Portland, Or.: Hart Publishing, 2011.
Martin, Taylor, and Daniel L. Schwartz. "Physically distributed learning: Adapting and 
reinterpreting physical environments in the development of fraction concepts." 
Cognitive science 29, no. 4 (2005): 587-625.
Marx, Karl. Capital. Everyman's Library ; No.849. London: Dent, 1951.
Marx, Karl, and Engels, Friedrich. Preface and Introduction to A Contribution to the 
Critique of Political Economy. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1976.
———. The German Ideology : Including Theses on Feuerbach and Introduction to 
The Critique of Political Economy. Great Books in Philosophy. Amherst, N.Y.: 
Prometheus Books, 1976.
Marx, Karl, Livingstone, Rodney, and Benton, Gregor.  Early Writings. The Penguin 
Classics. Harmondsworth ; New York: Penguin in Association with New Left Review, 
1992.
Marx, Karl, Struik, Dirk J., and Milligan, Martin. Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts 
of 1844. New Ed.]. ed. London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1970.
Mason, Gillian E., Sarah Ullman, Susan E. Long, LaDonna Long, and Laura 
Starzynski. "Social support and risk of sexual assault revictimization." Journal of 
Community Psychology 37, no. 1 (2009): 58-72.
Mason, Jennifer. "Tangible affinities and the real life fascination of kinship." Sociology 
42, no. 1 (2008): 29-45.
Menaker, Tasha A., and Robert J. Cramer. "The victim as witness: Strategies for 
increasing credibility among rape victim-witnesses in court." Journal of Forensic 
Psychology Practice 12, no. 5 (2012): 424-438.
Metz, Thaddeus. "Censure theory and intuitions about punishment." Law and 
Philosophy 19, no. 4 (2000): 491-512.
 245
Mccartney, Margaret. "Racism, Immigration, and the NHS." BMJ 354 (2016): I4477.
McKinlay, Alan, Chris Carter, and Eric Pezet. "Governmentality, power and 
organization." Management & Organizational History 7, no. 1 (2012): 3-15.
McLellan, David. "Marx's View of the Unalienated Society." The Review of Politics 31, 
no. 4 (1969): 459-65.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Smith, London: 
Routledge, 1962.
———. Phenomenology of Perception. Routledge Classics. London: Routledge, 2002.
Mészáros, István. Marx's Theory of Alienation. London: Merlin P, 1970.
Moran, Dermot. "Edmund Husserl's phenomenology of habituality and habitus." 
Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 42, no. 1 (2011): 53-77.
Moran, Dominique. "Carceral geography and the spatialities of prison visiting: 
visitation, recidivism, and hyperincarceration." Environment and Planning D: Society 
and Space 31, no. 1 (2013): 174-190.
Morrisson, Iain P. D.  Kant and the Role of Pleasure in Moral Action. Series in 
Continental Thought ; No. 35. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2008.
Moore, Dawn, Lisa Freeman, and Marian Krawczyk. "Spatio-therapeutics: Drug 
treatment courts and urban space." Social & Legal Studies 20, no. 2 (2011): 157-172.
Moors, A. “Automaticity.” In Bayne, Tim., Cleeremans, Axel, and Wilken, Patrick. The 
Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 
2009.
Murphy, Jeffrie. “Retributive Hatred.” In Frey, & Morris, Frey, R. G., and Morris, 
Christopher W.  Liability and Responsibility : Essays in Law and Morals. Cambridge 
Studies in Philosophy and Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
 246
Murray, David AB. "Laws of desire? Race, sexuality, and power in male Martinican 
sexual narratives." American Ethnologist 26, no. 1 (1999): 160-172.
Musto, Marcello. "The ‘Young Marx’ Myth in Interpretations of the Economic–
Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844." Critique 43, no. 2 (2015): 233-60.
Naffine, Ngaire. “The Body Bag’.”  In Naffine, Ngaire., and Owens, Rosemary 
J. Sexing the Subject of Law. 1st ed. North Ryde, NSW: LBC Information Services, 
1997. 
Nathan, Mitchell. “An embodied cognition perspective on symbols, gesture, and 
grounding instruction.” In Vega, Manuel De., Glenberg, Arthur M, and Graesser, Arthur 
C. Symbols and Embodiment : Debates on Meaning and Cognition. Oxford ; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2008.
Neary, Karen R., Ori Friedman, and Corinna L. Burnstein. "Preschoolers infer 
ownership from “control of permission”." Developmental psychology 45, no. 3 (2009): 
873.
Norrie, Alan W. Punishment, Responsibility, and Justice : A Relational Critique. Oxford 
Monographs on Criminal Law and Criminal Justice. Oxford, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000.
Nussbaum, Martha C. Hiding from Humanity Disgust, Shame, and the Law. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2009.
O'Connor, Daniel. "Kant's Conception of Happiness." The Journal of Value Inquiry16, 
no. 3 (1982): 189-205.
O’Donovan, Katherine. "With sense, consent, or just a con? Legal subjects in the 
discourse of autonomy." In Naffine, Ngaire., and Owens, Rosemary J.  Sexing the 
Subject of Law. 1st ed. North Ryde, NSW: LBC Information Services, 1997: 47-64.
Padilla-Walker, Laura. “Parental Socialization of Prosocial Behaviour.” In Padilla-
Walker, Laura M., and Carlo, Gustavo. Prosocial Development : A Multidimensional 
Approach. Oxford University Press, 2014.
 247
Paivio, Allan. "Mental imagery in associative learning and memory." Psychological 
review 76, no. 3 (1969): 241.
Parrish, Rick. Violence Inevitable : The Play of Force and Respect in Derrida, 
Nietzsche, Hobbes, and Berlin. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006.
Pashukanis, Evgeniĭ Bronislavovich, and Arthur, C. J. Law and Marxism : A General 
Theory. London: Ink Links, 1978.
Pavlakos, George. “The relation between moral and legal obligation: An alternative 
Kantian reading.” In Pavlakos, George, and Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco, eds. Reasons 
and Intentions in Law and Practical Agency. Cambridge University Press, 2015.
Pippin, Robert. "On the moral foundations of Kant’s Rechtslehre." The Philosophy of 
Immanuel Kant (1985): 107-42.
“Practical reflexivity.” In  Sandywell, Barry.  Reflexivity And The Crisis of Western 
Reason, Volume 1 Logological Investigations: Volume One. London: Routledge, 1995: 
291-317.
Putnam, Hilary. Philosophical Papers Vol.2, Mind, Language, and Reality. Cambridge 
[Eng.] ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975.
Rae, Gavin. "Hegel, Alienation, and the Phenomenological Development of 
Consciousness." International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20, no. 1 (2012): 23-42.
Ransom, John S. Foucault's Discipline : The Politics of Subjectivity. Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1997.
Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976.
Raz, Joseph. The Authority of Law : Essays on Law and Morality. Oxford: Clarendon, 
1979.
 248
Reath, Andrews.  Agency and Autonomy in Kant's Moral Theory. Oxford, UK: 
Clarendon Press, 2006.
Riedel, Manfred. "Transcendental Politics? Political Legitimacy and the Concept of 
Civil Society in Kant." Social Research 48, no. 3 (1981): 588-613.
Rossano, Federico, Hannes Rakoczy, and Michael Tomasello. "Young children’s 
understanding of violations of property rights." Cognition 121, no. 2 (2011): 219-227.
Rossano, Matt J. "The essential role of ritual in the transmission and reinforcement of 
social norms." Psychological bulletin 138, no. 3 (2012): 529.
Rothbart, Myron, and Marjorie Taylor. "Category labels and social reality: Do we view 
social categories as natural kinds?." In Semin, G. R., and Fiedler, Klaus. Language, 
Interaction and Social Cognition. London: Sage Publications, 1992. 
Rupp, Jan CC. "Michel Foucault, body politics and the rise and expansion of modern 
anatomy." journal of Historical Sociology 5, no. 1 (1992): 31-60.
Sayers, Sean. "Creative Activity and Alienation in Hegel and Marx."  Historical 
Materialism 11, no. 1 (2003): 107-28.
Scott, Charles E. "Foucault, Ethics, and the Fragmented Subject." Research in 
Phenomenology (1992): 104-137.
Searle, John R. The Construction of Social Reality. London: Penguin, 1996.
———. Making the Social World : The Structure of Human Civilization. Oxford ; New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2010.
Senra, Hugo, Rui Aragão Oliveira, Isabel Leal, and Cristina Vieira. "Beyond the body 
image: a qualitative study on how adults experience lower limb amputation." Clinical 
Rehabilitation 26, no. 2 (2012): 180-191.
Setiya, Kieran. Reasons without Rationalism. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 2007.
 249
Shapiro, Scott, Legality. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 2011.
———. “Planning agency and the Law.” In Bertea, Stefano, and Pavlakos, George. 
New Essays on the Normativity of Law. Law and Practical Reason ; v. 3. Oxford ; 
Portland, Or.: Hart Publishing, 2011.
Sherman, Howard. "Marx and Determinism."  Journal of Economic Issues  15, no. 1 
(1981): 61-71.
Shin, Gi-Wook. "The historical making of collective action: The Korean peasant 
uprisings of 1946." American Journal of Sociology 99, no. 6 (1994): 1596-1624.
Sidelle, Alan. "Modality and objects." The Philosophical Quarterly 60, no. 238 (2010): 
109-125.
Sider, Theodore. Writing the Book of the World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
Simmonds, N. E. Law as a Moral Idea. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 
2007.
Skinner, Diane. "Foucault, subjectivity and ethics: towards a self-forming subject." 
Organization 20, no. 6 (2013): 904-923.
Smith, Carole. "The sovereign state v Foucault: law and disciplinary power." The 
Sociological Review 48, no. 2 (2000): 283-306.
Smith, Peter K., and Craig H. Hart. Blackwell handbook of childhood social 
development. Oxford ; Malden, MA : Blackwell Publishing, 2002.
Soffer, Gail. "Phenomenologizing with a hammer: Theory or practice?." Continental 
philosophy review 32, no. 4 (1999): 379-393.
Solomon, Karen Olseth, and Lawrence W. Barsalou. "Representing properties locally." 
Cognitive psychology 43, no. 2 (2001): 129-169.
Stern, David. "Autonomy and Political Obligation in Kant."  The Southern Journal of 
Philosophy 29, no. 1 (1991): 127-147.
 250
Stich, Stephen, and Shaun Nichols. “Folk Psychology.” In Collected Papers, Volume 1 
Oxford University Press, 2011.
Stoilkovska, Aleksandra, Violeta Milenkovska, and Gordana Serafimovic. "The 
influence of family relations on decision making in family businesses." UTMS Journal 
of Economics 4, no. 1 (2013): 17-26.
Stoilova, Mariya, Sasha Roseneil, Julia Carter, Simon Duncan, and Miranda Phillips. 
"Constructions, reconstructions and deconstructions of ‘family’ amongst people who 
live apart together (LATs)." The British journal of sociology 68, no. 1 (2017): 78-96.
Sullivan, Roger J. "The Influence of Kant's Anthropology on His Moral Theory." The 
Review of Metaphysics 49, no. 1 (1995): 77-94.
Tabak, Mehmet. Dialectics of Human Nature in Marx's Philosophy. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012.
Tadros, Victor. "Between governance and discipline: The law and Michel Foucault." 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 18, no. 1 (1998): 75-103.
Titus, Sandra L., Paul C. Rosenblatt, and Roxanne M. Anderson. "Family conflict over 
inheritance of property." Family Coordinator (1979): 337-346.
Urry, John. "Social networks, travel and talk." The British journal of sociology 54, no. 2 
(2003): 155-175.
Van Mill, David. Liberty, Rationality, and Agency in Hobbes's Leviathan. Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2001.
de Vega, M. "Levels of embodied meaning. From pointing to counterfactuals.” In Vega, 
Manuel De., Glenberg, Arthur M, and Graesser, Arthur C. Symbols and Embodiment : 
Debates on Meaning and Cognition. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 
2008.
 251
Veitch, Scott. Law and Irresponsibility : On the Legitimation of Human Suffering. 1st 
ed. Abingdon, Oxon ; NewYork., NY: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007.
Vosniadou, Stella. "Analogical reasoning as a mechanism in knowledge acquisition: A 
developmental perspective.” In Vosniadou, Stella, and Andrew Ortony, eds. Similarity 
and analogical reasoning. Cambridge University Press, 1989: 413-437.
Waksler, Frances Chaput, ed. Studying the social worlds of children: Sociological 
readings. Routledge, 2003.
Walton, Jessica. "Feeling it: Understanding Korean adoptees’ experiences of 
embodied identity." Journal of Intercultural Studies 36, no. 4 (2015): 395-412.
Walton, P., A. Gamble, and J. Coulter. "Image of Man in Marx." Social Theory and 
Practice 1, no. 2 (1970): 69-84.
Wartenberg, Thomas E. ""Species-Being" and "Human Nature" in Marx."  Human 
Studies 5, no. 2 (1982): 77-95.
Websdale, Neil. "Disciplining the non‐disciplinary spaces, the rise of policing as an 
aspect of governmentality in 19th century Eugene, Oregon." Policing and Society: An 
International Journal 2, no. 2 (1991): 89-115.
Weinrib, Ernest J., ‘Liberty, community, and corrective justice.’ In Frey, R. G., and 
Morris, Christopher W. Liability and Responsibility : Essays in Law and Morals. 
Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991: 290-316.
Weinstock, Danielm. "Natural Law and Public Reason in Kant's Political 
Philosophy." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26, no. 3 (1996): 389-411.
Wellman, Henry M. Making Minds : How Theory of Mind Develops. Oxford Series in 
Cognitive Development. 2014.
Wilson, Margaret. "Six views of embodied cognition." Psychonomic bulletin & review 9, 
no. 4 (2002): 625-636.
 252
Wilson, Robin Fretwell, ed. Reconceiving the Family: Critique on the American Law 
Institute's Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution. Cambridge University Press, 
2006.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. Past Masters. Charlottesville, Va.: 
InteLex Corporation, 1998 
Wood, Mitchell J. "The gay male gaze: Body image disturbance and gender 
oppression among gay men." Journal of Gay & Lesbian Social Services 17, no. 2 
(2004): 43-62.
Wringe, Bill. "Rethinking expressive theories of punishment: why denunciation is a 
better bet than communication or pure expression." Philosophical Studies 174, no. 3 
(2017): 681-708.
Žižek, Slavoj. The Sublime Object of Ideology. Phronesis. London: Verso, 1989.
———. Enjoy Your Symptom! : Jacques Lacan in Hollywood and out. Routledge 
Classics. New York: Routledge, 2008. 
 253
